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Abstract	  	  My	   thesis	   presents	   a	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   analysis	   of	   the	   British	   ‘post-­‐2008	  context’,	  a	  conjuncture	  that	  I	  operationalise	  as	  the	  five-­‐year	  period	  following	  the	  financial	  crash	  of	  2007-­‐2008.	  I	  conceptualise	  economic	  crisis	  as	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  need	  for	  ‘decisive	  intervention’	  in	  response	  to	  economic	  policy	  failure.	  This	  constructivist	   conceptualisation	   asserts	   that	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   in	   response	   to	   crisis	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   way	   that	   policymakers	  ‘diagnose’	   economic	   symptoms,	   and	   the	   success	   with	   which	   they	   persuade	   the	  electorate	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   corresponding	   decisive	   interventions.	   Interpreting	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	   in	  this	  light,	   I	  operationalise	  and	  empirically	   interrogate	  the	   ‘crisis	  diagnoses’	  and	   ‘crisis	  narratives’	  of	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments.	  	  	  My	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  informed	  by,	  and	  speaks	  to,	  two	  principal	  literatures.	  The	  first	   concerns	   neoliberalism	   and	   ‘neoliberalisation’.	   The	   second	   analyses	   the	  emergence	  and	  subsequent	  failure	  of	  a	  fragile	  and	  contradictory	  ‘growth	  model’	  in	  Britain,	   viewing	   this	   as	   an	   unanticipated	   consequence	   of	   neoliberal	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   My	   analysis	   indicates	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   contested	  process	   of	   crisis	   construction	   than	   the	   predominant	   focus	   on	   macroeconomic	  policy	   leads	   us	   to	   believe.	   I	   present	   evidence	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   two	   crisis	  diagnoses	  existing	  simultaneously	  in	  government	  –	  one	  neoliberal,	  one	  not	  –	  on	  the	  part	  of	  macroeconomic	  and	  industrial	  policymakers	  respectively.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  reflects	  the	  impact	  of	  departmental	  boundaries	  on	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis.	  I	  find	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  decisive	  interventions	  to	  which	  it	  points	  to	   be	   the	   predominant	   one,	   reflected	   in	   the	   constrained	   resources	   given	   over	   to	  post-­‐2008	  industrial	  policy	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  defence	  of	  neoliberalisation	  in	  post-­‐2008	   crisis	   narratives.	   Yet	   I	   argue	   that,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   latter	   literature,	   my	  findings	  point	   to	   the	  potential	   for	   contingency	  and	  categorical	  political-­‐economic	  change	  in	  the	  present	  conjuncture.	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  A	  Note	  On	  The	  Referencing	  System	  	  I	  use	  a	  referencing	  system	  derived	  from	  the	  Department	  Of	  Politics’	  own	  footnote	  system.	   The	   system	   requires	   that	   a	   full	   bibliographic	   reference	   is	   given	   the	   first	  time	   that	   a	   piece	   is	   cited	   and	   that	   an	   abbreviated	   form	   is	   used	   on	   subsequent	  citations.	  If	  the	  citation	  refers	  to	  a	  quotation	  then	  the	  page	  number	  containing	  the	  quote	  is	  given	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  citation.	  	  However,	   there	   are	   a	  number	  of	   lengthy	   footnotes	   in	  my	   thesis.	   I	   found	   that	   the	  referencing	  system	  as	  it	  stood	  tended	  to	  produce	  footnotes	  that	  were	  very	  difficult	  to	  scan,	  and	  in	  which	  it	  was	  unclear	  where	  one	  citation	  stopped	  and	  another	  began.	  In	  order	   to	  be	  kind	  to	  my	  readers	   I	  have	  modified	   the	  referencing	  system	  in	   two	  ways:	   authors’	   names	   and	   dates	   of	   publication	   are	   brought	   together	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  citation,	  and	  both	  are	  underlined.	  Doing	  so	  makes	  it	  clear	  where	  each	   citation	   begins,	   and	   allows	   the	   reader	   to	   quickly	   ascertain	  where	   the	   piece	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  bibliography.	  	  I	  cite	  several	  documents	  produced	  by	  government	  departments	  with	  quite	  lengthy	  names.	  Again,	  these	  tended	  to	  produce	  footnotes	  that	  were	  difficult	  to	  scan.	  When	  citing	  these	  I	  have	  given	  the	  full	  name	  of	  the	  department	  on	  the	  first	  citation,	  and	  subsequently	   refer	   to	   them	   by	   an	   abbreviation	   or	   an	   acronym.	   ‘H.M.	   Treasury’	  becomes	   ‘Treasury’;	   ‘Department	   For	   Business,	   Innovation	   And	   Skills’	   becomes	  ‘DBIS’;	  Department	  For	  Communities	  And	  Local	  Government’	  becomes	  ‘DCLG’,	  etc	  etc.	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Acronyms	  	  	  ABW	   	   Asset-­‐Based	  Welfare	  ALGM	   	   Anglo-­‐Liberal	  Growth	  Model	  AMSCI	  	   Advanced	  Manufacturing	  Supply	  Chain	  Initiative	  COLA	   	   Cost	  Of	  Living-­‐Adjusted	  CSDP	   	   Critical	  Social	  Democratic	  Perspective	  DBERR	   Department	  Of	  Business,	  Enterprise	  And	  Regulatory	  Reform	  DBIS	   	   Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  DCLG	   	   Department	  For	  Communities	  And	  Local	  Government	  DTI	   	   Department	  Of	  Trade	  And	  Industry	  ECF	   	   Enterprise	  Capital	  Funds	  ECGD	  	   	   Export	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  Guarantee	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  EFCT	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  EFG	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   Foreign	  Direct	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   Funding	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   Financial	  Policy	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  FSA	   	   Financial	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  Systemically	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   Home	  Equity	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  To	  Buy	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   Non-­‐Accelerating	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  Of	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  NLGS	   	   National	  Loan	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  R&D	   	   Research	  And	  Development	  RDA	   	   Regional	  Development	  Agencies	  RGF	   	   Regional	  Growth	  Fund	  SME	   	   Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises	  TIC	   	   Technology	  And	  Innovation	  Centre	  TSB	   	   Technology	  Strategy	  Board	  UKEF	   	   UK	  Export	  Finance	  UKFI	   	   UK	  Financial	  Investments	  Ltd.	  UKTI	   	   UK	  Trade	  And	  Investment
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   3	  
Introduction	  
	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  examine	  political-­‐economic	  ideas,	  analyses	  and	  narratives	  that	  have	  shaped	   economic	   policy	   and	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   in	  Britain	  in	  the	  five	  years	  between	  September	  2008	  and	  the	  end	  of	  2013.	  1	  I	  refer	  to	  this	   period	   as	   the	   ‘post-­‐2008	   context’	   –	   an	   ongoing	   conjuncture	   marked	   by	   the	  failure	   of	   Britain’s	   problematic	   pre-­‐2007-­‐2008	   ‘growth	   model’	   amid	   the	  international	   economic	   conditions	   that	   have	   followed	   the	   financial	   instability	   of	  2007	   and	  2008.	   I	  make	   this	   analysis	   in	   order	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   interpretation	  and	  explanation	  of	  the	  trajectory	  of	  British	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  and	  to	  understand	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  process	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	   that	   was	   previously	   occurring	   in	   Britain.	   I	   do	   so	   from	   a	  ‘constructivist	   institutionalist’	   perspective	   that	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	  ‘neoliberal	   ideas’	   to	   that	  process,	  and,	  more	  generally,	   the	   importance	  of	   ideas	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  When	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘restructuring’	  of	  a	  political	  economy	  I	  mean	  the	  transformation	  of	  its	  institutional	  structure,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  present	  study	  I	  use	  it	  to	  refer	  specifically	  to	  the	  purposeful	  but	  contextually	  constrained	  attempts	  by	  policymakers	  to	  impart	  a	  particular	  trajectory	  of	  restructuring	  to	  the	  political	  economy.	  By	  a	  ‘trajectory’	  I	  mean,	  firstly,	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  a	  political	  economy	  is	  being	  restructured	  relative	  to	  other	  political	  economies	  in	  other	  places	  and	  times,	  and	  the	  contrasting	  kinds	  and	  configurations	  of	  institutions	  that	  emerge	  from	  these	  differing	  directions.	  My	  argument	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  view	  that	  from	  1979	  until	  at	  least	  2008	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economic	  restructuring	  can	  be	  broadly	  characterised	  as	  one	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  –	  of	  ‘neoliberalisation’.	  Secondly,	  the	  ‘trajectory’	  metaphor	  implies	  a	  velocity	  as	  well	  as	  a	  direction	  of	  travel.	  The	  speed,	  intensity	  and	  precise	  form	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  has	  varied	  in	  Britain	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time,	  marking	  a	  qualitative	  difference	  in	  the	  form	  that	  restructuring	  has	  taken.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  latter	  point	  in	  Section	  2	  of	  this	  introduction	  and	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
	  4	  
shaping	  the	  trajectories	  of	  political	  economies.2	  I	  ask	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  poorly	  performing	   (and	   at	   times	   catastrophically	   failing)	   economic	   indicators	   that	  characterise	  the	  British	  post-­‐2008	  context	  have	  been	  understood	  and	  represented	  by	   the	   two	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   as	   indicative	   of	   ‘crisis’	   and	   the	   need	   to	  ‘decisively	  intervene’	  in	  ways	  that	  impact	  upon	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  	  The	  first	  over-­‐arching	  question	  that	  I	  ask	   is	  whether	  or	  not	  the	   ideas	  that	   inform	  economic	  policymaking	  and	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  have	  changed	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	   context,	   and	  what	   the	   implications	  of	   changes	  or	   continuities	   in	   these	  ideas	  are	  for	  the	  terms	  with	  which	  we	  characterise	  the	  contemporary	  trajectory	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economic	  restructuring.	  This	  part	  of	  my	  research	  concerns	  the	  ideas	  that	  policymakers	  have	  about	   the	  context	   that	   they	  govern	   in,	   the	  way	  that	  they	   conceptualise	   the	   problems	   that	   economic	   policy	   addresses,	   and	   how	   they	  judge	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  policies	  with	  which	  they	  address	  them.	  Yet	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  ideas	  impact	  upon	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political	  economies	  from	  the	  perspective	   I	   adopt.	   A	   second	   impact	   arises	   from	   the	   use	   of	   ideas,	   woven	   into	  persuasive	  narratives,	  as	  ‘weapons’	  of	  political	  struggle,	  deployed	  to	  influence	  the	  perceptions	  that	  other	  actors	  have	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  context	  and	  so	  secure	  their	   consent	   for	   policies	   that	   they	   might	   not	   otherwise	   have	   supported.3	   My	  second	   overarching	   question	   relates	   to	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   ideas	   upon	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   I	   ask	   how	   politicians	   have	   sought	   to	   represent	  the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   to	   the	   electorate	   so	   as	   to	   legitimise	   the	   dramatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘constructivist	  institutionalism’	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  institutionalist	  approaches	  that	  situate	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  in,	  and	  study	  the	  effects	  of,	  an	  ideational/discursive	  context	  as	  well	  as	  an	  institutional	  one.	  Such	  approaches	  have	  been	  given	  a	  variety	  of	  names,	  including	  ‘ideational	  institutionalism’	  and,	  more	  recently,	  ‘discursive	  institutionalism’.	  Cf.	  C.	  Hay	  (2001),	  'The	  'Crisis'	  Of	  Keynesianism	  And	  The	  Rise	  Of	  Neoliberalism	  In	  Britain:	  An	  Ideational	  Institutionalist	  Approach',	  in	  J.L.	  Campbell	  and	  O.K.	  Pedersen	  (eds.),	  The	  Rise	  Of	  Neoliberalism	  And	  Institutional	  Analysis	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press),	  193-­‐218;	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  'Discursive	  Institutionalism:	  The	  Explanatory	  Power	  Of	  Ideas	  And	  Discourse',	  Political	  Science,	  11	  (1),	  pp.303-­‐26;	  M.	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations:	  Economic	  Ideas	  And	  Political	  Change	  In	  The	  Twentieth	  
Century	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press).	  I	  retain	  the	  heading	  of	  ‘constructivist	  institutionalism’	  over	  ‘discursive	  institutionalism’	  in	  order	  to	  give	  prominence	  to	  the	  perspective’s	  origins	  in	  the	  more	  general	  constructivist	  critique	  of	  political	  analysis,	  on	  which	  see	  C.	  Hay	  (2011b),	  'Ideas	  And	  The	  Construction	  of	  Interests',	  in	  D.	  Béland	  and	  R.H.	  Cox	  (eds.),	  Ideas	  and	  Politics	  in	  Social	  Science	  Research	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.90-­‐114.	  3	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	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interventions	  that	  they	  have	  undertaken	  when	  attempting	  to	  stabilise	  and	  restore	  economic	  growth	  to	  the	  British	  economy	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  The	  terms	  I	  use	  to	  denote	  the	  two	  processes	  to	  which	  these	  two	  over-­‐arching	  questions	  refer	  are	  ‘crisis	  diagnosis’,	  and	  ‘crisis	  narration’	  respectively.	  Together,	  these	  constitute	  the	  more	  general	  concept	  of	  ‘crisis	  construction’.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘crisis’	  is	  central	  to	  the	  debates	  that	  surround	  these	  questions.	  Claims	  of	  crisis	  have	  featured	  large	  in	  public	  debate	  since	  2008:	  a	  ‘banking	  crisis’,	  a	  ‘debt	  crisis’	   and	   a	   ‘growth	   crisis’,	   to	   name	   but	   a	   few.	   Crisis,	   understood	   here	   as	   a	  ‘moment	   of	   decisive	   intervention’,	   is	   also	   central	   to	   the	   academic	   literatures	   on	  constructivist	   institutionalism	   and	   on	   neoliberalism.4	   For	   those	   conceptualising	  and	   charting	   the	   history	   of	   neoliberalism,	   the	   ideas	   and	   practices	   to	   which	   the	  concept	  refers	  are	  both	   the	  cause	  and	   ‘creature’	  of	  economic	  crises.5	  Historically,	  advocates	  of	  neoliberalisation	  have	  seized	  upon	  moments	  of	  crisis	  to	  acquire	  state	  power	   and	   implement	   neoliberalisation	   strategies,	   beginning	   in	   Britain	  with	   the	  coming	   to	   power	   of	   the	   Thatcher	   Governments	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	  troubled	   economic	   context	   of	   the	   late	   1970s.	   During	   neoliberalism’s	   inglorious	  career	  as	  the	  principal	  mode	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  in	  the	  British	  and	  international	   political	   economies	  many	   economic	   crises	   have	   been	   attributed	   to	  the	   dynamics	   that	   it	   has	   unleashed.6	   Yet	   a	   consistent	   regularity	   associated	  with	  crisis	   tendencies	   of	   ‘neoliberal	   capitalism’	   is	   that	   they	   have	   functioned	   to	  accelerate	  the	  process	  of	  neoliberalisation,	  or	  to	  bring	  it	   into	  national	  contexts	   in	  which	  it	  was	  previously	  less	  established.	  	  For	  constructivist	   institutionalists,	  neoliberalism	   is	  manifest	  primarily	  as	  a	  set	  of	  ideas	   and	   corresponding	   practices	   that	   constitute	   the	   objectives	   of	   economic	  policymaking	   by	   specifying	   to	   policymakers	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   problems	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  C.	  Hay	  (1999a),	  Crisis	  And	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  Of	  The	  State:	  Interrogating	  The	  Process	  Of	  Change',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  1	  (3),	  pp.317-­‐44.	  This	  definition	  of	  crisis	  is	  expanded	  on	  at	  length	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3.	  5	  J.	  Peck	  and	  A.	  Tickell	  (2007),	  'Conceptualizing	  Neoliberalism,	  Thinking	  Thatcherism',	  in	  H.	  Leitner,	  J.	  Peck,	  and	  E.	  Sheppard	  (eds.),	  Contesting	  Neoliberalism:	  Urban	  Frontiers	  (New	  York:	  The	  Guilford	  Press),	  pp.26-­‐50.	  6	  J.	  Peck	  and	  A.	  Tickell	  (2002),	  'Neoliberalizing	  Space',	  Antipode,	  34	  (3),	  pp.380-­‐404.	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various	  aspects	  of	  public	  policy	  must	  address.7	  In	  this	  perspective	  the	  turn	  towards	  neoliberalisation	  since	  1979	  reflects	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  ‘neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos’	   by	   dominant	   factions	   within	   British	   governments	   since	   1979.	   The	  importance	  of	  crisis	  to	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  perspective	  is	  that	  crises,	  and	   the	   deterioration	   of	   economic	   circumstances	   from	   which	   they	   invariably	  emerge,	   are	   moments	   in	   which	   the	   ideas	   that	   structure	   economic	   policymaking	  and	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   can	   undergo	   rapid	   change.8	   In	   such	  situations,	   both	   the	   faith	   of	   policymakers	   in	   existing	   ideas	   about	   the	   conduct	   of	  policy	   and	   the	   patience	   of	   the	   electorate	   with	   existing	   policies	   are	   tested.	  Policymakers	  (or	  their	  rivals	  in	  opposition	  parties)	  can	  dramatically	  re-­‐assess	  the	  way	   in	   which	   they	   conceptualise	   and	   approach	   economic	   policymaking	   in	   such	  circumstances,	   coming	   to	   perceive	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   crisis	   requiring	   ‘decisive	  intervention’	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	   new	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	  The	   legitimacy	  with	  which	   the	   electorate	   invests	   old	   or	   new	  modes	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   can	   also	   change.	   Both	   the	   ideas	   of	   policymakers	   and	   the	  public,	   and	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   they	   are	   formed	   and	   changed,	   are	  consequently	  considered	  decisive	   factors	   in	   shaping	   the	  subsequent	   trajectory	  of	  political	   economies	   at	   times	   of	   crisis	   from	   a	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  perspective.	   Neoliberalism	   itself	   is	   seen	   to	   have	   achieved	   its	   ascent	   in	   Britain	  through	  such	  a	  process,	  having	   re-­‐constituted	   the	  political-­‐economic	  project	   that	  the	  Conservative	  leadership	  sought	  to	  undertake	  in	  the	  troubled	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Through	  a	  successful	  politicisation	  of	  the	  episode	  now	  remembered	  as	   the	   ‘Winter	   of	   Discontent’,	   the	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos	  was	   brought	   to	  state	   power,	   and	   with	   its	   subsequent	   permeation	   of	   opposition	   parties	   it	   has	  remained	  there	  ever	  since.	  	  It	  is	  from	  this	  perspective	  that	  the	  two	  overarching	  questions	  asked	  in	  my	  research	  arise.	   The	   post-­‐2008	   context	   has	   been	   a	   protracted	   period	   of	   poor	   economic	  performance	   across	   many	   indicators.	   Among	   the	   most	   memorable	   is	   the	  international	   banking	   system	   collapse	   of	   2007-­‐08,	   of	   which	   British	   banks	   were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  C.	  Hay	  (2004a),	  'The	  Normalizing	  Role	  Of	  Rationalist	  Assumptions	  In	  The	  Institutional	  Embedding	  Of	  Neoliberalism',	  Economy	  And	  Society,	  33	  (4),	  pp.500-­‐27;	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2014),	  'Speaking	  To	  The	  Markets	  Or	  To	  The	  People?	  A	  Discursive	  Institutionalist	  Analysis	  Of	  The	  EU's	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Crisis',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  
Relations,	  16	  (1),	  pp.188-­‐209.	  8	  A	  review	  of	  this	  perspective,	  and	  of	  this	  claim	  in	  particular,	  is	  offered	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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major	   casualties.	   The	   sharp	   recession	   that	   this	   gave	   rise	   to	   led	   to	   a	   protracted	  period	   of	   stagnation	   in	   which	   unemployment	   has	   been	   consistently	   higher	   than	  prior	   to	   the	  recession	   (although	  well	  below	  the	   levels	   reached	  during	   the	  1990s’	  recession)	   and	   in	   which	   real	   wages	   have	   been	   subject	   to	   a	   historically	  exceptionally	  prolonged	  contraction.9	  As	  I	  show	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  a	  strong	  case	  can	  be	  made	   linking	   these	   economic	   performance	   failures	   to	   prominent	   aspects	   of	   the	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economy,	  including	  (but	  not	  limited	  to)	   the	   rise	   to	   central	   economic	   importance	  of	   a	  permissively	   regulated	   financial	  services	   industry.	   It	   is	   consequently	   an	   opportune	   moment	   in	   which	   to	   ask	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  experience	  of	  these	  economic	  ‘pathologies’	  has	  caused	  either	  of	  the	   governments	   that	   have	   held	   power	   amid	   them	   to	   diagnose	   a	   crisis	   of	  neoliberalism	   and	   re-­‐assess	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   conceptualise	   the	   goals	   and	  purposes	  of	  economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring,	  or	  whether	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  in	  Britain	  is	  another	  moment	  in	  which	  neoliberalism	  has	  arisen	  unscathed	  and	  rejuvenated	  from	  a	  crisis	  in	  which	  it	  is	  itself	  implicated.	  Moreover,	  the	   impact	   on	   the	   general	   public	   of	   both	   the	   deterioration	   of	   economic	  circumstances	  and	  the	  policies	  with	  which	  governments	  have	  responded	  to	  these	  conditions	  means	  that	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  an	  opportune	  moment	  in	  which	  to	  ask	   how	   politicians	   are	   seeking	   to	  maintain	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   in	   the	   troubled	   economic	   context,	   especially	  where	   they	  defend	   an	  implicated	  form	  of	  political-­‐economic	  governance.	  Both	  questions	  are	  instrumental	  in	   understanding	   the	   future	   trajectory	   of	   the	   British	   political	   economy	   from	   a	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   perspective,	   for	   they	   relate	   to	   the	   conditions	   by	  which	   restructuring	   trajectories	   are	   established,	   thwarted,	   or	   shaped	   in	  unanticipated	  ways	  by	  forces	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  policymakers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  These	  claims	  are	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  (ONS).	  Readily	  viewable	  and	  frequently	  updated	  sources	  for	  ONS	  employment	  and	  growth	  data	  covering	  the	  period	  that	  my	  analysis	  concerns	  are	  available	  from	  the	  BBC’s	  ‘Economy	  Tracker’	  website,	  see	  British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  (2014a),	  ‘Economy	  Tracker',	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10612209>,	  accessed	  12/11/2014.	  A	  plotting	  of	  ONS	  average	  weekly	  earnings	  data	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  measures	  of	  inflation	  has	  recently	  been	  produced	  by	  the	  Resolution	  Foundation,	  see	  Resolution	  Foundation	  (2014),	  'Tentative	  Signs	  That	  Wages	  Are	  Starting	  To	  Turn	  A	  Corner',	  <http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/press-­‐releases/tentative-­‐signs-­‐that-­‐wages-­‐are-­‐starting-­‐to-­‐turn-­‐a-­‐corner/>,	  accessed	  13/11/2014.	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  contraction	  in	  wages	  is	  historically	  exceptional	  is	  based	  on	  research	  by	  the	  TUC	  based	  on	  historical	  data	  produced	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  see	  Trades	  Union	  Congress	  (2014),	  'UK	  Workers	  Suffering	  The	  Most	  Severe	  Squeeze	  In	  Real	  Earnings	  Since	  Victorian	  Times',	  <http://www.tuc.org.uk/economic-­‐issues/labour-­‐market-­‐and-­‐economic-­‐reports/economic-­‐analysis/britain-­‐needs-­‐pay-­‐rise/uk>,	  accessed	  13/10/2014.	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  The	   findings	   that	   I	   report	   here	   suggest,	   in	   answer	   to	   the	   first	   question,	   a	   more	  complex	  and	  nuanced	  outcome	  than	  either	  a	  rejection	  or	  a	   triumph	  of	  neoliberal	  ideas	   among	   policymakers.	   In	   Chapters	   5	   and	   6	   I	   make	   a	   case	   that	   post-­‐2008	  economic	   policies	   and	   institutional	   reforms	   reflect	   two	   subtly	   different	   ‘crisis	  diagnoses’	  which	  have	  been	  made	  by	  different	  government	  departments,	  and	  that	  the	  same	  conclusion	  applies	  to	  both	  governments	  that	  have	  held	  power	  since	  2008.	  A	   distinction	   is	   found	   between	   the	   ideas	   that	   I	   argue	   to	   be	   informing	  macroeconomic	   and	   industrial	   policies	   of	   both	   governments,	   with	   the	   former	  pointing	   towards	   an	   accelerated	   and	   intensified	   trajectory	   of	   neoliberal	  restructuring	   while	   the	   latter	   has	   developed	   tentatively	   (perhaps	   abortively)	   in	  ways	   that	   are	   not	   classifiably	   neoliberal.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	  diagnosis	   has	   been	  more	   contested	   than	   is	   commonly	   suggested.	  Whilst	   not	   yet	  amounting	  to	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	  neoliberalism,	  this	  second	  crisis	  diagnosis	  does	  call	  into	  question	  some	  fundamental	  ideas	  on	  which	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  is	   premised	   and	   consequently	   sanctions	   a	   nascent	   form	   of	   non-­‐neoliberal	  restructuring	  that	  would	  be	  a	  ‘decisive’	  form	  of	  change	  were	  it	  given	  full	  practical	  expression.	  Yet	  the	  ongoing	  constraints	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  on	  the	  budgets	  of	  industrial	  policymakers	  means	   that	   the	  realisation	  of	   ‘decisive	   intervention’	   in	   this	  sense	   is	  yet	  to	  be	  obtained.	  	  In	   answer	   to	   the	   second	   question	   I	   find	   that	   it	   is	   primarily	   the	   neoliberal	  macroeconomic	  policies	  of	  post-­‐2008	  governments	   that	  have	  been	   the	  subject	  of	  crisis	   narration	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   and	   consequently	   that	   politicians	   have	  found	   it	   necessary	   to	   defend	   and	   legitimise	   neoliberal	   restructuring.	   Unpacking	  these	  crisis	  narratives,	  I	  show	  how	  politicians	  have	  sought	  to	  obtain	  a	  persuasive	  effect	  by	  adopting	  a	  range	  of	  rhetorical	  strategies	  to	  mobilise	  the	  public	  in	  support	  of	  post-­‐2008	  restructuring	  even	  as	  these	  reforms	  have	  increased	  pressures	  on	  the	  incomes	   of	   much	   of	   the	   population.	   It	   falls	   to	   future	   research	   to	   ascertain	   how	  successful	  these	  strategies	  have	  been	  in	  securing	  support.	  However	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  political	  party	  advocating	  a	  different	  crisis	  diagnosis	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  taking	  government,	  or	  a	  sustained	  extra-­‐parliamentary	  mobilisation	  against	  such	  reforms,	  I	  conclude	  that	  successful	  or	  not,	   the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  narrative	  processes	  have	  posed	  little	  threat	  to	  ongoing	  neoliberalisation	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	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  My	  over-­‐arching	  conclusion,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  not	  one	  in	  which	  new	  ideas	  about	  political	  economy	  –	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  crisis	  diagnoses	  or	  crisis	  narratives	  –	  have	  yet	  impacted	  decisively	  upon	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   in	   Britain,	   and	   that	   until	   such	   a	   time	   as	   they	   do	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  deterioration	  of	  economic	  circumstances	  since	  2008	  has	  acted	  to	  revive,	  accelerate	  and	   entrench	   a	   more	   aggressive	   form	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring.	   Yet	   my	  conclusion	   is	   a	   qualified	   one,	   for	   neoliberalism	   has	   not	   emerged	   from	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   unscathed	   or	   unchallenged,	   and	   nor	   are	   the	   underlying	   conditions	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  troubled	  post-­‐2008	  context	  (an	  unsustainable	  growth	  model	  replete	   with	   internal	   contradictions	   and	   external	   vulnerabilities)	   likely	   to	   be	  remedied	  by	  the	  further	  rounds	  of	  neoliberalisation	  now	  being	  undertaken.	  Whilst	  more	   akin	   to	   the	   early	  1970s	   than	   the	   late	  1970s	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  proximity	   of	   a	  categorical	   change	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring,	   the	  parallels	  between	  that	  moment	  and	  my	  own	  post-­‐2008	  case	  study	  may	  yet	  prove	  indicative	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  things	  to	  come.	  	  	  
1.	  
Neoliberalism	  	  The	   concepts	   of	   ‘neoliberalism’	   and	   ‘neoliberalisation’	   are	   central	   to	   my	  characterisation	  of	  the	  ideational	  and	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  the	  processes	  that	  my	  analysis	   interrogates	  have	  occurred.	  More	  generally,	   they	  are	  prominent	  concepts	   among	   critical	   approaches	   in	   political	   economy	   and	   have	   also	   gained	  prominence	   in	  public	  debate	  since	  2008.	  And	  yet	   in	  spite	  of	   (or	  perhaps	  because	  of)	   the	   increasing	   popular	   currency	   of	   the	   concept,	   some	   critics	   have	   called	   into	  question	   its	   utility.10	   There	   are	   good	   grounds	   to	   do	   so.	   Neoliberalism	   is	   almost	  invariably	  a	  ‘critic’s	  word’,	  although	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  can	  facilitate	  important	  critical	  insights	   if	   used	  with	   analytical	   rigor.	   A	  more	   pressing	   problem,	   however,	   is	   that	  neoliberalism	   is	   sometimes	   a	   ‘rascal	   concept’,	   invoked	   both	   promiscuously	   and	  incoherently	   to	   denote	   any	   aspect	   of	   contemporary	   capitalism	   that	   a	   critic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  C.	  Barnett	  (2005),	  'The	  Consolations	  Of	  'Neoliberalism'',	  Geoforum,	  36	  (1),	  pp.7-­‐12.	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disapproves	   of.11	   Yet	   I	   maintain	   that	   the	   concept	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   facilitate	  valuable	  analytical	  insights	  into	  the	  restructuring	  of	  capitalist	  economies	  over	  the	  past	   thirty-­‐five	   years	   if	   used	   with	   precision	   and	   rigor.	   For	   this	   purpose	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   begin	   by	   assembling	   a	   coherent	   conceptualisation	   of	   neoliberalism	  and	  the	  related	  process	  of	  neoliberalisation.	  	  	  Broadly	   speaking,	   ‘neoliberalism’	   refers	   to	   a	   market-­‐affirming	   view	   of	   the	  appropriate	  form	  of	  political	  economic	  governance,	  and	  a	  related	  form	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   that	  has	  been	   in	  evidence	   in	  national	  political	  economies	  and	   international	  economic	  governance	  since	  the	   late	  1970s.12	   	  More	  specifically,	  the	   term	   ‘neoliberal’	   can	   be	   used	   in	   reference	   to	   at	   least	   three	   (related)	  phenomena:	   the	   ideas	   and	   ideologies	   that	   provide	   the	   intellectual	   basis	   for	   such	  restructuring;	   the	   practices	   and	   policies	   through	   which	   such	   restructuring	   is	  pursued;	  and	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  relations,	  institutions	  and	  institutional	  forms	  (of	  states,	  sectors	  and	  whole	  political	  economies)	  that	  such	  restructuring	  brings	  about	  at	   the	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   levels.13	   Any	   such	   phenomena	   can	  meaningfully	   be	   categorised	   as	   neoliberal	   insofar	   as	   it	   conforms	   to	   a	   coherent	  conceptualisation	   of	   the	   concept	   and	   there	   need	   be	   no	   contradiction	   between	  accounts	   that	   focus	   on	   one	   aspect	   or	   analytical	   level	   over	   others.	   However	   in	  practice	   differing	   conceptualisations	   of	   neoliberalism	   have	   produced	   implicit	  dissensus	  among	  accounts	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  actually	  being	  studied.	  	  	  In	  a	  simple	  conceptualisation	  prevalent	  in	  public	  debate,	  neoliberalism	  is	  a	  (capital	  I)	  Ideology,	  an	  associated	  bundle	  of	  policies,	  and	  a	  type	  of	  state,	  standing	  alongside	  other	  Ideologies	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  such	  as	  ‘social	  democracy’	  that	  have	  their	  own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  N.	  Brenner,	  J.	  Peck	  and	  N.	  Theodore	  (2010),	  'Variegated	  Neoliberalisation:	  Geographies,	  Modalities,	  Pathways',	  Global	  Networks,	  10	  (2),	  pp.182-­‐222.	  12	  J.	  Peck	  (2010a),	  Constructions	  Of	  Neoliberal	  Reason	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press);	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’.	  13	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  'Neoliberalizing	  Space';	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010)	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’.	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associated	   signature	   policies	   and	   state	   forms.14	   In	   this	   view	   neoliberalism	   is	  identifiable	  by	   the	  presence	  of	   a	  package	  of	   reforms	   that	   the	   Ideology	   sanctions:	  namely	   privatisation,	   counter-­‐inflationary	   macroeconomic	   policy,	   product	   and	  financial	   market	   liberalisation,	   trade	   and	   capital	   account	   liberalisation,	   the	  disciplining	   of	   trade	   unions	   and	   reform	   of	   industrial	   relations,	   and	   the	  implementation	   of	  market	   and	  market-­‐like	   forms	   of	   governance	  where	   they	   had	  not	  been	  previously.15	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  reforms,	  or	  reforms	  that	  take	  a	  more	  complicated	  tack	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors,	  are	  held	  up	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   inapplicability	   of	   the	   term	   ‘neoliberal’	   to	   the	   party	   or	  government	  enacting	  them.16	  	  This	  conceptualisation	  has	  the	  virtue	  of	  clarity,	  allowing	  us	  to	  characterise	  polities	  and	  ideas	  as	  being	  either	  ‘neoliberal’,	  ‘non-­‐neoliberal’,	  or	  perhaps	  ‘post-­‐neoliberal’.	  Yet	   it	   confronts	   at	   least	   two	   problems.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   it	   tells	   us	   little	   of	   the	  substance	   of	   the	   process	   of	   ‘neoliberalisation’	   (the	   process	   by	   which	   political-­‐economies	   become	   neoliberal),	   particularly	   the	   political	   struggles	   and	   (small	   i)	  ideological	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  traumatic	  and	  highly	  contested	  transformations	  that	  the	  concept	  denotes	  have	  been	  achieved	  in	  countries	  of	  the	  core	  and	  periphery	  of	  the	  international	  economy.17	  More	  seriously	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  typological	  potential,	  this	  perspective	  confronts	  the	  problem	  of	  ‘actually	  existing	  neoliberalism’:	  the	  fact	  that	  wherever	  processes	  of	  neoliberalisation	  are	  pointed	  to	  they	   invariably	  differ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  I	  draw	  a	  distinction	  in	  this	  thesis	  between	  ‘Ideology’	  (with	  a	  capital	  ‘I’)	  and	  ‘ideology’	  (with	  a	  small	  ‘i’).	  The	  distinction	  reflects	  the	  differing	  emphases	  in	  the	  phenomena	  to	  which	  the	  term	  is	  commonly	  applied.	  While	  all	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  refer	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  ideas	  on	  political	  processes,	  for	  many	  analysts	  and	  popular	  users	  the	  term	  is	  simply	  a	  shorthand	  for	  the	  normative	  and	  technical	  ideas	  that	  political	  parties	  endorse	  and	  to	  which	  their	  members	  and/or	  politicians	  are	  assumed	  to	  subscribe	  (at	  least	  to	  some	  extent).	  Examples	  of	  capital	  I	  Ideologies	  that	  have	  been	  analysed	  in	  the	  British	  context	  are	  socialism,	  social	  democracy,	  liberalism	  and	  conservatism.	  Small	  ‘i’	  ideology	  is	  a	  more	  nuanced	  concept	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  critical	  social	  scientific	  literatures.	  Here	  ideology	  refers	  to	  the	  functioning	  (deliberate	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  ideas	  for	  a	  particular	  end	  –	  the	  ‘naturalisation’	  of	  otherwise	  contestable	  social	  relationships	  (such	  as	  the	  relationships	  between	  employees	  and	  employers,	  or	  the	  distributional	  outcomes	  of	  a	  particular	  political-­‐economic	  structure	  for	  social	  groups	  and	  classes.	  On	  this	  and	  other	  distinctions	  in	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  ideology,	  see	  T.	  Eagleton	  (2007),	  Ideology:	  An	  Introduction	  (London:	  Verso).	  	  15	  W.	  Larner	  (2000),	  'Neoliberalism:	  Policy,	  Ideology,	  Governmentality',	  Studies	  in	  Political	  
Economy,	  63,	  pp.5-­‐25.	  16	  This,	  for	  instance,	  is	  the	  strategy	  taken	  by	  S.	  Buckler	  and	  D.P.	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?	  New	  Labour,	  Social	  Liberalism	  And	  British	  Economic	  Policy',	  New	  Political	  
Economy,	  9	  (1),	  pp.23-­‐38.	  17	  Larner	  (2000),	  ‘Neoliberalism:	  Policy,	  Ideology’.	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in	   the	   details	   of	   ideas,	   (small	   or	   capital	   ‘I’)	   ideologies,	   policies,	   and	   modes	   of	  restructuring,	   and	  are	  unevenly	   implemented	  within	  and	  between	  polities.18	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  thus	  constituted	  captures	  only	  a	  small	  section,	  if	  any,	  of	  the	  vast	  array	  of	  things	  to	  which	  the	  term	  ‘neoliberal’	  might	  be	  meaningfully	  and	  usefully	  attached,	  and	  excludes	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  phenomena	  that	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  capture.	  More	  sophisticated	  academic	  conceptualisations	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  which	  the	   concept	   refers	   to	   specific	   ideational	   or	   regime	   categories	   encounter	   similar	  difficulties	   by	   attempting	   to	   identify	   neoliberalism	   ahistorically	   through	   the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  particular	  ideas,	  practices	  or	  institutional	  forms.19	  	  	  Yet	  the	  diversity	  of	  ‘actually	  existing	  neoliberalism’	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  good	  grounds	  to	  reject	   the	   utility	   of	   the	   concept	   outright	   if	   it	   is	   accepted	   that	   there	   are	   relevant	  historical	   and	   geographical	   relationships	   between	   these	   national	   and	   local	  variants.	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  both	  greater	  abstraction	  and	  greater	  specificity	  than	  a	  monolithic	  conception	  can	  provide	  –	  a	  conceptualisation	  able	  to	  hold	  purchase	  on	  nationally	   and	   locally-­‐specific	   processes	   of	   neoliberalisation	   and	   their	   outcomes	  whilst	  also	  retaining	  purchase	  on	  the	  historical	  and	  geographical	  linkages	  between	  them	  and	  the	  ‘family	  resemblances’	  that	  render	  them	  categorically	  related.	  	  	  Here	  the	  work	  of	  Peck,	  Tickell,	  Brenner	  and	  Theodore	  is	  particularly	  insightful.	  In	  the	   perspective	   that	   they	   expound,	   neoliberalism	   is	   an	   evolving	   and	   travelling	  ‘restructuring	   ethos’	   rather	   than	   a	   monolithic	   phenomenon.20	   Particular	  ‘neoliberalisms’	  do,	  however,	  contain	  common	  historical	  links,	  geographical	  inter-­‐linkages,	   and	   over-­‐arching	   commonalities	   in	   ideational	   and	   practical	   substance	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  across	  time	  and	  space	  that	  render	  them	  categorically	  related.	  The	  ‘restructuring	  ethos’	  refers	  to	  these	  commonalities	  and	  interlinkages.	  It	  takes	  the	   form	   of	   a	   historically	   specific,	   unevenly	   developed,	   hybrid,	   and	   patterned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  ‘Neoliberalizing	  Space’;	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010),	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’.	  19	  Examples	  include	  Hay	  (2004a),	  ‘The	  Normalizing	  Role’;	  J.L.	  Campbell	  and	  O.K.	  Pedersen	  (2001),	  'Introduction',	  in	  J.L.	  Campbell	  and	  O.K.	  Pedersen	  (eds.),	  The	  Rise	  of	  Neoliberalism	  
And	  Institutional	  Analysis	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐24.	  20	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  ‘Neoliberalizing	  Space’;	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’.	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tendency	   of	  market-­‐disciplinary	   regulatory	   restructuring.21	  More	   succinctly,	   it	   is	  the	   state-­‐facilitated	   extension	   of	   commodification,	   and	  market	   rule.22	   Among	   its	  hallmarks	   at	   the	   national	   level	   are	   the	   incorporation	   of	  market	   and	  market-­‐like	  forms	  of	  governance	  (that	   is,	  an	  expansion	  of	   the	  realm	  of	  private-­‐sector	  activity	  and	  market-­‐resource	  allocation	   relative	   to	   the	  public	   sector,	  or	   the	   simulation	  of	  such	   means	   of	   resource	   allocation	   within	   the	   public	   sector),	   a	   critical	   stance	  towards	  non-­‐market	   forms	  of	  association	  (specifically	  of	  a	  collectivist,	  statist	  and	  bureaucratic	   kind),	   and	   the	   subordination	   of	   other	   areas	   of	   policy	   to	   the	  imperative	   of	   creating	   or	   sustaining	   this	   regime	   of	   market	   rule.	   Ideationally,	   it	  follows	   that	   the	   restructuring	   ethos	   is	   comprised	   of	   those	   beliefs,	   analyses	   and	  normative	   arguments	   that	   assert	   the	   efficacy,	   necessity	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   such	  restructuring.	   The	   ‘policy	   package’	   outlined	   above	   constitutes	   some	   recurring	  means	  by	  which	  neoliberalisation	  has	  been	  pursued	  in	  different	  times	  and	  places,	  but	  to	  focus	  on	  them	  alone	  is	  to	  miss	  the	  tendency	  towards	  hybridity,	  incoherence	  and	  adaptive	  experimentation	  that	  is	  also	  a	  hallmark	  of	  neoliberalisation.	  	  	  As	  a	  historically	  specific	  phenomenon,	  the	  restructuring	  ethos	  has	  its	  early	  origins	  in	  the	  philosophers	  and	  economic	  thinkers	  who	  participated	  in	  or	  took	  inspiration	  form	   the	  Mont	  Pèlerin	  Society	   in	   the	  years	   following	   the	  Second	  World	  War.23	   It	  was	  honed	  into	  a	  series	  of	  familiar	  arguments	  by	  American	  and	  British	  think	  tanks	  in	   the	   mid-­‐20th	   century,	   initially	   as	   a	   diagnosis	   of	   crisis-­‐ridden	   domestic	   and	  international	  political	  economies	  of	  the	  1970s.24	  Adherents	  to	  this	  ‘second	  wave’	  of	  neoliberal	   thought	  deliberately	  sought	   to	  recruit	   those	   in	  positions	  of	  power	  and	  influence.25	  The	   ideas	  were	  taken	  up	  by	  centre-­‐right	  politicians	   in	  the	  US	  and	  UK	  (and,	   in	   an	   altogether	   less	   democratic	   process,	   Chile)	   as	   a	   diagnosis	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  J.	  Peck,	  N.	  Theodore,	  and	  N.	  Brenner	  (2012),	  'Neoliberalism	  Resurgent?	  Market	  Rule	  After	  The	  Great	  Recession',	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly,	  111	  (2),	  pp.265-­‐88.	  The	  term	  ‘regulatory’	  is	  being	  used	  here	  after	  the	  manner	  of	  the	  regulation	  approach,	  denoting	  extra-­‐economic	  institutional	  forms	  underpinning	  historically	  and	  spatially	  contingent	  forms	  of	  capitalist	  accumulation	  –	  so-­‐called	  ‘modes	  of	  regulation’.	  Although	  the	  vocabulary	  and	  precise	  research	  questions	  differ,	  there	  is	  an	  affinity	  between	  the	  regulation	  approach	  and	  the	  more	  general	  kind	  of	  institutionalist	  political	  economy	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1	  –	  both	  represent	  institutionalist	  forms	  of	  political	  economy.	  Consequently,	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  regulatory	  restructuring	  is	  consistent	  with	  my	  emphasis	  on	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  	  22	  Ibid;	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’.	  23	  Peck	  (2010a),	  Constructions	  Of	  Neoliberal.	  24	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’;	  Peck	  (2010a),	  Constructions	  Of	  
Neoliberal.	  25	  Ibid.	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economic	  malaise	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Following	  electoral	  success	   in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	   1980s	   they	   began	   the	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   of	   their	   national	   political	  economies	   and,	   in	   combination	   with	   institutions	   of	   international	   economic	  governance	   that	   shared	   their	   diagnoses,	   promoted	   similar	   reforms	   of	   other	  economies.	   Thereafter,	   it	   has	   been	   the	   dominant	   tendency	   in	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  within	  many	  countries,	  and	  of	  the	  international	  economy	  itself.	  	  These	  historical	  linkages,	  and	  general	  ideational	  and	  practical	  form,	  constitute	  the	  principal	  abstract	  components	  of	   the	  conceptualisation	  of	  neoliberalism,	  and	   it	   is	  from	   these	   components	   that	   the	   ‘family	   resemblance’	   of	   ‘actually	   existing	  neoliberalisms’	   can	   be	   identified	   and	   separated	   from	   phenomena	   to	   which	   the	  term	  does	  not	  apply.	  But	   the	  value	  of	   the	  concept	   thus	  defined	   lies	  principally	   in	  the	   analytical	   purchase	   that	   it	   can	   levy	   on	   changes	   occurring	   in	   specific	  contemporary	   political	   economies,	   which	   Peck	   and	   Tickell	   argue	   to	   have	   been	  shaped	   by	   the	   intended	   and	   unintended	   outcomes	   of	   the	   process	   of	  neoliberalisation	   –	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring.26	   Rather	   than	   a	   process	   of	  ‘convergence’	   on	   some	   archetypal	   neoliberal	   Ideology	   and	   state	   form,	  ‘neoliberalisation’	  refers	  to	  the	  international	  diffusion	  of	  the	  restructuring	  ethos	  by	  both	   consensual	   and	   coercive	  means,	   its	   adaptation	   to	   domestic	   ideological	   and	  institutional	  circumstances	  by	  national	  policymakers	  as	   it	   is	  applied	   in	  particular	  places,	   its	   further	   experimental	   adaptation	   in	   response	   to	   crises	   and	   societal	  resistance	   that	   have	   arisen	   from	   the	   dissembedding	   of	  market	   processes	   that	   it	  entails,	  and	  the	  diffusion	  of	  these	  local	  adaptations	  back	  to	  other	  localities.27	  New	  ideas	  have	  emerged	  in	  support	  of	  the	  broad	  terms	  of	  the	  restructuring	  ethos	  that	  were	   not	   deployed	   in	   the	   1970s	   –	   the	   ‘hyper-­‐globalisation	   thesis’,	   ‘the	   efficient	  market	  hypothesis’	  and	  ‘financial	  innovation’	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  The	  restructuring	  ethos	   and	   the	   political-­‐economic	   changes	   that	   it	   gives	   rise	   to	   are	   consequently	  neither	  static	  nor	  monolithic,	  but	  evolve	  across	  space	  and	  time.	  	  	  The	  conceptualisation	  of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  dynamic	  restructuring	  ethos	  allows	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  some	  of	  the	  insights	  of	  other	  prominent	  conceptualisations	  of	  neoliberalism	   from	   perspectives	   that	   are	   sometimes	   held	   to	   be	   opposed	   to	   one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  ‘Neoliberalizing	  Space’.	  	  27	  Ibid;	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010),	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’.	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another.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	   the	   neo-­‐Foucauldian	   literature	   on	   governmentality	  studies,	   in	  which	   neoliberalism	   is	   viewed	   as	   a	  mobile	   ‘technology	   of	   rule’.28	   The	  ‘technology’	  operates	  through	  attempts	  to	  reconstitute	  the	  subjectivities	  of	  citizens	  and	  actors	  by	  changing	  their	  institutional	  and	  discursive	  settings	  so	  that	  they	  are,	  at	   least	   in	   principle,	   ‘reconstituted’	   as	   idealised	   market	   subjects,	   bearing	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  welfare	  and	  affairs	  and	  attending	  to	  them	  according	  to	  a	   market	   logic	   in	   areas	   where	   the	   state	   institutions	   once	   exercised	   such	  responsibility.	  As	  Ong	  stresses,	  the	  neoliberal	  technology	  of	  rule	  is	  not	  deployed	  in	  isolation	   from	  existing	   ideas	   and	   institutions,	   and	   for	  her	   the	   result	   is	   an	   almost	  infinite	   variety	   of	   hybrid	   ‘assemblages’.29	   Ong	   is	   quite	   correct	   to	   mark	  neoliberalism’s	  tendency	  to	  hybridity	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  contexts,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   importance	  of	   ‘subject	  positioning’	   in	  neoliberalisation	  strategies	  (a	   theme	  to	  which	  I	  shall	  return	  in	  Chapter	  1).	  Yet	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  these	  is	  to	  miss	  the	  wider	  structural	   and	   historical	   contexts	   in	   which	   they	   occur,	   and	   the	   historical	   and	  geographical	  links	  stressed	  above.30	  	  	  A	  second	  and	  contrasting	  approach	  –	  ‘Historical	  Materialist	  International	  Political	  Economy’	  –	  conceptualises	  neoliberalism	  as	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  the	  post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	   international	   political	   economy	   and	   a	   worldwide	   regime	   for	   capitalist	  growth.31	  The	  regime	  is	  said	  to	  be	  politically	  reproduced	  by	  the	  ‘lock	  in’	  effects	  of	  liberalised,	  disembedded	  world	  markets	  (commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘globalisation’),	  and	   international	  organisations	  and	   institutions	  of	  economic	  governance,	  both	  of	  which	   serve	   to	   ‘discipline’	   nation	   states	   into	   capital-­‐friendly	   policies.	   Such	   an	  approach	   is	   useful	   in	  highlighting	   the	   international	   constraints	   on	   countries	   that	  would	  adopt	  a	  non-­‐neoliberal	  path	  and	  the	   institutional	  pressures	   that	  may	  exist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  A.	  Ong	  (2007),	  'Neoliberalism	  As	  A	  Mobile	  Technology',	  Transactions	  Of	  The	  Institute	  Of	  
British	  Geographers,	  32	  (1),	  pp.3-­‐8;	  W.	  	  Larner	  (2003),	  'Neoliberalism?',	  Environment	  And	  
Planning	  D:	  Society	  And	  Space,	  25	  (5),	  pp.509-­‐12;	  P.	  Langley	  (2007),	  'Uncertain	  Subjects	  Of	  Anglo-­‐American	  Financialisation',	  Cultural	  Critique,	  65	  (1),	  pp.67-­‐91.	  29	  Ong	  (2007),	  ‘Neoliberalism	  As	  A	  Mobile’.	  30	  As	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  note,	  the	  architects	  of	  this	  approach	  are	  epistemologically	  and	  methodologically	  committed	  to	  problematise	  the	  impact	  of	  structural	  and	  historical	  contexts.	  These	  commitments	  do	  not	  burden	  the	  present	  analysis.	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010),	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’.	  31	  J.	  Crotty	  (2000),	  'Structural	  Contradictions	  Of	  The	  Global	  Neoliberal	  Regime',	  Review	  of	  
Radical	  Political	  Economics,	  32	  (3),	  pp.361-­‐68;	  S.	  Gill	  (1995),	  'Globalisation,	  Market	  Civilisation	  And	  Disciplinary	  Neoliberalism',	  Millennium,	  24	  (3),	  pp.399–423;	  S.	  Gill	  (1998),	  'New	  Constitutionalism,	  Democratisation	  And	  Global	  Political	  Economy',	  Pacifica	  Review,	  10	  (1),	  pp.23-­‐38;	  For	  a	  critical	  overview	  of	  this	  literature	  see	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010),	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’.	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towards	   convergence	   in	   some	   areas	   of	   economic	   policy.	   It	   also	   underlines	   the	  rationality	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   international	  financial	  interests	  when	  restructuring	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  process	  impacting	  on	  a	  global	  system	  of	  accumulation	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  national	  economies	  and	  domestic	  capital.32	  Yet	  in	  situating	  analysis	  principally	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  this	  approach	   is	   less	   well	   equipped	   to	   account	   for	   the	   national	   and	   sub-­‐national	  processes	  through	  which	  market	  rule	  is	  extended	  or	  resisted,	  and	  so	  too	  confronts	  the	   problem	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   ‘actually	   existing	   neoliberalisms’.	   In	   the	  conceptualisation	   favoured	   here	   such	   processes	   are	   instrumental	   in	   explaining	  neoliberalism’s	  dynamics:	   the	  emergence	  and	  survival	  of	  neoliberalism	   following	  crises	  in	  which	  it	  is	  itself	  implicated.	  	  The	  essential	  hybridity	  of	   ‘actually	  existing	  neoliberalisms’	   is	  one	  of	   two	   insights	  arising	  from	  Peck	  and	  Tickell’s	  work	  that	  are	  of	  great	  relevance	  to	  my	  analysis.	  The	  restructuring	   ethos	   does	   not	   find	   ‘pure	   expression’,	   but	   exists	   in	   a	   complex	   and	  antagonistic	  relationship	   to	  pre-­‐existing	  and	  contrasting	   ideas	  and	   institutions	   in	  the	   contexts	   in	   which	   neoliberalisation	   unfolds.33	   These	   can	   be	   usefully	  characterised	  as	  neoliberalism’s	   ‘others’,	   and	   the	   ‘sediment’	   of	  previous	   forms	  of	  political-­‐economic	   structuring.34	   The	   existence	   of	   this	   sediment	   reflects	   the	   fact	  that	   neoliberalisation	   is	   a	   drawn-­‐out	   process	   of	   struggle	   in	   which	   battles	   for	  institutional	  change	  are	  fought	  against	  constituencies	  who	  favour	  the	  continuity	  of	  non-­‐neoliberal	   institutions,	   and	   in	   which	   priority	   is	   given	   by	   those	   enacting	  neoliberalisation	   to	   those	   strategies	   and	   confrontations	   that	   bring	   the	   greatest	  likelihood	  of	  success.	  Witness,	  for	  example,	  the	  caution	  and	  strategic	  foresight	  with	  which	   the	   Thatcher	   governments	   approached	   the	   reform	   of	   industrial	   relations,	  and	   the	   comparatively	   uneven	   penetration	   of	   private	   sector	   involvement	   in	   the	  National	   Health	   Service	   at	   the	   end	   of	   their	   terms	   compared	  with	   other	   areas	   of	  political-­‐economic	  life.	  	  	  Yet	   the	  relationship	  between	  neoliberalism	  and	   its	   institutional	  and	  (importantly	  for	   the	   present	   argument)	   ideational	   others	   is	   more	   complicated	   than	   that	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  A.	  Gamble	  (2001),	  'Neo-­‐liberalism',	  Capital	  and	  Class,	  25	  (3),	  pp.127-­‐34.	  33	  J.	  Peck,	  N.	  Theodore,	  and	  N.	  Brenner	  (2010),	  'Postneoliberalism	  And	  Its	  Malcontents',	  
Antipode,	  41	  (S1),	  pp.94-­‐116.	  34	  Brenner,	  Peck	  and	  Theodore	  (2010),	  ‘Variegated	  Neoliberalism’;	  Peck,	  Theodore	  and	  Brenner	  (2010)	  ‘Postneoliberalism	  And	  Its’.	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grudging	   and	   temporary	   co-­‐existence.	   Instead,	   it	   is	   something	   closer	   to	   a	  parasitical	   dependence.35	   Themes	   drawn	   from	   pre-­‐existing	   Ideologies	   allow	  neoliberal	   policymakers	   to	   give	   the	   restructuring	   ethos	   the	   normative	   scope	   it	  would	   otherwise	   lack	   as	   a	   comprehensive	   vision	   of	   governmental	   purpose,	   and	  thus	   facilitate	   the	  contestation	  of	  elections.	  The	  centre-­‐right	  political	  parties	   that	  first	   took	   neoliberalism	   to	   state	   power	   in	   the	   capitalist	   core	   combined	   it	   with	  traditional	   conservative	   themes	   of	   paternal	   responsibility,	   family,	   and	   national	  pride,	   renewal	   and	   borders	   –	   collectivist,	   conservative	   and	   nationalist	   concepts	  with	   which	   the	   ethos	   is	   arguably	   in	   stark	   tension.36	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   late	  1980s	   and	   early	   1990s	   many	   centre-­‐left	   political	   parties	   embraced	   the	  restructuring	  ethos	  and	  have	  adapted	  progressivist	  and	  social	  democratic	  concepts	  such	   as	   ‘social	   justice’	   and	   ‘community’	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   (at	   least	   nominally)	  compatible	  with	  the	  extension	  of	  commodification	  and	  market	  rule.	  In	  Chapter	  4	  I	  characterise	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  ‘New	  Labour’	  governments	  in	  neoliberal	  terms	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   insight,	   suggesting	   that	   discernible	   adaptations	   of	  rhetoric	   and	   policies	   associated	   with	   the	   Party’s	   ‘progressivist’	   and	   (more	  contestably)	   ‘social	   democratic’	   heritage	   do	   not	   in	   themselves	   count	   against	   the	  claim	  that	  these	  governments	  pursued	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  or	  were	  influenced	  by	  neoliberal	  ideas,	  but	  are	  more	  often	  evidence	  of	  precisely	  such	  an	  influence.	  	  A	   second	   important	   insight	   related	   to	   this	   last	   point	   concerns	   the	   relationship	  between	   neoliberalism,	   contradiction	   and	   crisis,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   impact	   of	  contradiction	   and	   crisis	   upon	   the	   form	   that	   neoliberalisation	   takes.	   A	   range	   of	  heterodox	  approaches	   to	  political	   economy,	   among	   them	  Marxist,	  Keynesian	  and	  Polanyian	  perspectives,	  give	  grounds	  for	  the	  view	  that	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  is	  likely	   to	  militate	   against	   the	   successful	   reproduction	   of	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	  medium	  term.	  What	  unites	  these	  approaches	  is	  the	  view	  that	  ‘disembedded’	  forms	  of	   capitalism	   are	   prone	   to	   endogenous	   contradictions	   and	   crises,	   as	   well	   as	   to	  crises	  of	   legitimacy	  that	  arise	  from	  their	  social	  externalities.	   In	  Peck	  and	  Tickell’s	  earlier	  work	  neoliberalisation	   itself	  was	  cast	  as	  a	  period	  of	   capitalist	   ‘jungle	   law’	  rife	  with	  contradictions,	  whose	   legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  policymakers	  and	  public	  would	  flounder	  on	  the	  economic	  performance	  failures	  and	  crises	  that	  it	  was	  likely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Peck,	  Theodore	  and	  Brenner	  (2012),	  'Neoliberalism	  Resurgent?’.	  36	  Gamble,	  A.	  (1988),	  The	  Politics	  Of	  Thatcherism:	  The	  Free	  Economy	  And	  The	  Strong	  State	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan).	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to	  unleash.37	  Certainly,	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  can	  be	  implicated	  in	  many	  national	  and	   international	   economic	   crises	   over	   the	   past	   35	   years	   (the	   first	   chapter	   shall	  explore	  such	  an	  argument	  in	  reference	  to	  Britain	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  2007-­‐08).	  Yet,	  confounding,	  neoliberalisation	  has	  also	  coincided	  with	  a	  period	  of	  strong	  economic	   growth	  both	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   in	   the	   global	   economy,	  whilst	   the	   crises	   in	  which	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   is	   implicated	   have	   often	   given	   rise	   to	   the	  acceleration	   and	   deepening	   of	   neoliberalisation	   in	   the	   national	   contexts	   that	   are	  affected.38	  	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  characterise	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  ‘creature	  of	   crisis’	   in	   their	   later	  work.	   Yet	   the	   two	   authors	   also	   note	   that	   both	   crises	   and	  emergent	   contradictions	   have	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   changing	   the	   general	   form	   that	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   takes.39	   Neoliberalisation	   processes,	   they	   note,	   tend	   to	  begin	   with	   a	   confrontational	   and	   destructive	   dynamic	   that	   they	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘roll	  back	  neoliberalisation’	   in	  which	  neoliberalising	  policymakers	  deploy	  state	  power	  to	   break	   down	   existing	   non-­‐neoliberal	   institutional	   arrangements	   and	   forms	   of	  association.	  The	  deflationary	  adjustments,	  privatisations	  and	  disciplining	  of	  trade	  unions	   undertaken	   by	   the	   Thatcher	   governments	   are	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   Roll	   back	  neoliberalisation	   serves	   to	   dissemble	   formerly	   embedded	  market	   processes	   and	  extend	   market	   rule	   into	   areas	   where	   it	   was	   hitherto	   absent.	   The	   unforeseen	  consequences	   are	   a	   range	   of	   economic	   and	   social	   dysfunctions	   and	   instabilities	  that	  lead	  to	  pressures	  on	  policymakers	  for	  alleviation.	  	  	  In	   response,	   neoliberalisation	   tends	   to	   acquire	   a	   different	   character	   as	   it	  progresses	   over	   time.	   Peck	   and	   Tickell	   term	   this	   ‘roll	   out	   neoliberalisation’.	   The	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  is	  the	  use	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  state	  intervention	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   new	   institutions	   as	   ‘flanking	   mechanisms’	  around	   the	   neoliberalised	   political	   economy	   in	   order	   to	   contain	   its	   crisis	  tendencies,	   shore	   up	   its	   legitimacy,	   and,	   ultimately,	   facilitate	   the	   continuation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  J.	  Peck	  and	  A.	  Tickell	  (1994),	  'Jungle	  Law	  Breaks	  Out:	  Neoliberalism	  And	  Global-­‐Local	  Disorder',	  Area,	  pp.317-­‐26.	  38	  Peck,	  Theodore	  and	  Brenner	  (2010),	  ‘Postneoliberalism	  And	  Its’.	  39	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  ‘Neoliberalising	  Space’.	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neoliberalisation.40	   Peck	   characterises	   it	   as	   a	   re-­‐orientation	   of	   neoliberalisation	  towards	  the	  “proliferating	  challenges	  of	  managing	  the	  costs	  and	  contradictions	  of	  earlier	  waves	  of	  neoliberalisation”.41	  Examples	  of	  such	  measures	  in	  the	  UK	  include	  the	   provision	   of	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   for	   the	   low	   paid	   and	   the	   public	   funding	   of	  ‘employability’	   training	   to	   compensate	   for	   what	   are	   negative	   outcomes	   of	   the	  neoliberalised	   labour	  market	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  many	  working-­‐age	  adults	  (stagnating	   real	   wages	   and	   a	   loss	   of	   job	   security).	   They	   also	   include	   the	  deployment	   of	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   industrial	   interventionism	   to	   compensate	   for	  ‘market	   failures’	   that	   have	   emerged	   over	   the	   course	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring	  (such	  policies	  are	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  my	  argument	  here	  and	  are	  revisited	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  6).	  Crucially,	  strategies	  of	  ‘roll	  out	  neoliberalisation’	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  pragmatic	  reversion	  to	  non-­‐neoliberal	  forms	  of	  governance	  or	  a	  social	  ‘re-­‐embedding’	  of	  capitalism	  as	  a	  Polanyian	  perspective	  might	  anticipate.42	  Rather,	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  restructuring	  ethos	  and	  continue	  to	  prioritise	  the	  extension	  of	  commodification	   and	   market	   rule,	   attempting	   to	   stabilise	   and	   reproduce	   the	  regime	   of	   market	   governance	   and	   expanded	   domain	   of	   private	   sector	   resource	  allocation	  that	  neoliberalisation	  brings	  into	  being.	  	  From	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   neoliberalism	   and	   neoliberalisation	   emerges	   the	  empirical	   ‘problem’	   that	   my	   analysis	   addresses.	   Because	   neoliberalism	   is	   a	  creature	   of	   crisis,	  we	   can	   anticipate	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   crisis	   diagnoses	   and	  narratives	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   will	   be	   neoliberal	   ones,	   and	   the	   policies	  undertaken	   within	   and	   in	   response	   to	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   will	   entail	   further	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  of	  either	  or	  both	  a	  ‘roll	  back’	  or	  a	  ‘roll	  out’	  type.	  However,	  the	  contradictions	  bound	  up	  in	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  and	  revealed	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  British	  growth	  model	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  may	  have	  exceeded	  the	  scope	  for	  rationalisation	  by	  the	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos,	  leading	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2002),	  ‘Neoliberalising	  Space’;	  B.	  Jessop	  (2002),	  'Liberalism,	  Neoliberalism,	  and	  Urban	  Governance:	  A	  State-­‐Theoretical	  Perspective',	  Antipode,	  34	  (3),	  pp.452-­‐72.	  41	  J.	  Peck	  (2010b),	  'Zombie	  Neoliberalism	  And	  The	  Ambidextrous	  State',	  Theoretical	  
Criminology,	  14	  (1),	  p.106;	  although	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  two	  strategies	  are	  often	  pursued	  simultaneously.	  42	  Jessop	  utilises	  the	  ‘re-­‐embedding’	  metaphor	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  flanking	  mechanisms,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  ‘fixes’	  that	  he	  refers	  to	  do	  not	  contravene	  the	  broader	  goal	  of	  neoliberalisation	  and,	  insofar	  as	  neoliberalism	  represents	  the	  extension	  of	  commodification	  and	  market	  rule,	  do	  not	  take	  the	  de-­‐commodifying	  form	  that	  ‘embedded’	  capitalisms	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  once	  did.	  See	  Jessop	  (2002),	  'Liberalism,	  Neoliberalism’.	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a	   new	   trajectory	   in	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   Both	   the	   notion	   that	  neoliberalism	   exists	   in	   hybrid	   forms	   and	   the	   concepts	   of	   roll	   back	   and	   roll	   out	  neoliberalisation	   are	   of	   great	   analytical	   value	   in	   addressing	   this	   question.	   They	  facilitate	  the	  characterisation	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  positioning	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  Britain’s	  political	  economy	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1980s,	  ‘90s	   and	   2000s.	   I	   draw	   upon	   these	   ideas	   in	   the	   following	   chapters	   when	  characterizing	  the	  nature	  of	  economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  in	  the	  years	  preceding	  and	  proceeding	  2007	  and	  2008.	  In	  particular,	  they	  allow	  me	  to	   identify	  whether	  a	  particular	  pattern	  of	   intervention	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  constitutes	  a	  neoliberal	  or	  a	  post-­‐neoliberal	   strategy,	  or	  a	   continuity	  of	  practices	  that	   pre-­‐date	   neoliberalisation	   and	   so	   which	   are	   classifiable	   amongst	  neoliberalism’s	  ‘others’	  and	  the	  ‘sediment’	  against	  which	  it	  struggles.	  	  	  
2.	  	  
Contributions	  	  The	  research	  presented	   in	  this	  dissertation	  makes	  both	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  contributions	   to	   the	   literature.	   Empirically,	   my	   analysis	   contributes	   to	   our	  understanding	   of	   the	   contemporary	   trajectory	   of	   British	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  by	  offering	  an	  empirically	  and	  theoretically	  informed	  investigation	  of	  continuity	   and	   change	   in	   a	   conjuncture	   characterised	   by	   the	   presence	   and	  management	  of	  economic	  crisis.	  From	  this	  investigation,	  two	  specific	  contributions	  arise	   that	   speak	   to	   three	   (sometimes	   overlapping)	   literatures	   concerning	  British	  political	  economy.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  a	  critical	  and	  institutionalist	  analysis	  of	  the	  British	   political	   economy’s	   structural	   shortcomings	   and	   the	   weakness	   of	   its	  ‘growth	  model’.	   I	   outline	   this	   perspective	   in	   Chapter	   1	   under	   the	   heading	   of	   the	  ‘critical	   social	   democratic	   perspective’	   (‘CSDP’).	   The	   second	   is	   a	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  strand	  in	  literatures	  on	  British	  and	  comparative	  political	  economy	  that	   emphasises	   the	   impact	   of	   ideas,	   discourses	   and	   crises	   upon	   the	   course	   of	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   I	   introduce	   this	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  literature	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   The	   third	   concerns	   the	   ‘neoliberalisation’	   of	   the	   British	  political	   economy,	   and	   forms	   part	   of	   a	   more	   general	   literature	   on	   neoliberal	  restructuring	  at	  a	  variety	  of	  scales	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	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  Drawing	   insights	   from	   all	   three	   literatures	   to	   structure	   my	   investigation	   and	  interpretation,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  British	  growth	  model	   in	  2007-­‐2008	  has	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   process	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   that	   is	   more	   complex,	  nuanced	  and	  contested	  than	  a	  focus	  on	   ‘austerity	  macroeconomics’	  might	   lead	  us	  to	   believe,	   suggesting	   greater	   scope	   for	   contingency	   and	   categorical	   political	  change	  in	  the	  conjuncture	  under	  study.	  My	  analysis	  confirms	  the	  opinion	  prevalent	  within	  the	  critical	  social	  democratic	  and	  neoliberalisation	  literatures	  that	  2008	  has	  not	  marked	  the	  high	  point	  of	  neoliberalisation	  in	  Britain,	  and	  it	  shares	  the	  view	  of	  these	   literatures	   that	   it	   is	   also	   unlikely	   to	  mark	   the	   high	   point	   of	   the	   economic	  instability	   that	   is	   the	   material	   basis	   of	   crisis.	   These	   findings	   provide	   a	  contextualised	   validation	   of	   the	   view	   that	   neoliberalism	   is	   a	   ‘creature	   of	   crisis’	  because	   they	   suggest	   that	   neoliberal	   ideas	   provide	   the	   dominant	   framing	   of	  economic	   policy	   problems	   for	   macroeconomic	   policymakers	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context	  and	  that	  the	  overarching	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  reflects	  them.	  	  	  Yet	  where	  my	  analysis	  extends	  that	  arising	  from	  these	  two	  literatures	  is	  in	  pointing	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  what	  I	  argue	  to	  be	  non-­‐neoliberal	   framings	  of	  economic	  policy	  problems	  among	  certain	  sections	  within	  both	  post-­‐2008	  governments.	  In	  doing	  so	  my	   analysis	   reveals	   contested	   dynamics	   in	   policymaking	   and	   a	   potential	   for	  contingency	   and	   change	   in	   the	   present	   conjuncture	   that	   is	   otherwise	   missed.	   I	  point	   to	  a	  nascent	  non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  policy	  agenda	   that	  has	   the	  potential	  to	  gain	  momentum,	  particularly	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  ‘neoliberal	  solution’	  to	   the	   crisis	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   presently	   being	   pursued	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   a	  politically	   costly	   route	   to	   sustained	   stagnation	   and	   economic	   instability	   for	   the	  governments	  that	  are	  implementing	  it	  –	  an	  expectation	  with	  which	  the	  CSDP	  and	  neoliberalisation	   literatures	   equips	   us.	   The	   insights	   arising	   from	   my	   research	  consequently	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  of	  British	  economic	  policy	   in	   the	  present	  conjuncture	  and	  serve	  to	  guide	  our	  analysis	  of	  its	  future	  dynamics	  by	  pointing	  our	  attention	  towards	  these	  areas	  of	  contestation.	  	  	  This	   first	   contribution	   arises	   primarily	   out	   of	   my	   inquiry	   concerning	   ‘crisis	  diagnosis’.	   The	   second	   empirical	   contribution	   arises	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   second	  process	   that	   I	   interrogate:	   ‘crisis	   narration’.	   Here	   my	   analysis	   speaks	   to	   the	  
	  22	  
constructivist	   institutionalist	   perspective,	   particularly	   a	   strand	   within	   it	   that	  investigates	   the	   impact	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   upon	   public	   opinion	   and	   the	  opportunities	   and	   constraints	   that	   this	   presents	   for	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	   In	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   analysis	  of	  neoliberalisation	   in	  Britain	  and	  other	  national	  contexts	  the	  ‘narration	  of	  crisis’	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  explaining	  the	  political	  possibility	  of	  rapid	  institutional	  change.	  My	  contribution	  here	  is	  an	  empirically	  informed	  analysis	  of	  the	  crisis	  narratives	  that	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  constructed	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  Importantly,	  this	  is	  but	   one	   among	   several	   pieces	   of	   research	   that	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   fully	  comprehend	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context	  has	  been	  narrated	   and	   the	  impact	   of	   this	   process	   if	   causal	   inferences	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   process	   on	  policy	   choices	   are	   to	   be	   drawn.43	   However,	   mine	   is	   an	   important	   contribution	  towards	   this	   collaborative	   end	   because	   politicians	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   among	   the	  primary	  agents	  of	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  narrative	  construction.	  	  	  Beyond	   these	   specific	   empirical	   contributions,	   my	   analysis	   and	   the	   evidence	  presented	   for	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   of	   use	   to	   researchers	   addressing	   other	   research	  questions	   elsewhere	   within	   the	   field	   of	   British	   political	   economy.	   It	   holds	  implications	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   consensus	   and	   conflict	   between	   political	  parties	   and	   between	   government	   departments	   in	   the	   period	   to	  which	   it	   relates,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  enduring	   issues	  of	  debate	  and	   research	   in	   the	   study	  of	  British	  politics.	  More	  generally,	  it	  serves	  to	  raise	  the	  profile	  of	  recent	  changes	  in	  industrial	  policy	  among	   those	   studying	   responses	   to	   economic	   crisis	  both	   in	  Britain	  and	   in	  other	  national	   contexts,	   as	   these	  have	  not	   featured	  prominently	   in	   the	  debate	   to	  date.	  	  As	   well	   as	   these	   empirical	   contributions,	   my	   analysis	   makes	   a	   theoretical	  contribution	   in	   the	   form	   of	   an	   empirically	   operationalised	   constructivist	  institutionalist	   analytical	   framework	   for	   the	   study	   of	   crisis	   and	   transformative	  institutional	   change	   that	   is	   more	   comprehensive	   than	   existing	   frameworks.	   In	  Chapter	  2	  I	  review	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  concepts	  and	  claims	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  issues	  that	  arise	   from	   the	   overarching	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   contention	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  I	  discuss	  this	  potential	  research	  agenda,	  and	  the	  contribution	  that	  my	  thesis	  makes	  to	  it,	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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intersubjective	  ideas	  and	  discursive	  processes	  impact	  upon	  the	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	   political-­‐economic	   actors.	   In	   relation	   to	   crisis	   and	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring,	   it	   is	   the	   contention	   of	   this	   literature	   that	   policy	   responses	   to	  economic	   crisis	   reflect	   the	   ideas	   that	   policymakers	   have	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  crisis,	  and	  that	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  government	  or	  opposition	  party	  to	  implement	  transformations	   in	  the	   institutional	   fabric	  of	   the	  political	  economy	  is	  conditioned	  to	   an	   extent	   by	   the	   success	  with	  which	   they	   are	   able	   to	   successfully	   narrate	   the	  crisis	  to	  other	  actors.	  However	  although	  the	  logical	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  roles	   attributed	   to	   ideational/discursive	   dynamics	   is	   implicit	   and	   understood	   by	  constructivist	   institutionalists,	   an	   analytical	   framework	   that	   incorporates	   both,	  that	   is	  empirically	  operationalisable,	  and	   that	   is	   transportable	   to	  other	  spatial	  or	  temporal	  contexts	  has	  been	  lacking.	  My	  theoretical	  contribution	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  critical	  appraisal	   of	   existing	   concepts	   and	   to	   assemble	   them	   alongside	   other	   relevant	  concepts	   into	   such	   an	   analytical	   framework.	   Additional	   relevant	   concepts	   are	  drawn	  from	  within	  constructivist	  political	  analysis	  to	  this	  end,	  and	  also	  from	  other	  fields	   pursuing	   separate	   but	   related	   research	   questions	   –	   namely	   the	   ‘framing	  approach’	  to	  the	  study	  of	  social	  movements.	  	  In	  the	  process	  of	  constructing	  this	  analytical	  framework	  and	  carrying	  out	  empirical	  analysis	  with	   it	   I	   have	   also	   encountered	   and	  generated	   a	  number	  of	   avenues	   for	  further	   research.	   These	   are	   noted	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   discussions,	   and	   the	  principal	  ones	  are	  summarised	  in	  the	  conclusion.	  	  	  	  
3.	  
Structure	  Of	  The	  Thesis	  	  	  In	  Part	   I	  of	   the	  dissertation	   I	  make	   the	  preliminary	  arguments	   that	   structure	  my	  interpretation	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  diagnosed	  and	   narrated	   crisis	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   In	   Chapter	   1	   I	   examine	   the	  perspective	   of	   a	   group	   of	   scholars	   whom	   I	   term	   ‘critical	   social	   democrats’.	   This	  analysis	  implicates	  the	  recent	  restructuring	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economy	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	   fragile	   ‘growth	  model’.	  The	  critical	   social	  democrats’	  argument	   is	  that	   the	   economic	  problems	   that	   have	   faced	   economic	  policymakers	   in	   the	  post-­‐
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2008	   context	   stem	   from	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   growth	   model	   due	   to	   its	   inability	   to	  reproduce	   private	   debt-­‐led	   growth	   in	   the	   prevailing	   economic	   circumstances	   of	  those	   years.	   I	   take	   this	   analysis	   as	   the	   ‘institutional’	   aspect	   of	  my	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  analysis,	  arguing	   in	  the	  same	  chapter	  that	   it	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  process-­‐oriented	  institutionalist	  political	  economy	  of	  which	  constructivist	  institutionalism	  is	  an	  example.	  	  	  In	   Chapter	   2	   I	   then	   introduce	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   approach	   to	  political	  economy	  and	  review	  the	   literature	  surrounding	  the	  core	  concepts	  of	  my	  argument	   here.	   The	   distinctiveness	   of	   constructivist	   institutionalism	   is	   that	   it	  locates	   the	   actors	   whose	   behaviour	   we	   study	   in	   an	   ideational	   as	   well	   as	   an	  institutional	   context,	   and	   conceptualises	   the	   actors	   as	   being	   ‘sentient’	   ideational	  agents	   with	   the	   capacity	   to	   re-­‐interpret	   and	   strategically	   represent	   the	  institutionally	   structured	   political-­‐economic	   context	   that	   they	   inhabit.	   From	   this	  general	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor	   arises	   a	   number	   of	  general	  concepts	  that	  relate	  ideationally	  and	  institutionally	  conditioned	  agency	  to	  the	   study	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change.	   I	   examine	   these	   concepts	   at	   length,	  showing	  how	  they	  have	  been	  assembled	  into	  frameworks	  for	  studying	  institutional	  change	   while	   also	   drawing	   attention	   to	   a	   number	   of	   assumptions	   and	  controversies	   in	   relationship	   to	   such	   frameworks.	   In	   Chapter	   3	   I	   refine	   and	  operationalise	  these	  concepts	  to	  better	  reflect	  the	  ends	  of	  my	  own	  research.	  In	  so	  doing	   I	   address	   certain	   tensions	   and	   silences	   in	   existing	   conceptualisations	   and	  draw	   upon	   the	   insights	   of	   bodies	   of	   literature	   from	   other	   fields	   that	   study	  analogous	  processes.	  Through	  this	  discussion	  I	  articulate	  my	  operational	  research	  questions.	   After	   presenting	   these	   I	   move	   on	   to	   reflect	   the	   epistemological	  implications	  of	   the	  questions	  and	  outline	  my	  methodological	  approach	   in	   light	  of	  these	  considerations.	  	  	  Chapter	   4	   completes	   these	   contextual	   and	   conceptual	   preliminaries	   by	   drawing	  upon	  the	  literature	  on	  the	   ‘New	  Labour’	  governments	  of	  1997-­‐2007	  to	  advance	  a	  characterisation	  of	  the	  ideas	  underpinning	  economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   prior	   to	   2007-­‐2008.	   I	   do	   so	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   a	   comparison	  between	   these	  and	  post-­‐2008	   ideas,	  and	  more	  generally	   to	  substantiate	  my	  view	  that	   the	   British	   political	   economy	   had	   been	   subject	   to	   a	   process	   of	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neoliberalisation	   in	   the	   years	   preceding	   2007-­‐2008.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   undertaken	   by	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   was	  predominantly	   composed	   of	   strategies	   of	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation,	   that	   these	  reflected	   neoliberal	   ‘problem	   definitions’,	   and	   that	   these	   and	   prior	   strategies	   of	  neoliberalisation	  were	  thus	  implicated	  in	  the	  emergence	  and	  failure	  of	  the	  growth	  model	  identified	  by	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats.	  Establishing	  this	  point	  brings	  me	  into	   contact	  with	   an	   ongoing	   debate	   between	   ‘social	   democratic’,	   ‘synthetic’	   and	  ‘neoliberal’	  characterisations	  of	  New	  Labour.	  Rather	  than	  adopting	  the	  traditional	  channels	   of	   this	   debate,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   debate	   itself	   is	   misconceived	   in	   its	  presupposition	   that	   the	   various	   attributions	   made	   by	   the	   different	   camps	   are	  mutually	  exclusive.	  To	  make	  this	  argument	  I	  consider	  in	  detail	  what	  is	  implied	  by	  a	  neoliberal	   microeconomic	   approach,	   introducing	   the	   concepts	   of	   ‘strategic	  discretionary’	  and	  ‘non-­‐discretionary’	  intervention	  to	  clarify	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  claim	   that	   New	   Labour	   either	   practiced	   or	   did	   not	   practice	   neoliberal	  restructuring.	  These	  concepts	  are	  drawn	  upon	  later	  in	  the	  thesis	  to	  make	  a	  similar	  analysis	  of	  post-­‐2008	  governments.	  	  In	  Part	   II	   I	   report	   the	   findings	  of	  my	  empirical	   research	   into	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  crisis	  narration	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  and	  offer	  conclusions.	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  concern	   the	   crisis	   diagnoses	   of	   the	   two	   post-­‐2008	   governments.	   Chapter	   5	  examines	   their	   macroeconomic	   policy	   agendas,	   finding	   evidence	   of	   a	   neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  and	  policies	  that	  amount	  to	  new	  strategies	  of	  roll	  back	  and	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation.	  I	  show	  how	  the	  policies	  of	  both	  governments	  have	  cohered	  with	  neoliberal	   problem	  definitions,	   yet	   I	   also	   identify	   something	  of	   a	  divergence	   and	  subsequent	   re-­‐convergence	   in	   the	   approaches	   that	   they	   have	   adopted.	   Between	  2010	   and	   2012	   the	   Coalition	   pursued	   a	   strategy	   of	   rapid	   wage-­‐deflationary	  macroeconomic	   adjustment	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   ‘expansionary	   fiscal	  consolidation	   thesis’.	   After	   2012,	   and	   reflecting	   the	   failure	   of	   this	   approach,	   the	  Coalition’s	   macroeconomic	   strategy	   began	   to	   resemble	   more	   closely	   that	   of	   the	  Brown	  Government:	  the	  use	  of	  stimulus	  instruments	  to	  preserve	  fixed	  and	  human	  capital	   through	   an	   acknowledged	   downturn,	   the	   placation	   of	   perceived	   market	  sentiment	  through	  pledges	  to	  future	  fiscal	  consolidation,	  and	  a	  re-­‐regulation	  of	  the	  credit	  cycle	  alongside	  a	  defence	  of	  financial	  market	  practices	  that	  had	  given	  rise	  to	  asset	  price	   inflation	  prior	   to	  2008.	   Indeed,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  Coalition’s	  post-­‐2012	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macroeconomic	   strategy	   can	  be	   considered	  a	  pragmatic	   and	   strategic	   attempt	   to	  resuscitate	   and	   stabilise	   the	   dynamic	   of	   ‘privatised	   Keynesianism’	   that	   had	  underpinned	  the	  pre-­‐2008	  growth	  model.	  	  Chapter	   6	   examines	   the	   two	   governments’	  microeconomic	   policies.	   The	   findings	  reported	   here	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   those	   of	   Chapter	   5,	   for	   a	   strand	   of	   diagnosis	   in	  relation	  to	   industrial	  policy	   is	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  could	  be	  characterised	  as	  either	  strategies	  of	  roll	  back	  or	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  form	  and	  the	  arguments	  offered	   for	   it.	   I	   find	   that	   the	   same	  holds	   true	   for	  both	  governments.	   I	  argue	   that	   this	   reflects	   the	   simultaneous	   existence	   in	   government	   of	   two	  contrasting	   but	   pragmatically	   aligned	   crisis	   diagnoses	   –	   one	   neoliberal,	   one	   not,	  respectively	  located	  in	  the	  two	  departments	  responsible	  for	  the	  macro	  and	  micro	  dimensions	   of	   economic	   policymaking.	   I	   suggest	   that	   this	   indicates	   that	   certain	  more	  nuanced	  and	  contested	  processes	  are	  at	  play	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  than	  a	  narrative	   of	   straightforward	   ideational	   and	   policy	   continuity	   would	   suggest.	   I	  suggest	   that	   it	   reflects	   a	   longer	   standing	   tension	   in	   British	   politics	   between	  industrial	   policymakers	   and	   macroeconomic	   policymakers,	   and	   conclude	   the	  chapter	   by	   reflecting	   on	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   finding	   for	   the	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  analytical	  perspectives	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  7	  I	  change	  my	  focus	  to	  crisis	  narration.	  I	  report	  the	  findings	  of	  research	  carried	   out	   on	   the	   crisis	   narratives	   that	   both	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   have	  constructed	   in	   order	   to	   assert	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   their	   decisive	   interventions.	   The	  crisis	   narratives	   relate	   primarily	   to	   macroeconomic	   interventions,	   and	  consequently	   reflect	   the	   attempted	   legitimation	  of	   the	  neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  The	  research	  draws	  upon	  120	  newspaper	  articles	  authored	  by	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  prime	  ministers	  and	  the	  ministers	  responsible	  for	  economic	  policymaking	   and	   related	   areas	   of	   policy.	   I	   analyze	   the	   rhetorical	   techniques	  utilised	  by	  the	  two	  governments	  to	  this	  end	  and	  discuss	  their	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  narration	  more	  generally.	  	  	  In	  the	  concluding	  chapter	  I	  draw	  together	  the	  empirical	  analysis,	  and	  reflect	  upon	  its	   implications	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   British	   political	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economy	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   in	   light	   of	   the	   critical	   social	   democratic	  perspective.	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Chapter	  1.	  
Institutionalist	  Political	  Economy	  And	  The	  Post-­2008	  Context	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  conceptually	  and	  empirically	  situate	  the	  ‘institutionalist’	  element	  of	   my	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   analysis.	   A	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  analysis	  of	   institutional	   continuity	  and	  change	   locates	   the	  determinants	  of	   either	  condition	   in	   the	   way	   that	   actors	   diagnose	   and	   narrate	   political-­‐economic	  circumstances.	   These	   circumstances	   are	   in	   turn	   the	   unintended	   outcomes	   of	  complex	  and	  interacting	  processes	  of	  institutionally	  conditioned	  behaviour	  by	  the	  many	  actors	  comprising	  the	  political	  economy.	  The	  circumstances	  comprising	  the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   –	   a	   financial	   crash	   and	   its	   stagnationary	   aftermath	   –	   were	  produced	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  task	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  elucidate	  a	  perspective	  on	  how	   this	   came	   to	  pass.	   In	   the	   first	   section	   I	   introduce	   the	  broad	   contours	  of	   the	  ‘institutionalist’	  approach	  to	  political	  economy.	  In	  the	  second	  section	  I	  outline	  what	  I	  term	  the	  ‘critical	  social	  democratic’	  perspective	  on	  contemporary	  British	  political	  economy	   and	   then	   show	   in	   the	   third	   section	   that	   it	   can	   be	   considered	   an	  institutionalist	  perspective	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  poor	  economic	  performance	  which	  characterises	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   I	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   CSDP’s	   focus	   on	   a	  number	   of	   ‘institutional	   processes’	   (processes	   in	  which	   the	   institutions	   are	   both	  factors	   and	   ‘dependent	   variables’)	   and	   the	   outcomes	   of	   these	   processes	   on	   the	  stability	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economy.	  	  	  	  
1.	  
‘New	  Institutionalism’	  	  The	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   perspective	   to	   which	   my	   analysis	   speaks	   has	  emerged	  from	  the	  broader	  family	  of	  ‘new	  institutionalist’	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  political	  economy.1	  All	  such	  approaches	  share	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘institutions’	  are	  an	  irreducible	   factor	   shaping	   the	   conduct	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   and	   thus	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Here	  simply	  termed	  ‘institutionalism’,	  given	  their	  predominance	  in	  the	  subfield.	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trajectory	   of	   political	   economies.2	   Institutions	   are	   ‘rule-­‐like	   structures’	   and	  ‘relatively	   enduring’	   modes	   of	   conduct	   (i.e.	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	   that	   are	  reproduced	   over	   time)	   that	   actors	   in	   a	   given	   context	   collectively	   expect	   of	   one	  another.3	  We	   could,	   for	   example,	   speak	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	   industrial	   relations	  (encompassing	   firm-­‐employee	   settlements,	   statutory	   rights,	   and	   the	   legal	   and	  extra-­‐legal	   practices	   by	   which	   they	   are	   enforced),	   of	   finance	   (encompassing	  business	   practices	   such	   as	   lending	   and	   credit	   assessment,	   and	   statutory	  market	  regulators),	   or	   of	   monetary	   policy	   (encompassing	   the	   central	   bank	   and	   its	  techniques	   and	   remit):	   in	   all	   cases	   reference	   is	   being	   made	   to	   the	   formal	   or	  informal	  rules	  that	  structure	  the	  way	  that	  relevant	  actors	  behave	  in	  these	  areas	  of	  political-­‐economic	  life,	  and	  which	  consequently	  impact	  on	  the	  outcomes	  that	  arise	  from	  these	  areas.	  	  The	   ‘collectively	  expected’	  criterion	  signals	  an	   important	  distinction	  between	   the	  ‘old’	   and	   ‘new’	   institutionalisms.	   As	   collectively	   expected	   modes	   of	   practice,	  institutions	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  codified	  legal	  institutions	  such	  as	  constitutions	  or	  industrial	   relations	   regimes:	   the	   term	   ‘institution’	   can	   refer	   to	   any	   enduring	  organisational	   regularity	   that,	   in	   practice,	   exhibits	   this	   rule-­‐like	   quality.	   That	  institutions	  are	  defined	  in	  this	  way	  does	  however	  suggest	  that	  they	  possess	  at	  least	  a	  de	   facto	   legitimacy:	   regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  actors	  operating	  within	  a	  given	   institution	   believe	   it	   to	   be	   the	   most	   appropriate	   or	   efficient	   means	   of	  organising	  whatever	  aspect	  of	  political-­‐economic	   life	   that	   it	   relates	   to,	   they	  do	  at	  least	  recognise	  and	  abide	  by	  its	  dictates	  –	  they	  comply.	  Compliance,	  and	  the	  factors	  that	   account	   for	   it,	   are	   thus	   important	   variables	   in	   the	   sustenance	   of	   individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  C.	  Parsons	  (2007),	  How	  To	  Map	  Arguments	  In	  Political	  Science	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press);	  Steinmo	  (2008),	  'Historical	  Institutionalism',	  in	  D.D.	  Porta	  and	  M.M.	  Keating	  (eds.),	  
Approaches	  And	  Methodologies	  In	  The	  Social	  Sciences:	  A	  Pluralist	  Perspective	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University),	  pp.118-­‐38;	  P.A.	  Hall	  and	  R.C.R.	  Taylor	  (1996),	  'Political	  Science	  And	  The	  Three	  New	  Institutionalisms',	  Political	  Studies,	  44	  (5),	  pp.936-­‐57;	  V.	  Lowndes	  (2002),	  'Institutionalism',	  in	  D.	  Marsh	  and	  G.	  Stoker	  (eds.),	  Theories	  And	  Methods	  In	  
Political	  Science;	  2nd	  Edition	  (London:	  Palgrave),	  pp.90-­‐108.	  3	   W.	   Streeck	   and	   K.	   Thelen	   (2005),	   'Introduction:	   Institutional	   Change	   In	   Advanced	  Political	   Economies',	   in	  W.	   Streeck	   and	   K	   Thelen	   (eds.),	  Beyond	   Continuity:	   Institutional	  
Change	   In	   Advanced	   Political	   Economies	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press),	   pp.1-­‐40;	  Lowndes	   (2002),	   ‘Institutionalism’;	   Parsons	   (2007),	   How	   To	   Map;	   Stienmo	   (2008),	  ‘Historical	  Institutionalism’.	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institutions.4	   The	   reason	   for	   compliance	   is	   an	   important	   differentiating	   point	  between	  the	  ‘Rational	  Choice’	  and	  ‘Historical	  Institutionalist’	  positions	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   which	   see	   compliance	   as	   the	   result	   of	   coercion	   and	   compromise	   among	  actors	   who	   undertake	   political	   struggles	   with	   competing	   interests,	   and	  ‘Sociological	   Institutionalists’	   on	   the	   other,	   who	   define	   institutions	   as	   pre-­‐conscious	   ‘cognitive	   scripts’	   which	   precede	   the	   consideration	   of	   interests.5	   In	  either	  case,	  however,	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  institutions	  is	  to	  foreclose	  or	  raise	  the	  costs	  of	  some	  strategies	  for	  actors	  attempting	  to	  secure	  valued	  ends,	  lower	  the	  costs	  of	  others,	  and	  ultimately	  favour	  some	  courses	  of	  action	  over	  others.	  It	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  their	  ‘strategic	  selectivity’	  –	  their	  conditioning	  of	  actors’	  strategic	  choices	  –	  is	  exerted.6	  	  The	  appeal	  of	  studying	  institutions	  lies	  precisely	  in	  their	  relative	  endurance:	  they	  and	   their	   effects	   can	   be	   examined,	   theorised,	   modelled	   and	   compared.	  Institutionalism,	   however,	   represents	   a	   rather	   distinctive	   ‘genre’	   of	   political	  analysis	   that	   is	   more	   contextually	   sensitive	   and	   modest	   in	   its	   epistemological	  ambitions	   than	   the	   behaviouralist	   and	   rationalist	   approaches	   against	   which	   it	  emerged.	   Institutionalists	   are	   united	   in	   their	   attention	   to	   contextual	   specificities	  that	   render	   acontextual	   generalisation	   problematic,	   adhering	   instead	   to	   the	  relatively	   modest	   epistemological	   ambition	   of	   generating	   ‘mid-­‐range’	   analytical	  frameworks	   of	   transferable	   concepts	   with	   which	   to	   guide	   the	   empirical	  investigation	  of	  disparate	  events	  in	  different	  times	  and	  places.7	  As	  we	  shall	  shortly	  see,	  many	  of	  these	  transferable	  concepts	  relate	  not	  simply	  to	  typologies	  of	  different	  varieties	  of	  institutional	  forms	  (although	  such	  scholarship	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  institutionalist	  literature	  –	  for	  example	  the	  ‘Varieties	  of	  Capitalism’	  approach),	  but	  rather	  to	  processes	  in	  which	  institutions	  are	  factors	  and	  outcomes.	  	  	  A	  feature	  of	  institutionalism	  since	  its	  inception	  has	  been	  an	  explicit	  emphasis	  on	  a	  ‘dialectical’	  model	  of	  the	  ‘structure-­‐agency’	  relationship	  through	  which	  institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  J.	  Mahoney	  and	  K.	  Thelen	  (2010),	  'A	  Theory	  Of	  Gradual	  Institutional	  Change',	  in	  J.	  Mahoney	  and	  K.	  Thelen	  (eds.),	  Explaining	  Institutional	  Change:	  Ambiguity,	  Agency	  And	  
Power	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐37.	  5	  Hall	  and	  Taylor	  (1996),	  'Political	  Science	  And’.	  6	  C.	  Hay	  (2002),	  Political	  Analysis:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan).	  7	  Lowndes	  (2002),	  'Institutionalism';	  Steinmo	  (2008),	  'Historical	  Institutionalism'.	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are	  theorised	  as	  both	  factors	  and	  consequences,	  of	  actor	  conduct.8	  The	  kind	  of	  actor	  appealed	   to	   in	   institutionalist	   theory	   is	   similar	   to	   that	   dominating	   most	   post-­‐Machiavellian	  political	  analysis:	  an	  actor	  that	  is	  ends-­‐oriented,	  instrumentalist	  and	  strategic.9	   Actors	   are	   modelled	   as	   possessing	   valued	   end-­‐states,	   towards	   the	  attainment	  of	  which	  their	  behaviour	  is	  instrumentally	  and	  strategically	  directed.	  In	  an	   institutionalist	   account,	   however,	   these	   valued	   ends	   are	   realised	   in	   a	   context	  structured	   by	   established	   institutions.	   By	   defining	   the	   relative	   resources	   and	  authority	  of	   the	  actors	  pursuing	  their	  preferences	  within	  and	  between	  them,	  and	  defining	  sanctions	  for	  the	  transgressions	  of	  rules,	  institutions	  and	  the	  institutional	  context	   as	   a	   whole	   exert	   a	   ‘strategic	   selectivity’	   that	   shapes,	   but	   does	   not	  necessarily	  determine,	  the	  choices	  that	  actors	  make.10	  	  	  Yet	  institutions	  and	  the	  institutional	  context	  that	  they	  comprise	  are	  themselves	  the	  outcome	   of	   actor	   choices	   in	   past	   moments.	   Institutional	   analysis	   consequently	  implies	  some	  variant	  of	  what	  is	  termed	  ‘path-­‐dependency’;	  the	  notion,	  discussed	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  K.	  Thelen	  and	  S.	  Steinmo	  (1992),	  'Historical	  Institutionalism	  In	  Comparative	  Politics',	  in	  S.	  	  Steinmo,	  K	  Thelen,	  and	  F.	  Longstreth	  (eds.),	  Structuring	  Politics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	   Press),	   pp.1-­‐33;	   and	   C.	   Hay	   and	   D.	   Wincott	   (1998),	   'Structure,	   Agency	   And	  Historical	  Institutionalism',	  Political	  Studies,	  46	  (5),	  pp.951-­‐57.	  Parsons	  forcefully	  stresses	  the	   need	   to	   differentiate	   ‘institutionalist	   explanations’	   from	   ‘explanations	   about	  institutions’:	   the	   former	   invoke	   institutions	   as	   an	   independent	   variable	   rather	   a	   straight	  forward	  reflection	  of	  actor	  interests.	  Parsons	  (2007),	  How	  to	  Map	  Arguments.	  9	   A	   point	   of	   clarification	   is	   warranted	   here,	   for	   some	   reviews	   of	   the	   ‘sociological	  institutionalist’	  literature	  differentiate	  between	  it	  and	  other	  institutionalisms	  by	  opposing	  the	   end-­‐oriented	   actor	   of	   some	   accounts	   with	   the	   ‘goal’	   or	   ‘appropriateness’	   directed	  behaviour	  of	   the	  actors	  modeled	  by	  sociological	   institutionalists.	  For	  an	   instance	  of	  such	  analysis	  see	  J.G.	  March	  (1992),	  'The	  War	  Is	  Over,	  The	  Victors	  Have	  Lost',	  Journal	  of	  Public	  
Administration	   Research	   and	   Theory,	   2	   (3),	   pp.225-­‐31.	   On	   closer	   examination,	   however,	  what	  such	  analysts	  are	  often	  claiming	  is	  that	  valued	  ends	  towards	  which	  action	  is	  directed	  are	   culturally	   given	   –	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   socially	   constructed.	   This,	   we	   shall	   see,	   is	   quite	  compatible	   with	   the	   core	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   contention	   that	   interests	   are	  socially	   constructed,	   but	   for	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   this	   makes	   the	   behaviour	   in	  pursuit	   of	   socially	   constructed	   ends	   no	   less	   end-­‐oriented	   or	   strategic.	   The	   relationship	  between	  the	  constructivist	  and	  sociological	   institutionalism	  warrants	  closer	  examination	  than	   space	   here	   permits,	   the	   focus	   is	   instead	   on	   the	   ‘rational	   choice’	   and	   historical’	  institutionalisms	   that	   are	   most	   prevalent	   in	   the	   field	   of	   political	   economy.	   For	   rational	  choice	   institutionalists,	   such	   ends	   can	   be	   deduced	   from	   a	   conserved	   number	   of	   ‘utility	  functions’	  that	  the	  theory	  assigns	  to	  different	  analytical	  classes	  of	  political	  actor	  (on	  which	  see	   W.H.	   Riker	   (1995),	   'The	   Political	   Psychology	   of	   Rational	   Choice	   Theory',	   Political	  
Psychology,	  16	  (1),	  pp.23-­‐44).	  Historical	   institutionalists,	  by	  contrast,	  assert	  an	   inductive	  approach	   to	   understanding	   the	   ends	   to	   which	   strategic	   action	   is	   put,	   deriving	   this	  information	  through	  empirical	  adjudication	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  For	  a	  comparison	  of	  both	   approaches,	   see	   K.A.	   Thelen	   (1999),	   'Historical	   Institutionalism	   In	   Comparative	  Politics',	  Annual	  Review	  Of	  Political	  Science,	  2	  (1),	  pp.369-­‐404.	  10	  Hay	  (2002),	  Political	  Analysis.	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greater	   length	   below,	   that	   choices	  made	   at	   ‘Time	  1’	  will	   subsequently	   shape	   the	  range	  of	  strategic	  options	  available	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  subsequent	  institutions	  at	  ‘Time	   2’,	   ad	   infinitum.11	   This	   claim	   focuses	   institutionalist	   analysis	   on	   dynamic	  
processes	  over	   time,	  with	   the	   impact	  of	   institutions	  on	  actors’	   strategies	  and	  vice	  versa	   exerted	   in	   the	   fourth	   dimension.12	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   institutionalist	  ontology	  favours	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  institutionally	  mediated	  processes,	  drawing	  the	   attention	   of	   the	   analyst	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   institutions	   beget	   certain	  behaviours,	  and	  these	  behaviours	  impact	  on	  the	  institutional	  context,	  and	  so	  shape	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political	  economies.13	  	  	  Crucially,	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  such	  processes	  need	  relate	  to	  political	  or	  
economic	   change.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   generally	   asserted	   that	   institutional	   processes	  function	   in	   such	   a	   manner	   that	   institutions	   are	   reproduced.	   Insofar	   as	  institutionalists	  assert	  an	  expansive	  empirical	  generalisation,	  it	  is	  that	  institutions	  are	   difficult	   to	   reform	   once	   they	   are	   created.	   Actors	  within	   a	   given	   institutional	  context	   are	   suggested	   to	   bring	   whatever	   resources	   that	   context	   grants	   them	   to	  bear	  in	  order	  to	  thwart	  attempts	  to	  alter	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  detract	  from	  their	  ability	  to	  achieve,	  or	  approximate,	  their	  valued	  end-­‐states	  within	  it.14	  In	  short,	   the	  endurance	  of	   institutions	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	  reproduction-­‐favouring	  logic	  of	   behaviour	   created	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   institutional	   structure	   and	   agency.	  Because	   individual	   institutions	  are	  resistant	   to	  change,	   the	   temporality,	  direction	  and	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  institutional	  change	  is	  an	  object	  of	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  import	  for	  institutionalist	  analysis.	  	  An	   important	   but	   sometimes	   under-­‐specified	   distinction	   in	   institutionalist	  conceptual	  frameworks	  lies	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ontological	  nature	  of	  institutions	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  another	  analytical	  category:	  ‘the	  ideational’.	  This	  distinction	  is	   particularly	   important	   for	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   approaches	   because	  they	  work	  across	  the	  two	  categories	  and	  relate	  processes	  occurring	  in	  one	  domain	  with	   processes	   occurring	   in	   the	   other	   when	   explaining	   political-­‐economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  J.L.	  Campbell	  (2010),	  'Institutional	  Reproduction	  And	  Change',	  in	  G.	  Morgan,	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  
Oxford	  Handbook	  Of	  Comparative	  Institutional	  Analysis	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.	  87-­‐117.	  12	  Lowndes	  (2002),	  ‘Institutionalism’.	  13	  On	  diachronic	  analysis	  and	  institutionalism,	  see	  Hay	  (2002),	  Political	  Analysis.	  14	  Campbell	  (2010),	  'Institutional	  Reproduction’.	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outcomes.	   The	   two	   categories	   are	   often	   invoked	   separately,	   yet	   this	   can	   lead	   to	  ambiguity	  because	  the	  definition	  of	  institutions	  outlined	  above	  renders	  them	  of	  the	  same	  ontological	  ‘stuff’	  as	  ideas	  –	  they	  too	  exist	  (in	  part)	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  actors	  as	  ideas	  and	  resulting	  behaviours,	  rather	  than	  as	  physical	  constraints	  on	  behaviour.15	  	  	  To	  specify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  distinction	  it	   is	  helpful	  to	  briefly	  examine	  the	  way	  in	  which	   the	   categories	   are	  used	   in	   institutionalist	   approaches	   that	   invoke	   ideas	   as	  explanatory	   factors	   (which	  are	   the	   topic	  of	  Chapter	  2).	   In	   such	  approaches	   ideas	  condition	  what	  actors	  believe	  possible,	  desirable,	  and	  how	  they	  conceive	  of	   their	  interests,	   whilst	   institutions	   arise	   from	   the	  ways	   that	   actors	   collectively	   require	  one	  another	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  given	  area	  of	  political	  economic	  life.	  This	  distinction	  is	  implicit	   in	   much	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   work.	   It	   provides	   the	   analytical	  clarity	   necessary	   to	   discern	   the	   impact	   of	   ideational	   processes	   on	   institutional	  changes.	  However	  some	  recent	  contributions	  risk	  undermining	  the	  distinction.	   In	  an	   effort	   to	   differentiate	   ‘discursive	   institutionalism’	   from	   its	   historical	  institutionalist	   and	   rational	   choice	   institutionalist	   forebears,	   Schmidt	   has	  suggested	   that	   institutions	   are	   conceived	   of	   differently	   by	   discursive	  institutionalists:	   as	   ‘internal’	   ‘constraining	   and	   enabling	   structures	   of	   meaning’,	  rather	   than	   only	   as	   ‘external’	   ‘rule	   following	   structures’.16	   In	   advancing	   this	  definition	  Schmidt	  risks	  eliding	  the	  distinction	  between	  institutional	  processes	  and	  the	   ideational/discursive	  ones	   that	   she	  herself	   theorises,	   for	   it	   is	  no	   longer	   clear	  where	   the	  boundary	  between	   the	  analytical	   classes	  of	   institutions	  and	   ideas	   lies,	  and	   thus	   what	   their	   relative	   contributions	   to	   explaining	   a	   given	   outcome	   are.	  However,	   in	   her	   own	   empirical	   work	   Schmidt’s	   concept	   of	   institution	   bears	   a	  striking	  similarity	  to	  that	  of	  the	  older	  new	  institutionalisms	  that	  she	  criticises.	  The	  role	   that	  she	  ascribes	   institutions	   is	   in	  shaping	  the	   inter-­‐change	  of	   ideas	   through	  discourse	   by	   structuring	   who	   talks	   to	   whom,	   where	   and	   how,	   as	   well	   as	  distributing	   political	   resources	   among	   the	   proponents	   of	   particular	   ideas.17	   The	  institutions	  she	  has	  in	  mind	  are	  constitutional	  ones	  at	  the	  national	  and	  European	  levels.	  Consequently,	  her	  argument	  rests	  upon	  an	  ontological	  distinction	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Parsons	  (2007),	  How	  To	  Map.	  16	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2010b),	  'Taking	  Ideas	  And	  Discourse	  Seriously:	  Explaining	  Change	  Through	  Discursive	  Institutionalism	  As	  The	  Fourth	  New	  Institutionalism',	  European	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  2	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐25.	  17	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures	  Of	  European	  Capitalism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press).	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The	  Critical	  Social	  Democratic	  Perspective	  	  The	   British	   post-­‐2008	   context	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   an	   increasingly	  comprehensive	   body	   of	   analysis	   that	   I	   here	   term	   the	   ‘critical	   social	   democratic	  perspective’.	  In	  this	  and	  the	  following	  section	  I	  review	  some	  of	  this	  literature	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  constitutes	  (albeit	  sometimes	  implicitly)	  an	  institutionalist	  analysis	  of	  the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   that	   can	   inform	   my	   own	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  analysis.	  	  
Critical	  Social	  Democrats	  	  Critical	   social	   democrats	   do	   not	   describe	   themselves	   thus,	   and	   nor	   do	   they	  necessarily	   perceive	   their	   collective	   work	   as	   constituting	   a	   perspective.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	  my	   contention	   that	   their	   work	   does	   form	   a	   broadly	   coherent	  whole	   and	   that	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   think	   of	   it	   as	   such	   insofar	   as	   their	   complementary	  contributions	   can	   together	   tell	   us	   a	   great	   deal	   about	   underlying	   causes	   of	   the	  failures	   of	   economic	   stability	   and	   performance	   that	   characterise	   Britain	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  	  	  The	  perspective	  is	  ‘critical’	  because	  it	  has	  emerged	  among	  scholars	  who	  have	  both	  ethical	   and	   practical	   reservations	   regarding	   the	   restructuring	   of	   the	   British	   and	  international	   political	   economies	   over	   the	  past	   thirty	   years,	  whether	   or	  not	   they	  deploy	   the	  concept	  of	  neoliberalism	  to	  analyse	   this	  restructuring.	  They	  share	   the	  view	  that	  substantial	  political-­‐economic	  and	  policy	  change	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  structural	  problems	  that	  they	  identify	  as	  having	  resulted	  from	  it.	  The	  contributors	   generally	   advocate	   a	  more	   ‘embedded’	   form	   of	   capitalism	   in	  which	  government	   takes	  a	  more	  proactive	   role	   in	   addressing	   the	   functional	   and	  ethical	  failures	  of	  the	  capitalist	  political	  economy.	  Many	  subscribe	  to	  a	  (broadly	  defined)	  Keynesian	   understanding	   of	   the	   economy	   in	   which	   macroeconomic	   stability,	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correct	   market	   functioning	   and	   sufficient	   levels	   of	   productive	   investment	   are	  things	   for	   which	   government	   can	   and	   should	   take	   a	   greater	   amount	   of	  responsibility	  than	  it	  presently	  does,	  using	  more	  interventionist	  means	  to	  this	  end.	  This	   last	  point	   is	  also	   the	  basis	  of	  my	  attribution	  of	   the	   term	   ‘social	  democrat’	   to	  these	  scholars.	  The	   focus	  of	   the	  CSDP	   is	   the	  particular	   form	  of	   capitalist	  political	  economy	  that	  has	  been	  brought	  into	  being	  Britain	  since	  1979	  and	  the	  pathological	  outcomes	   and	   dynamics	   that	   it	   has	   engendered	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   rather	  than	   capitalism	   itself.	   Consequently,	   they	   leave	   largely	   unexamined	   the	   more	  general	   and	   enduring	   contradictions	   that	   Marxian	   scholars	   claim	   to	   afflict	   all	  capitalist	   economies.18	   Instead,	   their	   work	   holds	   the	   implicit	   assumption	   that	  capitalist	  economy,	  properly	  instituted,	  can	  function	  for	  the	  collective	  welfare	  of	  its	  host	  society.	  	  
The	  Anglo-­Liberal	  Growth	  Model	  	  Contributors	   to	   the	   CSDP	   are	   united	   by	   their	   shared	   assessment	   of	   a	   number	  institutional	   features	  of	   the	  UK	  political	   economy	  which	   they	  argue	  underpinned	  economic	   growth	   between	   1993	   and	   2008:	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘growth	   model’.19	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  D.	  Harvey	  (2014),	  Seventeen	  Contradictions	  And	  The	  End	  Of	  Capitalism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press).	  19	  A	  sample	  of	  the	  CSDP	  literature	  outlining	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  the	  perspective	  would	  include	  the	  following:	  J.	  Buchanan,	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  'Undisclosed	  And	  Unsustainable:	  Problems	  Of	  The	  UK	  National	  Business	  Model',	  CRESC	  Working	  Papers	  (75;	  Manchester:	  CRESC);	  C.	  Crouch	  (2009),	  'Privatised	  Keynesianism:	  An	  Unacknowledged	  Policy	  Regime',	  
The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  11	  (3),	  pp.382-­‐99;	  T.	  Dolphin	  and	  M.	  Griffith	  (2011),	  Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles?	  Housing's	  Role	  In	  The	  UK	  Economy	  (London:	  Institute	  For	  Public	  Policy	  Research);	  E.	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  
Complacence:	  Financial	  Innovation	  And	  The	  Politics	  Of	  Reform,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press);	  J.	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  'Rebalancing	  The	  Economy	  (Or	  Buyer's	  Remorse)',	  CRESC	  
Working	  Papers	  (87;	  Manchester:	  CRESC);	  A.	  Gamble	  (2011),	  Economic	  Futures:	  A	  Report	  
Prepared	  For	  The	  British	  Academy	  (London:	  The	  British	  Academy);	  P.A	  Hall	  (2013),	  'The	  Political	  Origins	  Of	  Our	  Economic	  Discontents',	  in	  M.	  Kahler	  and	  D.A.	  Lake	  (eds.),	  Politics	  In	  
The	  New	  Hard	  Times:	  The	  Great	  Recession	  In	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (London:	  Ithica),	  pp.129-­‐49;	  C.	  Hay	  (2013a),	  'The	  British	  Growth	  Crisis:	  A	  Crisis	  Of	  And	  For	  Growth',	  SPERI	  
Papers	  (1;	  Sheffield:	  SPERI);	  C.	  Hay	  (2011a),	  'Pathology	  Without	  Crisis?	  The	  Strange	  Demise	  Of	  The	  'Anglo	  Liberal	  Growth	  Model'',	  Government	  And	  Opposition,	  46	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐31;	  M.	  Watson	  (2010),	  'House	  Price	  Keynesianism	  And	  The	  Contradictions	  Of	  The	  Modern	  Investor	  Subject',	  Housing	  Studies,	  25	  (3),	  pp.413-­‐26;	  S.	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of	  
Inequality	  (London:	  Gibson	  Square);	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2007a),	  'The	  Logic	  Of	  Neoliberalism	  And	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  Consumer	  Debt-­‐Led	  Growth',	  in	  S.	  Lee	  and	  S.	  McBride	  (eds.),	  
Neoliberalism,	  State	  Power	  And	  Global	  Governance	  (Dordrecht:	  Springer),	  pp.157-­‐72;	  R.	  Wade	  (2009a),	  'From	  Global	  Imbalances	  To	  Global	  Reorganisations',	  Cambridge	  Journal	  Of	  
Economics,	  33	  (4),	  pp.539-­‐62.	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‘Growth	   Model’	   concept	   has	   become	   increasingly	   prominent	   in	   post-­‐2008	  academic	  and	  political	  discourse.	   In	   its	  academic	  context,	   it	  denotes	  the	   idea	  that	  differently	   organised	   national	   forms	   of	   capitalism	   are	   capable	   of	   generating	  economic	   growth,	   as	   captured	   by	   GDP	   figures	   and	   other	   common	   measures	   of	  economic	   performance,	   over	   a	   period	   of	   time	   that	   we	   might	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘the	  medium	  term’	  (a	  period	  that	  might	  extend	  for	  roughly	  a	  decade,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  depending	   on	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   model).20	   For	   proponents	   of	   the	   concept,	  contrasting	   growth	  models	   can	   exhibit	   different	   institutional	   structures,	   and	   can	  embody	   very	   different	   relationships	   between	   ‘state’,	   market	   and	   societal	   actors.	  Crucially,	   while	   all	   growth	  models	   can	   (by	   definition)	   produce	   growth,	   different	  models	   are	   argued	   to	   exhibit	   different	   longer-­‐term	   dynamics	   and	   economic	  performance	   outcomes,	   with	   some	   being	   more	   ‘sustainable’	   and	   having	   greater	  longevity	  than	  others.21	  	  	  Hay	   has	   usefully	   termed	   the	   growth	   model	   that	   came	   to	   underpin	   the	   British	  economy	  between	  1993	  and	  2008	  the	  ‘Anglo-­‐liberal	  growth	  model’	  (ALGM).22	  The	  ALGM	  was	  premised	  on	   the	   capacity	  of	   the	   financial	   services	   industry	   to	   expand	  household	  credit	  and	  tax	  revenues	   from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  to	  2007	   in	   the	  context	  of	  low	  global	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rates	  and	  high	  global	  liquidity	  that	  characterised	  the	   period.23	   This	   capacity	   sustained	   expanding	   domestic	   demand	   by	   bolstering	  household	  consumption	  spending	  while	  geographically	  redistributing	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  and	  ‘para-­‐state’	  sectors	  through	  rising	  public	  spending.24	  The	  model	  was	  increasingly	  premised	  on	  a	  financial	  boom	  in	  securitised	  credit	  products	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’.	  21	  Where	  ‘sustainability’	  denotes	  longevity,	  rather	  than	  environmental	  sustainability.	  See	  C.	  Crouch	  (2012b),	  'Employment,	  Consumption,	  Debt,	  And	  European	  Industrial	  Relations	  Systems',	  Industrial	  Relations,	  51	  (2),	  pp.389-­‐412;	  Froud	  et	  al	  (2011),	  ‘Buyer’s	  Remorse’;	  Hay	  (2013a),	  ‘The	  British	  Growth’;	  R.	  Wade	  (2009b),	  'The	  Global	  Slump:	  Deeper	  Causes,	  Harder	  Lessons',	  Challenge,	  52	  (5),	  pp.5-­‐24;	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’.	  22	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’.	  23	  Some	  have	  referred	  to	  Britain’s	  growth	  model	  as	  a	  ‘neoliberal’	  one,	  for	  example	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’.	  Caution	  is	  warranted	  here,	  for	  it	  is	  an	  important	  subtlety	  of	  those	  contributions	  that	  directly	  interrogate	  the	  relationship	  between	  neoliberalisation	  and	  the	  ALGM	  that	  the	  growth	  model	  was	  largely	  the	  unanticipated	  consequence	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring.	  See	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Buyer’s	  Remorse’;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’;	  C.	  Crouch	  (2012a),	  'Beyond	  The	  Flexibility/Security	  Trade-­‐Off:	  Reconciling	  Confident	  Consumers	  With	  Insecure	  Workers',	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Industrial	  
Relations,	  50	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐22;	  E.	  Stockhammer	  (2013a),	  'Financialisation,	  Income	  Distribution	  And	  The	  Crisis',	  in	  S.	  Fadda	  and	  P.	  Tridico	  (eds.),	  Financial	  Crisis,	  Labour	  Markets	  And	  
Institutions	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge),	  pp.98-­‐120;	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed	  And’.	  	  24	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed	  And’.	  
	   37	  
the	  rising	  financial	  profits	  and	  expanding	  credit	  to	  which	  it	  gave	  rise.	  The	  ALGM	  is	  subject	   to	   a	   number	   of	   contradictions	   and	   vulnerabilities.	   Fatefully,	   it	   was	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  an	  exogenously	  or	  endogenously	  generated	  interest	  rate	  or	  inflationary	  spike	  capable	  of	  upsetting	  the	  inflationary	  dynamic	  in	  certain	  asset	  prices	  on	  which	  credit	  expansion	  and	  financial	  sector	  profits	  depended.25	  Once	  this	  risk	   was	   realised,	   and	   then	   compounded	   by	   the	   2007-­‐08	   financial	   crisis,	   a	  temporary	  breakdown	  in	  financial	  accumulation	  set	  loose	  a	  number	  of	  pathological	  dynamics	  that	  have	  reverberated	  through	  the	  UK	  economy	  for	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  	  	  This	  vulnerability	  is	  not	  the	  only	  shortcoming	  attributed	  to	  the	  ALGM:	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	   the	   CSDP	   highlights	   a	   number	   of	   other	   contradictions	   that	   critical	   social	  democrats	  argue	  would	  render	  the	  model	  unsustainable	  in	  the	  long	  term	  even	  had	  these	   vulnerabilities	   not	   been	   realised	   in	   the	   banking	   crisis	   of	   2007-­‐2008.	  Consequently	   for	   critical	   social	   democrats	   the	   ‘crisis’	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   is	  really	   a	   crisis	   of	   the	   ALGM.	   In	   this	   perspective	   the	   restoration	   of	   sustainable	  economic	  expansion	  requires	  a	  new	  growth	  model,	  while	  the	  likely	  consequences	  of	  a	  ‘patched-­‐up’	  ALGM	  are	  future	  failures	  in	  economic	  performance.	  	  ‘Privatised	  Keynesianism’	  
	  The	  activities	  of	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  services	  industry	  and	  their	  consequences	  for	  the	  wider	  economy	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  CSDP.	  One	  such	  consequence	  was	  the	  expansion	  of	  household	  and	  consumer	  credit	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  consumption	  spending	  of	  households.	  In	  Crouch’s	  ironic	  phrase,	  a	  dynamic	  of	  ‘privatised	  Keynesianism’	  was	  at	   play	   in	   the	   ALGM	   in	   which	   economic	   growth	   was	   sustained	   by	   household’s	  leveraged	   consumption	   spending	   and	   the	   leverage	   opportunities	   and	   confidence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’.	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enhancing	   effects	   of	   capital	   gains	   on	   rising	   house	   prices.26	   The	   effect	   of	   the	  resulting	  consumer	  spending	  was	  to	  stimulate	  domestic	  demand	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	   that	   a	   traditional	   Keynesian	   counter-­‐cyclical	   fiscal	   stimulus	   might.	   In	   this	  subsection	  I	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  empirical	  indicators	  appealed	  to	  by	  critical	  social	  democrats	   when	   making	   this	   claim,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   institutional	   factors	   that	   are	  identified	  as	  having	  underpinned	  it.	  	  At	  the	  core	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  scale	  and	  accessibility	  of	  personal	  credit	  in	  the	  UK	  had	  reached	  unprecedented	  levels	  in	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  2008.	  In	  un-­‐disaggregated	  terms,	  levels	  of	  outstanding	  personal	  debt	  reached	  nearly	  £1.4Tn	  by	   the	   beginning	   of	   2008,	   the	   same	   statistic	   having	   stood	   at	   £574bn	   in	   1993.27	  Around	   £1.2tn	   of	   this	   2008	   total	   was	   composed	   of	   secured	   lending,	   while	   total	  consumer	   lending	  stood	  at	  £235bn	  (having	  stood	  at	  around	  £50bn	   in	  1993).28	   In	  2009	   the	   average	  UK	  adult	   owed	  £9,280	   in	   consumer	  debt,	   comprised	  mostly	   of	  personal	   loans	   (41%)	   and	   credit	   card	   bills	   (49%).29	   At	   this	   point	   the	   ratio	   of	  household	  debt	  to	  disposable	   income	  stood	  at	  154%.30	  There	  had	  been	  a	  marked	  increase	   in	  availability	  of	  unsecured	  credit	   for	   those	  on	   lower	   incomes	   in	   the	  UK	  since	  the	  1980s,	  much	  in	  the	  form	  of	  credit	  card	  availability.31	  Montgomerie	  notes	  that	   between	   1995	   and	   2000	   households	   in	   the	   bottom	   two	   income	   brackets	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  C.	  Crouch	  (2008),	  'What	  Will	  Follow	  The	  Demise	  Of	  Privatised	  Keynesianism?',	  The	  
Political	  Quarterly,	  79	  (4),	  pp.476-­‐87;	  C.	  Hay,	  N.J.	  Smith,	  and	  M.	  Watson	  (2006),	  'Beyond	  Prospective	  Accountancy:	  Reassessing	  The	  Case	  For	  British	  Membership	  Of	  The	  Single	  European	  Currency	  Comparatively',	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  And	  International	  
Relations,	  8	  (1),	  pp.101-­‐21;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  
Of;	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2007b),	  'Financialisation	  And	  Consumption:	  An	  Alternative	  Account	  Of	  Rising	  Consumer	  Debt	  Levels	  In	  Anglo-­‐America',	  CRESC	  Working	  Papers	  (44;	  Manchester:	  CRESC);	  Watson	  (2010),	  'House	  Price	  Keynesianism’;	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  
Complacence;	  A	  further	  irony	  being	  that	  while	  ‘nationalised	  Keynesian’	  policies	  were	  intentionally	  counter-­‐cyclical,	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  embodies	  no	  such	  coordinated	  purpose	  and,	  Crouch	  argues,	  proved	  emphatically	  pro-­‐cyclical.	  27	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2008),	  Social	  Trends	  38	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  p.88.	  28	  These	  figure	  are	  compiled	  by	  The	  Money	  Charity	  (formerly	  Credit	  Action)	  from	  Bank	  of	  England	  data.	  Credit	  Action	  (2014),	  'Debt	  Facts	  And	  Figures,	  December	  2008',	  <http://themoneycharity.org.uk/media/december-­‐2008.pdf>,	  accessed	  24/04/2014,	  pp.1-­‐2.	  29	  The	  figures	  are	  drawn	  from	  British	  Household	  Panel	  Survey	  data	  by	  The	  Young	  Foundation.	  The	  Young	  Foundation	  (2009),	  Sinking	  &	  Swimming:	  Understanding	  Britain’s	  
Unmet	  Needs	  (London:	  The	  Young	  Foundation),	  p.54.	  30	  Department	  of	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  (2008),	  Household	  Debt	  
Monitoring	  Paper	  H1	  2008	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  pp.13-­‐14;	  	  31	  Montgomerie	  (2007a),	  ‘The	  Logic	  Of	  Neoliberalism’;	  Montgomerie	  (2007b),	  ‘Financialisation	  and	  Consumption’.	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(below	  £17,500	  and	  £11,500	  per	  annum)	  saw	  the	  largest	  expansion	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  unsecured	  debt	  to	  income,	  with	  unsecured	  debt	  amounting	  to	  an	  average	  of	  35.9%	  of	  household	  income	  in	  the	  lower	  bracket	  (up	  from	  8.7%	  in	  1995).32	  Rising	  house	  prices	  at	  this	  time	  generated	  improvements	  in	  household	  balance	  sheets	  and	  had	  thus	   increased	   the	   scope	   for	   home	   owners	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   ‘home	  equity	   withdrawal’	   (HEW)	   –	   secured	   loans	   against	   their	   properties	   made	   for	  purposes	  other	   than	  house	  purchase.	  Hay	  notes	   that	   in	  2006,	   at	  which	  point	   the	  average	  house	  price	  in	  the	  UK	  had	  topped	  £200,000	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  wealth	  effect	  of	  rising	  house	  prices	  was	  equal	  to	  around	  75%	  of	  the	  average	  annual	  pre-­‐tax	  income	  of	  approximately	  £30,000	  per	  annum.33	  He	  further	  notes	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  new	  mortgage	  lending	  accounted	  for	  by	  HEW	  rose	  sharply	  between	  2002	  and	  2004,	  at	  which	  point	  £1	  in	  every	  £6	  of	  new	  mortgage	  lending	  being	  was	  made	   for	  equity	   release.34	  Between	  2002	  and	  2006,	   total	  HEW	  was	  worth	  6%	  of	  total	  household	  post-­‐tax	  income.35	  	  	  The	   notion	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   implies	   that	   credit	   is	   either	   directly	   or	  indirectly	   ‘driving’	  consumer	  spending.	  A	  null	  hypothesis	   is	   that	  credit	   is	  used	   to	  finance	  the	  purchase	  of	  non-­‐housing	  assets	  or	  to	  pay	  down	  debt.36	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	   assume	   that	   credit	   card	   debt	   generally	   services	   consumption.	   There	   remains,	  however,	   a	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   precise	   proportion	   of	   HEW	   that	  was	  invested	  into	  consumption	  in	  the	  years	  running	  up	  to	  2007.37	  A	  strong	  correlation	  existed	   between	   HEW	   and	   GDP	   growth	   in	   cyclical	   upturns	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	  2000s.38	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   the	  value	  of	  HEW	  actually	   exceeded	   the	  value	  of	  GDP	  growth.39	   Hay	   et	   al.	   calculate	   that	   between	   2002	   and	   2006,	   credit-­‐fuelled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Montgomerie	  (2007a),	  ‘The	  Logic	  Of	  Neoliberalism’,	  p.169.	  33	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’,	  p.18.	  34	  C.	  Hay	  (2009a),	  'Good	  Inflation,	  Bad	  Inflation:	  The	  Housing	  Boom,	  Economic	  Growth	  And	  The	  Disaggregation	  Of	  Inflationary	  Preferences	  in	  The	  UK	  And	  Ireland',	  The	  British	  Journal	  
of	  Politics	  and	  International	  Relations,	  11	  (3),	  p.471.	  35	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2008),	  Social	  Trends	  38,	  p.88.	  36	  S.	  Nickel	  (2004),	  'Household	  Debt,	  House	  Prices	  And	  Consumption	  Growth',	  Speech	  given	  
by	  Professor	  Stephen	  Nickell,	  Bank	  Of	  England	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  at	  Bloomberg,	  London,	  14/09/2004.	  37	  Froud	  et	  al	  offer	  a	  ‘guesstimate’	  of	  two	  thirds	  over	  the	  1997-­‐2009	  period,	  although	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  on	  what	  foundation	  this	  estimation	  is	  based,	  see	  Froud	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’,	  p.21.	  Others	  –	  namely	  Nickell	  in	  the	  piece	  cited	  above	  –	  have	  contested	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  HEW	  was	  being	  invested	  in	  consumption.	  38	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles;	  Froud	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’.	  	  39	  Froud	  et	  al,	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’,	  pp.	  21-­‐25.	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consumption	  was	  worth	  between	  4	  and	  6%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  could	  therefore	  it	  alone	  be	  said	   to	   be	   responsible	   for	   keeping	   the	   economy	   in	   growth	   in	   this	   period.40	  However,	  as	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  note,	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  HEW	  drives	  GDP	   growth	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   further	   degree	   of	   empirical	   complexity	   upon	   closer	  examination.	  During	  the	  period	  in	  the	  2000s	  in	  which	  HEW	  and	  GDP	  were	  rising	  in	  a	  correlated	  fashion	  household	  spending	  growth	  was	  on	  a	  downward	  trend.41	  This	  challenges	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘consumer	   boom’,	   for	   a	   simple	   positive	   correlation	  between	   household	   leverage	   and	   expanding	   consumption	   is	   absent.	   Moreover,	  official	   figures	   assert	   that	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   HEW	   (56%)	   was	   being	   used	   to	  finance	  home	  improvements	  in	  2006-­‐07,	  whilst	  29%	  was	  being	  used	  to	  pay	  down	  debt.42	  Such	  spending	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  neutral	  in	  macroeconomic	  terms,	  yet	  these	  observations	  add	   further	  complexity	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  direct	   link	  between	  HEW,	  consumer	  spending	  and	  GDP	  growth.	  	  Yet	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  also	  note	  that	  household	  savings	  ratios	  were	  falling	  during	  the	   same	   period	   and	   that	   these	   are	   positively	   related	   to	   rising	   HEW.43	   They	  postulate	   that	   home-­‐owning	   consumers	   were	   willing	   to	   tolerate	   lower	   savings	  levels	  and	  spend	  more	  than	  they	  otherwise	  would	  because	  of	  the	  capital	  gains	  they	  were	  achieving	  on	  their	  homes	  and	  the	  opportunities	   for	  HEW	  that	  this	  afforded,	  raising	  the	  counterfactual	  that	  the	  savings	  ratio	  would	  have	  been	  higher	  (and	  thus	  consumption	  spending	  on	  a	  sharper	  downward	  trend)	  were	  it	  not	  for	  rising	  house	  prices	  and	  expanding	  HEW.44	  	  	  Thus	   whilst	   further	   research	   is	   required	   on	   the	   uses	   of	   funds	   realised	   through	  HEW	  and	  the	  indirect	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  it	  might	  have	  promoted	  GDP	  growth,	  by	   pointing	   to	   the	   sheer	   scale	   of	   HEW	   critical	   social	   democrats	   are	   able	   to	  confidently	  postulate	  that	  with	  all	  else	  equal	  economic	  growth	  would	  have	  been	  a	  great	  deal	  weaker	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  secured	  and	  unsecured	  credit	  and	  the	  capital	  gains	  that	  facilitated	  the	  former,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40Hay	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  ‘Beyond	  Prospective’.	  41	  The	  authors’	  figures	  are	  drawn	  from	  ONS	  data.	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  Forever	  
Blowing	  Bubbles,	  p.9.	  42	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2008),	  Social	  Trends	  38,	  p.148.	  43	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles,	  p.9.	  44	  See	  also	  E.	  Stockhammer	  (2007),	  'Some	  Styalised	  Facts	  On	  The	  Finance-­‐Dominated	  Accumulation	  Regime',	  PERI	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  (142;	  Amhurst:	  University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Amhurst).	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real-­‐term	  wage	  stagnation	  to	  which	  I	  turn	  presently.	  Instead,	  in	  the	  seven	  years	  to	  2007	   the	   index	   of	   retail	   sales	   grew	   35%	   in	   constant	   prices,	  which	   is	  more	   than	  three	  times	  as	  fast	  as	  the	  growth	  of	  disposable	  incomes.45	  	  A	   sub	  group	  of	   critical	   social	  democrats	  have	  asked	  why	   it	  was	   that	   savings	   and	  credit,	   rather	   than	   earned	   incomes,	   had	   come	   to	   fuel	   consumption.	   The	   answer	  they	  offer	  is	  the	  slowing	  (at	  times,	  stagnation)	  in	  real-­‐term	  wage	  growth	  for	  many	  British	  earners,	  and	  consequently	  a	  proportional	  decline	  in	  the	  earned	  purchasing	  power	   component	   of	   domestic	   consumption	   demand.46	   Examining	   percentage	  changes	   in	   employee	   compensation,	  Montgomerie	   notes	   compression	   in	   year	   on	  year	   fluctuations	   in	  wage	   increases	   and	   a	   downward	   trend	   in	   the	   scale	   of	  wage	  increases	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  Having	  risen	  at	  an	  average	  of	  11%	  from	  1976-­‐1986,	  the	   percentage	   change	   from	   1990	   until	   2004	   had	   exceeded	   6%	   only	   once.47	   For	  most	   nominal	   pay	   changes,	   she	   reports,	   the	   real	   wage	   increase	   was	   zero	   and	   a	  considerable	   proportion	   of	   workers	   received	   annual	   pay	   cuts	   (up	   to	   20%	   of	  workers	   depending	   on	   inflation	   conditions).48	   Lansley	   reports	   that	   real	   earnings	  for	  the	  median	  earner	  were	  near	  static	  between	  2002	  and	  2007,	  with	  the	  median	  worker	  seeing	  only	  a	  0.1%	  annual	  increase	  in	  real	  hourly	  rates.49	  Correspondingly,	  the	   period	   has	   been	   characterised	   by	  mounting	   inequality	   between	   owners	   and	  higher	  paid	  executives	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  ordinary	  employees	  on	   the	  other	   (a	  falling	   ‘wage	   share’	   of	   national	   income).	   Ryner	   has	   recently	   contributed	   a	  sophisticated	   measure	   of	   the	   wage	   share	   of	   GDP	   in	   the	   UK,	   demonstrating	   a	  downward	   trend	  since	  1980.50	  Lansley	   shows	   that	   this	  declining	  wage	   share	  has	  not	  been	  evenly	  distributed	  within	  the	  pay	  scale.	  From	  1978	  to	  2008	  the	  top	  10%	  of	  wage	   earners	   saw	   real	   gross	   earnings	  double,	  while	   the	  median	   earner	   saw	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of	  Inequality,	  p.153.	  46	  Ibid;	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  '(Re)Politicizing	  Inflation	  Policy:	  A	  Global	  Political	  Economy	  Perspective',	  CRESC	  Working	  Papers	  (53;	  Manchester:	  CRESC);	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’;	  Stockhammer	  (2013a),	  ‘Financialisation,	  Income	  Distribution’;	  M.	  Ryner	  (2012),	  'The	  (I)PE	  of	  Falling	  Wage	  Shares:	  Situating	  Working	  Class	  Agency',	  The	  British	  
Growth	  Crisis:	  The	  Search	  For	  A	  New	  Model,	  Inaugural	  Conference	  Of	  The	  Sheffield	  Political	  
Economy	  Research	  Institute	  (Sheffield,	  16-­‐18/07/2012).	  47	  Montgomerie	  (2007a),	  ‘The	  Logic	  Of	  Neoliberalism’,	  p.167.	  48	  Ibid,	  p.168.	  49	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of,	  p.48.	  50	  Ryner	  (2012),	  ‘The	  (I)PE’,	  p.26;	  Ryner	  argues	  his	  preferred	  measure	  -­‐	  employee	  compensation	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  measured	  through	  factor	  costs	  -­‐	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  than	  others	  due	  to	  its	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  wage-­‐linked	  transfer	  payments	  and	  social	  benefits	  in	  wage	  statistics,	  and	  the	  distorting	  effects	  of	  government	  taxes	  and	  subsidies	  in	  GDP	  measured	  through	  market	  prices.	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56%	  increase	  and	  the	  bottom	  10%	  saw	  27%.51	  This	  inequality	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  macroeconomic	   implications	  because	  high	  wage	  earners	  have	  a	   lower	  propensity	  to	  consume,	  and	  are	  able	   to	   invest	   their	  earnings	   in	   funds	  that	  were	   increasingly	  becoming	  centred	  on	  speculative	  and	  non-­‐productive	  business	  strategies	  –	  a	  trend	  examined	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  third	  subsection.52	  	  	  This,	   along	   with	   arguments	   about	   household	   spending	   and	   HEW,	   amounts	   to	   a	  claim	   of	   a	   latent	   crisis	   of	   under	   consumption	   in	   the	   UK	   offset	   by	   privatised	  Keynesianism.	   When	   the	   cost	   of	   servicing	   debt	   rose	   and	   the	   supply	   of	   credit	  contracted	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   banking	   crisis	   of	   2007-­‐08,	   so	   consumption	  demand	  contracted	  as	  well.	  This	  failure	  of	  the	  growth	  model’s	  central	  element	  is,	  in	  essence,	  the	  core	  of	  the	  critical	  social	  democratic	  assessment	  of	  the	  stagnationary	  malaise	  that	  has	  hovered	  over	  the	  British	  economy	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  	  The	  institutional	  factors	  identified	  by	  critical	  social	  democrats	  as	  being	  at	  the	  root	  of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   fall	   into	   four	   areas.	   The	   first	   relate	   to	   business	  practices	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  that	  facilitated	  the	  development	  and	  profitability	  of	  financial	   businesses	   centred	   on	   the	   expansion	   of	   household	   and	   personal	   credit.	  These	   are	   discussed	   separately	   in	   the	   third	   subsection.	   The	   second	   relate	   to	  changes	   in	  macroeconomic,	   industrial	  relations	  and	   labour	  market	  policies	   in	  the	  UK	  that	  lie	  behind	  the	  stagnation	  of	  real	  wages	  just	  discussed.	  The	  third	  relates	  to	  labour-­‐commodifying	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  policy	  practices	  in	  other	  countries	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  low-­‐inflation,	  low	  interest	  rate	  equilibrium	  on	  which	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  was	  based.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  housing	  and	  savings	  policies	  that	  lie	  at	  the	   root	   of	   house	   price	   inflation	   and	   the	   willingness	   of	   British	   consumers	   to	  leverage	  their	  consumption	  and	  investment	  activities	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  did.	  I	  examine	  these	  in	  turn.	  	  According	   to	   those	   critical	   social	   democrats	   that	   take	   up	   the	   question	   of	   wage	  stagnation	   the	   phenomenon	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   neoliberalisation	   of	   the	   British	  political	   economy	   and	   the	   changes	   to	  macroeconomic	   and	   labour	  market	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of,	  p.48.	  52	  Wade	  (2009a),	  ‘The	  Global	  Slump’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of.	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that	  it	  entailed.53	  Their	  argument	  is	  that	  successive	  governments	  have	  deliberately	  sought	  price	  flexibility	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  as	  a	  means	  to	  their	  broader	  economic	  policy	  goals	  of	  controlling	  consumer	  price	  inflation	  and	  promoting	  labour	  market	  flexibility.	   The	  most	   general	   institutional	   factor	   here	   is	   the	   over-­‐arching	   shift	   in	  macro-­‐economic	  policy	  objectives	  that	  have	  occurred	  since	  the	  late	  1970s,	  with	  the	  abandonment	  of	  full	  employment	  as	  an	  objective	  of	  macroeconomic	  policy	  and	  of	  the	   quasi-­‐corporatist	   arrangements	   that	   had	   characterised	   the	   macro-­‐economic	  management	   of	   the	   previous	   decades.54	   Since	   this	   time,	   policymakers	   have	  exhibited	   a	   greater	   tolerance	   of	   unemployment	   and	   lower	   real	   income	   growth,	  with	  the	  imperative	  to	  stable	  inflation	  often	  invoked	  as	  a	  justification.55	  The	  effect	  is	   to	   place	   the	   burden	   of	   counter-­‐inflationary	   policy	   on	   to	   the	  majority	   of	   wage	  earners	  who	  occupy	  middle	  and	  lower	  income	  brackets.56	  	  	  A	  prominent	   feature	   of	   roll	   back	  neoliberalisation	   in	  Britain	  has	  been	   the	  use	   of	  cumulative	  rounds	  of	  legislation	  to	  contain	  the	  power	  of	  organised	  labour.57	  Such	  legislation	  was	  conceived	  of	  quite	  openly	  as	  a	  means	  of	  redressing	  the	  balance	  of	  economic	   power	   in	   favour	   of	   managers	   and	   owners,	   restoring	   their	   bargaining	  position	  in	  pay	  deals	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  acquire	  and	  shed	  labour	  rapidly.58	  These	  included	   greater	   exposure	   of	   unions	   to	   tort	   laws,	   the	   substantial	   weakening	   of	  permissible	  strike	  action	  (including	  the	  elimination	  of	  ‘flying	  pickets’	  and	  solidarity	  strikes),	  and	  the	  strengthening	  of	  employers’	  rights	  to	  transact	  with	  non-­‐unionised	  labour	   and	   firms	   that	   served	   to	   undermine	   recruitment.	   As	   the	   UK	   economy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’;	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2006),	  'Giving	  Credit	  Where	  It's	  Due:	  Public	  Policy	  and	  Household	  Debt	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Canada',	  Policy	  and	  Society,	  25	  (3),	  pp.109-­‐41;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Ryner	  (2012),	  ‘The	  (I)PE’;	  M.	  Watson	  (2002a),	  'The	  Institutional	  Paradoxes	  of	  Monetary	  Orthodoxy:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Central	  Bank	  Independence',	  Review	  of	  
International	  Political	  Economy,	  9	  (1),	  pp.183-­‐96;	  Stockhammer	  (2013a),	  ‘Financialisation,	  Income	  Distribution’;	  E.	  Stockhammer	  (2013b),	  Why	  Have	  Wage	  Shares	  Fallen?	  A	  Panel	  
Analysis	  Of	  The	  Determinants	  Of	  Functional	  Income	  Distribution	  (Geneva:	  International	  Labour	  Organisation).	  54	  Montgomerie,	  (2007),	  ‘The	  Logic	  of	  Neoliberalism’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Crouch	  (2009),	  ‘Privatised	  Keynesianism’.	  55	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’;	  Hay	  (2004a),	  ‘The	  Normalising	  Role’;	  Watson	  (2002a),	  ‘The	  Institutional	  Paradoxes’.	  56	  Montgomerie	  (2007a),	  ‘The	  Logic	  Of	  Neoliberalism’;	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’.	  57	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of.	  58	  Montgomerie	  (2006),	  ‘Giving	  Credit’;	  D.	  Farnham	  (1990),	  'Trade	  Union	  Policy	  1979-­‐1989:	  Restriction	  Or	  Reform?',	  in	  S.P.	  Savage	  and	  D.	  Farnham	  (eds.),	  Public	  Policy	  Under	  
Thatcher	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.60-­‐74.	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underwent	   a	   transition	   away	   from	   the	  unionised	  manufacturing	   sectors	   towards	  service	   industries,	  organised	   labour	   lacked	   the	  capacity	   to	   impose	   itself	  on	   these	  growth	   sectors,	   and	   so	   declined	   in	   significance	   as	   an	   actor	   in	   political-­‐economic	  struggle.59	   For	   Lansley	   and	   for	   Hall,	   the	   containment	   and	   eclipsing	   of	   organised	  labour	   in	   the	   UK	   is	   alone	   sufficient	   to	   explain	   falling	   wage	   share	   and	   rising	  economic	  inequality.60	  
	  Montgomerie	   also	   points	   to	   the	   increasing	   prevalence	   of	   ‘cost	   of	   living	   adjusted’	  (COLA)	  pay	  deals,	  which	  formally	   link	  wage	  rises	  to	  the	  consumer	  prices	   index.61	  Although	   unable	   to	   offer	   data	   showing	   the	   exact	   extent	   of	   these	   instruments,	  Montgomerie	   notes	   use	   in	   both	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sectors	   and	   also	   in	   some	  union	  pay	  bargains,	   suggesting	   the	   instrument’s	  widespread	  acceptance.	  By	   their	  very	  nature,	  COLA	  settlements	  are	  designed	  to	  bring	  about	  stagnation	  in	  real	  wage	  inflation.	  Yet	  Montgomerie	  suggests	  that	  such	  instruments	  might	  also	  bring	  about	  an	   increase	   in	   purchasing	   power	   under	   certain	   circumstances	   because	   of	   the	  methodology	  through	  which	  CPI	  is	  calculated.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  next	  institutional	  factor,	  the	  basket	  of	  goods	  from	  which	  CPI	  is	  calculated	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  deflationary	  pressures	  from	  export-­‐led	  growth	  models.	  However,	  the	  same	   is	   not	   necessarily	   true	   of	   other	   household	   necessities	   such	   as	   gas	   or	  electricity,	   creating	   a	   scenario	   in	  which	   COLA	  pay	   deals	   can	   inadequately	   reflect	  the	   full	   range	   of	   pressures	   on	   household	   incomes	   and	   contribute	   towards	  deflationary	  pressures	  on	  incomes.	  	  	  The	   issue	   of	   purposefully	   wage	   stagnationary	   stances	   by	   governments	   (‘wage	  repression’)	   is	   an	   area	   in	   which	   the	   CSDP	   overlaps	   with	   a	   broader	   literature	   in	  critical	   IPE	   that	   investigates	   the	   outcomes	   of	   different	   kinds	   of	   wage-­‐repressive	  policies	   and	   income	   inequality	   for	   the	   growth	   and	   stability	   of	   the	   international	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  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’.	  60	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Hall	  (2013),	  ‘The	  Political	  Origins’.	  61	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’.	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capitalist	   economy.62	   In	   common	  with	   this	   literature	   a	   number	   of	   critical	   social	  democrats	   have	   noted	   that	   an	   important	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   leveraged	  consumption-­‐led	  growth	  models	  such	  as	  the	  ALGM	  are	  export-­‐led	  growth	  models	  such	   as	   those	   of	   Germany,	   China,	   East	   Asia	   and	   oil	   exporting	   countries.63	  Wage	  stagnation	  and	  labour	  market	  flexibility	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  these	  economies	  as	  it	  is	   in	   consumption-­‐led	   economies,	   yet	   in	   these	   economies	   growth	   has	   been	  sustained	   by	   foreign	   demand	   emanating	   from	   the	   consumption-­‐led	   economies.	  Consequently,	  global	  growth	  had	  come	  to	  be	  sustained	  by	  current	  account	  deficits	  and	   the	   effects	   of	   credit	   expansion	   and	   capital	   gains	   in	   countries	   with	   growth	  models	   such	   as	   the	   ALGM.64	   Much	   of	   the	   commentary	   has	   focused	   on	   China	  because	  it	  is	  now	  the	  world’s	  major	  exporter	  of	  consumer	  goods,	  with	  factors	  such	  as	   the	   pegging	   of	   the	   Renminbi,	   restrictions	   on	   welfare	   provision	   and	  concomitantly	   high	   household	   and	   public	   savings	   ratios	   cited	   as	   central	   to	   its	  growth	  model.	  65	  	  There	  are	  three	  important	  consequences	  of	  these	  export-­‐led	  growth	  models	  for	  the	  ALGM.	  First,	  the	  running	  of	  persistent	  trade	  deficits	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  economies,	  and	  the	  high	  savings	  ratios	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  reserves	  in	  export-­‐led	  countries,	  led	  to	  large	  financial	  surpluses	  on	  the	  part	  of	  exporting	  countries.	  The	  ‘recycling’	  of	  these	   funds	   back	   into	   investments	   in	   countries	   with	   consumption-­‐led	   growth	  models	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   lowering	   interest	   rates	   and	   stimulating	   the	  ‘search	   for	   yield’	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   ‘innovative’	   financial	   practices,	   whilst	  these	   in	   turn	   (among	   other	   things)	   sustained	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   by	  expanding	   the	   availability	   of	   credit.66	   Secondly,	   the	   supply	   of	   cheap	   consumer	  goods	  from	  these	  jurisdictions	  placed	  downward	  pressure	  on	  domestic	  inflation	  in	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  F.	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  A.	  Izurieta,	  and	  A.	  Singh	  (2011),	  'Global	  Imbalances,	  Under-­‐Consumption	  And	  Over-­‐Borrowing:	  The	  State	  Of	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  World	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  Policies',	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  And	  
Change,	  42	  (1),	  pp.228-­‐61;	  M.L.	  Mah-­‐Hui,	  M.	  Lim,	  and	  E.	  Khor	  Hoe	  (2011),	  'From	  Marx	  To	  Morgan	  Stanley:	  Inequality	  And	  Financial	  Crisis',	  Development	  And	  Change,	  42	  (1),	  pp.209-­‐27;	  A.	  Saith	  (2011),	  'Inequality,	  Imbalance,	  Instability:	  Reflections	  On	  A	  Structural	  Crisis',	  
Development	  And	  Change,	  42	  (1),	  pp.70-­‐86;	  B.	  Lucarelli	  (2012),	  'Financialisation	  And	  Global	  Imbalances:	  Prelude	  To	  Crisis',	  Review	  Of	  Radical	  Political	  Economics,	  20	  (10),	  pp.1-­‐19.	  63	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’;	  Wade,	  (2009b),	  ‘From	  Global’;	  Gamble	  (2009),	  The	  Specter;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’.	  64	  Wade	  (2009a),	  ‘From	  Global’.	  65	  Lucraelli	  (2012),	  ‘Financialisation	  and	  Global’;	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’;	  Wade	  (2009b),	  ‘The	  Global	  Slump’.	  66	  Ibid;	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  (2009),	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  (2012),	  ‘Financialisation	  and	  Global’.	  
	  46	  
the	  years	  running	  up	  to	  2006.	  This	  created	  the	  very	  low-­‐inflationary	  equilibrium	  in	  which	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  could	  operate,	  for	  credit	  could	  expand	  to	  the	  huge	  scale	   that	   it	  did	  without	   the	  need	   for	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  to	   intervene.67	  Finally,	  this	   supply	   of	   cheap	   consumer	   goods	   served	   to	   limit	   the	   politicisation	   of	   wage	  stagnation.	  Montgomerie	  notes	  that	  the	  basket	  of	  goods	  from	  which	  the	  CPI	  linked	  COLA	  pay	  deals	  was	  based	  was	  20.17%	  composed	  of	  goods	  the	  price	  of	  which	  was	  deflated	   by	   export-­‐led	   growth	  models,	   limiting	   the	   loss	   of	   purchasing	   power	   for	  lower-­‐paid	   consumers	   in	   the	   UK.68	   	   We	   might	   also	   add	   that	   this	   counter-­‐inflationary	  effect	  also	  limited	  the	  political	  capital	  to	  be	  made	  from	  an	  appeal	  to	  a	  ‘cost	  of	  living’	  crisis	  even	  as	  real	  wages	  lay	  stagnant	  for	  many.	  	  	  These	   first	   three	   institutional	   factors	   all	   militate	   against	   real	   wage	   growth.	   The	  remaining	   two	  militate	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  greater	  use	  of	   credit	  and	   the	   lowering	  of	  savings	   ratios	   on	   the	   part	   of	   consumers.	   House	   prices	   in	   the	   UK	   have	   trended	  upwards	   since	   the	  1970s,	  but	  have	  been	   subject	   to	  occasional	   episodes	  of	   above	  and	   below-­‐trend	   volatility	   often	   discussed	   in	   the	   financialistic	   language	   of	  ‘bubbles’	   and	   ‘busts’.	   The	   upswing	   in	   house	   prices	   that	   underpinned	   privatised	  Keynesianism	   began	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   and	   was	   remarkable	   not	   merely	   for	   its	  magnitude	   but	   also	   for	   its	   longevity:	   prices	   remained	   above	   trend	   for	   18	  consecutive	   quarters.69	   Policy	   and	   academic	   debates	   concerning	   the	   volatile	  behaviour	   of	   house	   prices	   in	   the	   UK	   tend	   to	   polarise	   between	   those	   who	  analytically	  prioritise	  the	  secular	  upward	  trend	  in	  UK	  house	  prices	  –	  often	  ascribed	  to	   the	   impact	   of	   restrictive	   housing	   and	   planning	   policies	   –	   and	   those	   who	  prioritise	   the	   volatile	   spikes	   and	   troughs,	   often	   characterised	   as	   the	   product	   of	  speculative	   lending	   and	   over-­‐borrowing	   on	   the	   demand	   side	   of	   the	   market.70	  Critical	   social	   democrats	   have	   paid	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   increasingly	  speculative	  character	  of	  mortgage	  lending	  in	  the	  UK	  (the	  financial	  ‘supply-­‐side’	  of	  the	   bubble,	  which	   is	   addressed	   in	   the	   third	   subsection),	   yet	   a	   number	   have	   also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’;	  A.	  Gamble	  (2012),	  'The	  United	  Kingdom:	  The	  Triumph	  Of	  Fiscal	  Realism?',	  in	  W.	  Grant	  and	  G.K.	  Wilson	  (eds.),	  The	  Consequences	  Of	  The	  
Global	  Financial	  Crisis:	  The	  Rhetoric	  Of	  Reform	  And	  Regulation	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.34-­‐50.	  68	  Montgomerie	  (2008b),	  ‘(Re)politicizing	  Inflation’,	  p.12.	  69	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  ‘Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles’,	  p.15.	  	  70	  Cf.	  A.	  Morton	  (2011),	  Cities	  for	  Growth	  (London:	  Policy	  Exchange)	  (an	  archetypal	  statement	  of	  the	  former	  view),	  and	  Hay	  (2009a),	  ‘Good	  Inflation	  Bad	  Inflation’	  (an	  example	  of	  the	  latter).	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pointed	   to	   factors	   that	   led	   to	   the	   sharp	   rise	   in	   demand	   for	  mortgage	   credit	   and	  powered	   the	   purchasing	   behaviour	   that	   sustained	   the	   bubble,	   all	   of	   which	   are	  related	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  to	  macroeconomic,	  housing	  and	  savings	  policies.	  	  Several	   critical	   social	   democrats	   have	   noted	   that	   the	   ‘New	   Labour’	   governments	  exhibited	  a	  curious	  ‘double	  standard’	  in	  their	  inflationary	  preferences,	  extolling	  the	  virtues	  of	   low	  consumer	  price	   inflation	  while	  simultaneously	   tolerating	  the	  rapid	  inflation	   of	   asset	   prices	   –	   including,	   from	   late	   2003,	   housing.71	   At	   this	   time,	   the	  government	  reformed	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  so	  as	  to	  target	  the	  CPI	  measure	  of	  inflation	  instead	  of	  the	  RPIX	  measure.	  This	  measure	  excludes	  housing,	  and	   thus	   absolved	   the	   macro-­‐economic	   policy	   regime	   of	   addressing	   the	   house-­‐price	  bubble	  even	  as	  inflation	  measured	  through	  RPIX	  began	  to	  rise	  sharply	  above	  the	   CPI	   measure.72	   Watson	   also	   noted	   the	   subsidisation	   of	   some	   public	   sector	  workers’	  mortgage	  payments	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2006	  Key	  Worker	  Living	  programme,	  an	   action	   that	   suggests	   an	   acceptance	   of	   the	   inflationary	   housing	   market	   and	   a	  willingness	   to	   explicitly	   over-­‐ride	   potentially	   counter-­‐inflationary	   forces.73	   For	  both	  Hay	  and	  Watson,	  a	  repoliticisation	  of	  monetary	  policy	  had	  occurred	  in	  which	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  had	  embraced	  the	  inflationary	  housing	  market	  as	  a	  means	  to	  other	  ends.74	  	  	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  argue	  that	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  in	  housing	  policy	  and	  financial	  regulation	  permitted	  the	  rise	  of	   the	   ‘buy-­‐to-­‐let’	  property	  holder,	  a	   feature	  unique	  to	   the	   2000s’	   housing	   bubble	   that	   helps	   explain	   its	   longevity.75	   Following	   the	  liberalisation	  of	  private	  rented	  sector	  under	  the	  1988	  Housing	  Act	  and	  the	  opening	  of	   mortgage	   markets	   to	   competition	   in	   the	   1980s	   (discussed	   in	   the	   third	  subsection),	   the	   buy-­‐to-­‐let	   market	   increased	   rapidly	   as	   lenders	   competed	   for	  market	  share	  in	  this	  profitable	  new	  sector.76	  In	  the	  period	  between	  1998	  and	  2007,	  the	   number	   of	   outstanding	   buy-­‐to-­‐let	   mortgages	   grew	   at	   more	   than	   30%	   per	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Hay	  (2009a),	  ‘Good	  Inflation	  Bad	  Inflation’;	  Watson	  (2010),	  ‘House	  Price	  Keynesianism’.	  72	  Hay	  (2009a),	  ‘Good	  Inflation	  Bad	  Inflation’,	  p.474.	  73	  Watson	  (2010),	  ‘House	  Price	  Keynesianism’.	  74	  A	  debate	  exists	  as	  to	  what	  these	  ends	  were.	  I	  revisit	  this	  debate	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  75	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  ‘Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles’.	  76	  A.	  Leyshon	  and	  S.	  French	  (2009),	  '"We	  All	  live	  in	  a	  Robbie	  Fowler	  House":	  The	  Geographies	  of	  the	  Buy	  to	  Let	  Market	  in	  the	  UK',	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  
International	  Relations,	  11	  (3),	  pp.438-­‐60.	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annum,	   and	   exceeded	   60%	   per	   annum	   between	   2000	   and	   2003.77	   As	   well	   as	  bolstering	  demand	   for	  housing,	   the	  Buy-­‐to-­‐Let	  sector	  served	  to	  restrict	  supply	  of	  housing	   stock	   to	  more	   conventional	   purchasers.	   The	   net	   annual	   loss	   of	   housing	  stock	   to	   the	   owner-­‐occupied	   sector	   arising	   from	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   buy-­‐to-­‐let	  sector	  rose	  from	  15,240	  in	  2003-­‐04	  to	  158,770	  in	  2007-­‐08	  (shortly	  after	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  housing	  bubble	  that	  underpinned	  privatised	  Keynesianism).78	  	  	  Buy-­‐to-­‐Let	  borrowers	  were	  typically	  speculative,	  seeking	  to	  leverage	  capital	  gains	  through	  a	  broad	  portfolio	  of	  housing	  assets	  in	  a	  rising	  housing	  market.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  Department	  of	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government’s	  Private	  Landlord	  Survey,	  Leyshon	   and	  French	  note	   that	  Buy-­‐to-­‐let	   borrowers	  were	   often	  highly	   leveraged	  and	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   outstanding	   mortgages	   were	   interest-­‐only.79	   This	  rendered	  many	  buy-­‐to-­‐let	  businesses	  vulnerable	   to	   changes	   in	   interest	   rates	  and	  negative	  equity,	  and	  suggests	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  hubris	  given	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  the	  UK’s	  housing	  market.	  More	  revealing	  still,	  the	  same	  survey	  also	  reports	  that	  as	  many	   as	   35%	   of	   respondents	   saw	   their	   primary	   source	   of	   income	   from	   their	  business	   arising	   out	   of	   house	   price	   appreciation,	   rather	   than	   rental	   income.80	   A	  further	   33%	   retained	   a	   role	   for	   house	   appreciation	   in	   their	   core	   business	  strategy.81	   The	   rising	   housing	   market	   on	   which	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   rested	  was	   thus	   facilitated	   by	   changes	   in	   government	   policy	   that	   impacted	   upon	   the	  supply	  and	  kinds	  of	  credit	  available,	  and	  was	  driven	  increasingly	  by	  the	  activities	  of	   speculative	   Buy-­‐to-­‐Let	   Borrowers	   to	   whom	   housing’s	   new	   role	   as	   an	   income	  bearing	  asset	  was	  very	  clear.	  	  	  Other	   critical	   social	   democrats	   have	   examined	   the	   motives	   of	   more	   general	  categories	   of	   non-­‐professional	   borrowers	   and	   investors.	   Through	   the	   work	   of	  Watson	   in	   particular	   there	   is	   a	   dialogue	   between	   the	   CSDP	   and	   the	   work	   of	   a	  number	   of	   neo-­‐Foucauldian	   ‘governmentality’	   scholars	   who	   have	   made	   the	  ‘financialisation	   of	   the	   subject’	   and	   its	   resulting	   contradictions	   their	   topic	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Leyshon	  and	  French	  (2009),	  ‘We	  All	  Live’,	  p.10.	  78	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  ‘Forever	  Blowing	  Bubbles’,	  p.40	  79	  Leyshon	  and	  French	  (2009),	  ‘We	  All	  Live’,	  pp.13-­‐14.	  80	  Ibid,	  pp.13-­‐14	  81	  Ibid,	  p.13-­‐14.	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research.82	   By	   ‘financialisation	   of	   the	   subject’,	   they	   mean	   the	   attempts	   of	  governments	   to	   reconstitute	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   citisens	   to	   incorporate	   a	   greater	  role	  for	  a	  financial	   logic	  of	  calculation	  and	  behaviour.	  A	  particular	  focus	  has	  been	  the	  turn	  by	  some	  governments	  to	   ‘asset-­‐based	  welfare’	  (ABW),	  a	  policy	  approach	  in	  which	  individuals	  are	  expected	  to	  contribute	  towards	  their	  consumption	  needs	  in	   times	   of	   emergency	   or	   in	   retirement	   by	   investing	   present	   earnings	   into	   a	  portfolio	  of	  low-­‐risk	  assets	  that	  can	  be	  liquidated	  at	  the	  point	  of	  need.	  	  	  Watson	  charts	  how	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  the	  tension	  between	   a	   macroeconomics	   premised	   on	   control	   of	   inflation	   and	   a	   faltering	  commitment	   to	   budgetary	   discipline	   with	   a	   welfare	   policy	   that	   was	   substantive	  enough	   to	   address	   the	   electorally	   disadvantageous	   outcomes	   of	   such	   policies.83	  Drawing	   on	   a	   mixture	   of	   policy	   observations,	   government	   documents	   and	  ministerial	   statements,	   he	   shows	   how	   aftefr	   2001	   the	   Labour	   governments	  increasingly	  sought	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal	  through	  a	  turn	  to	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  and	  the	   cultivation	   of	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   subjective	   identity	   and	   behaviour	   among	  citizens	   –	   that	   of	   self-­‐reliant	   and	   financially	   literate	   ‘welfare	   citizens’	  who	  would	  limit	   their	   requirements	   for	   state-­‐provided	   social	   security	   through	   their	   own	  savings	  and	  investments	  activities.84	  The	  role	  of	  government	  in	  this	  vision	  was	  to	  equip	  the	  citizen	  with	  the	  financial	  literacy	  and	  skills	  necessary	  to	  do	  this,	  and	  offer	  some	   small	   incentives	   to	  begin	  participation	   in	   financial	  markets	   at	   an	   early	   age	  (seen,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	   ‘Child	   Trust	   Funds’).	   Initially	   adopted	   as	   a	   means	   of	  promoting	   greater	   pensions	   self-­‐provision,	   under	   New	   Labour	   the	   ABW	   agenda	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  M.	  Watson	  (2008a),	  'The	  Split	  Personality	  Of	  Prudence	  In	  The	  Unfolding	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  79	  (4),	  pp.578-­‐89;	  M.	  Watson	  (2008b),	  'Constituting	  Monetary	  Conservatives	  Via	  The	  'Savings	  Habit':	  New	  Labour	  And	  The	  British	  Housing	  Market	  Bubble',	  Comparative	  European	  Politics,	  6	  (3),	  pp.285-­‐304;	  Watson	  (2010),	  ‘House	  Price	  Keynesianism’;	  M.	  Watson	  (2013a),	  'The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources	  of	  Bank	  Instability:	  Displacing	  the	  Conditions	  of	  Welfare	  State	  Fiscal	  Crisis	  under	  Pressures	  of	  Macroeconomic	  Financialisation',	  Public	  Administration,	  91	  (4),	  pp.855-­‐70;	  M.	  Watson	  (2013b),	  'New	  Labour's	  'Paradox	  Of	  Responsibility'	  And	  The	  Unraveling	  Of	  Its	  Macroeconomic	  Policy',	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  15	  (1),	  pp.6-­‐22;	  P.	  Langley	  (2007),	  'Uncertain	  Subjects’;	  P.	  Langely	  (2008),	  The	  Everyday	  Life	  of	  
Global	  Finance:	  Savings	  and	  Borrowing	  in	  Anglo-­America	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  university	  Press);	  A.	  Finlayson	  (2009a),	  'Financialisation,	  Financial	  Literacy	  and	  Asset	  Based	  Welfare',	  The	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  11	  (3),	  pp.400-­‐21.	  83	  Watson	  (2010),	  ‘House	  Price	  Keynesianism’;	  Watson	  (2013b),	  ‘New	  Labour’s	  Paradox’;	  Watson	  (2013a),	  ‘The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’;	  See	  also	  Finlayson	  (2009a),	  ‘Financialisation,	  Financial	  Literacy’.	  84	  Watson	  (2013b),	  ‘New	  Labour’s	  Paradox’;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’.	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became	   an	   increasingly	   important	   approach	   to	   tackling	   a	   range	   of	   social	   policy	  issues.	  	  As	  painted	  by	  the	  Foucauldian	  scholarship	  that	  Watson	  speaks	  to,	  the	  ABW	  agenda	  was	  at	  once	  a	  very	  intimate	  injection	  of	  neoliberal	  norms	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  identity	  and	  behaviour,	  but	  also	  a	  distinctly	  non-­‐coercive	  form	  of	  public	  policy:	  the	  principal	  means	  used	  to	  advance	  the	  agenda	  was	  exhortation,	   incentivisation	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  opportunities.85	  However,	  the	  agenda	  was	  contradictory:	  the	  kind	  of	  subject	  position	  that	  the	  citizen	  was	  being	  exhorted	  to	  take	  on	  was	  both	  that	  of	  the	  prudent	  ‘passive	  saver’	  who	  lays	  money	  aside	  for	  a	  rainy	  day,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  asset	  speculator	   seeking	   to	   profit	   from	   price	   movements,	   positions	   that	   yield	   a	   very	  different	  orientation	  to	  risk.86	  This	  contradiction	  holds	  the	  potential	  for	  unforeseen	  macroeconomic	  consequences	  insofar	  as	  it	  succeeds	  in	  changing	  citizens’	  financial	  behaviour,	  for	  it	  could	  impart	  an	  increasingly	  speculative	  character	  to	  asset	  pricing	  as	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   citizens	   begin	   to	   invest	   their	   savings	   in	   speculatively	  priced	  markets.	  It	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  ordinary	  citizens	  would	  hold	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  good	  financial	  decisions	  upon	  entering	  such	  markets.	  As	  Montgomerie	  notes,	  potent	  socially	  constructed	  forces	  such	  as	  consumerism	  can	  lead	  ‘actually	  existing’	  financialised	   subjects	   to	  make	   poorer	   investment	   and	   purchasing	   decisions	   than	  their	   idealised	   counterparts	   in	   the	   theory	   of	   ABW.87	   Leyshon	   and	   French,	   for	  instance,	  suggest	  that	  the	  willingness	  of	  some	  Buy-­‐to-­‐Let	  property	  holders	  –	  many	  of	  them	  inexperienced	  or	  first-­‐time	  business	  people	  –	  to	  enter	  the	  housing	  market	  in	  this	  highly	  speculative	  sector	  could	  be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  ABW	  agenda.88	  	  	  Whether	   or	   not	   a	   demonstrable	   relationship	   exists	   between	   New	   Labour’s	  exhortative	   reconstitution	   of	   citizens	   subjectivities,	   its	   contradictions,	   and	   the	  growth	   of	   consumer	   leverage	   and	   house	   price	   speculation	   remains	   an	   open	  question.	   However	   the	   growing	   opportunities	   for	   citizens	   to	   leverage	   their	  consumption	   and	   investment	   activities	   and	   to	   enter	   speculatively	   priced	   asset	  markets	   were	   undoubtedly	   factors	   contributing	   towards	   the	   rise	   in	   speculative	  housing	  market	  behaviour	  on	  the	  part	  of	  ordinary	  citizens,	  as	  seen	  with	  buy-­‐to-­‐let	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Finlayson	  (2009a),	  ‘Financialisation,	  Financial	  Literacy’;	  Langley	  (2007),	  ‘Uncertain	  Subjects’.	  86	  Watson	  (2013a),	  ‘The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	  87	  Montgomerie	  (2007b),	  ‘Financialisation	  And	  Consumption’.	  88	  Leyshon	  and	  French	  (2009),	  ‘We	  All	  Live’.	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landlords.	   Insofar	  as	  the	  ABW	  agenda	  sought	  to	  harness,	  encourage	  and	  facilitate	  such	  behaviour	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  implicated	  to	  some	  degree.	  	  Expansion	  Of	  The	  Para-­‐Public	  Sector	  	  Another	  channel	  by	  which	  economic	  performance	  was	  sustained	  under	  the	  ALGM	  was	   through	   the	   (geographical)	   redistribution	   of	   revenues	   arising	   from	  Britain’s	  booming	  financial	  sector	  through	  rising	  public	  spending.	  Growing	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  reflected	  the	  growth	  in	  public	  spending	  following	  New	  Labour’s	  first	   term.	   In	   the	   seven	   years	   to	   2007,	   real	   expenditure	   increased	   by	   nearly	  £200Bn,	  with	  the	  predominant	  beneficiaries	  being	  health	  and	  education	  sectors.89	  Total	  employment	  in	  the	  conventionally	  defined	  public	  sector	  rose	  between	  1998	  and	   2007	   by	   571,000	   (decreasing	   93,000	   from	   its	   2005	   peak),	   increasing	   the	  proportion	  of	  the	  workforce	  in	  public	  sector	  employment	  by	  over	  10%.90	  	  	  Yet	  Buchanan,	  et	  al.	  argue	  that	  an	  even	  greater	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  increase	  in	  employment	  between	  1998	  and	  2007	  is	  accounted	  for	  by	  public	  sector	  expansion.	  They	  estimate	  that	  by	  2007	  28%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  workforce	  was	  employed	  either	  by	  the	  ‘state’	  or	  the	  ‘para-­‐state	  sector’	  (the	  former	  denoting	  conventionally	  defined	  public	  sector	   employment,	   the	   latter	   concept	   including	   those	   businesses	   dependent	   on	  public	  sector	  funds	  or	  contracts).91	  The	  state	  and	  para-­‐state	  sector	  is	  estimated	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed’,	  p.23.	  90	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2011),	  Statistical	  Bulletin:	  Public	  Sector	  Employment	  Q1	  
2011	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  Tables	  1	  and	  5.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  number	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  reported	  here	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ONS	  data	  cited	  differs	  from	  Buchanan	  et	  al’s	  by	  an	  additional	  214,000	  employees,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  latter’s	  also	  being	  based	  on	  ONS	  data.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  reflects	  Buchannan	  et	  al.’s	  decision	  to	  exclude	  Northern	  Irish	  public	  sector	  employment	  from	  their	  sample.	  Whilst	  this	  does	  not	  detract	  from	  Buchanan	  et	  al.’s	  central	  claim	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  additional	  jobs	  were	  sustained	  indirectly	  in	  the	  ‘para-­‐state	  sector’,	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  double	  counting	  may	  occur	  if	  a	  direct	  comparison	  of	  my	  statistics	  and	  theirs	  is	  attempted.	  Consequently,	  my	  presentation	  of	  these	  two	  statistics	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  is	  made	  to	  illustrate	  the	  scale	  of	  public	  sector	  employment	  growth	  rather	  than	  to	  provide	  a	  precise	  basis	  for	  asserting	  the	  relative	  number	  of	  ‘state’	  and	  ‘para-­‐state’	  employees	  as	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  do.	  91	  Buchanan	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed’,	  p.20.	  The	  size	  of	  the	  combined	  state	  and	  para-­‐state	  sector	  employment	  total	  is	  estimated	  utilising	  ONS	  sub-­‐sectoral	  employment	  data	  drawn	  from	  its	  Annual	  Business	  Inquiry	  and	  applying	  divisors	  of	  between	  1	  and	  0.25	  to	  sub-­‐sectors	  in	  which	  business	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  dependent	  to	  some	  extent	  on	  public	  sector	  activity,	  based	  on	  the	  Analysts’	  estimates	  of	  the	  likely	  dependence	  of	  business	  in	  those	  sub-­‐sectors	  on	  such	  funds.	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account	  for	  57%	  of	  net	  employment	  growth	  nationally	  between	  1998	  and	  2007.92	  Geographically,	  it	  is	  estimated	  to	  account	  for	  over	  50%	  of	  job	  growth	  in	  all	  regions	  except	  London	  and	  the	  South.	  In	  some	  sub-­‐regions,	  such	  as	  the	  Northeast	  and	  West	  Midlands,	   it	   accounted	   for	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   employment	   growth	   over	   that	  period.93	   That	   this	   should	   have	   happened	   within	   such	   loose	   credit	   conditions	  suggest	  to	  Buchanan	  et	  al	  that	  rather	  than	  ‘crowding	  out’	  the	  private	  allocation	  of	  resources,	  the	  public	  sector	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  ‘filling	  in’	  and	  was	  the	  lead	  growth	  sector	  in	  the	  country’s	  ‘national	  business	  model’.94	  	  	  For	   Buchanan	   et	   al.	   and	   other	   critical	   social	   democrats	   a	   succinct	   institutional	  explanation	   of	   rising	   public	   spending	   can	   be	   offered:	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   large	  welfare	   state	   sustained	   through	   current	   public	   spending	   and	   the	   need	   of	   the	  Labour	  party	  to	  win	  elections	  in	  a	  competitive	  multi-­‐party	  democracy.95	  Buchanan	  et	   al.	   suggest	   that	   although	  New	   Labour	  were	   convinced	   of	   neoliberal	   nostrums	  regarding	   the	   institutional	   pre-­‐conditions	   of	   private	   sector	   employment	   growth,	  the	   governments	   inadvertently	   stumbled	   upon	   this	   geographically	   redistributive	  element	  of	  the	  ALGM	  through	  their	  attempts	  to	  maintain	  the	  support	  of	  southern	  swing	  voters	  with	  health	  and	  education	  spending	  commitments.96	  The	  unintended	  but	  politically	  and	  economically	  happy	  result	  –	  the	  better	  performance	  of	  northern	  regional	   economies	   –	   was	   sustainable	   in	   the	   medium	   term	   insofar	   as	   growing	  revenues	  could	  be	  maintained.	  	  Critical	  social	  democrats	  have	  also	  examined	  the	  institutional	  factors	  that	  militated	  against	   private	   sector	   employment	   expansion	   in	   the	   UK’s	   regional	   economies.	  Buchanan	   et	   al.’s	   argument	   that	   the	   public	   sector	   was	   ‘filling	   in’	   for	   a	   deficient	  private	   sector	   reflects	   a	  more	   general	   critical	   social	   democratic	   claim	   about	   the	  British	   economy:	   that	   it	   suffers	   from	  a	   lack	  of	   long-­‐term	   ‘productive	   investment’	  and	   that	   British	   producers	   –	   particularly	  manufacturers	   –	   are	   not	   able	   to	   reach	  their	   growth	   potential	   because	   the	   UK’s	   flourishing	   financial	   sector	   militates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Ibid,	  p.16.	  93	  Ibid,	  p.22.	  94	  See	  also	  Froud	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’.	  95	  Buchanan	  et	  al	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed’;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’.	  96	  Buchanan	  et	  al	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed’.
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against	   this	   outcome	   in	   a	   number	   of	  ways.97	   Froud	   et	   al	   note	   that	   in	   the	  decade	  from	  1998	  gross	  fixed	  capital	  investment	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  manufacturing	  output	  began	   to	  decline	   to	  an	  unprecedented	   low	  of	  around	  9%,	  well	  below	   the	   cyclical	  lows	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	   ‘90s.98	   This	   concern	  with	   the	   performance	   of	   productive	  investment	   is	   shared	   with	   a	   range	   of	   critical	   perspectives	   on	   British	   political	  economy	   going	   back	   to	   the	   seminal	   Marxian	   thesis	   developed	   by	   Anderson	   and	  Nairn.99	  Like	  these	  earlier	  writings,	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats	  perceive	  this	  lack	  of	   productive	   investment	   and	   the	  underperformance	   of	   private	   sector	   growth	   to	  arise	   from	   the	   centrality	   of	   financial	   businesses	   and	   the	   political	   influence	   of	  financial	   interests	   in	   the	   British	   political	   economy,	   and	   the	   paucity	   of	   British	  industrial	   policy	   in	   remedying	   the	   outcomes.	   In	   the	   contemporary	   critical	   social	  democratic	  literature	  these	  issues	  are	  expressed	  through	  the	  more	  recent	  concept	  of	   ‘financialisation’.	   The	   institutional	   factors	   surrounding	   financialisation	   and	   a	  lack	  of	  productive	  investment	  are	  explored	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  Personal	  and	  Household	  Credit	  Expansion	  	  The	   critical	   social	   democratic	   argument	   thus	   far	   reviewed	   amounts	   to	   the	   claim	  that	   acceptable	   economic	   performance	   in	   Britain	   (in	   terms	   of	   growth	   and	  employment)	   in	   the	   ten	   years	   to	   2007	   was	   being	   sustained	   by	   privatised	  Keynesianism	  and	  expanding	  para-­‐state	   employment	   –	   two	  elements	   of	  Britain’s	  growth	  model.	  These	  two	  components	  are	  tied	  together	  by	  their	  dependence	  on	  a	  third:	  the	  indirect	  impacts	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  sector,	  namely	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  These	  include	  the	  over-­‐valuing	  of	  Sterling,	  the	  paucity	  of	  industrial	  policy	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  capital	  market	  expectations	  on	  firm’s	  investment	  decisions.	  The	  latter	  issue	  is	  explored	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  following	  subsection.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  term	  ‘productive	  investment’	  is	  not	  used	  in	  the	  normative	  sense	  (i.e.	  to	  denote	  one	  investment	  as	  being	  more	  moral	  or	  worth	  while	  than	  another),	  but	  rather	  descriptively:	  productive	  investments	  are	  made	  in	  enterprises	  that	  produce	  goods	  or	  services	  (as	  in	  capital	  investments	  or	  the	  financing	  thereof)	  whilst	  unproductive	  investments	  are	  not	  (such	  as	  investments	  in	  the	  exchange	  of	  existing	  financial	  assets,	  or	  in	  enterprises	  that	  yield	  a	  profit	  by	  divestment	  and	  the	  asset	  stripping	  of	  productive	  enterprises).	  Critical	  social	  democrat	  addressing	  the	  poor	  performance	  of	  the	  ‘real	  economy’	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  production	  along	  these	  lines	  include	  Froud	  et	  al	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’;	  Wade	  (2009b),	  ‘The	  Global	  Slump’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  M.	  Watson	  and	  C.	  Hay	  (1998),	  'In	  The	  Dedicated	  Pursuit	  Of	  Dedicated	  Capital:	  Restoring	  An	  Indigenous	  Investment	  Ethic	  To	  British	  Capitalism',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  3	  (3),	  pp.407-­‐26.	  	  	  98	  Froud	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’,	  pp.33-­‐34.	  99	  On	  which	  see	  C.	  Hay	  (1997a),	  'A	  Sorry	  State?	  Diagnosing	  The	  British	  Affliction',	  Socialism	  
and	  Democracy,	  11	  (1),	  pp.87-­‐104.	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expansion	   of	   credit	   and	   tax	   revenues	   that	   it	   facilitated.100	   The	   scale	   of	   credit	  expansion	  has	  already	  been	  noted	   in	  the	   first	  subsection.	  The	  contribution	  of	   the	  sector	  to	  government	  revenues	  arose	  from	  the	  substantial	  profits	  that	  it	  generated.	  According	  to	  statistics	  provided	  by	  the	  industry	   itself,	   in	  each	  of	  the	  five	  years	  to	  2007	   the	   financial	   services	   industry	   contributed	   in	   excess	   of	   a	   quarter	   of	   all	  corporate	  tax	  receipts,	  peaking	  at	  27.5%	  (£12.2Bn)	  in	  2007.101	  	  In	  the	  same	  period,	  income	   tax	   receipts	   from	   financial	   sector	  workers	   did	   not	   fall	   below	  11%	  of	   the	  total	   income	   tax	   take,	   and	  were	   at	   14.6%	   (£18.2Bn)	   in	   2007.102	   Insofar	   as	   these	  figures	   are	   accepted,	   and	   if	   one	   also	   factors	   in	   the	   impact	   of	   privatised	  Keynesianism	   on	   GDP	   growth	   and	   profits	   more	   broadly,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  financial	   sector	   to	   funding	   the	   government’s	   spending	   ambitions	   is	   clear.	   The	  ALGM	  was	  very	  much	  a	  finance-­‐led	  and	  financialised	  growth	  model.	  	  
Institutional	  Bases	  Of	  Credit	  And	  Financial	  Sector	  Profit	  Expansion	  	  Engelen	   et	   al	   offer	   perhaps	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   account	   of	   the	   institutional	  factors	  and	  processes	  at	  play	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  credit	  and	  financial	  sector	  profits	  in	   the	   ALGM,	   although	   other	   critical	   social	   democrats	   share	   many	   of	   their	  observations.103	   They	   identify	   three	   processes	   at	   play.	   The	   first	   is	   the	  normalisation	  of	  a	  short-­‐termist	  conception	  of	  ‘shareholder	  value’	  maximisation	  in	  the	  UK’s	  system	  of	   industrial	   finance.	  The	  effects	  of	   this	  approach	  to	  shareholder	  value	  maximisation	  are	  said	   to	  have	  negatively	   impacted	   the	  development	  of	   the	  non-­‐financial	   economy	  by	   encouraging	   short-­‐termist	  developmental	   strategies	   in	  financial	   and	   non-­‐financial	   firms.	   The	   second	   process	   follows	   on	   from	   this,	   and	  involves	   the	   adoption	   of	   non-­‐interest	   income	   based	   business	   models	   by	   major	  retail	   and	   universal	   banks	   premised	   upon	   ‘transaction	   generation’	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  The	  direct	  impacts	  were	  rather	  smaller.	  In	  many	  estimates	  the	  financial	  services	  sector	  accounted	  for	  around	  10%	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  late	  2000s:	  a	  significant	  proportion,	  but	  comparable	  with	  other	  sectors.	  Buchannan	  et	  al.	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  direct	  job	  creation	  and	  the	  multiplier	  effects	  of	  well-­‐paid	  city	  workers	  did	  not	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  net	  employment	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  that	  they	  study.	  See	  theCityuk	  (2010),	  Economic	  
Contribution	  Of	  UK	  Financial	  Services,	  2010	  (London:	  theCityuk),	  p.1;	  J.	  Tomlinson	  (2010),	  'Sick	  But	  Not	  Dying',	  Political	  Studies	  Review,	  8	  (1),	  p.71;	  Buchanan	  et	  al	  (2009),	  ‘Undisclosed’,	  pp.12-­‐13.	  101	  theCityuk	  (2010),	  ‘Economic	  Contribution’,	  p.1.	  	  102	  Ibid,	  p.1.	  	  103	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’;	  Gamble	  (2009),	  The	  Specter;	  Stockhammer	  (2007),	  ‘Some	  Stylised’;	  Wade	  (2009a),	  ‘From	  Global’.	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prioritisation	   of	   the	   rapid,	   highly	   leveraged	   expansion	   of	   lending	   (particularly	  lending	  secured	  against	  residential	  and	  commercial	  property	  and	  lending	  to	  other	  financial	   businesses).	   They	   observe	   how	   financial	   business	   had	   become	  increasingly	   focused	   on	   originating,	   acquiring,	   managing	   and	   trading	   financial	  assets	   (and	   the	   financing	  of	   such	  activities	  by	  other	   financial	   actors)	   rather	   than	  traditional	   financial	   intermediation.	   However,	   in	   common	   with	   many	   other	  analyses	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   they	   situate	   these	   processes	   within	   a	   third:	   the	  growing	   liquidity	   of	  world	   financial	  markets	   in	   the	   years	   leading	   up	   to	   2007-­‐08	  (often	  discussed	  as	  ‘financial	  globalisation’).	  	  In	   this	   area	   there	   is	   a	   direct	   overlap	   between	   the	   CSDP	   and	   the	   broader	  comparative	   and	   international	   literatures	   on	   the	   'financialisation'	   of	   advanced	  capitalist	   economies.104	   The	   amorphous	   concept	   of	   financialisation	   refers	   to	   a	  number	   of	  more	   or	   less	   distinct	   processes.	   Insofar	   as	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   advance	   a	  definition	  that	  encompasses	  all	  applications	  of	  the	  concept	  (at	  the	  cost	  of	  analytical	  precision),	   its	   essence	   can	   be	   captured	   through	   the	   broad-­‐stroke	   definitions	  offered	   by	   Epstien	   and	   Montgomerie.	   For	   Epstien,	   financialisation	   refers	   to	   the	  “increasing	   role	   of	   financial	   motives,	   financial	   markets,	   financial	   actors	   and	  financial	   institutions	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   domestic	   and	   international	  economies”;	  while	   for	  Montgomerie	   it	   refers	   to	  a	  dynamic	  by	  which	   “individuals,	  firms	  and	  the	  macro-­‐economy	  are	  increasingly	  mediated	  by	  new	  relationships	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  W.	  Lazonick	  and	  M.	  O'Sullivan	  (2000),	  'Maximising	  Shareholder	  Value:	  A	  New	  Ideology	  For	  Corporate	  Governance',	  Economy	  And	  Society,	  29	  (1),	  pp.13-­‐35;	  G.A.	  Epstein	  (2005),	  'Introduction:	  Financialisation	  And	  The	  World	  Economy',	  in	  G.A.	  Epstein	  (ed.),	  
Financialisation	  And	  The	  World	  Economy	  (Cheltenham:	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing),	  pp.3-­‐16;	  G.R.	  Krippner	  (2005),	  'The	  Financialisation	  Of	  The	  American	  Economy',	  Socio-­Economic	  
Review,	  3	  (2),	  pp.173-­‐208;	  B.	  Fine	  (2011),	  'Neo-­‐liberalism	  In	  Retrospect?	  It's	  Financialisation,	  Stupid',	  in	  C.	  Kyung-­‐Sup,	  B.	  Fine,	  and	  L.	  Weiss	  (eds.),	  Developmental	  
Politics	  In	  Transition:	  The	  Neoliberal	  Era	  And	  Beyond	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.51-­‐69;	  E.	  Stockhammer	  (2010),	  'Financialisation	  And	  The	  Global	  Economy',	  PERI	  
Working	  Paper	  Series	  (242;	  Amhurst:	  University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Amhurst);	  J.	  Froud,	  S.	  Johal,	  and	  K.	  Williams	  (2002),	  'Financialisation	  And	  The	  Coupon	  Pool',	  Capital	  &	  Class,	  26	  (3),	  pp.119-­‐51;	  J.	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000a),	  'Shareholder	  Value	  And	  Financialisation:	  Consultancy	  Promises,	  Management	  Moves',	  Economy	  and	  Society,	  29	  (1),	  pp.80-­‐110;	  J.	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  Financialisation	  and	  Strategy:	  Narrative	  and	  Numbers	  (London:	  Routledge);	  D.M.	  Kotz	  (2010),	  'Financialisation	  And	  Neoliberalism',	  in	  G.	  Teele	  and	  S.	  McBride	  (eds.),	  Relations	  of	  Global	  Power:	  Neoliberal	  Order	  and	  Disorder	  (Plymouth:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐18;	  for	  a	  useful	  review	  see	  J.	  Froud,	  A.	  Leaver,	  and	  K.	  Williams	  (2007),	  'New	  Actors	  In	  A	  Financialised	  Economy	  And	  The	  Remaking	  Of	  Capitalism',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  12	  (3),	  pp.339-­‐47.	  
	  56	  
financial	  markets”.105	   These	   definitions	   allow	   us	   to	   identify	   at	   least	   two	   general	  categories	  of	  process	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  conceptual	  umbrella	  of	  financialisation.	  106	  There	   are	   quantitative	   processes,	   relating	   to	   the	   growing	   size	   and	   proportional	  significance	   of	   the	   financial	   businesses,	   and	   the	   size	   of	   their	   balance	   sheets	   and	  profits,	   in	   the	   national	   and	   the	   international	   economies.107	   Secondly,	   there	   are	  
qualitative	   processes,	   relating	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   financial	   activities,	   to	   the	  relationship	  between	  financial	  businesses	  and	  the	  broader	  economy	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  production,	  and	  the	  growing	  incorporation	  of	  financial	  subjectivities	  into	  the	  'everyday'	  affairs	  of	  ordinary	  citizens.	  Qualitative	  processes	  of	  financialisation	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  CSDP.	  Yet	  these	  were	  situated	  and	  enabled	  by	  the	  context	  of	  expanding	  global	  liquidity.	  	  
Quantitative	  Financialisation	  Of	  The	  International	  And	  UK	  Economies	  	  The	   financialisation	  of	   the	  UK	  economy	  has	  been	  taking	  place	   in	  an	   international	  and	   domestic	   economic	   context	   in	   which	   a	   growing	   volume	   of	   capital	   seeks	  profitable	   returns	   on	   financial	  markets	   around	   the	  world.108	  On	   an	   international	  level,	  this	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  extraordinary	  growth	  in	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  financial	  market	   participants	   since	   the	   1980s.	   Having	   occupied	   a	   similar	   level	   to	   world	  output	  in	  the	  1980s,	  the	  value	  of	  global	  assets	  had	  grown	  to	  343%	  of	  global	  GDP	  in	  2007.109	   This	   expansion	   in	   financial	   assets	   reflects	   the	   increasing	   quantity	   of	  money	   entering	   the	   international	   financial	   sector,	   adding	   liquidity	   to	   established	  markets	   and	   facilitating	   newer	   secondary	   ones	   in	   securitised	   debt	   products	   and	  their	  derivative	  assets.	  A	  parallel	  quantitative	   financialisation	  of	   the	  UK	  economy	  occurred	   alongside	   that	   of	   the	   international	   one.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   world’s	   major	  financial	   centres,	   the	  City	   could	   thrive	   in	   these	   international	   conditions.	   In	   2010	  London	   originated	   18%	   of	   cross-­‐border	   lending,	   and	   accounted	   for	   50%	   of	   all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Epstien	  (2005),	  'Introduction:	  Financialisation’,	  p.3;	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2008c),	  'Bridging	  The	  Critical	  Divide:	  Global	  Finance,	  Financialisation	  And	  Contemporary	  Capitalism',	  
Contemporary	  Politics,	  14	  (3),	  p.234.	  106	  This	  distinction	  is	  inspired	  by	  Kotz	  (2010),	  ‘Financialisation	  and	  Neoliberalism’.	  107	  Krippner	  (2005),	  'The	  Financialisation’.	  108	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of.	  109	  C.	  Roxbrugh,	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Global	  Capital	  Markets:	  Entering	  A	  New	  Era	  (McKinsey	  Global	  Institute).	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European	   investment	  banking	  activity.110	  A	   financial	  boom	  thus	  underpinned	   the	  ALGM,	  with	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  financial	  companies	  expanding	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  rate	  than	  domestic	  economic	  output.	  Having	  stood	  at	  around	  40%	  of	  GDP	  in	  1960,	  the	  combined	  asset	  bases	  of	  the	  largest	  10	  UK	  banks	  stood	  at	  450%	  in	  2010,	  which	  Barclays,	  RBS	  and	  HSBC	   (the	   three	   large	  universal	  banks)	   each	  holding	  assets	   in	  excess	   of	   100%	  of	   GDP.111	   It	   is	   in	   this	   context	   that	   the	   financial	   sector’s	   taxable	  profits	  expanded	  to	  the	  levels	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsection	  above.	  	  Another	   quantitative	   change	   has	   been	   the	   increasing	   concentration	   of	   long-­‐term	  savings	  under	   the	  management	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  different	   institutional	   investors.112	  Alongside	   the	  growth	  of	  well-­‐established	   fund-­‐types	  such	  as	  pension	  and	  mutual	  funds	  were	  a	  range	  of	  more	  specialised	  institutional	  investors	  such	  as	  hedge	  funds	  and	  private	  equity	  funds.	  The	  assets	  under	  management	  by	  the	  former	  grew	  from	  $20bn	  to	  around	  $2tn	  in	  the	  ten	  years	  to	  2007,	  whilst	  the	  average	  investment	  size	  of	  the	  former	  increased	  exponentially	  from	  2002	  at	  nearly	  20%	  per	  anum.113	  The	  international	   financial	   markets	   in	   which	   institutional	   investors	   operated	   were	  marked	  by	  a	  proliferation	  of	  increasingly	  exotic	  securitised	  fixed-­‐income	  products	  (and	  derivatives	  thereof)	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  ALGM,	  however	  the	  traditional	  stock	   remained	   the	   largest	   global	   asset	   class.114	   A	   consequence	   of	   the	   growing	  financial	  power	  of	  institutional	  investors	  is	  that	  the	  decisions	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  financial	  actors	  can	  dramatically	  alter	  the	  stock	  price	  of	  listed	  firms.	  	  The	   institutional	   factors	   that	   explain	   financial	   globalisation,	   the	   expansion	   of	  global	   liquidity	   and	   the	   growth	  of	   the	   funds	   controlled	  by	   institutional	   investors	  are	   complex	   and	   multifaceted.	   They	   include	   the	   turn	   away	   from	   ‘embedded	  liberalism’	   and	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   exchange	   and	   capital	   accounts.115	   Regarding	  the	   growth	   of	   institutional	   investors,	   some	   critical	   social	   democrats	   have	   cited	  neoliberal	   economic	   and	   social	   policies	   in	   both	   the	   UK	   and	   abroad	   as	   one	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  I.	  Eturk,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  'City	  State	  Against	  National	  Settlement:	  UK	  Economic	  Policy	  And	  Politics	  After	  The	  Crisis',	  CRESC	  Working	  Papers	  (101;	  Manchester:	  CRESC).	  111	  M.	  King	  (2010),	  'Banking:	  From	  Bagshot	  To	  Basel	  And	  Back	  Again',	  Speech	  By	  The	  
Governor	  Of	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  At	  The	  Buttonwood	  Gathering	  (New	  York,	  25/10/2010).	  112	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Engelen	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	  113	  Engelen	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence,	  figs.	  3.1	  and	  3.2.	  114	  Roxbrugh,	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Global	  Capital.	  115	  M.	  Blyth	  (2008),	  'The	  Politics	  Of	  Compounding	  Bubbles:	  The	  Global	  Housing	  Bubble	  In	  Comparative	  Perspective',	  Comparative	  European	  Politics,	  6	  (3),	  pp.387-­‐406.	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contributing	  factor.	  For	  Engelen	  et	  al,	  the	  growing	  flows	  of	  funds	  into	  pension	  and	  insurance	   funds	   are	   partly	   reflective	   of	   a	   ‘great	   risk	   shift’	   occurring	   in	  neoliberalising	  political	  economies,	  whereby	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  state	  welfare	  and	  service	   provision	   requires	   the	   greater	   utilisation	   of	   private	   management	   of	  personal	  risks.116	  Similarly,	  Watson	  has	  identified	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  policies	  that	  inculcate	   the	   rationality	   of	   the	   ‘investor	   subject’	   as	   a	   channel	   through	   which	   a	  greater	  number	  of	   individuals	  were	  being	  encouraged	  and	  given	  opportunities	  to	  participate	   in	   various	   forms	   of	   funds.117	   The	   implementation	   of	   wage-­‐stagnationary	  policies	  discussed	  in	  a	  previous	  subsection	  have	  also	  been	  argued	  to	  play	   a	   part,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   corollary	   of	   falling	  wages	   –	   rising	   profit	   share	   (which	   is	  extended	   by	   some	   authors	   to	   include	   senior	   executive	   pay)	   –	   that	   has	   yielded	  additional	  money	  with	  which	  hedge	  funds	  and	  various	  other	  wealth	  management	  entities	   build	   their	   capital	   bases.118	   Finally,	   similar	   low	  wage	   policies	   in	   the	   Far	  East	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   sovereign	  wealth	   funds,	   the	   fastest	   growing	  component	  of	   the	  global	   ‘liquidity	  glut’	   that	   served	   to	   lower	  global	   interest	   rates	  prior	  to	  2007-­‐2008.119	  	  	  
Capital	  Market	  Short-­Termism	  	  The	   financial	  power	  of	  British	   institutional	   investors	   lies	   at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   first	  qualitative	  process	  of	  financialisation	  that	  critical	  social	  democrats	  have	  identified	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ALGM:	  the	  economically	  damaging	  impact	  of	  increasingly	  short-­‐termist	   capital	   market	   actors.	   The	   character	   that	   they	   attribute	   to	   institutional	  investors	  –	  that	  they	  operate	  to	  short	  time	  horizons,	  and	  have	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  liquidity	  –	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  venerable	  distinction	  between	  ‘capital	  market-­‐based’	   and	   ‘bank-­‐based’	   systems	   of	   industrial	   finance,	   with	   the	   UK	   being	   an	  instance	  of	  the	  former.120	  Critical	  social	  democrats	  have	  favoured	  the	  latter	  for	  the	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  Engelen	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	  117	  Watson	  (2010),	  ‘House	  Price	  Keynesianism’;	  Watson	  (2013a),	  ‘The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	  118	  Lansley,	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of.	  119	  Wade	  (2009a),	  ‘From	  Global	  Imbalances’.	  120	  A.	  Gerschenkron	  (1962),	  Economic	  Backwardness	  In	  Historical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press);	  J.	  Zysman	  (1983),	  Governments,	  Markets	  And	  Growth:	  
Financial	  Systems	  And	  The	  Politics	  Of	  Reform	  (Ithaca:	  Cornel	  University	  Press);	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (1998),	  ‘In	  The	  Dedicated	  Pursuit’;	  For	  a	  review	  of	  this	  literature	  See	  R.	  Pollin	  (1995),	  'Financial	  Structures	  And	  Egalitarian	  Economic	  Policy',	  PERI	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  (182;	  Amhurst	  University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Amhurst).	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‘patient	   capital’	   that	   they	   are	   said	   to	   offer	   and	   chastised	   the	   former	   for	   the	  tendency	   that	   they	   argue	   such	   systems	   show	   towards	   a	   deficiency	   of	   investor	  patience	  and	  long-­‐term	  investment	  in	  non-­‐financial	  enterprises.121	  The	  expectation	  is	   that	   (all	   other	   things	   equal)	   levels	   of	   investment	   and	   long-­‐term	   economic	  performance	   will	   be	   lower	   under	   capital	   market	   systems,	   because	   firms	   must	  internalise	  and	  meet	  their	  investors’	  preferences	  for	  fast	  returns	  and	  liquidity.	  	  	  Many	  years	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  debate	  the	  jury	  remains	  out	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  simple	  institutional	  binary	  can	  offer	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  investment	  performance	  and	  economic	  outcomes	  across	  broad	  stretches	  of	  time	  and	  space.122	  A	  number	  of	  critical	  social	  democrats	  have,	  however,	  located	  Britain	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  a	  related	  trend	  that	  they	  argue	  is	  particularly	  damaging	  to	  non-­‐financial	  businesses	   in	  capital	  market-­‐centred	  financial	  systems	  such	  as	  Britain’s:	  the	   emergence	   in	   recent	   decades	   of	   an	   aggressively	   short-­‐term	   norm	   of	  ‘Shareholder	  Value	  Maximisation’	  amongst	  capital	  market	  actors	  and	  management	  consultants.123	   In	   this	   view,	   ‘shareholder	   value’	   came	   to	   be	   understood	   among	  capital	   market	   actors	   and	   the	   financial	   commentariat	   as	   a	   readily	   quantifiable	  outcome	   with	   which	   metrics	   were	   constructed	   to	   rank	   the	   performance	   of	  individual	  firms	  (and	  towards	  the	  attainment	  of	  which	  consultancy	  services	  could	  be	   purchased).124	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   norm	   capital	   markets	   began	   to	   expect	   and	  demand	   returns	   on	   equity	   at	   scales	   and	   timeframes	   that	   are	   simply	   beyond	   the	  capacity	   of	   mature	   industries	   to	   deliver	   through	   production-­‐centred	   business	  strategies.125	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (1998),	  ‘In	  The	  Dedicated	  Pursuit’;	  M.	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  (2005),	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  Funds,	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  And	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  The	  Political	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  76	  (4),	  pp.516-­‐28.	  122	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  a	  critical	  view	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  R.	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  (2002),	  'Bank-­‐Based	  Or	  Market-­‐Based	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  Systems:	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  Journal	  Of	  Financial	  Intermediation,	  11	  (4),	  pp.398-­‐428.	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  J.	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000b),	  'Restructuring	  For	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  Value	  And	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  Implications	  For	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  Cambridge	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  24	  (6),	  pp.771-­‐97;	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000a),	  'Shareholder	  Value	  And’;	  J.	  Montgomerie	  (2008a),	  'Labour	  And	  The	  Locusts:	  Private	  Equity's	  Impact	  On	  The	  Economy	  And	  The	  Labour	  Market',	  7th	  British-­German	  Trades	  
Union	  Forum	  (Manchester,	  16-­‐17th	  July	  2008);	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Stockhammer	  (2007),	  'Some	  Stylised	  Facts’;	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	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  The	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  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000a),	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  And’.	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  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000b),	  'Restructuring	  For	  Shareholder’;	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  
Financialisation	  And’;	  Montgomerie	  (2008a),	  'Labour	  And	  The’;	  Engelen	  et	  al	  (2012),	  After	  
The	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  Complacence.	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In	  developing	  this	   line	  of	  argument,	  critical	  social	  democrats	  have	  incorporated	  a	  further	  institutional	  characteristic	  of	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  economy	  into	  the	  critique:	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  ‘liquid	  market	  for	  corporate	  control’.	  The	  term	  is	  a	  neologism	  of	  the	   1980s	   that	   refers	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   senior	   executives	   ought	   to	   compete	   for	  their	   positions	   through	   corporate	   performance	   as	   measured	   by	   shareholder	  value.126	  For	  proponents	  of	  shareholder	  value	  maximisation,	  the	  threat	  of	  takeover	  and	  management	   changes	   that	   it	  brings	   is	   said	   to	  align	   the	   strategic	  priorities	  of	  managers	   to	   that	   of	   its	   shareholders.	   The	   UK	   indeed	   has	   a	   liquid	   market	   for	  corporate	   control:	   takeovers	   are	   frequent	   and	   a	   high	   proportion	   result	   in	  managerial	   replacement.127	   Although	   take-­‐over	   ‘waves’	   have	   occurred	   at	   other	  times	   in	   the	   history	   of	   British	   capitalism,	   a	   common	   motif	   of	   the	   wave	   that	  occurred	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   was	   the	   justification	   of	   hostile	   take-­‐overs	  (including	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  private	  equity	  buy-­‐outs)	  as	  being	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  restructure	  the	  company	  so	  as	  to	  deliver	  greater	  shareholder	  value.128	  	  Critical	  social	  democrats	  are	  less	  optimistic	  than	  proponents	  of	  shareholder	  value	  as	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  norm	  and	  the	  behaviours	  to	  which	  it	  gives	  rise	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	   prosperity	   of	   financial	   and	   non-­‐financial	   businesses.	   Indeed,	   the	   negative	  impacts	  of	   these	  changes	  are	  cited	  as	  reasons	  both	   for	   the	  under-­‐performance	  of	  Britain’s	   private	   sector	   and	   the	   ultimately	   self-­‐destructive	   business	   strategies	   of	  several	  British	  banks	  under	   the	  ALGM.129	  Firms	  are	  said	   to	   increasingly	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  on	  the	  stock	  markets,	  seeking	   to	  slake	  capital	  market	  demands	  for	   stock	  appreciation	  and	  maintain	   the	  market	  value	  of	   the	   firm	   through	  means	  that	  are	  often	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  long-­‐run	  sustainability	  of	  the	  firm.	  Some	  of	  the	  phenomena	  extant	   in	   the	  British	   case	   that	   are	   attributed	   to	   these	   capital	  market	  demands	   include	   the	   hoarding	   of	   investable	   funds,	   share	   buy-­‐backs,	   divestment	  strategies,	   private	   equity	   buy-­‐outs	   and	   a	   willingness	   to	   engage	   in	   higher	   risk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000b),	  'Restructuring	  For	  Shareholder’.	  127	  Ibid;	  J.	  Franks	  and	  C.	  Mayer	  (1996),	  'Hostile	  Takeovers	  And	  The	  Correction	  Of	  Managerial	  Failure',	  Journal	  Of	  Financial	  Economics,	  40	  (1),	  pp.163-­‐81.	  128	  Montgomerie	  (2008a),	  'Labour	  And	  The’;	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000b),	  'Restructuring	  For	  Shareholder;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of.	  129	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence;	  Froud	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  ‘Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2000a),	  'Shareholder	  Value’;	  Montgomerie	  (2008a),	  'Labour	  And	  The’.	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strategies	   than	  would	  otherwise	  be	   the	   case.130	  This	   is	   a	   sharp	   contrast	   to	  other	  national	   cases,	   in	  which	   the	  emergence	  of	   ‘Anglo-­‐Saxon’	   capital	  market	  demands	  has	  been	  met	  with	  national	  outcry.131	  	  
Banking	  In	  The	  ALGM	  	  	  While	  many	  non-­‐financial	   firms	  have	   struggled	   to	   satisfy	   the	   demands	   of	   capital	  markets	   British	   banks	   performed	   impressively,	   with	   apparent	   convergence	   on	  targets	   of	   return	  on	   equity	   in	   excess	  of	   15%	   (and	  with	  many	   firms	  delivering	   in	  excess	  of	  this).132	  This	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  declining	  returns	  on	  assets	  that	  were	  partly	  a	  consequence	   of	   the	   intense	   competition	   on	   the	   personal	   credit	   markets	   as	  availability	   expanded.133	   Engelen	   at	   al.	   suggest	   that	   a	   shareholder	   value-­‐driven	  form	   of	   banking	   had	   emerged,	   sharing	   Haldane’s	   conclusion	   that	   banks	   were	  driven	   to	   “keep	   up	   with	   the	   Jones’”	   (or	   in	   the	   Economist’s	   rendition,	   the	  Goldmans).134	  The	  transformation	  of	  bank	  business	  strategies	  in	  response	  to	  these	  capital	  market	  pressures,	  and	  the	  macroeconomic	  consequences	  of	  these	  changes	  (the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   household	   credit)	   constitute	   the	   second	   qualitative	  processes	  of	  financialisation	  implicated	  in	  the	  CSDP.	  	  	  The	   precise	   means	   by	   which	   this	   was	   achieved	   differed	   from	   bank	   to	   bank.	   135	  	  However,	  Engelen	  et	  al	  identify	  several	  general	  strategies	  common	  among	  the	  UK	  retail	   and	   universal	   banks.	   Firstly,	   they	   took	   up	   of	   aggressively	   expansionary	  business	   models,	   leveraging	   their	   capital	   bases	   with	   funds	   from	   international	  wholesale	  markets.	  In	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  discussion	  it	  is	  Northern	  Rock	  (the	  first	  of	  the	  UK	  retail	  banks	  to	  succumb	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis)	  that	  is	  often	  held	  as	  emblematic	  of	  such	  practices.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  nationalisation	  in	  late	  2007,	  Northern	  Rock	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  As	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  note,	  however,	  a	  tendency	  towards	  asset	  stripping	  and	  sub-­‐optimal	  growth	  strategies	  is	  an	  enduring	  feature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  British	  capital	  markets	  and	  industry	  in	  critical	  political	  economy	  well	  prior	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ALGM.	  See	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (1998),	  'In	  The	  Dedicated	  Pursuit’.	  131	  Watson	  (2005),	  ‘Hedge	  Funds’.	  132	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence,	  pp.107-­‐110.	  133	  Ibid;	  A.	  Haldane	  (2009),	  'Small	  Lessons	  From	  A	  Big	  Crisis',	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  Of	  
Chicago	  45th	  Annual	  Conference	  (Chicago,	  08/05/2009).	  134	  The	  Economist	  (2009),	  'Keeping	  Up	  with	  the	  Goldmans',	  The	  Economist,	  16/06/2009.	  135	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  individual	  business	  strategies	  of	  the	  UK	  banks	  that	  were	  subject	  to	  public	  rescue	  following	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  see	  Commons	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  (2009),	  'Banking	  Crisis:	  Dealing	  With	  The	  Failure	  Of	  The	  UK	  Banks',	  (7th	  Report	  of	  Session	  2008–09;	  London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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76%	  funded	  by	  short-­‐term	  borrowing	  on	  wholesale	  markets,	  its	  growth	  ambitions	  having	   long	   since	   outstripped	   its	   capital	   base.136	   However,	   the	   reliance	   on	  wholesale	   funding	   was,	   to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   extent,	   a	   common	   feature	   of	   the	  business	  models	  of	  the	  UK	  banks,	  and	  was	  instrumental	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  those	  that	  became	  stricken	  during	  the	  wholesale	  market	  ‘panics’	  of	  2007	  and	  2008.137	  	  	  Secondly,	   banks	   increasingly	   pursued	   non-­‐interest	   income	   (that	   is,	   income	  achieved	  through	  services	  on	  which	  a	  transaction	  fee	   is	  charged).	   138	   In	  this,	   they	  paralleled	  a	  broader	  trend	  identified	  by	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  in	  which	  financial	  businesses	  more	  generally	  were	  turning	  to	  ‘transaction	  generation’	  as	  a	  business	  strategy.	  In	  the	  UK	  such	   income	  grew	   from	  around	  35%	  of	  net	  bank	   income	   in	  1984	   to	  over	  53%	   in	  2007.139	  This	  was	   achieved	   in	   a	   number	  of	  ways:	   the	  mass-­‐marketing	  of	  retail	   products,	   engagement	   in	   proprietary	   trading	   and	   acquisitions	   activities	   by	  universal	  banks,	  and	  the	  securitisation	  of	  fixed-­‐income	  assets	  for	  consumption	  by	  investors	  on	  the	  international	  secondary	  markets	  in	  securitised	  debt.	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  that	   concerns	   us	   most	   here,	   as	   it	   is	   most	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   expansion	   in	  household	  credit	  that	  underpinned	  the	  ALGM.	  	  The	  complex	  process	  of	  securitisation	  and	  the	  ‘originate	  to	  distribute’	  transaction-­‐generating	   business	   model	   that	   it	   sustained	   has	   been	   well	   summarised	  elsewhere.140	   The	   practice	  was	   originally	   imported	   and	   ‘translated’	   to	   the	   legal-­‐regulatory	  environment	  of	  the	  UK	  by	  the	  US	  investment	  banks	  following	  the	  1986	  liberalisations,	  yet	  it	  met	  the	  preferences	  of	  UK	  banks	  responding	  to	  capital	  market	  pressures	   in	   a	   number	   of	   respects:	   it	   allowed	  banks	   to	   eliminate	  maturity	   costs,	  freed	  up	   additional	   investable	   capital	   that	  might	   otherwise	  have	  been	   tied	  up	   in	  meeting	   international	   capital	   reserve	   ratios,	   and	   allowed	   the	   liquidity	   of	   the	  growing	   global	   secondary	   markets	   in	   securitised	   credit	   instruments	   and	   their	  derivatives	  to	  be	  drawn	  upon	  to	  finance	  the	  expansion	  of	  mortgage	  and	  unsecured	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence,	  p.76.	  137	  Commons	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  (2009),	  'Banking	  Crisis’.	  138	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘The	  Strange	  Demise’;	  Lansley	  (2012),	  The	  Cost	  Of;	  Crouch	  (2009),	  'Privatised	  Keynesianism’.	  139	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence,	  Table	  4.1.	  140	  T.	  Wainwright	  (2009),	  'Laying	  The	  Foundations	  For	  A	  Crisis:	  Mapping	  The	  Historico-­‐Geographical	  Construction	  Of	  Residential	  Mortgage	  Backed	  Securitisation	  In	  The	  UK',	  
International	  Journal	  Of	  Urban	  And	  Regional	  Research,	  33	  (2),	  pp.372-­‐88;	  for	  a	  global	  picture	  see	  G.	  Tett	  (2009),	  Fool's	  Gold	  (London:	  Abacus).	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lending	  in	  the	  UK.141	  It	  is	  sometimes	  objected	  by	  supporters	  of	  liberalised	  financial	  innovation	  that	  the	  stricken	  UK	  banks	  were	  not	  deeply	  embroiled	  in	  the	  ‘alphabet	  soup’	  products	  assembled	   from	  securitised	  debt	  (CDOs,	  CDSs,	  MBSs	  and	  the	   like)	  that	   brought	   down	   the	   US	   investment	   banks.	   However,	   only	   in	   the	   most	   direct	  sense	  is	  this	  true.	  Securitisation	  was	  a	  very	  profitable	  business	  in	  Britain	  and	  many	  British	  banks	  acted	  as	  originators,	   including	  HSBC,	  RBS,	  Barclays,	  Northern	  Rock,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  numerous	  specialised	  lenders	  that	  drew	  on	  investment	  banking	  finance	   to	   fund	   their	   lending.142	   Official	   estimates	   place	   the	   number	   of	   UK	  mortgages	   that	   had	   been	   securitised	   at	   upwards	   of	   30%	  of	   the	   total	   stock.143	   In	  many	  cases	  then,	  the	  business	  models	  of	  banks	  were	  conditioned	  by	  the	  presence	  of	   the	   secondary	  markets	   in	   securitised	   credit	   products	  which	   served	   both	   as	   a	  source	  of	  demand	  for	  securities	  based	  on	  underlying	  personal	  credit	  assets	  and	  as	  a	  source	  of	  fee-­‐based	  income.	  	  	  Engelen,	   et	   al.	   characterise	   the	   expansionary	   and	   increasingly	   non-­‐intermediary	  business	  models	  of	  banks	  during	  the	  ten	  years	  to	  2007	  as	  collectively	  constituting	  a	  ‘transaction	  generation	  machine’.	  In	  effect,	  they	  argue,	  the	  ‘innovative’	  activities	  that	  facilitated	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  to	  unproductive	  activities	  and	  the	  earning	  of	  fee-­‐based	  non-­‐interest	  income	  had	  become	  the	  overriding	  aim	  of	  the	  British	   financial	  sector.	  From	  1996	  to	  2008	  bank	   lending	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	   total	  productive	  investment	  (operationalised	  as	  all	  sectors	  except	  finance	  and	  property	  re-­‐selling)	  fell	  from	  30%	  to	  12%.144	  By	  2007,	  79%	  of	  all	  bank	  lending	  was	  made	  on	  the	   purchase	   of	   residential	   or	   commercial	   property	   or	   lending	   to	   other	   financial	  businesses.145	   The	   pertinent	   outcome	   of	   this	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   state/para-­‐state	  employment	   and	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   is	   that	   financial	   sector	   profits	   were	  expanding	   and	   that	   lending	   was	   increasingly	   concentrated	   into	   property	  acquisition,	   consumer	   purchases	   and	   lending	   to	   other	   financial	   businesses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  A.	  Leyshon	  and	  N.	  Thrift	  (2007),	  'The	  Capitalisation	  Of	  Almost	  Everything',	  Theory,	  
Culture	  And	  Society,	  24	  (7-­‐8),	  pp.97-­‐115.	  142	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence;	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  
Forever	  Blowing;	  Wainwright	  (2009),	  'Laying	  The	  Foundations’;	  Leyshon	  and	  Thrift	  (2007),	  'The	  Capitalisation	  Of’.	  143	  The	  figures	  draw	  on	  FSA	  calculations	  based	  on	  ONS	  data.	  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  
Forever	  Blowing,	  Fig	  5.6.	  144	  The	  figures	  are	  drawn	  from	  ONS	  data.	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  
Complacence,	  pp.209-­‐210.	  145	  The	  figures	  are	  drawn	  from	  Bank	  of	  England	  data.	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  
Complacence,	  Fig	  7.4.	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Consequently,	   transaction-­‐generating	   financial	   business	   models	   in	   response	   to	  capital	   market	   demands	   was	   sustaining	   the	   other	   two	   elements	   of	   the	   growth	  model	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  subsections.	  	  The	   principal	   institutional	   factor	   in	   this	   qualitative	   transformation	   of	   British	  banking	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  UK	  firm-­‐capital	  market	  relations	  and	  the	  liquid	  market	  for	   corporate	   control	   in	   a	   context	  of	   financial	   globalisation.	  However	   there	  are	   a	  number	  of	  other	  important	  institutional	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  are	   direct	  matters	   of	   government	   policy,	   namely	   the	   liberal	   re-­‐regulation	   of	   the	  UK’s	   financial	   sector	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Big	  Bang’	   and	   the	  opening	  of	   the	  mortgage	  and	  retail	  banking	  sectors	  to	  competition	  from	  firms	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  banking	  in	  the	  Financial	  Services	  and	   the	  Building	  Societies	  Acts	  of	  1986.	  Among	   the	  varied	  outcomes	   of	   the	   process	   of	   financial	   sector	   liberalisation,	   Dolphin	   notes	   that	   it	  served	  to	  increase	  competition	  in	  the	  banking	  sector	  in	  two	  important	  respects.146	  First,	   the	   personal	   credit	   markets,	   including	   mortgages	   (which	   had	   been	   the	  lucrative	   preserve	   of	   building	   societies	   until	   that	   time)	   were	   subject	   to	   much	  greater	   competition	   as	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   demutualised	   former	   building	  societies	   and	   banks	   sought	   to	   secure	   market	   share.	   Secondly,	   competition	   was	  further	  stimulated	  by	  non-­‐bank	  specialised	  lenders	  operating	  as	  subsidiaries	  of	  US	  investment	  banks.	  It	  was	  also	  in	  this	  liberal	  and	  competitive	  context	  that	  a	  number	  of	  retail	  and	  universal	  banks	  began	  to	  substantially	  leverage	  their	  deposit	  bases.	  	  	  A	   second	   is	   Britain’s	   over-­‐arching	   approach	   to	   financial	   regulation	   –	   a	   so-­‐called	  ‘light	   touch’	   approach.	   ‘Glass-­‐Steagall’-­‐style	   statutory	   separations	   of	   retail	   and	  investment	  banking	  activities	  have	  never	  applied	  in	  Britain.	  This	  allowed	  the	  turn	  towards	  wholesale	  funding	  and	  fee-­‐based	  income	  by	  banks	  to	  proceed	  unhindered,	  with	  little	  indication	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  ‘90s	  that	  either	  regulators	  or	  politicians	   perceived	   a	   risk	   to	   the	   banking	   system	  or	   to	   individual	   firms	   in	   such	  business	  models.	  Such	  a	   transition	  was	  politically	  more	  difficult	   to	  accomplish	   in	  the	   US,	   where	   legislation	   was	   required	   before	   American	   firms	   could	   become	  universal	  banks	  in	  that	  jurisdiction	  and	  adopt	  similar	  strategies.147	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  Dolphin	  and	  Griffith	  (2011),	  Forever	  Blowing.	  147	  Tett	  (2009),	  Fool's	  Gold.	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3.	  
Institutionalist	  Logics	  in	  the	  Critical	  Social	  Democratic	  Perspective	  	  I	  opened	  this	  chapter	  with	  a	  series	  of	  abstractions	  drawn	  from	  the	  institutionalist	  perspective	   on	   political	   economy	   concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   institutions	   and	   their	  role	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  explanation	  that	  institutionalist	  political	  economists	  produce.	  As	  we	   have	   seen,	   institutions	   and	   institutional	   reforms	   made	   over	   the	   past	   thirty	  years	   lie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   CSDP.	   In	   this	   final	   section	   I	   go	   one	   step	   further,	  demonstrating	   that	   the	  CSDP’s	   account	   of	   the	   rise	   and	   failure	   of	   the	  ALGM	   is	   an	  institutionalist	   one.	   I	   do	   so	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   account	   implicitly	   rests	   on	   a	  number	  of	   institutional	  processes	  and	   incorporates	  a	  relational	  view	  of	  structure	  and	   agency	   within	   these	   processes.	   These	   institutional	   processes	   are	   situated	  examples	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   have	   been	   conceptualised	   in	   the	   abstract	   by	  institutionalist	  political	  economists.	  	  	  
Complementarity	  	  A	   particularly	   prominent	   example	   is	   ‘institutional	   complementarity’.	  Complementarity	   refers	   to	   relationships	   between	   two	   or	   more	   institutions	   in	  which	   the	   logic	  of	  behaviour	  given	  by	  each	   forms	  a	  mutually	   re-­‐enforcing	  whole,	  such	   that	   their	   totality	   is	   reproduced	   over	   time.148	   It	   is,	   thus,	   most	   obviously	  applicable	   as	   part	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   continuity	   and	   stasis,	   and	   is	  utilised	   as	   such	   in	   the	   influential	   ‘Varieties	   of	   Capitalism’	   approach.149	   This	  approach	  has	  been	  rightly	  criticised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  empirical	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  static	   picture	   of	   political	   economic	   systems	   it	   portrays	  when	   the	   entire	   political	  economy	   is	   said	   to	   constitute	   a	   reproducing	   complementarity.150	   Yet	  complementarities	   can	   be	   an	   important	   component	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   political-­‐
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  Campbell	  (2010),	  'Institutional	  Reproduction’.	  149	  See	  P.A	  Hall	  and	  D.	  Soskice	  (2001),	  'An	  Introduction	  To	  Varieties	  Of	  Capitalism',	  in	  P.A	  Hall	   and	   D.	   Soskice	   (eds.),	   Varieties	   Of	   Capitalism:	   The	   Institutional	   Foundations	   Of	  
Comparative	  Advantage	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐68.	  150	  M.	  Blyth	  (2003b),	   'Same	  As	  It	  Never	  Was?	  Typology	  And	  Temporality	  In	  The	  Varieties	  Of	  Capitalism',	  Comparative	  European	  Politics,	  1	  (2),	  pp.215-­‐25.	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economic	   change	   if	   invoked	   to	   explain	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   contradictory	   or	  vulnerable	  organisational	  forms.151	  	  	  It	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  institutional	  complementarity	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  CSDP.	  The	  ALGM	  as	  painted	  by	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats	  is,	  in	  essence,	  the	  sum	  of	  an	  intricate	  network	  of	  complementary	  relationships	  between	  institutions	  that	  together	  served	  to	  generate	  and	  sustain	  the	  expansion	  of	  personal	  and	  household	  credit	  and	  financial	  sector	  profits	  on	  which	  the	  growth	  model	  depended.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  relationships	  are	  clearly	  discernible	  in	  the	  arguments	  reviewed	  above.	  For	  example,	   a	   complementarity	   exists	   between	   the	   predominant	   macroeconomic	  policy	   and	   industrial	   relations	   practices	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   the	   business	  strategies	  of	  banks	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  first	  two	  combine	  to	  create	  wage	  stagnation	  and	  a	  growing	  demand	  for	  credit,	   the	  third	   found	  a	  profitable	  activity	   in	  meeting	  this	   demand	   through	   practices	   such	   as	   securitisation	   and	   expands	   the	   supply	   of	  credit	   to	   a	   point	   where	   it	   briefly	   became	   for	   consumers	   a	   viable	   alternative	   to	  earned	  income.152	  Because	  credit	  was	  so	  plentiful,	   the	  contradictions	  imparted	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  by	  a	  set	  of	   institutions	   that	   limited	  the	  growth	  of	  domestic	  demand	  in	  an	  economy	  that	  was	  dependent	  upon	  it	  were	  not	  realised.	  Instead,	  the	  two	   sets	   of	   practices	   re-­‐enforced	   and	   partly	   sustained	   one	   another,	   pushing	   a	  latent	  crisis	  of	  under-­‐consumption	  further	  into	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
Path-­Dependency	  	  A	   related,	   broader,	   concept	   to	   complementarity	   is	   that	   of	   path-­‐dependency.	   As	  noted	   above,	   this	   notion	   lies	   in	   one	   form	   or	   another	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   all	  institutionalist	   forms	   of	   analysis.	   As	   enduring	   features	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	  context,	  institutions	  are	  factors	  in	  path-­‐dependent	  development:	  once	  established	  they	  shape	  the	  strategies	  and	  resources	  open	  to	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  and	  thus	  exert	  an	  irreducible	  effect	  on	  subsequent	  decisions,	  and	  hence	  the	  development	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  system.	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  J.L.	  Campbell	  (2011),	  'The	  US	  Financial	  Crisis:	  Lessons	  For	  Theories	  Of	  Institutional	  Complementarity',	  Socio-­Economic	  Review,	  9	  (2),	  pp.211-­‐34.	  152	  Crouch	  (2009),	  ‘Privatised	  Keynesianism’.	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The	  complementarities	  noted	  above	  are	  themselves	  part	  of	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  logic	  of	   development	   attributed	   to	   the	   British	   political	   economy	   by	   the	   critical	   social	  democrats	   in	   their	   account.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   such	   processes	   favour	   the	  reproduction	  of	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  and	  sustain	  economic	  dynamics	  over	  time.	  Another	  form	  of	  path-­‐dependent	  relationship	  that	  can	  be	  discerned	  in	  the	  growth	  model	  is	  what	  Pierson	  has	  termed	  ‘institutional	  lock-­‐in’.	  153	  	  This	  refers	  to	  growing	  political	   costs	   of	   reforming	   an	   institution	   as	   time	   goes	   on,	   so-­‐called	   ‘increasing	  returns’	  to	  past	  decisions.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  effect	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  way	  critical	  social	  democrats	  have	  approached	  the	  ‘New	  Labour’	  governments’	  relationship	  to	  asset	  price	  inflation,	  and	  the	  attempt	  of	  these	  governments	  to	  strategically	  harness	  it	   through	   asset	   based	   welfare	   rather	   than	   seeking	   to	   reform	   the	   underlying	  institutional	   factors	   that	   generated	   it.	   As	  Watson	   notes,	   the	   asset	   based	  welfare	  approach	  was	  politically	  expedient:	  it	  allowed	  New	  Labour	  to	  resolve	  the	  dilemma	  of	  welfare	  state	  sustainability	  while	  leaving	  the	  status	  quo	  largely	  unchallenged.154	  We	   can	   reason	   that	   the	   political	   costs	   of	   challenging	   the	   various	   interest	   groups	  tied	   to	   the	   institutional	   factors	   generating	   house	   price	   inflation	   and	   privatised	  Keynesianism	   would	   have	   been	   very	   great	   indeed.	   It	   would	   have	   meant	  confronting	   employers	   over	   wage-­‐growth	   stagnation,	   financial	   sector	   interest	  groups	   profiting	   from	   securitisation,	   and	   halting	   the	   growing	   prosperity	   of	   the	  electoral	   constituencies	   who	   profited	   from	   house	   price	   inflation.	   Consequently,	  asset	   price	   inflation	   and	   the	   institutional	   factors	   that	   generated	   it	   may	   have	  become	   ‘locked	   in’	   to	   the	   British	   political	   economy,	   or	   at	   least	   may	   have	   been	  perceived	   so	   by	   the	   government	   as	   it	  weighed	   up	   the	   relative	   costs	   of	   potential	  strategies.	  	  	  
Contradiction	  And	  Vulnerability:	  Endogenous	  And	  Exogenous	  Causes	  	  A	   second	   avenue	   of	   institutionalist	   inquiry	   has	   sought	   to	   identify	   the	   processes	  through	   which	   stability-­‐promoting	   complementarities	   and	   path-­‐dependencies	  break	  down.	  Originating	  in	  the	  study	  of	  US	  political	  development	  and	  the	  work	  of	  Orren	  and	  Skowronek,	  the	  historical	  institutionalist	  ‘multiple	  orders	  thesis’	  argues	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  P.	  Pierson	  (2000a),	  'Increasing	  Returns,	  Path	  Dependence,	  And	  The	  Study	  Of	  Politics',	  
American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  94	  (2),	  pp.251-­‐67;	  P.	  Pierson	  (2000b),	  'The	  Limits	  Of	  Design:	  Explaining	  Institutional	  Origins	  And	  Change',	  Governance,	  13	  (4),	  pp.475-­‐99.	  	  154	  Watson	  (2013b),	  'New	  Labour's	  Paradox’.	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against	   accounts	   that	   emphasise	   institutional	   equilibrium	   or	   which	   overstate	  complementarity,	   asserting	   in	   (Thelen’s	   words)	   that	   “the	   various	   institutional	  arrangements	  that	  make	  up	  a	  polity	  emerge	  at	  different	  times	  and	  out	  of	  different	  historical	  configurations.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  various	  ‘pieces’	  do	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  together	  into	  a	  coherent,	  self-­‐reinforcing,	   let	  alone	  functional,	  whole”.155	  A	  source	  of	  change	  in	  this	  account	  is	  the	  interaction	  of	  different	  institutions	  within	  the	  same	  polity,	   with	   advocates	   of	   this	   approach	   looking	   to	   ‘frictions’	   or	   ‘non-­‐complementary	   interactions’	  between	  previously	  unconnected	  or	  complementary	  institutions.	   Non-­‐complementary	   interactions	   are,	   in	   this	   view,	   the	   products	   of	  historical	   contingencies,	   emerging	   either	   exogenously	   (for	   instance,	   from	   an	  invasion,	  or	  natural	  disaster)	  or	  endogenously	  through	  the	  intensification	  of	  latent	  inter-­‐institutional	  tensions	  over	  time.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  affinity	  between	  this	  notion	  and	   that	   of	   ‘contradiction’	   in	   Marxian	   strands	   of	   political	   economy.	   In	   such	  perspectives	   tensions	  between	   certain	   aspects	  of	  political-­‐economic	  organisation	  are	  seen	  to	  occupy	  antagonistic,	  dialectical	  relationships	  that	  create	  pressures	  for	  change	  by	  generating	  conflicts	  and	  crises	  that	  must	  be	  resolved	  to	  ensure	  orderly	  reproduction	   of	   the	   overall	   political-­‐economic	   system.156	   Non-­‐complementary	  interactions	   constitute	  a	   form	  of	   contradiction	   in	   this	   sense.	  The	  multiple	  orders	  thesis	   urges	   close	   tracing	   of	   institutional	   processes	   to	   identify	   the	   emergence	   of	  such	   contradictory	   dynamics	   within	   the	   institutional	   fabric	   of	   the	   political	  economy	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  presence	  of	  pressure	  for	  institutional	  change.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Thelen	  (1999),	  'Historical	  Institutionalism’,	  p.382;	  See	  also	  K.	  Orren	  and	  S.	  Skowronek	  (1994),	  'Beyond	  The	  Iconography	  Of	  Order:	  Notes	  For	  A	  New	  Institutionalism',	  in	  L.C.	  	  Dodd	  and	  C.	  	  Jillson	  (eds.),	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  American	  Politics:	  Approaches	  And	  
Interpretations	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press),	  pp.311-­‐30;	  S.	  Skowronek	  (1995),	  'Order	  And	  Change',	  Polity,	  28	  (1),	  pp.91-­‐96;	  B.J.	  Glenn	  (2004),	  'The	  Two	  Schools	  Of	  American	  Political	  Development',	  Political	  Studies	  Review,	  2,	  pp.153-­‐65;	  R.C.	  Lieberman	  (2002),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions,	  And	  Political	  Order:	  Explaining	  Political	  Change',	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review,	  96	  (4),	  pp.697-­‐712.	  156	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  perspective	  is	  the	  regulation	  approach.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  however	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘institution’	  differs	  somewhat	  between	  this	  approach	  and	  the	  historical	  institutionalists	  reviewed	  in	  these	  paragraphs.	  Regulationist	  political	  economists	  often	  refer	  in	  general	  terms	  to	  ‘institutional	  forms’	  that	  regulate	  a	  given	  contradiction	  in	  a	  regime	  of	  accumulation	  (such	  as	  that	  between	  capital	  and	  wage	  labour).	  Historical	  institutionalists	  more	  frequently	  refer	  to	  specific	  institutions,	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  organise	  their	  analyses	  and	  analytical	  frameworks	  around	  presumed	  contradictions	  in	  regimes	  of	  accumulation.	  See	  B.	  Jessop	  (2013),	  'Revisiting	  The	  Regulation	  Approach:	  Critical	  Reflections	  On	  The	  Contradictions,	  Dilemmas,	  Fixes	  And	  Crisis	  Dynamics	  Of	  Growth	  Regimes',	  Capital	  &	  Class,	  37	  (1),	  pp.5-­‐24.	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The	   temporality	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   non-­‐complementary	   interactive	   processes	  varies	  according	  to	  circumstances.	  Orren	  and	  Skowronek	  confine	  their	  analyses	  to	  ‘frictions’	   that	   operate	   between	   contradicting	   institutions	   over	   long	   periods	   of	  time.157	   However,	   non-­‐complementary	   interaction	   can	   be	   much	  more	   rapid	   and	  devastating	  in	  its	  effect.	  Such	  a	  scenario	  might	  be	  termed	  ‘catastrophic	  interaction’,	  and	   bears	   greater	   resemblance	   to	   the	   Marxian	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘crisis’	   as	   a	  situation	   in	   which	   contradictions	   can	   no	   longer	   be	   managed,	   and	   orderly	  reproduction	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   system	   obtained,	   without	   some	   decisive	  form	  of	  institutional	  change.	  However,	  I	  withhold	  the	  term	  ‘crisis’	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  term	   ‘economic	   performance	   failure’	   and	   the	   related	   concept	   of	   ‘catastrophic	  equilibrium’	  for	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3.	  158	  	  For	  Hay	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ALGM	  in	  2007-­‐2008	  is	  the	  result	  of	  two	  closely	  related	  catastrophic	   interactions.	   One	   is	   endogenous	   to	   the	   growth	   model	   itself	   and	  reflects	   its	   contradictory	   nature,	   occurring	   amid	   the	   previously	   complementary	  institutional	   relations	   that	   sustained	   Privatised	   Keynesianism.	   The	   other	   is	  exogenous	   to	   the	   British	   growth	   model,	   reflecting	   its	   vulnerabilities	   and	   the	  realisation	  of	  threats	  posed	  by	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  highly	  leveraged	  British	  banks	  to	  the	  global	  wholesale	  markets.	  Both	  reflect	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  growth	  model	  on	   a	   particular	   and	   historically	   contingent	   set	   of	   interest	   rates	   and	   monetary	  conditions.159	  	  	  In	   the	   first	   instance,	   Hay	   argues	   that	   the	   same	   liberally	   instituted	   financial	  practices	   that	  were	  driving	  the	  boom	  in	  securitised	  consumer	  debt	  underpinning	  privatised	   Keynesianism	   had	   also	   given	   rise	   to	   commodity	   speculation.160	   This	  contributed	  to	  an	  unforeseen	  historical	  contingency	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  rapid	  rise	  of	  oil	  prices	  during	  2006.	  More	  generally,	  we	  might	  add	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  exporting	  countries	   sustained	   by	   demand	   from	   consumer	   debt-­‐led	   growth	  models	   such	   as	  the	  ALGM	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  added	  further	  non-­‐speculative	  inflationary	  pressures	  to	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  Skowronek	  (1995),	  'Order	  and	  Change'.	  158	  Succinctly,	   the	  reason	   is	   that,	   from	  a	  constructivist	  perspective,	  crisis	  does	  not	  obtain	  until	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   who	   are	   capable	   of	   mobilizing	   in	   favour	   of	   one	   ‘crisis	  diagnosis’	   or	   another	   perceive	   the	   situation	   confronting	   them	   as	   one	   of	   ‘crisis’.	  Catastrophic	   interaction	   giving	   rise	   to	   economic	   performance	   failure	   is	   a	   necessary,	   but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  crisis	  in	  the	  perspective	  adopted	  here.	  	  159	  Hay	  (2011a),	  ‘Pathology	  without	  Crisis?’	  160	  Ibid.	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markets	  for	  fossil	  fuels.	  The	  result	  of	  these	  inflationary	  pressures	  was	  an	  upturn	  in	  CPI	   inflation	   in	   Britain	   throughout	   2006.	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   macroeconomic	  policy	   is	   instituted	   in	   the	   UK	   meant	   that	   the	   primary	   means	   of	   combating	   this	  inflation	  was	  the	  base-­‐rate	  policy	  of	  the	  independent	  Bank	  of	  England.	  As	  the	  Bank	  raised	   interest	   rates	   in	   response	   it	   inadvertently	   interrupted	   the	   virtuous	  complementarity	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism.161	   As	   borrowers	   diverted	   more	  resources	  from	  consumption	  towards	  servicing	  debt	  the	  ensuing	  slow-­‐down	  of	  the	  housing	   market	   stymied	   the	   wealth	   effect	   on	   which	   growing	   consumption	  spending	   had	   been	   premised.	   The	   result	   was	   a	   slump	   in	   domestic	   demand,	   and	  what	  might	  potentially	  have	  been	  a	   severe	   stagflationary	   scenario	   in	  early	  2007.	  How	   such	   a	   scenario	  might	   have	   been	   dealt	  with	   is	   an	   interesting	   question.	   Yet	  across	  the	  Atlantic,	  interest	  rate	  rises,	  although	  a	  response	  to	  different	  inflationary	  pressures,	   were	   about	   to	   yield	   another	   catastrophic	   interaction	   –	   the	   financial	  crash	  of	  2007-­‐2008.	  	  	  As	   is	   now	   comprehensively	   documented,	   the	   interest	   rate	   hikes	   by	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	  between	  2004	  and	  2006	  were	  the	  precursor	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  markets	  for	   ‘sub-­‐prime’	   mortgages	   as	   such	   borrowers	   were	   increasingly	   unable	   to	   meet	  their	   repayments.162	   The	   exposure	   of	   highly	   leveraged	   financial	   institutions	  through	  complicated	  mortgage	  securitisation	  instruments	  and	  their	  derivatives	  led	  to	   a	  more	   general	   collapse	  of	   confidence,	   and	   the	   freezing	  of	   inter-­‐bank	   lending.	  The	   resulting	   liquidity	   traps	   set	   the	   condition	   for	   the	   worldwide	   collapse	   that	  followed.	  Again,	  the	  unexpected	  consequences	  of	  a	  change	  in	  interest	  rates	  led	  to	  the	  previously	  complementary	  relationships	  turning	  into	  catastrophic	  interactions	  as	  banks	  suffered	  crises	  of	  liquidity	  and	  solvency.	  The	  ALGM,	  and	  the	  transaction-­‐generating	  bank	  businesses	  strategies	  that	  had	  sustained	  it,	  ceased	  in	  this	  moment	  to	   function	   for	   the	   orderly	   reproduction	   of	   economic	   growth	   and	   expanding	  employment.	   The	   ensuing	   fiscal	   pressures	   have	   constrained	   the	   willingness	   of	  subsequent	   governments	   to	   expand	   state/para-­‐state	   employment.	   The	   result	   for	  Britain	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   has	   been	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   operational	   growth	  model.	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  Ibid.	  162	  Gamble	  (2009),	  The	  Specter.	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Agency	   In	   Institutionalist	   Political	   Economy	   And	   The	   Critical	   Social	   Democratic	  
Perspective	  	  When	   rendered	   only	   at	   the	   level	   of	   institutional	   interactions,	   institutionalist	  political	   economy	   takes	   on	   a	   very	   structuralist	   hue.	   The	   actual	   human	   actors	  making	  up	  the	  system	  appear	  more	   like	  passive	  automata	  of	   institutionally	  given	  pressures,	  save	  for	  path	  shaping	  ‘critical	  junctures’.163	  Neat	  as	  such	  an	  explanation	  undoubtedly	  is,	   is	   leaves	  unexamined	  the	  policy	  preference	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  political-­‐economic	   actors	   in	   response	   to	   non-­‐complementary	   or	   catastrophic	  interactions.	   The	   critical	   response	   holds	   that	   there	   is	   little	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	  non-­‐complementary	   interactions	   and	   economic	   performance	   failure	   to	   explain	  why	  actors	  choose	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  in	  one	  way	  and	  not	  another.164	  Such	  choices	  are	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  the	  causal	  sequence	  of	  the	  multiple	  orders	  thesis,	  for	  the	   intended	  and	  unintended	  consequences	  of	   reforms	  made	   to	  address	  negative	  feedback	   at	   Time	   1	   will	   also	   form	   the	   institutional	   conditions	   in	   which	   future	  complementary	  or	  catastrophic	  processes	  will	  occur	  at	  Time	  2.	  	  	  This	   line	  of	  critique	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  critique	  of	  institutionalist	  political	  economy,	  which	   is	   the	   topic	  of	   the	   following	  chapter.	  Yet	  before	  examining	  this	  critique	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  another	  debate	  is	  also	  at	  stake,	   concerning	   the	   relative	   roles	   of	   structure	   and	   agency	   in	   an	   institutionalist	  account.	  If	  the	  responses	  that	  actors	  make	  to	  negative	  feedback	  implies	  choice	  and	  strategy	  then	  a	  role	  for	  ‘political	  agency’	  is	  being	  asserted:	  the	  irreducible	  capacity	  within	  the	  explanatory	  logic	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  political	  economy	  for	  actors	  to	  conceive	  of,	   and	  attempt	   to	   instigate,	   changes	  on	   the	  environment	   they	   inhabit.165	  A	  vocal	  tendency	  within	   the	   historical	   institutionalist	   tradition	   has	   long	   insisted	   against	  their	   orthodox	   Marxian	   forebears	   on	   the	   irreducibility	   of	   actor	   choices	   to	  structural	  pressures,	  and	  thus	  the	  need	  to	  investigate	  empirically	  the	  preferences	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  Campbell	  (2010),	  'Institutional	  Reproduction’.	  164	   D.	   Béland	   (2007),	   'Ideas	   And	   Institutional	   Change	   In	   Social	   Security:	   Conversion,	  Layering,	   And	   Policy	   Drift',	   Social	   Science	   Quarterly,	   88	   (1),	   pp.20-­‐38;	   Hay	   and	  Wincott	  (1998),	  ‘Structure,	  Agency’;	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  'Analyzing	  Ideas	  And	  Tracing	  Discursive	  Interactions	   In	   Institutional	   Change:	   From	   Historical	   Institutionalism	   To	   Discursive	  Institutionalism',	   Annual	   Meeting	   Of	   The	   American	   Political	   Science	   Association	  (Washington	  DC).	  165	  Hay	  (2002),	  Political	  Analysis.	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of	  different	  actors	  and	  groups	  when	  analysing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  political	  change.166	  In	  recent	  years	  this	  tendency	  has	  been	  revived	  by	  Thelen	  and	  her	  collaborators.167	  In	   a	   seminal	   conceptual	   contribution,	   Streeck	   and	   Thelen	   have	   set	   about	  investigating	   how	   governments	   seeking	   to	   reform	   complementary	   or	   locked	   in	  institutions	  can	  under	  some	  conditions	  strategically	  outmanoeuvre	  the	  entrenched	  interests	  that	  perpetuate	  them	  by	  cumulatively	  instigating	  minor	  reforms	  in	  areas	  where	   they	   face	   less	   opposition.168	   Streeck	   and	   Thelen	   suggest	   that	   significant	  institutional	  changes	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  cumulative	  impact	  of	  such	  minor	  changes	  over	  time.	  	  	  The	   theoretical	   point	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   present	   argument	   is	   that	   in	   this	   view,	  actors	   can	   (either	   intentionally	   or	   unintentionally)	   bring	   about	   the	   non-­‐complementary	  interactions	  that	  drive	  change	  in	  the	  multiple	  orders	  thesis.	  Some	  of	  these	  agency-­‐driven	  processes	  are	  appealed	  to	  in	  the	  critical	  social	  democratic	  arguments	  reviewed	  here.	  One	  example	  concerns	  the	  process	  of	  cumulative	  change	  termed	   ‘layering’,	   which	   describes	   attempts	   to	   implement	   new	   institutions	   in	   a	  given	   area	   without	   directly	   dismantling	   older	   ones.169	   One	   frequently	   cited	  example	   is	   the	   tendency	   of	   many	   neoliberal	   governments	   to	   incentivise	   private	  pension	   schemes	   alongside	   existing	   state	   ones,	   rather	   than	   seeking	   to	   dismantle	  state	  pension	  schemes	  head	  on.170	  Watson	  identifies	  precisely	  this	  kind	  of	  layering	  in	  New	   Labour’s	   turn	   to	   ABW.	   171	   One	   unanticipated	   consequence	   of	   this	   choice	  was	   the	   channelling	   of	   greater	   quantities	   of	   long-­‐term	   savings	   into	   the	   global	  financial	   surplus	   controlled	   by	   private	   institutional	   investors,	   exacerbating	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Thelen	  and	  Steinmo	  (1992),	   ‘Historical	  Institutionalism’;	   for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  status	  of	  structure	  and	  agency	   in	   this	  strand	  of	  historical	   institutionalism,	  see	  Hay	  and	  Wincott	  (1998),	  ‘Structure,	  Agency’.	  	  167	   For	   instance,	   K.A.	   Thelen	   (2000),	   'Timing	   And	   Temporality	   In	   The	   Analysis	   Of	  Institutional	   Evolution	   And	   Change',	   Studies	   In	   American	   Political	   Development,	   14	   (1),	  pp.101-­‐08;	  Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  (2005),	   'Introduction:	   Institutional’;	  Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  (2010),	  'A	  Theory	  Of’.	  	  168	  Streeck	  and	  Thelen	  (2005),	  ‘Introduction:	  Institutional’.	  169	  For	  an	  expanded	  discussion	  of	  the	  conceptual	  literature	  on	  this	  process,	  see	  J.	  van	  der	  Heijden	  (2011),	   'Institutional	  Layering:	  A	  Review	  Of	  The	  Use	  Of	  The	  Concept',	  Politics,	  31	  (1),	  pp.9-­‐18.	  170	   Streeck	   and	   Thelen,	   ‘Introduction:	   Institutional’;	   See	   also	   J.S.	   Hacker	   (2005),	   'Policy	  Drift:	  The	  Hidden	  Politics	  Of	  Us	  Welfare	  State	  Retrenchment',	  in	  W.	  Streeck	  and	  K.	  Thelen	  (eds.),	   Beyond	   Continuity:	   Institutional	   Change	   In	   Advanced	   Political	   Economies	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.40-­‐82.	  171	  See	  Watson	  (2013b),	  'New	  Labour’s	  Paradox’;	  and	  Watson	  (2013a),	  'The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	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pressure	  on	   financial	  organisations	   to	  achieve	  above-­‐average	  returns	  and	  adding	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘liquidity	  glut’	  that	  had	  displaced	  financial	  capital	   into	  securitised	  credit	  markets	  and	  commodity	  speculation.	  The	  effect,	  in	  short,	  was	  to	  exacerbate	  contradictions	  and	  vulnerabilities	  that	  were	  later	  implicated	  in	  the	  growth	  model’s	  failure	   in	  2007-­‐2008.	  Similar	  points	  might	  be	  made	  about	  a	  variety	  of	  neoliberal	  reforms	  noted	   above	   that	   brought	   about	   the	   institutional	   conditions	   from	  which	  the	   complementary	   relationships	   comprising	   the	   growth	   model	   first	   emerged.	  Consequently,	   the	  ALGM,	   and	   the	   contradictions	   that	  were	   to	  prove	   its	  downfall,	  were	  in	  important	  senses	  the	  unintended	  product	  of	  (neoliberalising)	  agency	  in	  an	  institutionally	  structured	  context.	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  served	  to	  gather	  the	  empirical	  context	  and	  part	  of	  the	  theoretical	  context	   for	  my	   research	   in	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	   of	   this	   thesis.	   I	   have	   drawn	  attention	  to	   the	  critical	  social	  democratic	  analysis	  of	   the	  British	  growth	  model	   in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  2007-­‐2008.	  This	  analysis	  portrays	  a	  fragile	  growth	  model	  characterised	  by	   internal	   contradictions	  and	  vulnerabilities	   to	  external	   shocks.	   It	  was	   these	   contradictions	   and	   vulnerabilities	   that	   were	   realised	   in	   a	   series	   of	  catastrophic	  institutional	  processes	  that	  have	  left	  Britain	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  in	   a	   stagnationary	   malaise	   for	   want	   of	   a	   functioning	   growth	   model.	   In	   many	  respects	   both	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   ALGM	   and	   its	   subsequent	   failure	   were	   the	  unanticipated	   consequence	   of	   the	   neoliberalisation	   of	   the	   British	   political	  economy.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   nature	   of	   these	   contradictions	   and	  vulnerabilities	   I	   have	   introduced	   institutionalist	   political	   economy	   and	   have	  demonstrated	   that	   the	   CSDP	   implicitly	   appeals	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   institutionalist	  conceptualisations.	  Consequently,	  the	  CSDP	  can	  inform	  the	  ‘institutionalist’	  part	  of	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  analysis	  that	  I	  offer	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  	  Institutionalist	   political	   economy	   is	   a	   powerful	   means	   of	   explaining	   how	   the	  institutions	  that	  comprise	  the	  political	  economy	  function	  to	  sustain	  or	  undermine	  one	   another	   over	   time,	   and	   how	   political-­‐economic	   agents	   can,	   through	   their	  strategic	  actions,	  create	   intended	  and	  unintended	  changes	  that	  can	  exacerbate	  as	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well	  as	  ease	  contradictions.	  It	   is	  a	  powerful	  approach	  for	  explaining	  the	  failure	  of	  economic	   performance	   in	   previously	   well-­‐performing	   political	   economies.	   This,	  however,	   is	   as	   far	  as	  a	   ‘pure’	   institutionalist	   account	   (that	   is,	   one	   that	  deals	  only	  with	   institutional	   processes)	   can	   take	   us.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter	   I	   introduce	   the	  ‘constructivist	  institutionalist’	  critique	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  show	  how	  such	  an	  analysis	  can	   enrich	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   British	   political	   economy	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context.	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Chapter	  2.	  
The	  Constructivist	  Institutionalism	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  introduce	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  perspective	  and	  bring	  together	   a	   variety	   of	   conceptual	   insights	   that	   inform	  my	  empirical	   research.	  The	  constructivist	  critique	  of	  institutionalist	  political	  economy,	  succinctly	  stated,	  is	  that	  while	  institutionalists	  offer	  persuasive	  explanations	  of	  how	  pressures	  for	  political-­‐economic	   change	   accrue	   (such	   as	   the	   poor	   performance	   of	   economic	   indicators	  arising	   from	  the	   failure	  of	  an	  underlying	  growth	  model),	   they	  are	  neither	  able	   to	  explain	  the	  direction	  that	  change	  takes	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  failure,	  nor	  the	  entirety	  of	   the	   means	   by	   which	   change	   is	   accomplished.1	   The	   analysis	   of	   institutional	  processes	   alone	   can	   achieve	   only	   so	   much,	   even	   where	   the	   role	   for	   agency	   is	  incorporated,	   because	  no	   adequate	   account	   is	   given	   in	   such	   explanations	  of	  why	  actors	   pursue	   or	   support	   one	   kind	   of	   change	   and	   not	   another.	   Instead,	  constructivist	   institutionalists	  assert	   that	  an	  ontologically	  distinct	  but	   related	  set	  of	  processes	  must	  also	  be	  analysed	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  ones	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  explanation.	  These	  are	  ideational	  processes	  through	  which	  shared	  ‘intersubjective’	  ideas	   are	   formed	   and	   reformed,	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   form	   and	   reform	   the	  interpretations,	   behaviours	   and	   political	   struggles	   of	   the	   actors	   who	   together	  produce	   the	   political-­‐economic	   outcomes	   that	   we	   seek	   to	   explain.2	   The	  distinctiveness	  of	  the	  approach	  thus	  lies	  in	  attending	  to	  the	  bi-­‐directional	  influence	  of	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   contexts	   on	   one	   another	   through	   their	  mutual	  conditioning	  of	  political	  agency.	  	  The	   implications	   of	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   integration	   of	   ideational	  processes	   into	   institutional	   analysis	   are	   expansive.	   A	   second	   constructivist	  criticism	   of	   institutionalist	   political	   economy	   is	   that	   if	   ‘ideational	   variables’	   are	  simply	   grafted	   on	   to	   existing	   institutionalist	   analytical	   frameworks	   without	  attending	  to	  these	  implications	  then	  the	  result	  is	  an	  ad	  hoc	  form	  of	  explanation	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  ‘Analyzing	  Ideas’;	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And	  The’;	  D.	  Béland	  (2009),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions,	  And	  Policy	  Change',	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy,	  16	  (5),	  pp.701-­‐18;	  D.	  Béland	  and	  R.H.	  Cox	  (2011),	  'Introduction:	  Ideas	  And	  Politics',	  in	  D.	  Béland	  and	  R.H.	  Cox	  (eds.),	  Ideas	  And	  Politics	  In	  Social	  Science	  Research	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐26;	  Lieberman	  (2002),	  ‘Ideas,	  Institutions’.	  2	  The	  useful	  distinction	  between	  ideational	  and	  institutional	  processes	  is	  Béland’s.	  Béland	  (2009),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions’.	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The	   Constructivist	   Institutionalist	   Critique	   Of	   Institutionalist	   Political	  
Economy	  
	  The	   essential	   constructivist	   insight	   in	   the	   study	   of	   political	   economy	   is	   a	  problematisation	   of	   the	   motives	   and	   interests	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors.	  Constructivist	   institutionalists	   generally	   retain	   the	   view	   that	   actors	   are	   strategic	  and	  act	  to	  maximise	  or	  best	  approximate	  their	  perceived	  ‘interests’	  (whether	  it	  be	  an	   organisation	   or	   an	   individual	   in	   question).	   Yet	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   seemingly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  M.	  Blyth	  (1997),	  'Any	  More	  Bright	  Ideas?	  The	  Ideational	  Turn	  Of	  Comparative	  Political	  Economy',	  Comparative	  Politics,	  29	  (1),	  pp.229-­‐50;	  Hay	  (2011b),	  'Ideas	  And	  The’.	  4	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  'Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	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simple	   concept	   of	   ‘interests’	   that	   has	   been	   the	   object	   of	   constructivist	  problematisation.	  	  	  The	   characterisation	  of	   the	  political	   actor	   as	   interest-­‐oriented	   in	   their	  behaviour	  means	  that	  it	  is	  the	  actor’s	  own	  subjective	  assessments	  of	  their	  interests	  that	  are	  of	  analytical	   interest	   to	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   (rather	   than	   a	   third	   party’s	  assessment	   of	   the	   actor’s	   ‘real’	   interests).5	  At	   the	   root	   of	   any	   ‘interest	   claim’	   are	  two	   elements.6	   The	   first	   is	   a	   valued	   end	   state	   that	   would	   ideally	   obtain,	   or	   be	  approximated.	  This	  is	  an	  inextricably	  normative	  category:	  it	  asserts	  that	  which	  one	  thinks	  ought	  to	  be.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  course	  of	  action	  by	  which	  this	  valued	  end-­‐state	  can	  be	  brought	  about	  or	  approximated	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  one	  acts.	  This	  is	  an	  analytical	   category:	   it	   asserts	   (either	   correctly	   or	   incorrectly)	   that	  which	   is,	   and	  that	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  happen	  if	  certain	  choices	  are	  acted	  upon.	  	  	  A	   thought	   experiment	   can	   show	   how	   these	   two	   categories	   contribute	   to	   a	  perceived	  interest.	  For	  one	  to	  deem	  a	  life-­‐saving	  medicine	  to	  be	  in	  one’s	  interests	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  establish	  that	  one	  deems	  life	  to	  be	  a	  valuable	  end-­‐state.	  For	  the	  patient	  in	  chronic	  pain,	  or	  for	  a	  would-­‐be	  political	  martyr,	  perceived	  value	  may	  not	  obtain	  in	  the	  end-­‐state	  of	  ongoing	  life.	  Secondly,	  if	  an	  act	  is	  to	  be	  deemed	  ‘in	  one’s	  interests’	   then	   the	   act	   must	   be	   perceived	   as	   contributing	   towards	   achieving	   or	  approximating	   the	   valued	   end	   state.	   One	   perceives	   the	   option	   of	   taking	   the	   life-­‐saving	  medicine	  as	  in	  one’s	  interests	  only	  if	  one	  believes	  it	  really	  is	  life-­‐saving	  and	  will	  not	  make	  one’s	  condition	  any	  worse.7	  If	  one	  lacks	  the	  information	  to	  make	  this	  judgment	  then	  one’s	  context	   is	  uncertain	  and	  one	  cannot	  make	  an	   interest-­‐based	  judgment	  about	  how	  to	  behave.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  competing	  conceptualisations	  of	  ‘interests’	  see	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And	  The’.	  6	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	  7	   At	   this	   juncture	   the	   debate	   often	   shifts	   to	   a	   normative	   one	   regarding	   ‘real’	   or	   ‘true’	  interests	  versus	   ‘self-­‐regarding’	  or	   ‘false’	  ones.	  The	  notion	  of	   ‘real’	   interests	   involves	   the	  imposition	  of	  a	  normative	  standard	  by	  a	  third	  party	  against	  which	  ‘good’	  behaviour	  might	  be	   judged.	   As	   an	   analytical	   rather	   than	   value-­‐critical	   enterprise,	   constructivist	  institutionalism	  remains	  silent	  on	  this	  issue.	  For	  discussion	  of	  normative	  versus	  analytical	  conceptions	  of	   interest,	  see	  Hay’s	  discussion	  of	  the	   ‘false	  consciousness’	  debate	  in	  C.	  Hay	  (1997b),	   'Divided	  By	  A	  Common	  Language:	  Political	  Theory	  And	  The	  Concept	  of	  Power',	  
Politics,	  17	  (1),	  pp.45-­‐52.	  8	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  on	  uncertainty	  see	  B.C.	  Rathbun	  (2007),	  'Uncertain	  About	  Uncertainty:	  Understanding	  The	  Multiple	  Meanings	  Of	  A	  Crucial	  Concept	  In	  International	  Relations	  Theory',	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  51	  (3),	  pp.533-­‐57.	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  A	  central	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  question	  is	  how	  actors’	  subjectively	  valued	  end-­‐states,	   and	   their	   ideas	   about	   how	   to	   achieve	   them,	   are	   constituted	   and	  reconstituted.	   The	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   way	   that	   these	   ideas	   influence	   how	   political-­‐economic	  actors	  interpret	  their	  context	  and	  perceive	  their	  interests	  within	  it.	  It	  is	  helpful	   to	   draw	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘ambiguity’	   to	   understand	   this	   claim.9	  Constructivist	   institutionalists	   assert	   that	   the	   political-­‐economic	   context	   is	  ambiguous,	   meaning	   that	   it	   can	   be	   interpreted	   differently	   by	   identically	   located	  actors	   if	   their	   interpretations	   are	   mediated	   by	   different	   ideas	   about	   what	   is	  valuable	  and/or	  how	  best	   to	  obtain	   their	  valued	  end	   states.	  From	   this	   arises	   the	  essential	   constructivist	   proposition:	   that	   two	   actors	   who	   are	   identical	   in	   every	  respect	  save	   for	  subscribing	  to	  different	   ideas	  about	   the	  world	  may	   interpret	   the	  context	  and	  perceive	  their	  interests	  very	  differently,	  yielding	  different	  preferences	  and	  behaviours.10	  Ideas	  and	  interests	  are	  consequently	  not	  separate	  categories	  –	  to	  make	  a	  claim	  about	  ‘material	  interests’	  as	  a	  motive	  for	  behaviour	  is	  necessarily	  to	  presuppose	   the	   ideas	   that	   comprise	   those	   interest-­‐based	   motives.	   For	  constructivists,	   this	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   logical	   necessity:	   to	   talk	   of	   actors’	   interests-­‐based	  motives	  is	  to	  talk	  of	  ideas.11	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  On	  the	  analytical	  usefulness	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ambiguity	  in	  constructivist	  political	  economy,	  see	  J.	  Best	  (2008),	  'Ambiguity,	  Uncertainty	  And	  Risk:	  Rethinking	  Indeterminacy',	  
International	  Political	  Sociology,	  2	  (4),	  pp.355-­‐74.	  10	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  R.	  Abdelal,	  M.	  Blyth,	  and	  C.	  Parsons	  (2010),	  'Introduction:	  Constructing	  The	  International	  Economy',	  in	  R.	  Abdelal,	  M.	  Blyth,	  and	  C.	  Parsons	  (eds.),	  Constructing	  The	  International	  Economy	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press),	  pp.1-­‐20;	  A.	  Wendt	  (1999),	  Social	  Theory	  Of	  International	  Politics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press).	  	  11	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And	  The’;	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2010b),	  'Taking	  Ideas	  And	  Discourse	  Seriously:	  Explaining	  Change	  Through	  Discursive	  Institutionalism	  As	  The	  Fourth	  New	  Institutionalism',	  European	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  2	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐25;	  W.W.	  Widmaier	  (2007),	  'Where	  You	  Stand	  Depends	  On	  How	  You	  Think:	  Economic	  Ideas,	  The	  Decline	  Of	  The	  Council	  Of	  Economic	  Advisers	  And	  The	  Rise	  Of	  The	  Federal	  Reserve',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  12	  (1),	  pp.43-­‐59.	  There	  are	  several	  arguments	  that	  constitute	  ‘routes	  to	  constructivism’,	  of	  which	  this	  ‘argument	  from	  ambiguity’	  is	  only	  one	  (although	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  quite	  sufficient	  in	  and	  of	  itself).	  Blyth,	  for	  instance,	  favours	  one	  premised	  on	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  context	  and	  the	  cognitive	  limits	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  his	  ‘argument	  from	  Knightian	  uncertainty’,	  an	  argument	  aimed	  chiefly	  at	  rationalist	  approaches.	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  a	  system	  as	  complicated	  as	  a	  political-­‐economy	  one	  simply	  cannot	  know	  all	  of	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  one’s	  decisions,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  make	  ‘rational’	  decisions	  at	  all	  consequently	  demonstrates	  that	  they	  use	  theories	  about	  the	  political-­‐economy	  as	  guides	  to	  their	  interests.	  On	  this	  and	  other	  ‘routes	  to	  constructivism’	  see	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  Parsons	  (2010),	  ‘Introduction’.	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The	   proposition	   has	   far	   reaching	   epistemological	   implications	   for	   institutionalist	  political	  economy.	  Institutions	  and	  other	  structural	  variables	  are	  favoured	  in	  these	  perspectives	  because	  they	  are	  considered	  unambiguous:	  they	  have	  an	  observable	  impact	  on	   the	  behaviour	  of	  all	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  regardless	  of	  what	   ideas	  they	  possess,	   and	  provide	   the	  shape	  of	   the	  context	   in	  which	  actors	  must	  achieve	  their	   interests.	   For	   some	   schools	   of	   institutional	   political	   economy	   information	  about	  the	  institutional	  context	  alone	  is	  deemed	  sufficient	  to	  ‘read	  off’	  the	  interests	  of	   political-­‐economic	   actors.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   rational	   choice	   institutionalism	   (and	  rational	   choice	   theory	   more	   broadly)	   the	   valued	   ends	   (or	   ‘utility	   function’)	   to	  which	  political	  actors	  subject	  their	  instrumental	  behaviour	  are	  generally	  assumed	  by	  the	  analyst	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  fact,	  with	  different	  classes	  of	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  imputed	  particular	  valued	  ends	  by	  the	  analyst	  (‘politicians’	  seeking	   ‘votes’,	   ‘trade	  unions’	  seeking	  ‘wages’;	  ‘bureaucrats’	  seeking	  ‘rents’,	  etc).12	  For	  advocates	  of	  these	  approaches	   similarly	   located	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   are	   preconceived	   as	  understanding	   the	   context	   they	   inhabit,	   and	   the	   means	   by	   which	   to	   realise	   or	  approximate	   their	   valued	   ends,	   in	   essentially	   the	   same	   ‘rational’	   way.	   The	   only	  acknowledged	   difference	   between	   actors	   in	   this	   approach	   is	   the	   amount	   of	  information	   that	   they	   possess,	   not	   the	   bases	   on	   which	   that	   information	   is	  interpreted.	  The	  logically	  prior	  ideational	  constituents	  of	  valued	  end	  states	  and	  of	  the	   rational	  assessment	  of	   choices	  on	  how	   to	  pursue	   them	  are	  not	   considered	   in	  these	  accounts.	  Consequently,	   the	  assumption	  made	  by	   rationalists	   is	   that	   actors	  with	   identical	   utility	   functions	   and	   identical	   information	  will	   interpret	   the	   same	  context	   identically,	   and	   thus	   behave	   in	   the	   same	  way.	   If	   true,	   the	   upshot	   is	   that	  actor	  behaviour	  can	  be	  predicted.13	  	  	  This	  simplistic	  and	  unrealistic	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  actor	  is	  given	   legitimacy	   on	   a	   single	   proviso:	   that	   it	   supposedly	   facilitates	   reliable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12Riker	   suggests	   that	   such	   attributions	   should	   be	   the	   result	   of	   a	   process	   of	   hypothetical	  deduction,	  whereby	   clearly	   stated	   assumptions	   about	   the	   valued-­‐ends	  of	   political	   actors	  are	   tested	   against	   behaviour	   until	   one	   arrives	   at	   one	   that	   hold	   predictive	   purchase.	   See	  Riker	   (1995),	   ‘The	   Political	   Psychology’.	   However	   Hay	   notes	   that	   despite	   professed	  agnosticism	   and	   empiricism	   regarding	   utility	   functions	   in	   rational	   choice	   accounts,	   they	  are	  invariably	  defined	  narrowly	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  terms	  that	  I	  have	  stated	  above.	  Moreover,	  Hay	  notes	  that	  they	  must	  remain	  conserved	  in	  this	  way	  if	  rational	  choice	  theory	  is	  to	  retain	  its	   much-­‐vaunted	   parsimony	   of	   assumptions	   between	   studies.	   C.	   Hay	   (2004b),	   'Theory,	  Stylised	   Heuristic	   Or	   Self-­‐Fulfilling	   Prophecy?	   The	   Status	   Of	   Rational	   Choice	   Theory	   In	  Public	  Administration',	  Public	  Administration,	  82	  (1),	  pp.39-­‐62.	  	  13	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  Parsons	  (2010),	  ‘Introduction’.	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predictive	   inference	   about	   the	   future	   behaviour	   of	   similarly	   located	   actors	   and	  thus	   holds	   out	   hope	   for	   a	   predictive	   political	   science.14	   Whether	   or	   not	   the	  predictive	   track	   record	   of	   rationalist	   theories	   really	   does	   legitimise	   such	  assumptions	   is	  not	  within	  my	  scope	   to	  resolve	  here,	  although	  at	   least	  one	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  discipline	  is	  sceptical.15	  	  	  Constructivist	   institutionalists	   have	   adopted	   a	   different	   tack	   in	   criticizing	   the	  rationalist	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor,	   suggesting	   that	   it	   is	  flawed	  in	  its	  own	  terms.	  Blyth	  observes	  that	  rational	  choice	  institutionalists	  have	  been	   consistently	   troubled	   by	   the	   problem	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘multiple	   equilibria’:	  situations	  in	  which	  there	  are	  equally	  rational	  but	  qualitatively	  different	  outcomes	  to	   modeled	   scenarios	   involving	   rational	   utility-­‐maximizing	   actors.16	   In	   such	  scenarios	   the	   analyst	   is	   required	   to	   specify	   a	   non-­‐arbitrary	   and	   rational	   basis	   to	  the	   choices	   that	   actors	   have	   made.	   The	   rationalist	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	  political-­‐economic	   actor	   gives	   little	   grounds	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   some	   rationalist	  accounts	  have	  attempted	   to	   incorporate	  a	  role	   for	   ideas	  and	   interpretation	   to	   fill	  the	  resulting	  explanatory	  gap.	  This,	  Blyth	  charges,	  constitutes	  a	  kind	  of	  ontological	  arbitrariness,	   for	   if	   ideas	   and	   interpretations	   impact	   upon	   interests	   at	   times	   of	  multiple	  equilibria	  then	  they	  presumably	  must	  also	  impact	  at	  the	  other	  moments	  when	   rationalists	   disregard	   them.17	   In	   a	   stronger	   rendition	  of	   the	   critique,	  Blyth	  suggests	   that	   an	   attempt	   to	   incorporate	   ideational	   variables	   into	   a	   rationalist	  framework	  in	  a	  consistent	  manner	  yields	  an	  approach	  that	  is	  in	  essence	  no	  longer	  rationalist:	   if	   ideas	  constitute	   interests	  at	  all	   times,	   and	   if	   ideas	  can	  change,	   then	  this	   violates	   the	   parsimonious	   assumption	   that	   valued	   end-­‐states	   are	   conserved	  and	   that	   beliefs	   about	   achieving	   ends	   are	   contingent	   only	   on	   the	   supply	   of	  information.18	   Instead,	   the	   resulting	   approach	   becomes	   a	   constructivist	   one	   in	  which	  interests	  themselves	  must	  be	  explained	  rather	  than	  assumed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Hay	  (2004b),	  ‘Theory,	  Stylised’.	  15	  M.	  Blyth	  (2006),	  'Great	  Punctuations:	  Prediction,	  Randomness,	  And	  The	  Evolution	  Of	  Comparative	  Political	  Science	  ',	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  100	  (4),	  pp.493-­‐98.	  16	  Blyth	  (1997),	  ‘Any	  More’.	  17	  Ibid.	  18	  M.	  Blyth	  (2003a),	  'Structures	  Do	  Not	  Come	  With	  An	  Instruction	  Sheet:	  Interests,	  Ideas	  And	  Progress	  In	  Political	  Science',	  Perspectives	  On	  Politics,	  1	  (4),	  pp.695-­‐703.	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Any	   approach	   that	   rejects	   the	   rationalist	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor	   is	   obliged	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   ideas	   and	   processes	   of	  ideational	   reproduction/change	  on	  actor	  behaviour	   if	   ontological	   arbitrariness	   is	  to	   be	   avoided.19	   This	   is	   the	  basis	   of	   a	   friendlier	   constructivist	   critique	   leveled	   at	  historical	   institutionalism:	  while	   few	  authors	   identifying	  with	  this	  approach	  have	  explicitly	  ruled	  out	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  in	  constituting	  interests,	  they	  have	  not	  always	  adequately	   attended	   to	   the	   implications	   of	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	  actor	  when	  this	  importance	  is	  conceded.20	  	  	  Being	  consistent	  in	  the	  importance	  assigned	  to	  ideas	  and	  ideational	  processes	  not	  only	   resolves	   the	   issue	   of	   ontological	   arbitrariness	   but	   also	   facilitates	   additional	  empirical	  insights	  and	  theoretical	  integrity.	  It	  can	  enrich,	  for	  example,	  the	  iterative	  agent-­‐centred	   analyses	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   examined	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter	  by	  accounting	  for	  perceptions	  of	  a	  need	  to	  reform	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  agents	  of	  change,	  and	  why	  one	  strategy	  is	  favoured	  over	  another.21	  	  
2.	  
The	  Constructivist	  Institutionalism	  	  In	   making	   this	   critique	   constructivists	   have	   set	   themselves	   no	   small	   task.	   An	  analytical	   framework	   is	   required	   that	   consistently	   incorporates	   and	   relates	   both	  the	   impact	   of	   agency	   and	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   contexts	   in	   a	   co-­‐constitutive	   whole.	   At	   a	   basic	   level,	   the	   constructivist	   proposition	   is	   that	   if	   the	  interest-­‐oriented	  behaviour	  of	  political	  actors	  is	  influenced	  both	  by	  ideas	  as	  well	  as	  by	   the	   institutional	  structure	  of	   that	  context	   then	   ideational	  change	  or	   ideational	  stasis	  becomes	  a	   factor	   in	   changes	   in	   the	  behaviour	  of	  political	   economic	  actors:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	  20	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And	  The’.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  many	  self-­‐identifying	  historical	  institutionalists	  have	  made	  precisely	  such	  an	  attempt	  at	  consistency,	  for	  example	  P.A.	  Hall	  (1993),	  'Policy	  Paradigms,	  Social	  Learning,	  And	  The	  State:	  The	  Case	  Of	  Economic	  Policymaking	  In	  Britain',	  Comparative	  Politics,	  25	  (3),	  pp.275-­‐96.	  By	  the	  terms	  adopted	  here	  such	  authors	  are	  identified	  as	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  working	  in	  the	  historical	  institutionalist	  tradition.	  A	  similar	  claim	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  rational	  choice	  institutionalists	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  consistently	  incorporate	  ideas	  into	  their	  analytical	  frameworks.	  One	  example	  is	  Denzau	  and	  North’s	  model	  of	  ‘shared	  mental	  modes’,	  which	  Abdelal,	  Blyth	  and	  Parsons	  re-­‐characterise	  as	  a	  constructivist	  approach.	  A.T	  Denzau	  and	  D.C.	  North	  (1994),	  'Shared	  Mental	  Modes:	  Ideologies	  And	  Institutions',	  Kyklos,	  47	  (1),	  pp.3-­‐31;	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  Parsons	  (2010),	  ‘Introduction’.	  21	  Béland	  (2007),	  'Ideas	  And’;	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  ‘Analyzing	  Ideas’.	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outcomes	   will	   invariably	   reflect	   one	   or	   the	   other.	   Consequently,	   constructivist	  institutionalists	   have	   endeavoured	   to	   conceptualise	   how	   ideational	   processes	  condition,	   and	   are	   impacted	   upon	   by,	   the	   agency	   of	   actors	   in	   an	   institutionally	  structured	  context	  that	  is	  itself	  constituted	  by	  and	  conditioning	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  actor	   agency.	   It	   is	   agency	   situated	   in	   these	   ideational	   and	   institutional	   contexts	  that	  give	  direction	  to	  political-­‐economic	  change	  in	  a	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  account.	  	  	  
Intersubjectivity	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   conceptual	   issues	   that	   arise	   for	   constructivist	  institutionalists	  whilst	  developing	  this	  framework.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  the	  level	  of	  abstraction	   at	  which	   such	   research	   takes	  place.	  The	   ideas	   that	   structure	   a	   single	  individual’s	   motivations	   and	   interpretations	   of	   their	   surroundings	   are	   highly	  complex.	   To	   account	   for	   them	   all	   would	   be	   a	   historic	   neuro-­‐scientific	  accomplishment,	   let	   alone	   accounting	   for	   those	   of	   the	   many	   hundreds	   or	  thousands	  of	   individuals	  that	  are	  implicated	  in	  a	  given	  piece	  of	  political	  economy	  research.	   	  The	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  enterprise	  is	  therefore	  by	  necessity	  a	  more	  modest	   one.	   The	   ideas	   studied	   in	   this	   perspective	   are	   shared	   ones.	   These	  collectively	   held	   ‘intersubjective’	   ideas	   shape	   the	   subjective	   perceptions	   and	  perceived	   interests	  of	  multiple	   individuals,	   and	   so	   allow	  a	  degree	  of	   explanatory	  purchase	  on	  behaviours	   exhibited	  across	   actors	   (or	   among	  groups	  of	   individuals	  who	  comprise	  collective	  actors).22	  Constructivist	   institutionalists	  situate	  actors	  in	  an	   ideational	   context	   populated	  with	   a	   variety	   of	   intersubjective	   ideas	   on	  which	  they	   draw	   when	   making	   sense	   of	   the	   world	   that	   they	   inhabit.23	   Like	   the	  institutional	  context,	  the	  ideational	  context	  of	  intersubjective	  ideas	  is	  ontologically	  distinct	   from	   any	   particular	   individual	   that	   inhabits	   it.	   Because	   intersubjective	  ideas	  are	  shared,	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  ideational	  context	  (the	  emergence	  of	  new	  ideas	  that	  challenge	  old	  ideas,	  or	  the	  development	  of	  existing	  ideas	  in	  new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Wendt	  (1999),	  Social	  Theory.	  23	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And’;	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’;	  W.W.	  Widmaier	  (2004),	  'The	  Social	  Construction	  Of	  The	  Impossible	  Trinity:	  The	  Intersubjective	  Bases	  Of	  Monetary	  Cooperation',	  International	  
Studies	  Quarterly,	  48	  (2),	  pp.433-­‐53;	  W.W.	  Widmaier,	  M.	  Blyth,	  and	  L.	  Seabrooke	  (2007),	  'Exogenous	  Shocks	  Or	  Endogenous	  Constructions?	  The	  Meanings	  Of	  Wars	  And	  Crises',	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  51	  (4),	  pp.747-­‐59;	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  Parsons	  (2010),	  ‘Introduction’;	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  (2011),	  ‘Introduction’.	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ways)	  and	  changes	  to	  which	  ideas	  particular	  actors	  and	  groups	  subscribe	  can	  exert	  a	   wide-­‐reaching	   effect	   on	   the	   behaviour	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   and	   the	  struggles	   between	   them.	   As	   this	   perhaps	   suggests,	   the	   impact	   of	   intersubjective	  ideas	   can	   vary	   depending	   on	   how	   widely	   they	   are	   subscribed	   to	   and	   who	  subscribes	   to	   them.	   Some	   are	   so	   widely	   accepted	   as	   to	   constitute	   apparently	  objective	  facts	  about	  the	  world,	  whilst	  others	  facilitate	  agreement	  among	  groups	  of	  actors	   who	   might	   otherwise	   find	   themselves	   opposed,	   or	   cement	   opposition	  between	  groups	  that	  might	  otherwise	  find	  consensus.24	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   at	   this	   point	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   ideational	  structure	   and	   agency	   in	   a	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   account	   is	   not	   uni-­‐directional	  but	  a	  relational	  one:	  the	  political	  economic	  actor	  is	  an	  ideational	  agent	  as	  well	  as	  the	  recipient	  of	  intersubjective	  ideas,	  capable	  of	  creating	  changes	  in	  the	  ideational	   context	   in	   which	   they	   are	   situated.	   In	   the	   very	   act	   of	   drawing	   on	  intersubjective	  ideas	  to	  interpret	  the	  political-­‐economic	  context	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  critically	  reflect	  on,	  elaborate,	  develop	  and	  reject	  them,	  to	  contest	  those	  of	  others,	  and	   to	   seek	   to	   persuade	   others	   of	   the	   merits	   of	   new	   ideas.	   In	   doing	   so	   they	  transform	  the	  intersubjective	  context	  in	  which	  they	  and	  other	  actors	  will	  perceive	  their	  interests	  at	  future	  moments	  by	  altering	  its	  ideational	  composition.25	  Schmidt	  usefully	  terms	  this	  reflexive	  capacity	  ‘sentience’.26	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  Widmaier	  (2004),	  'The	  Social	  Construction’;	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  some	  intersubjective	  ideas	  can	  constitute	  apparently	  objective	  facts,	  an	  interesting	  front	  in	  constructivist	  research	  has	  recently	  opened	  up	  regarding	  ‘performativity’	  –	  the	  notion	  that	  ideas	  about	  societies,	  economies	  or	  political	  systems	  can	  become	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophesies	  that	  lead	  the	  actors	  that	  bare	  them	  to	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  bring	  about	  the	  very	  dynamics	  that	  the	  idea	  describes.	  This	  kind	  of	  research	  is	  particularly	  advanced	  in	  feminist	  and	  queer-­‐theoretical	  sociology,	  where	  ideas	  about	  gender	  that	  were	  once	  accepted	  as	  immutable	  facts	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  critique	  as	  contingent	  social	  constructs	  that	  shape	  social	  processes.	  The	  work	  of	  McKenzie	  has	  also	  taken	  these	  insights	  into	  the	  study	  of	  financial	  markets.	  D.	  MacKenzie	  (2006),	  An	  Engine,	  Not	  A	  Camera:	  How	  
Financial	  Models	  Shape	  Markets	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press).	  25	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  ‘Taking	  Ideas’;	  Widaier,	  Blyth	  and	  Seabrook	  criticise	  earlier	  IR	  constructivist	  work	  for	  having	  paid	  insufficient	  heed	  to	  the	  question	  ‘where	  do	  ideas	  come	  from?’	  and	  ‘how	  do	  people	  become	  persuaded	  by	  them?’,	  see	  Widaier,	  Blyth,	  Seabrook	  (2007),	  ‘Exogenous	  Shocks’.	  26	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  ‘Taking	  Ideas’.	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Normative	  And	  Analytical	  Ideas	  	  A	   variety	   of	   different	   kinds	   of	   intersubjective	   ideas	   about	   the	   political	   economy	  populate	  the	  ideational	  context	  that	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  study,	  and	  these	  can	   inform	   analysis	   in	   different	   ways.27	   We	   can,	   for	   instance,	   speak	   of	  encompassing	   systems	   of	   political	   thought	   such	   as	   Ideologies	   (social	   democracy,	  liberalism),	   specific	   theories	  about	  how	  parts	  of	   the	  political	   economy	  work	   (the	  non-­‐accelerating	  inflation	  rate	  of	  unemployment,	  the	  Phillips	  Curve),	  or	  systems	  of	  political-­‐economic	   analysis	   and	   restructuring	   ethoses	   assembled	   from	   such	  theories	   and	   concepts	   (Keynesianism,	   neoliberalism).	   At	   a	   very	   low	   level	   of	  generality,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  unnoticed	  concepts	  and	  metaphors,	  such	  as	  the	  range	  of	   water-­‐based	   metaphors	   used	   to	   describe	   financial	   market	   processes.	  Constructivist	   institutionalist	   analysis	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   address	   all	   such	  generalities	   of	   ideas.	   For	   this	   reason	   there	   has	   been	   interest	   in	   recent	  constructivist	  conceptual	  work	  in	  typologising	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  ideas	  so	  as	  to	  demarcate	  their	  explanatory	  functions.	  	  One	  such	  distinction	  applies	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  ideas	  and	  arguments	  constructed	  with	  them	   and	   typologises	   them	   according	   to	   their	   analytical	   or	   normative	   status.28	  Normative	  ideas	  relate	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  things	  and	  of	  how	  things	  ought	  to	  be.	  They	  are	  central	   to	   the	  specification	  of	  valued	  end-­‐states	   in	   the	  perception	  of	  interests	  because	  they	  confir	  value	  on	  certain	  outcomes.	  Analytical	  ideas	  consist	  of	  claims	   about	   what	   is,	   and	   what	   will	   happen	   if	   a	   particular	   course	   of	   action	   is	  taken.29	  They	  posit	   relationships	  between	  events	   and	  people	   (or	  more	  generally,	  between	   causes	   and	   effects),	   and	   so	   provide	   a	   guide	   to	   action	   in	   the	   world.30	  Analytical	   ideas	   offer	   the	   ‘means-­‐ends’	   relations	   on	  which	   instrumental	   action	   is	  based.	  	  	  Now,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   analytical	   ideas	   necessarily	   presuppose	   normative	  ideas	   when	   discerning	   between	   the	   relative	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’;	  J.	  Mehta	  (2011),	  'From	  'Whether'	  To	  'How':	  The	  Varied	  Roles	  Of	  Ideas	  In	  Politics',	  in	  D.	  Béland	  and	  R.H.	  Cox	  (eds.),	  Ideas	  And	  
Politics	  In	  Social	  Science	  Research	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.23-­‐46.	  	  28	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	  29	  These	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘cognitive	  ideas’,	  for	  instance	  Ibid.	  30	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  (2011),	  'Introduction’.	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options.31	   Neoliberal	   arguments,	   for	   instance,	   stress	   the	   collective	   welfare	  enhancing	  nature	  of	  the	  market	  and	  market-­‐like	  forms	  of	  governance	  and	  resource	  allocation,	   and	   the	   collective	   welfare-­‐harming	   effects	   of	   alternative	   forms	   of	  political-­‐economic	  organisation.	  Such	  claims	  are	  analytical	  because	  they	  assert	  the	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  particular	  forms	  of	  political-­‐economic	  governance,	  but	  they	  are	  necessarily	  underpinned	  by	  categorically	  normative	  assumptions	  about	   the	  value	  of	  certain	  outcomes,	   such	  as	  economic	  growth	  above	  other	  potential	  goals,	  when	  asserting	  what	  the	  collective	  welfare	  is.	  	  	  At	  this	  point	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  pause	  and	  to	  take	  a	  position	  on	  an	  issue	  of	  debate	  among	  constructivist	  institutionalists.	  The	  point	  in	  question	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  frameworks	   of	   predominantly	   normative	   ideas	   (for	   example,	   ethical	   beliefs)	  constitute	   the	   conscious	   basis	   of	   ‘elite’	   political-­‐economic	   actors’	   behaviour.	  Phrased	   differently,	   the	   question	   is	   whether	   they	   operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   what	  March	   terms	  an	   instrumental	   ‘logic	  of	   consequentiality’	  or	  a	  normatively-­‐centred	  ‘logic	   of	   appropriateness’	   when	   making	   decisions.32	   In	   the	   popular	   imagination	  (and	  in	  much	  political	  analysis)	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  politicians	  are	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  motivated	  by	  systematic	  or	  inflexible	  ethical	  commitments.	  This	  viewpoint	  is	  often	  simply	  the	  result	  of	  cynicism:	  the	  view	  that	  politicians	  enter	  office	  either	  to	  serve	  themselves,	  or	  to	  serve	  other	  powerful	   interests	  that	  are	  themselves	  self-­‐serving.	  This	  cynicism	  reaches	  its	  zenith	  in	  the	  rational	  choice	  theory,	  which	  characterises	  all	  human	  beings	  as	  necessarily	   self-­‐serving	  and	   incapable	  of	   cooperation	  except	  under	   very	   specific	   conditions.	   Yet	   while	   there	   are	   undoubtedly	   good	   historical	  examples	  to	  be	  found	  of	  corrupt	  or	  self-­‐serving	  politicians	  and	  political-­‐economic	  elites,	   cynicism	   alone	   does	   not	   constitute	   an	   adequate	   argument	   for	   the	  generalisation	   of	   these	   attributes.	   A	   number	   of	   constructivists	   have	   advocated	  leaving	   room	   for	   a	   more	   ethically	   inclined	   characterisation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor	   and	   the	   possibility	   that	   they	   do	   act	   according	   to	   a	   logic	   of	  appropriateness.33	  	  	  There	  are,	  however,	  more	  sophisticated	  grounds	  on	  which	  to	  maintain	  a	  qualified	  assumption	  that	  elite	  behaviour	  conforms	  to	  a	  logic	  of	  consequentiality	  under	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Mehta	  (2011),	  ‘From	  Whether’.	  32	  March	  (1992),	  ‘The	  War’.	  33	  Hay	  (2011b),	  ‘Ideas	  And’.	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conditions.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  Machiavelli’s	  16th	  century	  masterpiece	  The	  Prince	   is	  the	  observation	   that	   an	   inflexible	   commitment	   to	   ethical	   principles	   in	   the	   face	   of	   an	  unpredictable	  and	  highly	  contested	  political-­‐economic	  context	  is	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  survival	   of	   politicians.34	   He	   argued	   that	   the	   prioritisation	   of	   actions	   aimed	   at	  survival	  is	  both	  appropriate	  and	  inevitable	  for	  any	  political	  actor,	  for	  if	  they	  do	  not	  behave	  thus	  then	  they	  would	  soon	  be	  subject	  to	  defeat	  by	  their	  foes	  and	  cease	  to	  be	  a	   political	   actor	   at	   all.	   This	   pressure	   for	   survival-­‐oriented	   behaviour	   applies	  equally	  to	  contemporary	  political-­‐economic	  actors.	  While	  it	  is	  a	  near-­‐certainty	  that	  they	   possess	   genuine	   ethical	   beliefs	   and	   goals,	   these	   can	   only	   be	   acted	   upon	   in	  instances	   where	   doing	   so	   does	   not	   jeopardise	   their	   survival	   in	   their	   respective	  roles.	  	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	   this	   is	   to	   say	   that	   the	  context	   is	   ‘strategically	   selective’	  –	  that	  it	  favours	  some	  courses	  of	  action	  over	  others	  because	  of	  the	  consequences	  it	  assigns	  to	  different	  choices,	  but	  that	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  determine	  the	  choices	  that	  actors	  make.35	   I	  suggest	  on	  this	  basis	   that	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  policymakers	  will	   strive	   to	  appease	   forces	   that	   threaten	   their	  survival	   in	   their	   roles	   if	   they	  are	  unable	   to	   defeat	   them.	   They	   may,	   for	   example,	   seek	   to	   shape	   the	   opinion	   of	   a	  sceptical	  electorate	  so	  that	  it	  supports	  their	  preferred	  policies,	  but	  if	  this	  fails	  then	  they	  may	   attempt	   to	   accommodate	   the	   electorate’s	   demands	   and	   claim	   these	   to	  have	  been	  their	  preferences	  all	  along.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly	  for	  my	  argument,	  however,	  I	  maintain	  that	  politicians	  administering	  a	  capitalist	  political	  economy	  will	  
strive	  to	  maintain	  economic	  performance	  by	  whatever	  means	  they	  believe	  best	  able	  
to	  do	  this	  (insofar	  as	  powerful	  interests	  and	  electors	  will	  permit	  them	  in	  their	  given	  
historical	  and	  ideational	  context).	  This	   is	  because	  in	  a	  capitalist	  political	  economy	  failure	  to	  produce	  economic	  performance	  as	  measured	  by	  key	  indicators	  –	  namely	  GDP	  growth	  and	  socially	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  employment	  –	  will	  earn	  a	  democratic	  politician	  the	  wrath	  of	  economic	  interest	  groups	  and	  the	  electorate	  alike.	  	  Because	   the	   strategic	   selectivity	   imposed	   by	   the	   context	   elevates	   survival	   above	  other	  valued	  end-­‐states,	  and	  because	  the	  restoration	  of	  economic	  performance	  is	  a	  key	  means	  to	  political	  survival	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  my	  focus	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  N.	  Machiavelli	  (2003),	  The	  Prince	  (London:	  Penguin).	  35	  Hay	  (2002),	  Political	  Analysis.	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ideas	  that	  define	  the	  nature	  of	  post-­2008	  economic	  problems	  and	  prescribe	  solutions	  
to	   them	   (i.e.	   analytical	   ideas	   about	   the	   working	   of	   the	   political-­economy),	   rather	  
overtly	  normative	  ethical	  systems	  that	  might	  inform	  an	  actor’s	  conduct	  outside	  of	  the	  
structures	   of	   political-­economic	   governance.	   These	   ideas	   are	   analytical	   ones	  (although	   as	   I	   have	   mentioned	   above,	   analytical	   ideas	   presuppose	   oft-­‐times	  unconscious	  normative	  commitments,	  such	  as	   the	  value	  of	  a	  political	  career	  over	  charity	  work).	  Whilst	   politicians	   can	   lay	   aside	   rigid	   ethical	   commitments	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   political	   survival,	   analytical	   ideas	   about	   how	   to	   go	   about	   obtaining	  valued	  end	  states	  cannot	  be	  laid	  aside	  in	  this	  way.	  One	  does	  not	  simply	  choose	  to	  perceive	   reality	   differently	   because	   it	   suits	   one’s	   purposes	   –	   such	   a	   statement	   is	  nonsensical.36	  	  	  Now,	  statements	  such	  as	  these	  bring	  my	  position	  superficially	  close	  to	  some	  non-­‐constructivist	   (or	   indeed	   anti-­‐constructivist)	   renditions	   of	   the	   ‘structural	  dependencey	   thesis’,	   which	   states	   that	   politicians	   and	   policymakers	   are	   highly	  constrained	   in	   their	   autonomy	   by	   the	   economic	   interest	   groups	   that	   surround	  them.37	   Such	   a	   position	   becomes	   anti-­‐constructivist	   where	   it	   implies	   that	  policymakers’	  interests	  are	  reducible	  to	  a	  function	  of	  the	  context	  they	  inhabit	  and	  can	  be	  ‘read	  off’	  without	  attending	  to	  the	  ideational	  context.	  Yet	  my	  position	  differs	  in	  at	  least	  two	  respects.	  Firstly,	  my	  view	  that	  the	  strategic	  selectivity	  of	  the	  context	  strongly	  favours	  survival-­‐oriented	  behaviour	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  policymakers	  are	  unable	   to	   pursue	   normative	   motives	   under	   any	   circumstances.	   However,	   I	   do	  maintain	  that	  these	  conditions	  are	  unlikely	  to	  obtain	  during	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  performance	   failure	   such	   as	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   when	   the	   survival	   of	  policymakers	   rests	  upon	   restoring	   economic	  performance	  as	  quickly	   as	  possible.	  Although	   remaining	   open	   to	   the	   possibility	   in	   principle,	   I	   have	   encountered	   no	  evidence	  that	  GDP	  growth	  and	  employment	  levels	  have	  been	  displaced	  as	  primary	  objectives	   of	   economic	   policy	   and	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   Secondly,	  although	  the	  strategic	  selectivity	  of	  the	  context	  favours	  restoring	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	   capitalist	   economy,	   this	   does	   not	   determine	   the	  means	   that	   policymakers	   or	  other	  political	  actors	  will	  come	  to	  perceive	  as	  constituting	  the	  best	  route	  to	  do	  this.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  quite	  possible	  that	  a	  political-­‐economic	  actor	  could	  pretend	  to	  perceive	  reality	  differently	  to	  how	  they	  actually	  do	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  some	  strategic	  advantage	  or	  another,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  distinct	  proposition.	  37	  See,	  for	  instance,	  A.	  Przeworski	  (1985),	  Capitalism	  And	  Social	  Democracy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press).	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This,	   I	   maintain,	   is	   explicable	   only	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   ideational	   context	   that	  policymakers	  inhabit.	  	  	  
Policy	  Ideas	  And	  Problem	  Definitions	  	  Beyond	  the	  distinction	  between	  analytic	  and	  normative	  ideas,	  constructivists	  have	  also	  categorised	   ideas	  according	   to	   their	   ‘level	  of	  generality’	   in	  relation	   to	  policy.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  attempts	  to	  produce	  such	  a	  typology	  of	   ideational	  types.38	  Mehta	   proposes	   two	   categories	   that	   are	   of	   particular	   relevance	   to	  my	   argument	  here.	   At	   the	   lowest	   level	   of	   generality	   are	   ‘policy	   ideas’.	   These	   are	   ideas	   about	  means	   to	   solve	   a	   particular	   problem	   that	   has	   been	   deemed	   policy	   relevant.39	  ‘Inflation	   rate	   targeting’,	   for	   instance,	   is	   a	   policy	   idea	   in	   the	   field	   of	   monetary	  policy,	  stipulating	  a	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  product	  price	  stability.	  	  Policy	  ideas	  depend,	  however,	  on	  prior	  and	  more	  general	  intersubjective	  ideas	  that	  specify	   to	   policymakers	   that	   which	   constitutes	   a	   policy-­‐relevant	   problem	   in	   the	  first	  place	  (the	  ends	  to	  which	  the	  policy	  ideas	  are	  the	  means),	  and	  what	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  problems	  are.	  These	  more	  general	  ideas	  are	  termed	  ‘problem	  definitions’	  by	  Mehta,	  who	  places	  them	  on	  an	  equivalent	   level	  of	  generality	  to	  the	  ubiquitous	  notion	   of	   a	   ‘policy	   paradigm’.40	   Policy	   paradigms	   are	   bodies	   of	   intersubjective	  ideas	  that	  define	  the	  purposes	  and	  goals	  of	  policy	  in	  a	  given	  issue.41	  As	  Hay	  puts	  it,	  they	   “circumscribe…	   [for	   their	   adherents]	   what	   is	   feasible,	   possible	   and	  desirable”.42	   For	   reasons	   that	   shall	   shortly	   become	   clear,	   however,	   I	   prefer	   the	  term	  ‘coordinative	  discourse’	  to	  that	  of	  paradigm	  –	  a	  term	  that	   like	  the	  paradigm	  concept	  refers	  to	  intersubjective	  ideas	  held	  by	  a	  group	  of	  adherents,	  but	  which	  also	  refers	   to	   the	   discursive	   process	   through	   which	   these	   ideas	   are	   developed	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Mehta	  (2011),	  ‘From	  Whether’;	  J.L.	  Campbell	  (2002),	  'Ideas,	  Politics,	  And	  Public	  Policy',	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology,	  28,	  pp.21-­‐39.	  39	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘policy’	  and	  ‘policy	  idea’	  is	  a	  fine	  one.	  A	  policy	  idea	  remains	  a	  policy	  idea	  until	  it	  is	  implemented,	  at	  which	  point	  it	  is	  both	  a	  policy	  and	  a	  policy	  idea.	  40	  Mehta	  (2011),	  ‘From	  Whether’;	  These	  are	  also	  sometimes	  termed	  ‘programmatic	  ideas’,	  although	  confusingly	  other	  authors	  use	  the	  same	  term	  in	  reference	  to	  policy	  ideas,	  such	  as	  J.L.	  Campbell	  (1998),	  'Institutional	  Analysis	  And	  The	  Role	  Of	  Ideas	  In	  Politics',	  Theory	  And	  
Society,	  27	  (3),	  pp.377-­‐409.	  The	  term	  ‘problem	  definition’	  therefore	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  clarity.	  	  41	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’.	  42	  Hay	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Crisis	  Of	  Keynesianism’,	  p.202.	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through	  which	  policy	   ideas	  derived	  are	   from	  them.43	  Coordinative	  discourses	  are	  composed	  of	  problem-­‐defining	  ideas	  that	  are	  shared	  and	  developed	  by	  participants	  to	   the	   discourse.	   These	   are	   in	   turn	   composed	   of	   analytical	   ideas	   and	   their	  normative	   ideational	   precepts.	   In	   the	   field	   of	   economic	   policy	   these	   include	  analyses	   of	   how	   the	   economy	   works	   (comprised	   of	   economic	   theories	   and	  concepts	  through	  which	  policymakers	  can	  define	  strategies	  to	  achieve	  valued	  end-­‐states)	   and	   normative	   presuppositions	   (for	   instance,	   the	   value	   of	   certain	  behaviours	   such	   as	   ‘enterprise’,	   along	   with	   the	   more	   general	   suppositions	   that	  place	  economic	  growth	  and	  profit	  higher	  than	  other	  possible	  goals	  such	  as	  equality	  or	  environmental	  sustainability).	  	  	  Problem	   definitions	   within	   coordinative	   discourses	   consequently	   provide	   the	  ‘background	   assumptions’	   through	   which	   political	   economic	   actors	   understand	  their	  world.44	  They	  confer	  meaning	  on	  events	  and	  specify	  what	  the	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  particular	  choices	  are,	  and	  it	   is	  through	  such	  ideas	  that	   interests	  are	  identified	  and	  strategies	  are	  made.	  Insofar	  as	  they	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  rudimentary	  questions	  of	   policymaking	   in	   a	   capitalist	   political	   economy	   (such	   as	   how	   to	   maintain	  economic	   growth)	   they	   specify	   the	   goals	   and	   objectives	   of	   policymaking	   in	   the	  areas	  to	  which	  they	  relate	  for	  the	  actors	  that	  bear	  them,	  defining	  the	  problems	  to	  which	  policy	  ideas	  are	  attached.	  	  	  The	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  set	  of	  evolving,	  historically	  linked	   problem	   definitions	   and	   policy	   ideas	   in	   relation	   to	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	   Insofar	   as	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   have	   entered	   the	  coordinative	  discourses	  of	  policymakers,	  these	  coordinative	  discourses	  themselves	  can	   be	   considered	   neoliberal	   ones.	   Neoliberal	   coordinative	   discourses	   are	  composed	   of	   historically	   linked	  market-­‐positive	   problem	  definitions	   that	   paint	   a	  different	   picture	   of	   the	   relationship	   between,	   for	   example,	   inflation,	   growth	   and	  unemployment	  to	  earlier	  Keynesian	  problem	  definitions.	  A	  key	  point,	  however,	   is	  that	   problem	   definitions	   do	   not	   dictate	   particular	   policy	   ideas	   but	   instead	  demarcate	   the	   problems	   against	   which	   policymakers	   will	   seek	   to	   formulate	   or	  acquire	   policy	   ideas	   –	   there	   is	   a	   ‘directional	   dependence’	   between	   them.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	  44	  Ibid.	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Thatcher	   governments,	   for	   example,	   experimented	   with	   a	   range	   of	   counter-­‐inflationary	   policy	   ideas,	   yet	   these	   ideas	   were	   only	   countenanced	   because	   they	  spoke	   to	   a	   broader	   neoliberal	   problem	   definition	   that	   regards	   the	   control	   of	  product	  price	  inflation	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  target	  of	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  	  	  Problem	  definitions	  in	  policymaking	  coordinative	  discourses	  are	  an	  appealing	  level	  at	   which	   to	   operationalise	   the	   impact	   of	   ideational	   processes	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context	   because	   they	   inform	   our	   understanding	   of	   multiple	   policies	   and	   the	  trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   to	   which	   they	   contribute.	   Yet	   the	  analytic	  and	  normative	  ideas	  that	  are	  bound	  up	  in	  these	  problem	  definitions	  exist	  at	   a	   greater	   level	   of	   generality	   still,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   systematic	   economic	   theories,	  Ideologies	  or	   restructuring	  ethoses.	   In	   formulating	  problem	  definitions,	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  draw	  upon	  these	  to	  source	  the	  analytical	  and	  normative	  ideas	  on	  which	  problem	  definitions	   are	   based.	   Some	   ideational	   scholars	   have	  pushed	   still	  further	  up	   the	   ladder	  of	   ideational	   generality,	   seeking	   to	  operationalise	   concepts	  such	  as	  ‘public	  philosophies’,	  or	  even	  ‘the	  zeitgeist’.45	  Such	  abstractions,	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  measurable	  at	  all,	  exceed	  the	  level	  of	  generality	  required	  for	  my	  argument	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  
Ideational	  Processes	  	  The	   central	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   contribution	   to	   institutionalist	   political	  economy	   is	   to	   analyze	   how	   changes	   in	   the	   ideational	   context	   impact	   upon	   the	  institutional	   one	   through	   conditioning	   the	   behaviour	   of	   agents,	   and	   vice	   versa.	  Such	  analysis	  is	  naturally	  oriented	  to	  political-­‐economic	  change.	  As	  this	  emphasis	  on	   change	   perhaps	   suggests,	   it	   is	   not	   static	   ideas	   that	   are	   the	   core	   concern	   for	  constructivist	  institutionalists,	  but	  rather	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  ideational	  context	  in	  which	   ideas	   rise	   and	   fall	   from	   influence.	   Consequently,	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	  section	   shall	   draw	   out	   how	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   have	   conceptualised	  political	  economic	  ideas	  in	  this	  dynamic	  way.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Mehta	  (2011),	  ‘From	  Whether’;	  J.W.	  Kingdon	  (1984),	  Agendas,	  Alternatives,	  And	  Public	  
Policies	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company);	  Campbell	  (1998),	  ‘Institutional	  Analysis’.	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Here	  Schmidt’s	  terminology	  is	  particularly	  useful.	  	  Rather	  than	  talk	  of	  ‘paradigms’,	  Schmidt	  conceptualises	  intersubjective	  ideas	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  they	  are	   developed	   –	   through	   what	   she	   calls	   ‘coordinative’	   and	   ‘communicative	  discourses’.	  Coordinative	  discourse	   is	  a	  dual-­‐faceted	  concept.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	   it	  refers	   firstly	   to	   the	   ‘ideational	   background	   conditions’	   of	   actor	   preferences	   and	  behaviour	  –	  normative	  and	  analytical	   ideas	  assembled	  into	  problem	  definitions.46	  In	   this	   respect	   it	   serves	   a	   similar	   explanatory	   function	   to	   that	   of	   ‘paradigm’	   in	  Hall’s	   framework.47	   Yet	   Schmidt	   is	   critical	   of	   the	   utility	   of	   the	   paradigm	   concept	  because	   it	   imparts	   a	   static	   and	   homogenous	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   ideational	  context.48	  In	  its	  original	  academic	  context	  the	  paradigm	  concept	  served	  as	  a	  means	  of	   explaining	   the	   punctuated	   equilibrium	   dynamic	   that	   Kuhn	   attributed	   to	  scientific	  systems	  of	  thought.49	  The	  argument	  makes	  a	  number	  of	  suppositions	  that	  may	   very	   well	   hold	   purchase	   on	   scientific	   intersubjectivity	   but	   which	   are	  problematic	  when	  deployed	  in	  relation	  to	  political	  economy.	  	  	  Firstly	  it	  assumes	  that	  a	  paradigm	  is	  universally	  subscribed	  to	  by	  all	  actors	  save	  for	  a	  few	  maverick	  dissenters.50	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  political	  economy,	  where	   the	   bearers	   of	   multiple	   ‘paradigms’	   frequently	   interact	   and	   contest	   one-­‐another’s	  policy	  preferences	  and	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  they	  rest.	  Secondly,	  the	  notion	   of	   paradigm	   suggests	   an	   almost	   total	   lack	   of	   ideational	   agency,	   save	   for	  critical	   moments	   where	   an	   accumulation	   of	   empirical	   anomalies	   beyond	   the	  explanatory	   grasp	   of	   the	   predominant	   paradigm	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   revolution	   in	  scientific	   thought.51	   In	   Kuhn’s	   rendition,	   bearers	   of	   a	   paradigm	   work	   within	   its	  confines,	  interpreting	  information	  in	  line	  with	  it	  and	  disregarding	  information	  that	  challenges	  it.	  For	  Schmidt	  this	   is	  wrong	  on	  two	  counts.	  Firstly,	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  must	  be	  conceptualised	  as	   ‘sentient’	  ones	  able	   to	   reflect	   critically	  on	   their	  assumptions	  in	  the	  light	  of	  experiences	  and	  encounters	  with	  new	  ideas.	  Secondly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures;	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	  47	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’.	  48	  V.A.	  Schmidt	  (2011),	  'Ideas	  And	  Discourse	  In	  Transformational	  Political	  Economic	  Change	  In	  Europe',	  in	  G.	  Skogstad	  (ed.),	  Policy	  Paradigms,	  Transnationalism,	  And	  Domestic	  
Politics	  (London:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  press),	  pp.36-­‐63;	  see	  also	  M.B.	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man	  Vs.	  The	  Bricoleur:	  Bricolage	  As	  An	  Alternative	  Vision	  Of	  Agency	  In	  Ideational	  Change',	  European	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  3	  (1),	  pp.147-­‐67.	  49	  T.S.	  Kuhn	  (1996),	  The	  Structure	  Of	  Scientific	  Revolutions	  (3rd	  Edition)	  (London:	  University	  Of	  Chicago	  Press).	  50	  Schmidt	  (2011),	  'Ideas	  And	  Discourse’.	  51	  Ibid.	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and	  partly	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  sentience,	  she	  emphasises	  that	   ‘paradigms’	  where	  they	   relate	   to	   policymaking	   are	   continually	   adapted	   and	   elaborated	   by	   the	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  who	  bear	  them	  as	  they	  encounter	  failures	  and	  are	  forced	  to	   reconsider	   (and	   perhaps	   redefine)	   the	   very	   problems	   they	   are	   addressing.52	  This	  is	  the	  second	  facet	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  coordinative	  discourse.	  Subscribers	  to	  a	  coordinative	   discourse	   do	   not	   simply	   enact	   the	   problem	   definitions	   that	   it	  contains.	  Rather,	  they	  interact	  with	  other	  sentient	  agents	  and	  reflect	  critically	  upon	  their	  problem	  definitions,	  and	  through	  this	  process	   transform	  the	   intersubjective	  ideas	  they	  share	  and	  the	  ideational	  context	  that	  they	  inhabit.	  	  Following	  Schmidt	  I	  maintain	  that	  problem	  definitions	  should	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  the	  dynamic	  and	  changing	  outcomes	  of	  coordinative	  discourses.	  Doing	  so	  confers	  a	  number	   of	   advantages	   on	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   explanation.	   Firstly,	   it	  overcomes	   the	   punctuated	   equilibrium	   model	   of	   ideational	   change	   that	   has	  characterised	  some	  earlier	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  analyses	  of	  policymaking	  since	  Hall’s	  seminal	  article.	  This	  view	  sees	   the	   ideational	  context	  as	  static	  and	  so	  stability-­‐promoting	   save	   for	   rare	   critical	   junctures	   at	   which	   ideational	   changes	  promote	   institutional	   change.53	  While	   contributors	   in	   this	  vein	  offer	  many	  useful	  insights	   about	   the	   role	   of	   ideas	   during	   economic	   crises	   (many	   of	   which	   will	   be	  drawn	  upon	  here)	   they	  nevertheless	  deny	   the	  utility	  of	   constructivist	   insights	   to	  the	  slower-­‐paced	  institutional	  process	  explored	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  account	   for	   the	   entirety	   of	   the	   ideational	   conditions	   and	   agential	   processes	  through	   which	   sudden	   change	   occurs.54	   Secondly,	   conceiving	   of	   problem	  definitions	  as	  situated	  and	  developed	  within	  coordinative	  discourse	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  better	  explain	   the	  role	  of	   ideas	   in	  moments	  of	   ‘crisis’.	  Rather	   than	  seeing	  new	  ideas	   as	   largely	   unexplained	   exogenous	   factors	   that	   simply	   appear	   at	   such	  moments,	   the	   concept	   of	   coordinative	   discourse	   sensitises	   us	   to	   the	   collective	  process	  of	  re-­‐interpretation	  that	  goes	  on	  among	  policymakers	  and	  other	  political-­‐economic	   actors	   as	   they	   seek	   to	   explain	   anomalous	   events	   and	   catastrophic	  failures	  in	  economic	  performance.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Ibid.	  53	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’.	  54	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ‘Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	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Coordinative	   discourse	   denotes	   a	   consensual	   process:	   it	   implies	   that	   problem	  definitions	  and	  policy	  ideas	  are	  held	  in	  earnest	  by	  policymakers	  who	  develop	  them	  through	   coordinative	   discourses	   with	   the	   motive	   of	   better	   attaining	   genuinely	  valued	  end	  states.	  However,	  the	  traditional	  role	  assigned	  to	  ideational	  processes	  in	  political	   economy	   is	   of	   a	   different	   and	   somewhat	   more	   sinister	   category:	  mystification,	   and	   the	  use	  of	   arguments	   to	  disguise	   reality	   and	  manipulate	  other	  actors	  into	  compliance.	  This,	  at	  least,	  is	  one	  function	  assigned	  to	  ideology	  in	  those	  conceptions	  that	  stress	  the	   ‘naturalisation’	  of	  otherwise	  contestable	  relationships	  of	   dominance	   between	   actors,	   social	   groups	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   classes.55	   This	  notion	  is	  similar	  to	  Lukes’	  ‘third	  face	  of	  power’,	  in	  which	  ideas	  are	  deliberately	  and	  strategically	   deployed	   by	   manipulative	   actors	   to	   persuade	   other	   actors	   of	   the	  legitimacy	  and/or	  necessity	  of	  their	  preferences,	  securing	  their	  consent	  prior	  to	  a	  conflict	   occurring.56	   Both	   persuasion	   and	   mystification	   imply	   that	   strategy	   and	  manipulation	  are	  at	  the	  forefront,	  in	  place	  of	  the	  consensual	  sense-­‐making	  implied	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  coordinative	  discourse.	  	  	  The	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  treatment	  of	  ideas	  as	  constitutive	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  political-­‐economic	  elites	  is	  partly	  a	  response	  to	  this	  emphasis	  on	  manipulation.	  The	  concept	  of	  coordinative	  discourse	  allows	  us	  to	  assert	  that	  ideas	  and	  ideational	  processes	   matter	   in	   all	   areas	   of	   political-­‐economic	   research,	   not	   simply	   in	   the	  legitimation	  of	  powerful	  interests.	  However	  the	  use	  of	  ideas	  as	  manipulative	  tools	  still	  matters	  greatly	  to	  constructivist	  institutionalism.	  In	  relation	  to	  such	  processes,	  Schmidt	   supplements	   her	   concept	   of	   coordinative	   discourse	   with	   a	   second	   –	  ‘communicative	   discourse’.	   Communicative	   discourse	   refers	   to	   policymakers’	  attempts	  to	  communicate	  their	  policy	  programmes	  and	  restructuring	  preferences	  to	   the	   general	   public	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   their	   decisions	   and	   preferences	   appear	  legitimate,	   perhaps	   winning	   support	   for	   them	   in	   the	   process	   and	   limiting	  resistance	  that	  might	  otherwise	  exist.57	  	  Communicative	  discourse	  has	  a	  number	  of	  differentiating	   features	   in	  comparison	  with	  coordinative	  discourse.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  a	  process	  of	  persuasive	  communication.58	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Eagleton	  (2007),	  Ideology.	  56	  S.	  Lukes	  (2005),	  Power:	  A	  Radical	  View	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan).	  57	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures;	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  ’Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	  58	  Schmidt	  (2010b),	  ‘Taking	  Ideas’.	  
	   94	  
Its	  effect	  obtains	  through	  strategically	  shaping	  the	  ideational	  context	  that	  the	  actor	  who	   is	   being	   persuaded	   inhabits	   and	   through	   which	   they	   formulate	   their	  perceptions	   of	   the	   world	   and	   their	   interests,	   and	   does	   so	   in	   ways	   designed	   to	  encourage	   consent.	   This	   contrasts	   with	   coordinative	   discourse,	   wherein	   the	  process	  is	  less	  one	  of	  persuasion	  than	  of	  mutual	  sense-­‐making	  among	  actors	  with	  initially	   similar	   ideas	   pursuing	   similar	   objectives	   and	   confronting	   similarly	  perceived	   problems.	   Secondly,	   communicative	   discourse	   is	   characterised	   by	   the	  more	  widespread	  use	  of	  arguments	  composed	  of	  normative	  ideas	  than	  the	  analytic	  ideas	   utilised	   in	   communicative	   discourse.59	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   they	   are	  exclusively	   composed	   of	   normative	   arguments,	   yet	   it	   has	   been	   noted	   that	   they	  often	   achieve	   their	   persuasive	   effect	   by	   constructing	   a	   (possibly	   spurious)	  consistency	  between	  policymakers’	  preferences	  and	  widely	  held	  norms	  and	  ethical	  values.60	  Third,	  communicative	  discourse	  can	  be	  (and	  often	  is)	  combative;	  it	  is	  not	  simply	   a	   means	   by	   which	   subscribers	   of	   one	   coordinative	   discourse	   assert	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  policy	  preferences,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  means	  by	  which	  they	  contest	  and	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  political	  opponents.	  Indeed,	  the	  former	  is	  often	  achieved	  through	  the	  latter.	  Insofar	  as	  these	  preferences	  follow	  from	  the	  opponents’	  coordinative	  discourse,	  communicative	  discourse	  can	  become	  a	  means	   by	   which	   rival	   coordinative	   discourses	   are	   attacked,	   marginalised,	   and	  possibly	  displaced.	  However	  combative	  communicative	  discourses	  can	  also	  occur	  between	  groups	  of	  actors	  committed	  to	  very	  similar,	   if	  not	   identical	  coordinative	  discourses.	  Many	  years	  of	  near	  consensus	  on	  economic	  policy	   in	  Britain	  have	  not	  prevented	   the	   Labour	   and	   Conservative	   parties	   from	   attacking	   one	   another’s	  approaches	  in	  this	  area	  by,	  for	  example,	  questioning	  one	  another’s	  competence.	  	  While	   Schmidt’s	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   communication	   between	   policymakers	   and	   the	  general	   public	   it	   takes	   no	   stretch	   of	   the	   imagination	   to	   see	   that	   all	   political-­‐economic	  actors	  engage	  in	  some	  form	  of	  communicative	  discourse.	  Companies	  do	  not	   merely	   market	   their	   products	   (which	   is	   itself	   a	   form	   of	   communicative	  discourse),	  but	   they	  also	  extol	   the	  societal	  benefits	  of	   their	  activities	  where	   their	  business	   practices	   become	   subject	   to	   scrutiny	   (a	   political	   communicative	  discourse).	   Pressure	   groups	   and	   charities	   often	   rely	   on	   exhortative	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  A	  claim	  I	  substantiate	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  60	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	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(communicative)	  discourses	  to	  obtain	  funds	  and	  gain	  influence.	  Furthermore	  it	   is	  plausible	   that	   communicative	   discourse	   does	   not	   simply	   take	   place	   between	  political	   economic	   actors	   and	   the	   general	   public,	   but	   also	   between	   political-­‐economic	  elites.	  Engleen	  et	  al.,	  for	  instance,	  claim	  that	  a	  communicative	  discourse	  produced	   by	   financial	   sector	   lobbying	   organisations	  was	   in	   part	   responsible	   for	  shaping	  the	  coordinative	  discourse	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  on	  matters	  of	  financial	  policy.61	  	  	  
The	  Relationship	  Between	  Institutional	  And	  Ideational	  Processes	  	  Ideational	   processes	   such	   as	   coordinative	   and	   communicative	   discourse	   do	   not	  take	   place	   in	   isolation	   from	   the	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   those	   processes	  occur.	   As	   Schmidt	   observes,	   the	   distribution	   of	   resources,	   powers	   and	   authority	  among	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  –	  in	  part	  a	  function	  of	  the	  institutional	  context	  –	  is	  instrumental	  in	  deciding	  how	  coordinative	  discourses	  will	  play	  out.62	  They	  dictate,	  for	   example,	   who	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   be	   included	   within	   the	   policymaking	  coordinative	  discourses,	   the	  (relative)	  access	  of	  groups	  outside	  of	  government	   to	  policymakers’	   coordinative	   discourses,	   and	   more	   generally	   the	   powers	   of	  policymakers	   relative	   to	   other	   political-­‐economic	   actors.	   Institutions	   also	   define	  the	   resources	   available	   to	   actors	   with	   which	   to	   disseminate	   communicative	  discourses	  and	  structure	  access	  to	  the	  media.	  Ideational	  processes	  are	  thus	  shaped	  by,	   and	   cannot	   be	   analysed	   in	   isolation	   from,	   the	   institutional	   context	   when	  explaining	   outcomes.	   However	   the	   same	   is	   also	   true	   in	   reverse:	   institutional	  processes	   (such	   as	   the	   emergence	   of	   economic	   policy	   failure)	   unfold	   in	   an	  ideational	  context,	  and	  it	  is	  ideational	  processes	  that	  mediate	  how	  sentient	  actors	  respond	   to	   the	   outcomes	   of	   institutional	   processes.	   It	   is	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  approach	  to	  relate	  dynamics	  in	  the	  former	  domain	  to	  the	   latter	   through	   actor	   agency	   that	   gives	   the	   approach	   its	   analytical	   utility	   as	   a	  contribution	  to	  intuitionalist	  political	  economy.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great.	  62	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	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3.	  
Explaining	  Political-­Economic	  Change	  From	  A	  Constructivist	   Institutionalist	  
Perspective	  	  The	   previous	   sections	   have	   brought	   together	   conceptual	   building	   blocks	   of	   the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   approach.	   What	   remains	   is	   to	   show	   how	   these	  insights	   could	   be	   assembled	   in	   order	   to	   empirically	   study	   policy	   change	   and	  continuity,	  as	  well	  as	   to	  derive	  a	  more	  specific	  set	  of	  concepts	  on	  which	  my	  own	  empirical	   research	   can	   draw.	   A	   theme	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   discussion	   of	  institutionalist	  political	  economy	  in	  Chapter	  1	  concerns	  the	  temporality	  of	  change.	  As	  we	   have	   seen,	   institutionalist	   accounts	   fall	   into	   those	   that	   focus	   primarily	   on	  occasional	   and	   rapid	   periods	   of	   transformative	   change	   in	   political-­‐economic	  institutions	   and	   those	   that	   look	   to	   more	   gradual	   and	   cumulative	   processes	   by	  which	   endogenous	   pressures	   for	   change	   build	   up	   or	   are	   (deliberately	   or	  inadvertently)	   created	   by	   agents.	   So	   it	   is	   with	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  analysis	  of	  policymaking	  and	  policy	  change.	   	  There	  are	   those	  accounts	   that	   focus	  on	   moments	   of	   ‘great	   transformation’	   in	   political-­‐economic	   systems	   at	   times	   of	  crisis,	   and	   those	   that	   focus	   instead	   on	   non-­‐crisis	   moments	   of	   ‘normal	   policy	  making’.	  My	  own	  thesis	  is	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  first	  category,	  focusing	  as	  it	  does	  on	  a	  moment	  of	  significant	  economic	  failure	  in	  the	  British	  political	  economy.	  However	  during	   the	   course	   of	  my	   research	   the	   insights	   of	   the	   latter	   approach	   have	   been	  illuminating	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   that	   will	   be	   encountered	   later	   in	   this	  dissertation.	  Consequently,	   I	   shall	  briefly	  review	  both	  approaches	  here	  and	  draw	  attention	  to	  insights	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	  subsequent	  arguments.	  	  The	  ‘Diagnosis’	  And	  ‘Narration’	  Of	  Economic	  Crisis	  	  The	   analysis	   of	   moments	   of	   institutional	   transformation	   and	   change	   in	   the	  trajectory	   of	   capitalist	   political	   economies	   has	   been	   prominent	   in	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  research.	  Exponents	  sought	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  Hallian	  framework	  for	  studying	  transformative	  political-­‐economic	  change.	  Hall	  had	  suggested	  that	  at	  times	  of	  political-­‐economic	  failure	  and	  economic	  crisis	  paradigms	  could	  undergo	  a	  sort	  of	  Gestalt	  dynamic	  by	  which	  an	  ailing	  paradigm	  is	  suddenly	  replaced,	  and	  that	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following	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  a	  new	  paradigm	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  would	   thereafter	  be	   transformed.63	  Hall’s	   empirical	   case	   study	  was	  the	  transition	  from	  Keynesian	  to	  Monetarist-­‐inspired	  macroeconomic	  policy	  in	  the	  UK	   during	   the	   protracted	   problematic	   economic	   context	   of	   the	   1970s,	   yet	  subsequent	  authors	  have	  looked	  to	  his	  approach	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  how	  a	  shift	  to	  neoliberalism	  occurred	  in	  various	  national	  contexts.64	  	  	  Hall	  was	  circumspect	  regarding	  the	  means	  by	  which	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  would	  occur,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	   the	  1979	  election	   in	  his	  British	  case	  study	  and	  imputing	  the	  Conservatives’	  new	  outlook	  on	  economic	  policy	  as	  an	  exogenous	  factor.	   This	   left	   unexamined	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   processes	   by	  which	  new	  paradigms/coordinative	  discourses	   rise	   to	  dominance,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  means	  by	  which	  public	  support	  was	  drummed	  up	  for	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  policy	  prior	  to	  the	   1979	   general	   election.65	   These	   sort	   of	   prior	   mechanisms,	   Hall	   noted,	   were	  likely	   to	  be	   “more	   sociological	   than	   scientific”,	   but	  his	   account	  had	   little	  more	   to	  say	   either	   in	   general	   terms	   or	   specifically	   on	   his	   case	   study.66	   It	   is	   to	   these	  mechanisms	  that	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  turned.	  	  	  Schmidt’s	   concepts	   of	   coordinative	   and	   communicative	   discourse	   are	   a	   useful	  means	  with	  which	  to	  think	  about	  these	  missing	  elements	   in	  Hall’s	  account	  whilst	  also	   challenging	   the	   lack	   of	   agency	   inherent	  within	   it.	   For	   Schmidt,	   coordinative	  discourses	  are	  not	  exclusively	  the	  preserve	  of	  policymakers,	  but	  in	  principle	  can	  be	  opened	   to	   other	   actors	   as	   well	   with	   whom	   policymakers	   consult	   and	   seek	   new	  perspectives	   on	   the	   problems	   that	   they	   confront.67	   There	   is	   consequently	   scope	  within	   an	   account	   to	   incorporate	   the	   insights	   of	   scholars	   who	   have	   studied	   the	  history	   of	   neoliberalism	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   neoliberal	  coordinative	  discourse	  within	  the	  Conservative	  Party	   in	  the	  1970s.	  Such	  scholars	  have	   stressed	   the	   historical	   importance	   of	   particular	   intellectuals	   and	  organisations	   in	   the	   national	   and	   international	   contexts	   in	   fermenting	   the	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   within	   the	   financial	   press	   and	   the	   Conservative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’.	  64	  Hay	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Crisis	  Of	  Keynesianism’;	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	  65	  Blyth	  (1997),	  ‘Any	  More	  Bright’.	  66	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’,	  p.280.	  67	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	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Party	   itself	   prior	   to	   the	   1970s.68	   Secondly,	   she	   argues	   that	   political-­‐economic	  actors	  must	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  producers	  of	  communicative	  discourses	  as	  well	  as	   participants	   in	   coordinative	   discourses.	   Alerting	   us	   to	   ideational	   agency,	   this	  second	  aspect	  of	  Schmidt’s	  framework	  sensitises	  us	  to	  research	  on	  the	  sociological	  processes	  by	  which	  consent	  is	  constructed	  in	  the	  electorate	  and	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  a	  wider	  engagement	  with	  critical	  cultural	  and	  media	  studies.69	  	  	  With	   their	   contrasting	   emphasis	   on	   inter-­‐elite	   and	   elite-­‐public	   communications,	  the	  two	  strands	  of	  Schmidt’s	  framework	  provide	  a	  useful	  basis	  for	  conceptualising	  how	  ideational	  processes	  can	  impact	  transformations	  and	  non-­‐transformations	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political	  economies	  at	  times	  of	  crisis.	  Taking	  inspiration	  from	  Hay	  and	  Blyth,	  I	  call	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  this	  dual-­‐faceted	  framework	  the	  ‘diagnosis’	  and	  the	   ‘narration’	  of	   economic	   crisis	   respectively,	  with	  both	  comprising	   the	  broader	  concept	  of	  ‘crisis	  construction’.	  	  
Crisis	  Diagnosis	  	  Moments	   of	   transformative	   change	   in	   advanced	   capitalist	   economies	   have	  invariably	   coincided	   with	   moments	   of	   failure	   in	   economic	   performance,	  subsequently	   remembered	   as	   ‘crises’.70	   Schmidt,	   like	   Hall,	   notes	   that	   such	  moments	  can	  be	  ‘windows	  of	  opportunity’	  for	  entirely	  new	  problem	  definitions	  to	  be	  adopted	  in	  the	  coordinative	  discourses	  of	  governments	  and	  opposition	  parties,	  thereafter	   informing	   economic	   policy	   and	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring.71	   To	   conceptualise	   the	   process	   by	   which	   this	   occurs	   it	   is	   first	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’;	  R.	  Desai	  (1994),	  'Second-­‐Hand	  Dealers	  In	  Ideas:	  Think	  Tanks	  And	  Thatcherite	  Hegemony',	  New	  Left	  Review,	  1	  (206),	  pp.27-­‐64.	  69	  C.	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis:	  The	  Discursive	  Construction	  Of	  The	  Winter	  Of	  Discontent'',	  Sociology,	  30	  (2),	  pp.253-­‐77;	  D.	  Hudson	  and	  M.	  Martin	  (2009),	  'Narratives	  Of	  Neoliberalism:	  The	  Role	  Of	  Everyday	  Media	  Practices	  And	  The	  Reproduction	  Of	  Dominant	  Ideas',	  in	  A.	  Goffas	  and	  C.	  Hay	  (eds.),	  The	  Role	  Of	  Ideas	  In	  Political	  Analysis:	  A	  Portrait	  Of	  
Contemporary	  Debates	  (London:	  Routledge),	  pp.97-­‐117.	  70	  Hay	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Crisis	  Of’.	  71	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	  Schmidt	  borrows	  the	  term	  ‘window	  of	  opportunity’	  from	  Kingdon,	  whose	  work	  is	  examined	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  kind	  of	  ideational	  change	  Schmidt	  has	  in	  mind	  is,	  however,	  rather	  more	  encompassing	  that	  the	  changes	  in	  policy	  ideas	  that	  Kingden	  theorises	  –	  Schmidt	  is	  referring	  to	  a	  level	  of	  change	  akin	  to	  ‘paradigm	  shift’	  involving	  the	  transformation	  of	  problem	  definitions	  in	  a	  	  whole	  area	  of	  policy,	  whilst	  Kingdon’s	  focus	  is	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  particular	  policy	  idea	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  implemented.	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necessary	  to	  consider	  what	  exactly	  a	  crisis	  is.	  Hay	  does	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  term’s	  medical	   origins.	   In	   a	   medical	   context	   crisis	   refers	   to	   the	   moment	   at	   which	   the	  health	  of	  a	  patient	  has	  failed	  suddenly	  and	  a	  decision	  must	  be	  made	  –	  a	   ‘decisive	  intervention’	  –	  that	  will	  change	  the	  subsequent	  course	  of	  events	  and	  either	  heal	  or	  kill	  the	  patient	  (for	  example,	  the	  cauterizing	  of	  a	  swollen	  artery).72	  Consequently,	  there	   is	   an	   inherent	   element	   of	   diagnosis/interpretation	   involved:	   a	   crisis	   is	  defined	  not	  simply	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  failure	  in	  the	  health	  of	  the	  patient,	  but	  by	  the	   interpretation	   of	   symptoms	   and	   a	   related	   decision	   to	   intervene	   in	   order	   to	  stabilise	   and	   heal	   them.	   Hay	   transfers	   this	   conception	   of	   crisis	   to	   the	   political	  economy.	  For	  economic	  crisis	  to	  exist,	  he	  argues,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  set	  of	  ‘symptoms’	  that	   are	   deemed	   to	   constitute	   a	   failure	   of	   economic	   performance.	   Yet	   these	  ‘symptoms’	  must	   also	   be	   ‘diagnosed’	   by	  policymakers	   (or	   an	   opposition	  party	   of	  would-­‐be	   policymakers	   able	   to	   take	   government)	   as	   necessitating	   some	   form	   or	  another	  of	   ‘decisive	   intervention’	   and	  a	   conception	  of	   the	  underlying	   causes	   that	  the	  intervention	  should	  address	  (that	  is,	  a	  set	  of	  problem	  definitions	  which	  specify	  the	   presence	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   crisis).73	   Widmaier,	   Blyth	   and	   Seabrooke	  summarise	  this	  point	  of	  view	  succinctly	  by	  defining	  crises	  as	  “events	  which	  agents	  intersubjectivley	  interpret	  as	  necessitating	  change”.74	  	  In	  this	  view	  economic	  performance	  failures	  are	  not	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  evidence	  of	  the	  need	  for	  political-­‐economic	  change.	  A	  scenario	  in	  which	  economic	  failure	  is	  present	  but	  in	  which	  decisive	  intervention	  is	  not	  deemed	  necessary	  by	  agents	  in,	  or	  capable	  of	  taking,	  government	  is	  not	  one	  to	  which	  the	  term	  ‘crisis’	   is	  applicable	  –	  the	   scenario	   has	   not	   been	   ‘diagnosed’	   as	   a	   crisis.	   Following	   Gramsci,	   Hay	   terms	  such	   a	   scenario	   one	   of	   ‘catastrophic	   equilibrium’	   –	   a	   moment	   in	   which	  policymakers	  are	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  decisively	  intervene	  and	  so	  persist	  with	   policy	   ideas	   that	   are	   not	   yielding	   the	   economic	   performance	   that	   they	   are	  intended	   to.75	   Examining	   the	   1970s,	   Hay	   characterises	   that	   context	   as	   one	   of	  catastrophic	  equilibrium	  until	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  in	  1979.76	  The	  quasi-­‐corporatist	  policy	  practices	  and	  ‘monetarily	  constrained	  Keynesianism’	  of	   the	   Wilson-­‐Callaghan	   governments	   proved	   unable	   to	   control	   inflation	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Hay	  (1999a),	  'Crisis	  And’.	  73	  Ibid.	  74	  Widmaier,	  Blyth,	  Seabrooke	  (2007),	  ‘Exogenous	  Shocks’.	  75	  Hay	  (1999a),	  'Crisis	  And	  The’.	  76	  Hay	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Crisis	  Of’.	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improve	   economic	   performance	   for	   a	   protracted	   period	   of	   time	   amid	   what	   Hay	  views	  as	  a	   largely	  exogenous	   inflationary	  shock	  beginning	   in	  1973.77	  The	  Labour	  government	  was	  neither	  willing	  to	  initiate	  a	  full-­‐blooded	  deflationary	  monetarism	  nor	   to	  adopt	   the	  more	  radical	  physical	  and	   financial	   interventionism	  required	  by	  the	  Left’s	  ‘alternative	  economic	  strategy’.	  They	  had,	  Hay	  argues,	  failed	  to	  develop	  a	  coherent	   set	   of	   new	   problem	   definitions	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   experience	   but	  persevered	  with	  faltering	  commitments	  to	  the	  old	  ones.	  	  	  Crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  decisive	  intervention	  in	  this	  context	  fell	  to	  Thatcher’s	  ‘drys’,	  a	  group	  within	   the	  Conservative	  Party	   that	   subscribed	   to	  a	  neoliberal	   coordinative	  discourse	  and	  who	  were	  able	   to	   capture	  both	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  Conservative	  Party	   and	   then,	   after	   1979,	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   country	   as	   well.	   For	   these	  policymakers,	  the	  rise	  in	  unemployment	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  that	  resulted	  from	  their	  interventions	   was	   not	   indicative	   of	   crisis	   or	   economic	   performance	   failure,	   but	  rather	  of	  the	  ‘patient’	  responding	  to	  unpalatable	  but	  necessary	  medicine.	  	  Blyth	   has	   also	   pointed	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis.	   Utilizing	   a	   more	  economics-­‐centred	  prose,	  he	  suggests	  that	  crises	  are	  often	  moments	  of	  ‘Knightian’	  uncertainty;	  that	  is,	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  actors	  are	  unable	  to	  assign	  likely	  outcomes	  to	  the	  choices	  that	  are	  available	  to	  them	  because	  the	  analytical	  ideas	  encompassed	  within	   previously	   predominant	   problem	   definitions	   no	   longer	   hold	   purchase	   on	  the	   outcomes	   being	   produced	   by	   the	   political-­‐economic	   system.78	  What	   is	  more,	  because	   other	   actors	   can	   be	   similarly	   uncertain	   about	   their	   interests	   in	   such	  moments	   it	   becomes	  more	   difficult	   still	   for	   actors	   to	   guess	   one	   another’s	   likely	  behaviour,	  and	  so	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  context	  is	  compounded.	  In	  such	  moments,	  he	   argues,	   actors	   become	   receptive	   to	   new	   ideas	   in	   order	   to	   reestablish	   an	  understanding	   of	   the	   context	   that	   they	   act	   in.	   These	   new	   ideas	   serve	   both	   as	  ‘weapons’	  with	  which	  to	  formulate	  arguments	  to	  attack	  those	  of	  opposing	  interest	  groups	   and	  defenders	   of	   the	   status	   quo,	   and	   as	   ‘blueprints’	   for	   new	  policies	   and	  institutional	   changes	   aimed	   at	   resolving	   the	   crisis.	   In	   this	   sense	   he	   parallels	  Schmidt’s	  dual	  emphasis	  on	   the	   role	  of	   ideas	   in	   coordinative	  and	  communicative	  discourses.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Ibid.	  78	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	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  An	   interesting	   implication	  of	   this	  constructivist	   conceptualisation	  of	   crisis	   is	   that	  relatively	   unambiguous	   policy	   failure	   (as	   represented	   by	   poorly	   performing	  indicators	  such	  as	  GDP)	  need	  not	  actually	  be	  present	  for	  a	  crisis	  to	  be	  diagnosed.	  What	  is	  necessary	  is	  that	  some	  actors	  within	  the	  context	  diagnose	  crisis	  and	  then	  successfully	  persuade	   the	   electorate	   and	  other	  political-­‐economic	   actors	   that	   the	  circumstances	   they	   inhabit	   are	   marked	   by	   failure	   that	   demands	   decisive	  intervention.79	   Hay	   suggests	   that	   while	   catastrophic	   equilibrium	   had	   obtained	  throughout	   the	   mid-­‐1970s,	   it	   was	   only	   the	   episode	   immediately	   preceding	   the	  election	  of	  the	  Thatcher	  governments	  –	  the	  ‘Winter	  of	  Discontent’	  –	  that	  warrants	  the	  term	  crisis	  because	  it	  was	  successfully	  constructed	  as	  a	  moment	  necessitating	  decisive	   intervention.	   80	   This,	   he	   notes,	   occurred	   in	   spite	   of	   improving	   economic	  indicators.	  	  	  Blyth	   also	   emphasises	   another	   important	   role	   for	   ideas	   both	   in	   crisis	   and	   non-­‐crisis	   moments:	   because	   they	   are	   constitutive	   of	   interests	   they	   influence	   the	  formation	   of	   interest	   groups,	   and	   consequently	   the	   scope	   for	   collective	   action	  among	   actors.81	   Those	   groups	   between	  which	   co-­‐operation	  will	   be	   possible,	   and	  those	  groups	  with	  whom	  agents	  will	  perceive	  an	  advantage	  in	  seeking	  cooperation	  with,	   depends	  not	   simply	   on	   their	   structural	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   one	   another,	  but	   also	   on	   shared	   problem	   definitions.	   For	   constructivists,	   these	   can	   facilitate	  common	   interests	   between	   actors	   that	   cut	   across	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   other	  divisions.	   For	   Blyth,	   it	   is	   cooperation	   and	   opposition	   between	   organised	  expressions	  of	   ‘capital’	  and	  of	   ‘labour’	  with	   ‘the	  state’	   that	   is	  of	   interest,	  however	  the	   insight	   can	  be	   applied	   at	   a	   lower	   level	   of	   generality	   to	   sections	  within	   these	  broad	  categories.	  Blyth	  notes,	  for	  example,	  that	  some	  business	  groups	  were	  more	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  Widmaier,	  Blyth,	  Seabrook	  (2007),	  ‘Exogenous	  Shocks’.	  Cox	  calls	  this	  the	  ‘social	  construction	  of	  the	  need	  to	  reform’,	  on	  which	  see	  R.H.	  Cox	  (2001),	  'The	  Social	  Construction	  Of	  An	  Imperative:	  Why	  Welfare	  Reform	  Happened	  In	  Denmark	  And	  The	  Netherlands	  But	  Not	  In	  Germany',	  World	  Politics,	  53	  (3),	  pp.463-­‐98;	  Hay,	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’;	  Béland	  (2009),	  ‘Ideas,	  Institutions’.	  80	  Hay	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Crisis	  Of’;	  C.	  Hay	  (2009b),	  'The	  Winter	  Of	  Discontent	  Thirty	  Years	  On',	  
The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  80	  (4),	  pp.545-­‐52.	  81	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  see	  also	  Widmaier	  (2004),	  'The	  Social	  Construction’.
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prepared	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  US	  government	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  1930s	  largely	  because	  they	  shared	  a	  similar	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  economic	  context.82	  	  	  Conversely,	   however,	   Schmidt	   and	   Hay	   both	   alert	   us	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  ideationally-­‐constituted	   disunity	   among	   individuals	   within	   political	   parties,	  governments	   and	   the	   state	  more	  broadly,	   in	  both	   crisis	   and	  non-­‐crisis	  moments.	  Schmidt	  notes	  that	  there	  are	  often	  minority	  coordinative	  discourses	  ‘waiting	  in	  the	  wings’	   of	   parties	   and	   governments	   that	   contrast	   with	   the	   problem	   definitions	  being	   enacted	   by	   the	   leadership.83	   An	   example	   of	   such	   a	   minority	   coordinative	  discourse	   is	   the	   ‘wets’	   within	   Thatcher’s	   Conservative	   Party,	   for	   whom	   the	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  ‘drys’	  was	  premised	  on	  an	  incorrect	  understanding	  of	  the	  economic	   crisis	   and	   social	   problems	   that	   the	   government	   was	   confronting.	   For	  Hay,	   ‘the	   state’	   is	   an	   amorphous	   web	   of	   inter-­‐connected	   organisations	   that	   lie	  beyond	   the	   straightforward	   control	   of	   the	   core	   executive,	   and	  which	   is	   thus	   not	  amenable	   to	   analysis	   as	   a	   collective	   actor	   outside	   of	   very	   specific	   historical	  conditions.84	  The	  result	  of	  these	  observations	  is	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  collective	  interest	  and	   action,	   and	  of	   the	   composition	   of	   collective	   actors,	   is	  more	   complicated	   in	   a	  constructivist	  account	  than	  in	  other	  perspectives.	  	  	  This	  theme	  has	  emerged	  to	  be	  important	  in	  interpreting	  my	  own	  findings,	  and	  it	  is	  returned	  to	  in	  Chapters	  4,	  6	  and	  the	  Conclusion.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  tendency	  on	  the	   part	   of	   Schmidt,	   Hay	   and	   Blyth	   to	   treat	   governments	   and	   opposition	   party	  leaderships	  as	  unified	  collective	  actors	  during	  moments	  of	  crisis.	  For	  Hay,	  a	  crisis	  is	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  a	  (temporary)	  unity	  and	  coherence	  can	  be	  imposed	  upon	  the	  many	   interacting	   agencies	   comprising	   the	   state	   by	   a	   decisively	   intervening	  government	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   ‘state	   project’.85	   Thatcherism	   in	   his	   account	  constituted	  such	  a	  state	  project,	  and	  the	  unfolding	  process	  of	  neoliberalisation	   in	  the	   UK	   has	   been	   its	   legacy.86	   Schmidt	   shows	   greater	   caution	   in	   regard	   to	   this	  assumption.	   She	   remains	  open	   to	   the	  possibility	   that	   a	   single	  policy	  programme,	  even	  one	  made	  in	  the	  light	  of	  economic	  crisis,	  could	  be	  the	  product	  of	  compromises	  between	   policymakers	   subscribing	   to	   multiple	   and	   quite	   different	   coordinative	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  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	  83	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures;	  Schmidt	  (2011),	  ‘Ideas	  And	  Discourse’.	  84	  Hay	  (1999a),	  ‘Crisis	  And	  The’.	  85	  Ibid.	  86	  Ibid.	  
	   103	  
discourses.87	  However	  Schmidt	  does	  not	  regard	  this	  scenario	  as	  applicable	  to	  her	  British	   case	   study.	   For	   Schmidt,	   ‘single	   actor	   systems’	   (political	   systems	   that	   are	  unitary,	   executive-­‐centred	   and	   majoritiarian)	   such	   as	   Britain’s	   favour	  governmental	   and	   party	   unity	   around	   a	   single	   set	   of	   problem	   definitions	   in	  moments	   of	   crisis.	   She	   notes	   that	   having	   secured	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  Conservative	  Party	  and	  won	  the	  1979	  election	  the	  neoliberal	  ‘drys’	  were	  able	  to	  act	  on	  their	  crisis	  diagnosis	   largely	  unhindered	  by	  conservative	   ‘wets’	  or	   the	  divided	  Labour	   opposition	   due	   to	   the	   institutional	   structure	   of	   the	  British	   executive	   and	  electoral	  system.88	  My	  own	  findings	  suggest	   that	   this	  assumption,	  while	  a	  wholly	  plausible	  possibility,	  has	  been	  too	  readily	  generalised.	  	  
Crisis	  Narration	  	  These	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  arguments	  serve	  as	  an	  important	  amendment	  to	   silences	   in	   Hall’s	   framework.	   Yet	   the	   causal	   sequence	   is	   not	   yet	   complete.	   A	  second	   silence	   in	   Hall’s	   framework	   is	   how	   legitimacy	   and	   electoral	   consent	   is	  marshaled	   in	   support	   of	   transformative	   change.	   To	   amend	   this	   silence	   a	   shift	   of	  focus	   is	   necessary,	   from	   coordinative	   to	   communicative	   discourses,	   and	   to	   the	  process	   of	   ‘Crisis	   narration’.89	   Crisis	   Narration	   is	   a	   process	   of	   communicative	  discourse	   through	  which	  mobilizing	  agents	  –	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  present	   research,	  Government	  ministers	  –	  attempt	  to	  mobilise	  supportive	  constituencies	  behind	  the	  predominant	  governing	  crisis	  diagnosis	  by	  socially	  constructing	  the	  perception	  of	  crisis	   and	   the	   imperative	   to	   reform	   amongst	   the	   electorate.90	   It	   contrasts	   to	   the	  process	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis	   in	   coordinative	   discourse	   because	   it	   involves	   a	  potentially	   manipulative	   process	   in	   which	   the	   electorate	   is	   persuaded	   that	   it	   is	  experiencing	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   crisis;	   that	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   policies	   is	  necessitated	  in	  order	  to	  in	  response	  to	  the	  crisis;	  and	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  and	  in	  
its	   interests	  that	  the	  crisis	  be	  so	  resolved.	  91	  Consequently,	  crisis	  narration	  is	  also	  an	   ideological	   process	   because	   its	   outcomes	   mobilise	   people	   for	   or	   against	   the	  particular	  political-­‐economic	  relationships	  at	  stake	  in	  differing	  modes	  of	  capitalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	  88	  Ibid.	  89	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’.	  90	  Cox	  (2001),	  ‘The	  Social	  Construction’.	  91	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’;	  Campbell	  (1998),	  ‘Institutional	  Analysis’;	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  
The	  Futures.	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restructuring.92	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  crisis	  narration	  is	  successful	  in	  allowing	  a	  party	  or	   government	   to	   gain	   or	   retain	   governing	   power	   and	   implement	   decisive	  interventions,	   it	   completes	   the	   causal	   sequence	   in	   the	   constructivist	   analysis	   of	  transformative	  institutional	  change.	  I	  will	  dwell	  here	  on	  a	  number	  of	  features	  that	  are	  pertinent	  to	  the	  operationalisation	  of	  the	  concept	  in	  my	  own	  research.	  	  In	   exploring	   the	   concept	   I	   shall	   draw	  on	  Hay’s	   analysis	   of	   the	  narration	   of	   crisis	  during	   the	   ‘Winter	   of	   Discontent’.93	   Hay	   sees	   something	   of	   a	   coalition	   to	   have	  existed	  between	  right	  wing	  newspapers	  and	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  viewing	  both	  as	  producers	  of	  a	   ‘New	  Right’	   ‘crisis	  of	  social	  democracy’	  narrative.94	  The	  issue	  of	  which	   actors	   are	   party	   to	   this	   story-­‐telling	   process	   is	   complex:	   existing	   studies	  have	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   media	   as	   both	   the	   producer	   and	   shaper	   of	   crisis	  narratives	   themselves	   and	   the	   diffuser	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   produced	   by	  politicians.95	   The	   issue	   of	   my	   own	   choice	   of	   focus	   on	   politicians	   as	   narrative	  producers	  is	  taken	  up	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  	  A	  more	   conventional	   form	   of	   narrative	   –	   story-­‐telling	   –	   is	   a	   useful	   analogy	  with	  which	   to	   unpack	   crisis	   narration.	   In	   a	   straightforward	   way,	   crisis	   narratives	  resemble	  stories	  because	   they	  occur	   through	   the	  same	  media:	  written	  or	   spoken	  communications.	  Yet	  like	  a	  piece	  of	  historical	  fiction,	  a	  crisis	  narrative	  also	  invites	  the	  reader	  to	  imagine	  certain	  causal	  relationships	  as	  having	  comprised	  events	  that	  have	   really	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   world	   that	   the	   ‘decoder’	   (the	   recipient	   of	   the	  ideological	   narrative)	   inhabits.	   To	   do	   so,	   it	   foregrounds	   certain	   aspects	   of	   that	  reality	  as	  being	  of	  greater	  importance	  than	  others,	  or	  simply	  ignores	  others	  which	  an	   alternative	   telling	   of	   the	   story	   might	   highlight.96	   I	   term	   this	   aspect	   of	   crisis	  narrative	   construction	   ‘narrative	   selectivity’.	   In	   Hay’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   Winter	   of	  Discontent,	   he	   shows	   how	   events	   were	   selected	   for	   reporting	   by	   right-­‐wing	  newspapers	   only	   insofar	   as	   they	   were	   consistent	   with	   a	   causal	   attribution	   of	  economic	  and	  social	  problems	   to	  a	   failing	  strike-­‐prone	  social	  democracy.	  Strikes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’.	  93	  C.	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation:	  James	  Bulger,	  Juvenile	  Crime	  And	  The	  Construction	  Of	  A	  Moral	  Panic',	  Social	  &	  Legal	  Studies,	  4	  (2),	  pp.197-­‐223;	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’;	  Hay	  (2009b),	  ‘The	  Winter	  Of’.	  94	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’.	  95	  Ibid;	  Hudson	  and	  Martin	  (2009),	  ‘Narratives	  Of	  Neoliberalism’.	  96	  Hay	  (1996),	  ‘Narrating	  Crisis’.	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wage	  inflation,	  Jim’s	  Callaghan’s	   ‘junkette’	  and	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  social	  chaos	  are	  widely	   reported,	   while	   the	   generally	   improving	   economic	   indicators	   of	   the	   time	  that	   ran	   counter	   to	   this	   interpretation	   were	   neglected.97	   These	   are	   simply	  ‘deselected’	  and	  not	  presented	  to	  the	  reader.	  	  	  Narrative	  selectivity	  also	  imputes	  motives	  to	  the	  various	  real	  world	  characters	  that	  have	  been	   recruited	   into	   the	  narrative’s	  plot	   in	  order	   to	  explain	   their	  behaviour,	  and	  narratives	  may	  draw	  on	  certain	  culturally	  prevalent	  ‘stock	  characters’	  that	  the	  audience	   will	   readily	   identify	   in	   order	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   is	   done	   in	   order	   to	   invite	  certain	  normative	  judgments	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  characters’	  actions.	  In	   the	   New	   Right	   narrative	   trade	   union	   officials	   were	   cast	   as	   the	   promoters	   of	  sectional	   interest	   in	   opposition	   to	   parliament	   as	   the	   democratic	   voice	   of	   the	  people,	   a	   move	   which	   portrayed	   a	   confrontational	   relationship	   between	   ‘union	  bosses’	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  to	  which	  the	  decoder	  belonged	  (whilst	  deselecting	  contrary	   information	   about	   their	   democratic	  mandates	   and	   the	   less	   than	  perfect	  representativeness	  of	  the	  majoritarian	  UK	  electoral	  system).98	  	  	  As	  a	  story	  about	  crisis,	  a	  crisis	  narrative	  echoes	  an	  adventure	  story	   in	  describing	  certain	   risks	   and	  perils	   that	   impinge	  upon	   the	  decoder	   themselves	  or	   characters	  with	   which	   they	   are	   likely	   to	   sympathise	   (often	   arising	   from	   the	   behaviours	   or	  indifference	   of	   other	   characters).	   This	   is	   a	   particularly	   crucial	   characteristic	   of	   a	  crisis	   narrative,	   because	   it	   is	   through	   this	   function	   that	   the	   narrative	   specifies	  problems	  for	  the	  electorate,	  which	  are	  presented	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  demand	  that	   a	   government	   or	   opposition	   party’s	   decisive	   interventions	   be	   allowed	   to	  proceed	  (even	  if	  the	  problems	  identified	  are	  not	  economic	  ones	  or	  directly	  related	  to	   economic	   policy).	   Hay	   observes	   how	   the	   crisis	   of	   social	   democracy	   narrative	  attributes	   not	   only	   economic	   decline	   and	   impending	   economic	   collapse	   to	   the	  activities	  of	  unions	  and	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Labour	  government,	  but	  also	  a	  range	  of	  harmful	   inconveniences	   to	   (amongst	  others)	   sick	   children	  and	   the	   relatives	  of	  deceased	  people	  awaiting	  burial.	  For	  some	  decoders,	  these	  situations	  will	  directly	  implicate	  them	  (they	  could,	  perhaps,	  have	  a	  sick	  child	  and	  so	  feel	  directly	  outraged	  by	  the	  situation	  facing	  other	  parents	  with	  which	  they	  identify).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Ibid.	  98	  Ibid.	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  Yet	   the	   effect	   could	   also	   be	   less	   direct,	   appealing	   to	   empathy	   rather	   than	   direct	  experience.	  When	  thinking	  about	  how	  this	  empathic	  appeal	  can	  be	  made	  it	  is	  useful	  to	   consider	   that	   crisis	   narratives	   (like	   all	   forms	   of	   story-­‐telling)	   are	   composed	  within	   a	   social	   and	   normative	   context	   in	   which	   certain	   norms	   and	   values	   are	  prevalent,	  and	  these	  values	  and	  norms	  can	  be	  drawn	  upon	  strategically	  by	  authors	  to	  shape	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  decoder	  as	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  characters	  in	  the	  narrative.99	  Hay	  shows	  how	  the	  portrayed	  relationship	  between	  striking	   hospital	   workers	   and	   a	   sick	   child	   suffering	   from	   leukemia	   was	  straightforward	   recruitment	   of	   the	   social	   value	   that	   prioritises	   the	   interests	   of	  children	   (especially	   sick	   and	   vulnerable	   children)	   over	   the	  material	   interests	   of	  adults	   to	   the	   service	   of	   a	   crisis	   narrative	   that	   casts	   trade	   unions	   as	   a	   political-­‐economic	  problem	  against	  which	  state	  power	  should	  be	  used.	  	  In	  these	  ways	  and	  more	  crisis	  narration	  is	  like	  a	  process	  of	  story-­‐telling.	  Yet	  where	  crisis	   narratives	   depart	   from	   fiction	   is	   in	   their	   active	   attempt	   to	   change	   the	  decoder’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   context	   that	   they	   actually	  inhabit	   (to	  make	   them	   experience	   it	   as	   one	   of	   crisis),	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   to	   change	  their	   political	   attitudes	   and	   preferences.	   Successful	   crisis	   narratives	   function	   to	  constitute	  the	   ‘lived	  experience’	  of	  the	  decoder.100	  This	  occurs	  through	  the	  ‘meta-­‐narration’,	  whereby	   ideological	   texts	   published	   at	   different	   times	   and	  describing	  many	  disparate	  events	  or	  topics	  collectively	  re-­‐inforce	  the	  notion	  that	  these	  events	  are	  systematically	  linked,	  and	  are	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  crisis	  being	  underway.101	   As	   a	   process,	   crisis	   narration	   denotes	   this,	   rather	   than	   the	   stories	  told	   in	   individual	   texts.	   In	  Hay’s	   analysis,	  many	   disparate	   stories	   of	   government	  incompetence,	  alleged	  trade	  union	  self-­‐interest	  and	  a	  general	  climate	  of	  chaos	  are	  assembled	   through	   meta-­‐narration	   into	   the	   narrative	   of	   a	   crisis	   of	   social	  democracy.	  It	  is	  thus	  in	  the	  common	  themes	  comprising	  each	  story	  that	  the	  crisis	  narrative	  resides.	  The	  decoder	  may	  experience	  some	  of	   these	  events	  directly,	   for	  example	  power	  outages	  or	  public	   transport	   inconveniences	  as	  a	   result	  of	   strikes.	  Others	   are	   only	   experienced	   through	   the	   narrative.	   Yet	   providing	   a	   common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation’;	  Campbell	  (1998),	  ‘Institutional	  Analysis’;	  Cox	  (2001),	  'The	  Social	  Construction’.	  100	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation’;	  S.	  Hall	  (1979),	  'Great	  Moving	  Right	  Show',	  Marxism	  Today,	  	  (January,	  1979),	  pp.14-­‐20.	  101	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis’.	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explanation	  for	  and	  connection	  between	  disparate	  and	  experienced	  events,	  meta-­‐narration	  creates	  a	  ‘lived	  experience’	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  crisis	  being	  underway.	  102	  	  The	   claim	   that	   crisis	   narratives	   are	   able	   to	   constitute	   the	   lived	   experiences	   of	  decoders	   requires	   an	   account	   of	   the	   mechanism	   whereby	   crisis	   narration	  influences	   the	   perceptions	   and	   perceived	   interests	   of	   recipients	   –	   a	   theory	   of	  persuasion.	   Both	   Hay	   and	   Schmidt	   have	   pointed	   to	   the	   somewhat	   amorphous	  concept	  of	   ‘resonance’	  as	  a	   factor	  of	  persuasion.103	  The	  more	  successfully	  a	  crisis	  narrative	  is	  able	  to	  construct	  points	  of	  resonance	  with	  the	  decoding	  actor’s	  existing	  worldview,	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   is	   that	   they	  will	   internalise	   the	  crisis	  narrative	  as	  a	  lived	   experience	   and	   perceive	   the	   decisive	   intervention	   inscribed	   within	   it	   as	  necessary.	  	  	  Hay	  draws	  upon	  a	  modified	  form	  of	  the	  Althusserian	  concept	  of	  ‘interpellation’	  in	  explaining	  how	   resonance	   is	   achieved.104	   Crisis	   narratives,	   he	   argues,	   contain	   an	  implied	   ‘subject	  position’	   for	   the	  decoder	  that	   is	   ‘encoded’	  within	  the	  text.105	  The	  subject	  position	  is	  a	  point	  of	  view	  within	  the	  text	  that	  the	  decoder	  is	  being	  invited	  to	  take.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  text	  succeeds	  in	  interpellating	  the	  decoder	  –	  that	  is,	  successfully	   getting	   them	   to	   identify	  with	   the	  preferred	   subject	   position	   –	   it	  will	  prove	  persuasive.	  The	  mechanism	  of	  interpellation	  operates	  by	  constructing	  points	  of	   resonance	   between	   the	   claim	   that	   crisis	   is	   underway	   and	   the	   social	   roles,	  subjective	  understandings	  and	  values	  of	  the	  reader.	  This	  is	  done	  through	  the	  story-­‐telling	  processes	  and	  narrative	  strategies	  discussed	  above.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  is	  sometimes	   achieved	   directly	   by	   representing	   a	   social	   role	   that	   the	   decoder	  occupies	  in	  the	  text	  and	  then	  presenting	  these	  as	  implicated	  in	  an	  unfolding	  crisis	  (for	  instance,	  the	  direct	  appeal	  to	  parents	  noted	  above).	  Sometimes	  the	  process	  is	  less	   direct,	   acting	   instead	   upon	   values	   that	   the	   decoder	   is	   likely	   to	   hold	   and	  presenting	   these	   as	   pointing	   towards	   support	   for	   the	   decisive	   interventions	  inscribed	   in	   the	   text	   (for	   instance	   someone	  who	  believes	   the	  welfare	  of	   children	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Hall	  (1979),	  'Great	  Moving	  Right’.	  103	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis’;	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation’;	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  The	  Futures.	  104	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis’.	  105	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation’.	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trumps	   all	   else).	   These	   can	   be	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘direct’	   and	   ‘empathic’	   modes	   of	  interpellation,	  respectively.106	  	  A	  note	  of	  caution	  is	  required	  here,	  however,	  for	  the	  process	  of	  interpellation	  is	  not	  one	  synonymous	  with	  indoctrination.107	  An	  ideological	  text	  may	  fail	  to	  induce	  the	  decoder	  to	  internalise	  the	  crisis	  narrative	  either	  because,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  decoder	   may	   recognise	   its	   ideological	   nature,	   or	   because	   they	   have	   simply	   not	  understood	  the	  encoded	  ideological	  message.108	  They	  may	  be	  predisposed	  to	  reject	  the	  preferred	  subject	  position	  because	  their	  own	  lived	  experiences	  run	  counter	  to	  it	  (for	  instance,	  a	  union	  official	  is	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  persuaded	  by	  the	  crisis	  of	  social	  democracy	  narrative).	  Consequently,	  the	  theory	  of	  persuasion	  and	  ideology	  expounded	  by	  Hay	  and	  his	  intellectual	  influences	  is	  a	  ‘critical’	  one	  because	  it	  differs	  from	   deterministic	   accounts	   of	   ideology	   and	   retains	   the	   relational	  conceptualisation	   of	   (ideational)	   structure	   and	   agency.	   The	   outcomes	   of	  interpellation	  are	  negotiated,	  complicated	  and	  contingent,	  and	  it	   is	   likely	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  crisis	  narrative	  will	  be	  uneven	  across	  a	  population	  as	  broad	  as	   the	  general	  electorate.109	  	  Through	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   crisis	   narration	   through	   communicative	  discourse,	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   possess	   a	   sophisticated	   tool	   for	  addressing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  legitimacy	  and	  consent	  for	  decisive	  intervention	  are	  cultivated.	  Consequently,	  friendly	  critics	  such	  as	  Seabrooke	  are	  incorrect	  to	  equate	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  analyses	  with	  a	   ‘proclamation’	  view	  of	   legitimacy	   in	  which	  elite	  struggles	  alone	  are	  seen	  to	  determine	  the	  course	  of	  political-­‐economic	  change.110	   Legitimacy	   and	   consent	   for	   decisive	   interventions	   must	   often	   be	  achieved	  through	  the	  ideational	  process	  of	  crisis	  narration	  if	  a	  would-­‐be	  decisively	  intervening	   party	   or	   government	   is	   to	   obtain	   or	   retain	   office.	   Yet	   where	  Seabrooke’s	   ‘everyday	   politics’	   perspective	   does	   have	   a	   great	   deal	   to	   inform	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   research	   is	   in	   conceptualising	   the	   feedback	   of	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  Ibid.	  107	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis’.	  108	  Hay	  (1995),	  'Mobilisation	  Through	  Interpellation’.	  109	  Ibid;	  S.	  Hall	  (1988),	  'The	  Toad	  In	  The	  Garden:	  Thatcherism	  Among	  The	  Theorists',	  in	  C.	  Nelson	  and	  L.	  Grossberg	  (eds.),	  Marxism	  And	  The	  Interpretation	  Of	  Culture,	  pp.35-­‐57.	  110	  L.	  Seabrooke	  (2009),	  'Everyday	  Legitimacy	  And	  Institutional	  Change',	  in	  A.	  Goffas	  and	  C.	  Hay	  (eds.),	  The	  Role	  of	  Ideas	  In	  Political	  Analysis:	  A	  Portrait	  of	  Contemporary	  Debates	  (London:	  Routledge),	  pp.78-­‐94.	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resistance	   to	   interpellation	   and	   reform	   by	   the	   general	   public	   in	   processes	   of	  everyday	  politics,	  rather	  than	  through	  organised	  social	  movements	  that	  are	  more	  readily	   classifiable	   as	   ‘actors’	   in	   institutionalist	   terms.111	   Such	   insights	   apply	   at	  both	   crisis	   and	   non-­‐crisis	   moments	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   broadly	   commensurate	   to	  existing	  constructivist	  frameworks,	  and	  so	  may	  serve	  to	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  of	   the	   trajectory	   of	   the	   British	   political	   economy.	   This	   is,	   however,	   beyond	   the	  scope	  of	  my	  thesis,	  which	  remains	  focused	  on	  governments	  and	  their	  coordinative	  and	  communicative	  discourses.	  
	  Constructivist	  Analysis	  Of	  Non-­‐Crisis	  Moments	  	  This	  constructivist	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  study	  of	  transformative	  political-­‐economic	   change	   facilitates	   research	   and	   insights	   into	   important	   political	  processes	   that	   were	   neglected	   by	   earlier	   institutionalist	   accounts,	   and	   concepts	  derived	   from	  this	  perspective	  constitute	   the	  mainstay	  of	  my	  arguments	  here.	  Yet	  left	   thus	   there	   is	   the	   danger	   that	   constructivist	   institutionalism	   amounts	   to	   the	  claim	  that	  ideational	  processes	  matter	  only	  at	  times	  of	  crisis.	   	  This	  is	  problematic	  because	   the	   conceptualisation	  of	   the	  political-­‐economic	   actor	   as	   a	   sentient	   agent	  situated	   in	  dynamic	   ideational	   and	   institutional	   contexts	   suggests	   that	   ideas	   and	  ideational	  processes	  matter	  at	  all	  times.	  Now,	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  ideas	  matter	  in	  non-­‐crisis	  moments	  because	  they	  are	  a	  stabilizing	  influence.	  Hall	  suggests	  that	  the	  presence	   of	   a	   dominant	   paradigm	   means	   that	   policymakers	   agree	   on	   problem	  definitions,	   and	   so	   we	   need	   only	   attend	   to	   institutional	   processes	   and	   to	  adjustments	   in	   policy	   ideas	   in	   our	   analysis	   of	   political	   economy.112	   Yet	   this	   is	   a	  problematic	   general	   assumption	   to	   make	   if	   political	   actors	   really	   are	   sentient	  agents,	   for	   it	   suggests	   that	   policymakers	   are	   not	   reflexive	   about	   their	   own	  assumptions	  about	  the	  world	  and	  thus	  excludes	  ideational	  agency	  at	  all	  but	  crisis	  moments.113	  Such	  a	  view	  is	  challenged	  by	  the	  institutionalist	  approaches	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  1	  that	  emphasise	  gradual	  change	  as	  the	  result	  of	  strategic	  agency.	  These	  suggest	  a	  more	  fluid	  relationship	  between	  agency,	  interests	  and	  the	  ideational	  and	  institutional	  contexts.	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  L.	  Seabrooke	  (2007),	  'The	  Everyday	  Social	  Sources	  Of	  Economic	  Crises:	  From	  “Great	  Frustrations”	  To	  “Great	  Revelations”	  In	  Interwar	  Britain',	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  51	  (4),	  pp.795–810.	  112	  Hall	  (1993),	  ‘Policy	  Paradigms’.	  113	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’.	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  Other	  constructivists	  working	  in	  and	  beyond	  the	  field	  of	  political	  economy	  are	  less	  willing	  to	  bracket	  the	  role	  of	   ideational	  processes	  to	  moments	  of	  economic	  crisis.	  Schmidt’s	  own	  conceptual	  framework	  is	  attuned	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  ideas	  matter	  at	  all	  times,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  in	  the	  same	  way.114	  Yet	  her	  empirical	  work	  regarding	  economic	  policy	  change	  is	  mostly	  crisis-­‐centred,	  so	  it	  has	  fallen	  to	  others	  to	  show	  how	   ideational	   processes	   might	   impact	   on	   the	   policy	   process	   at	   non-­‐crisis	  moments.	   Recently,	   there	   has	   been	   renewed	   interest	   among	   some	   constructivist	  scholars	  in	  Kingdon’s	  seminal	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  policy	  process.115	  Unlike	  the	  approaches	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   Kingdon’s	   framework	   focuses	   on	  policy	  change	  that	  occurs	  outside	  of	  historically	  exceptional	  moments	  of	  economic	  performance	  failure.	  For	  him,	  policy	   formation	  is	  conditioned	  by	  the	  outcomes	  of	  processes	  unfolding	  in	  three	  distinct	  but	  inter-­‐related	  domains	  (or	  ‘streams’),	  with	  conditions	   favouring	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	   policy	   when	   these	   streams	   yield	   a	  compatibility	   between	   available	   policy	   ideas	   in	   the	   ‘policy	   stream’,	   problem	  definitions	   in	   the	   ‘problem	   stream’	   and	   political	   circumstances	   in	   the	   ‘political	  stream’.116	   Although	   not	   cast	   in	   the	   institutionalist	   vocabulary,	   Kingdon’s	  framework	   is	   clearly	   attuned	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   both	   ideational	   and	   institutional	  processes.	  	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  utilises	  a	  similar	  directional	  dependence	  of	  ideational	  types	  to	  that	  adopted	  here.	  First	  there	  are	   ‘problems’	   for	  policy	  to	  solve.	  These	  arise	   in	  the	   ‘problem	  stream’,	  a	   concept	  denoting	  policymakers’	   interpretations	  of	  events	  that	   occur	   in	   the	   areas	   for	   which	   they	   are	   responsible.	   Second	   are	   policy	   ideas	  which	   are	   formulated	   in	   the	   ‘policy	   stream’	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   actors	   (including	  policymakers,	   officials,	   experts	   and	   interest	   groups)	  who	   take	   interest	   in	   a	   given	  policy	  area	  and	  constitute	  ‘policy	  communities’	  around	  that	  issue	  area.	  Policy	  ideas	  hold	   no	   traction	   with	   policymakers	   until	   they	   offer	   a	   solution	   to	   a	   perceived	  problem.	   There	   are	   considerable	   parallels	   between	   these	   two	   streams	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Schmidt	  (2010b),	  'Taking	  Ideas’.	  115	  Kingdon	  (1984),	  Agendas,	  Alternatives;	  D.	  Béland	  (2005),	  'Ideas	  And	  Social	  Policy:	  An	  Institutionalist	  Perspective',	  Social	  Policy	  And	  Administration,	  39	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐18;	  Béland	  (2009),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions’;	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’;	  Mehta	  (2011),	  ‘From	  Whether’;	  D.	  Wincott	  (2011),	  'Ideas,	  Policy	  Change	  And	  The	  Welfare	  State',	  in	  D.	  Bèland	  and	  R.H.	  Cox	  (eds.),	  Ideas	  And	  Politics	  In	  Social	  Science	  Research	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.143-­‐66.	  116	  Kingdon	  (1984),	  Agendas,	  Alternatives.	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notion	   of	   coordinative	   discourse.	   Kingdon	   differs	   from	   constructivist	  institutionalists	   in	   bracketing	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   policy	   ideas	   and	   problem	  definitions	   are	   produced	   into	   these	   two	   different	   streams	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  analysis:	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   conceptualise	   both	   as	   arising	   from	   the	  more	  general	  process	  of	   coordinative	  discourse.117	  Nevertheless,	  Kingdon	  argues	  that	  policy	  communities	  tend	  to	  produce	  a	  common	  vocabulary	  and	  set	  of	  concepts	  over	  time	  (implying	  the	  production	  of	  problem	  definitions	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  ideas),	  whilst	   the	   identification	  and	  definition	  of	  problems	  rest	   in	  part	  on	   the	   ideas	   that	  policymakers	  have	  about	  how	  the	  world	  works	  and	  how	  it	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  strong	  sensitivity	  to	  political	  realities	  in	  Kingdon’s	  framework.	  The	  political	   stream	   consistently	   influences	   the	   policy	   and	   problem	   streams	   and	   so	  impacts	   upon	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   political	   agenda	   and	   the	   policy	   ideas	   that	   are	  practically	   available.	   Policymakers	  will,	   he	   suggests,	   tend	   to	   avoid	   conceding	   the	  existence	   of	   ‘problems’	   if	   doing	   so	   entails	   an	   increased	   burden	   of	   political	   or	  financial	   responsibility,	   and	  may	   instead	   choose	  either	  not	   to	   resolve	   them	  or	   to	  engage	   in	  bureaucratic	   ‘turf	  wars’	   in	   order	   to	   categorise	   the	  problem	  as	   another	  minister	  or	  organisation’s	   responsibility.	  Conversely,	  policymakers	  may	   jealously	  defend	  their	  remits	  and	  their	  own	  problem	  definitions	  where	  another	  department	  encroaches	  on	   it.	   Policymakers	  may	   also	   seek	   to	   confront	   or	  make	   compromises	  with	  other	  policymakers	  whose	  activities	  create	  externalities	   for	   them,	  especially	  where	   budgets	   are	   the	   issue	   at	   hand.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   also	   the	   struggle	   between	  organised	   interest	   groups	   seeking	   to	   influence	   the	   policy	   process,	   which	   can	  impose	  costs	  and	  benefits	  on	  the	  courses	  of	  action	  open	  to	  policymakers	  through	  the	  confrontations	  or	  compromises	  that	  they	  facilitate.	  In	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  the	  policy	   process	   represents	   the	   parallel	   unfolding	   of	   the	   three	   streams,	   in	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  The	  need	  for	  the	  bracketing	  in	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  reflects	  a	  different	  emphasis	  to	  constructivist	  institutionalists.	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  is	  chiefly	  designed	  to	  explain	  the	  adoption	  of	  particular	  policy	  ideas.	  Much	  of	  his	  discussion	  of	  problem	  definition	  is	  related	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  fairly	  short-­‐lived	  incidents	  that	  come	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  need	  for	  new	  legislation	  or	  regulation,	  such	  an	  aeroplane	  crash	  becoming	  emblematic	  of	  the	  need	  for	  new	  regulations	  on	  air	  traffic	  management.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  ‘problem	  definitions’	  that	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  conceptualise	  and	  investigate	  are	  more	  general	  and	  enduring	  issues	  such	  as	  how	  to	  maximise	  economic	  growth	  and	  combat	  unemployment,	  which	  are	  issues	  policymakers	  necessarily	  attend	  to	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  presently	  constitute	  a	  politicised	  issue	  for	  the	  general	  public.	  Nevertheless,	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  remains	  a	  useful	  heuristic	  in	  relation	  to	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  research	  questions	  providing	  this	  distinction	  is	  borne	  in	  mind.	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from	   time	   to	   time	   circumstances	   in	   the	   political	   stream	   will	   permit	   a	   problem	  identified	   and	   defined	   in	   the	   problem	   stream	   to	   be	   connected	   to	   a	   policy	   idea	  arising	  from	  policy	  communities	  in	  the	  policy	  stream.	  	  There	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   potential	   for	   Kingdon’s	   framework	   to	   inform	   a	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   analysis	   of	   policymaking	   at	   non-­‐crisis	  moments.	   Its	  emphasis	   on	   ongoing	   processes	   of	   problem	   definition	   and	   re-­‐definition	   can,	   for	  example,	  enrich	  accounts	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  incremental	  processes	  of	  institutional	  change	  emphasised	  by	  Thelen	  and	  her	  collaborators,	  accounting	  for	  why	  actors	  are	  attempting	   to	   incrementally	   change	   institutions	   in	   one	   direction	   and	   not	  another.118	  Such	  moments	  are	  not	  within	  the	  immediate	  remit	  of	  my	  argument	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  yet	  I	  maintain	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  has	  a	  number	  of	  lessons	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  a	  constructivist	  analysis	  of	  policymaking	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  crisis	  as	  well.	  	  	  Two	   related	   ones	   are	   the	   importance	   of	   being	   attuned	   to	   the	   impact	   of	  departmental	   boundaries	   and	   intra-­‐executive	   politics	   when	   considering	   the	  formation	   of	   problem	   definitions	   and	   policy	   ideas	   adopted	   by	   different	   parts	   of	  government.	   Choices	   of	   policy	   ideas	   will,	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   readily	  concede,	  closely	  reflect	  political	  realities	  in	  an	  institutionally	  structured	  context	  as	  well	   as	   problem	   definitions.	   Yet	   Kingdon	   raises	   the	   possibility	   that	   problem	  definitions	  may	   differ	   depending	   on	  which	   government	   department	   has	   defined	  them,	  owing	  to	  the	  different	  normative	  and	  analytical	  ideas	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  the	  different	   policy	   communities	   that	   inform	   the	   coordinative	   discourse	   of	  policymakers	   in	   particular	   departments.	   The	   extent	   and	   nature	   of	   executive	  boundaries,	  and	  the	  ideational	  divergences	  that	  may	  result,	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  constitutional	   make	   up	   of	   the	   polity	   in	   question.119	   Some	   are	   characterised	   by	  strong	  core	  executives	  whilst	   in	  others	   formal	  decision-­‐making	  power	   is	  diffused	  among	   central	   government	   departments,	   or	   between	   different	   levels	   of	  government	  and	  networks	  of	  governance.	  However	  Kingdon’s	  discussion	  of	  intra-­‐executive	   politics	   lends	   credence	   to	   the	   view	   that	   there	   is	   always	   likely	   to	   be	   a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  among	  policymakers	   from	  the	  head	  of	  government,	  and	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Béland	  (2007),	  'Ideas	  And	  Institutional’;	  Schmidt	  (2010a),	  'Analyzing	  Ideas	  And’.	  119	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	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the	   state	   bureaucracy	   itself	   has	   a	   degree	   of	   independent	   influence	   on	   the	   policy	  process.	  The	  former	  point	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  British	  polity,	  in	  which	  ministers	  are	  constitutionally	   responsible	   for	   departments	   that	   are	   themselves	   large	   and	  specialised	   bureaucracies.	   Despite	  many	   years	   in	  which	   the	   power	   of	   the	   prime	  minister	   has	   been	   seen	   to	   increase	   relative	   to	   ministers	   and	   in	   which	   attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  reform	  the	  executive	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ensures	  greater	  coherency	  between	   departmental	   issue	   areas,	   the	   role	   of	   ministers	   and	   their	   advisors	   and	  officials	   in	   policy	   formation	   and	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   operation	   of	   government	  remains	  a	  strong	  one.	  	  	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  point	  is	  that	  governments	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	   a	   collective	   actor	   in	   an	   area	   as	   expansive	   an	   economic	   policy.	   Instead,	   the	  executive	  is	  composed	  of	  (possibly	  competing)	  actors	  that	  may	  perceive	  problems	  very	   differently.	  Where	   these	   departmental	   actors	   hold	   responsibilities	   in	   over-­‐lapping	  issues	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  two	  departments	  with	  foremost	  responsibility	  for	  economic	   policymaking	   in	   the	   UK	   (the	   Department	   of	   Business,	   Innovation	   and	  Skills	  and	  the	  Treasury),	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   they	   formulate	   their	  understanding	  of	  issues	  among	  different	  policy	  communities	  and	  so	  develop	  separate	  coordinative	  discourses.	   Cross-­‐departmental	   decision-­‐making	   would	   in	   these	   circumstances	  reflect	   compromises	   between	   different	   interpretations	   of	   how	   economic	   policy	  ought	   to	   be	   conducted	   and	   the	   problems	   it	   ought	   to	   address.	   The	   importance	   of	  this	  insight	  for	  my	  own	  argument	  will	  become	  apparent	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  
4.	  
Bricolage	  and	  Constructivist	  Institutionalism	  	  A	  criticism	  that	  has	  been	   leveled	  at	   the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  approach	   is	  that	   it	   overstates	   how	   systematic	   and	   theory-­‐based	   the	   thinking	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor	   is.120	   In	   a	   contrasting	   view,	   policymakers	   are	   conceived	   of	   as	  pragmatic	   problem-­‐solvers	   wedded	   to	   whatever	   they	   believe	   will	   work	   at	   any	  given	  moment,	  rather	  than	  being	  inflexibly	  committed	  to	  theoretical	  abstractions.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  view	  held	  by	  some	  of	  the	  authors	  so	  far	  encountered	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  M.	  Watson	  (2004),	  'Endogenous	  Growth	  Theory:	  Explanation	  Or	  Post	  Hoc	  Rationalisation	  For	  Policy?',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  6	  (4),	  pp.543-­‐51;	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’.	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formal	   theories	   do	   exert	   an	   effect	   on	   problem	   definitions	   in	   coordinative	  discourses.	  In	  his	  seminal	  study	  Blyth,	  like	  his	  historical	  institutionalist	  forebears,	  traced	   the	   impact	   of	   historically	   significant	   economic	   theories	   of	   the	   1920s	   and	  ‘30s	  on	  policymaking	  in	  that	  decade.121	  Hay	  has	  traced	  the	  impact	  of	  ideas	  such	  as	  Friedman’s	   ‘natural	   rate	   hypotheses’	   on	   British	   policymaking,	   while	   Schmidt	  believes	  German	  ‘ordoliberalism’	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  recent	  budgetary	  debates	   within	   the	   European	   Union.122	   Such	   claims	   imply	   that	   the	   problem	  definitions	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  policymaking	  coordinative	  discourses	  are	  premised	  on	  well	   worked	   out	   (albeit	   evolving)	   abstractions	   about	   the	   economy	   that	   render	  policy	   decisions	   consistent	   with	   oneanother	   over	   time	   (excepting	   at	   times	   of	  transformative	  ideational	  change).	  	  	  An	  alternative	  perspective	  paints	  the	  structure	  of	  coordinative	  discourses	  and	  the	  processes	   by	   which	   politicians	   make	   decisions	   in	   an	   altogether	   messier	   way.	  Policymakers,	   exponents	   claim,	   are	   not	   rational	   strategic	   decision	   makers	   but	  instead	   simply	   (and	   exclusively)	   ‘muddle	   through’,	   drawing	   eclectically	   and	  possibly	   incoherently	   on	   available	   policy	   ideas	   in	   order	   to	   resolve	   the	   constant	  stream	  of	  problems	   that	  arise	   from	  the	  dynamic	  political-­‐economic	  context.123	   In	  this	   view	   they	   are	   professional	   problem-­‐solvers,	   constrained	   in	   both	   time	   and	  epistemological	   resources.	   Carstensen	  has	   recently	   contributed	   a	  well-­‐developed	  rendition	   of	   this	   critique	   intended	   as	   a	   corrective	   to	   the	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  perspective.124	  Critical	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘paradigm’	  and	  sceptical	  of	  the	   punctuated	   equilibrium	   temporality	   of	   ideational	   change	   that	   it	   implies,	  Carstensen	   instead	   advocates	   a	   ‘lean’	  model	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actor	   that	  stresses	   the	   cognitive	   limitations	   of	   human	   beings.	   People,	   he	   asserts,	   simply	  cannot	   internalise	   such	   complicated	   ideational	   systems	   as	   an	   entire	   economic	  theory	  and	  apply	  them	  consistently	  to	  every	  policy	  decision,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	   this	   exceeds	   the	   capacity	   of	   human	  memory.	   The	   result,	   he	   claims,	   is	   that	   a	  great	   deal	   of	   ideational	   content	   of	   a	   coordinative	   discourse	   exists	   ‘outside’	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  For	  examples	  of	  the	  former	  perspective	  see	  the	  contributors	  to	  P.A.	  Hall	  (ed.),	  (1989),	  The	  Political	  Power	  Of	  Economic	  Ideas:	  Keynesianism	  
Across	  Nations	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press).	  122	  Hay	  (2004a),	  'The	  Normalizing	  Role’;	  Schmidt	  (2014),	  'Speaking	  To	  The	  Markets’.	  123	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’,	  see	  also	  C.E.	  Lindblom	  (1959),	  'The	  Science	  Of	  'Muddling	  Through'',	  Public	  Administration,	  19	  (2),	  pp.79-­‐88.	  	  124	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’.	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minds	   of	   the	   political-­‐economic	   actors,	   presumably	   in	   the	   form	  of	   documents	   or	  distributed	  among	  the	  minds	  of	  other	  actors.	  For	  Carstensen,	  this	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  problem	  definitions	   that	  exist	  within	   the	  minds	  of	  all	  subscribers	  to	  a	  coordinative	  discourse.	  	  	  Having	   made	   this	   (highly	   plausible)	   observation,	   Carstensen	   then	   begins	   to	   re-­‐assemble	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	   ‘policymaker’	  from	  first	  principles.	  He	  argues	  that	  policymakers	  are	  ‘bricoleurs’.125	  ‘Bricolage’,	  as	  developed	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Levi-­‐Strauss,	   refers	   to	   a	   mode	   of	   problem-­‐solving	   conduct	   in	   which	   solutions	   to	  problems	   are	   improvised	   using	   the	   tools	   at	   hand.126	   It	   stands	   opposed	   to	  ‘engineering’,	   a	   mode	   of	   problem-­‐solving	   conduct	   in	   which	   tools	   are	   carefully	  designed	   depending	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   problem	   that	   they	   are	   intended	   to	  address.	   Transferred	   to	   the	   context	   of	   policymaking,	   Carstensen	   suggests	   that	  policymakers’	   decisions	   represent	   a	   kind	   of	   bricolage	   through	   which	   they	  creatively	  and	  eclectically	  draw	  upon	  the	  policy	  ideas	  available	  to	  them	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  that	  they	  face.	  Crucially,	  this	  differs	  from	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  implied	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  paradigm,	  in	  which	  each	  problem	  is	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  paradigm’s	  problem	  definitions	  and	  the	  policy	   ideas	  that	  they	  are	  compatible	   with.	   In	   Carstensen’s	   view,	   policymakers	   are	   not	   dogmatically	  committed	  to	  any	  one	  economic	  theory	  or	  set	  of	  problem	  definitions,	  and	  so	  carry	  out	  an	  atheoretical	   ‘inter-­‐paradigm	  borrowing’	  of	  policy	   ideas	   in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  problems	  that	  they	  confront.	  Because	  they	  are	  not	  committed	  to	  a	  single	  set	  of	  problem	   definitions,	   policymakers	   encounter	   each	   policy	   problem	   afresh,	   and	  ‘knead	   and	   mould’	   ideas	   drawn	   from	   a	   range	   of	   (possibly	   theoretically	  incommensurable)	  sources	  into	  a	  form	  that	  will	  prove	  acceptable	  to	  their	  parties,	  the	  electorate,	  and	  meld	  with	  existing	  institutional	  structures	  in	  the	  polity.127	  	  The	   debate	   between	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	  political-­‐economic	   actor	   and	   Carstensen’s	   own	   puts	   at	   stake	   a	   number	   of	   more	  subtle	   questions.	   Foremost	   is	   whether	   policymakers	   are,	   or	   even	   attempt	   to	   be,	  consistently	   rational	   in	   their	   decision-­‐making.	   Carstensen’s	   position	   is	   decidedly	  ‘irrationalist’	  because	  policymakers	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  addressing	  each	  problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Ibid.	  126	  C.	  Levi-­‐Strauss	  (1996),	  The	  Savage	  Mind	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press).	  127	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’.	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anew	   without	   appealing	   to	   a	   more	   general	   set	   of	   ideas	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  problems	   and	   their	   relationships	   to	   other	   problems	   (i.e.	   problem	   definitions).128	  Constructivist	   institutionalists	   meanwhile	   maintain	   that	   policymakers	   proceed	  from	  an	  evolving	  but	  relatively	  stable	  set	  of	  problem	  definitions	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  understand	  and	  respond	  to	  problems	  in	  different	  times	  and	  places	  in	  a	  consistent	  way.	  	  	  The	  debate	  also	  places	  in	  question	  the	  relative	  stability	  of	  the	  ideational	  context.	  At	  one	   extreme	   is	   Hall’s	   framework,	   in	   which	   problem	   definitions	   are	   stable	  paradigms	   except	   at	  moments	   of	   crisis.	   At	   the	   other	   is	   Carstensen’s	   position,	   in	  which	   problem	   definitions	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   in	   a	   state	   of	   constant	   flux	   as	  bricoleurs	   look	   to	   different	   bodies	   of	   theory	   and	   combine	   them	  eclectically	   each	  time	  they	  confront	  a	  problem.	  Between	  these	  two	  positions	  is	  the	  one	  explored	  in	  the	  preceding	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter,	  in	  which	  problem	  definitions	  are	  relatively	  stable	  features	  that	  structure	  coordinative	  discourses	  through	  which	  policymakers	  select	   policy	   ideas,	   but	   which	   are	   subject	   to	   change	   through	   coordinative	  discourses	   as	   actors	   critically	   reflect	   upon	   the	   intended	   and	   unintended	  consequences	  of	  past	  decisions.	  	  Whilst	   Carstensen	   is	   correct	   to	   criticise	   overly	   static	   conceptualisations	   of	  intersubjective	   ideas,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   conceptual	   and	   empirical	  considerations	   that	   together	   suggest	   that	   he	   has	   overstated	   his	   case.	   The	   first	  concerns	   Carstensen’s	   prioritisation	   of	   ‘policy	   ideas’	   (for	   which	   one	   could	   read	  ‘policy’,	   for	   a	   policy	   idea	   becomes	   a	   policy	   at	   the	   point	   that	   it	   is	   taken	   up	   and	  enacted	  by	  policymakers)	  and	  the	  factors	  influencing	  their	  selection.	  Interestingly,	  the	  factors	  he	  proposes	  are	  largely	  institutional	  and	  political	  ones,	  which	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  how	  far	  this	   is	  actually	  an	  ideational	  approach,	  and	  whether	   it	  would	  better	   be	   situated	   among	   non-­‐ideational	   forms	   of	   historical	   institutionalism	   that	  treat	   the	   uptake	   of	   ideas	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable	   conditioned	   by	   institutional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  On	  rationality	  and	  irrationalism	  in	  ideational	  explanation,	  see	  Parsons	  (2007),	  How	  to	  
Map.	  Carstensen	  would	  likely	  assert	  that	  bricolage	  is	  not	  irrational,	  but	  rather	  a	  distinct	  form	  of	  reason.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  involves	  actors	  combining	  ideas	  drawn	  from	  incommensurable	  economic	  theories,	  or	  resolving	  similar	  problems	  at	  different	  times	  in	  inconsistent	  ways,	  they	  are	  indeed	  being	  irrational.	  Rational	  decision	  implies	  the	  consistent	  application	  of	  a	  set	  of	  premises	  to	  decisions.	  Insofar	  as	  actors	  arbitrarily	  apply	  different	  premises	  to	  resolve	  different	  instances	  of	  the	  same	  ‘symptom’	  then	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making	  is	  an	  irrational	  one.	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‘fit’.129	  Carstensen	  appears	  to	  disregard	  a	  basic	  constructivist	   insight	  that	  it	   is	  the	  interpretation	   of	   events	   and	   circumstances	   that	   defines	   them	   as	   problems	  demanding	   a	   policy	   idea	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   As	   one	   of	   Kingdon’s	   respondents	  observed,	  “if	  you	  only	  have	  four	  fingers	  on	  one	  hand,	  that’s	  not	  a	  problem;	  that’s	  a	  situation”.130	   In	   the	   approaches	   that	   Carstensen	   criticises	   it	   is	   (relatively	   stable)	  problem	   ideas	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   ‘situations’	   as	   ‘problems’.	   Yet	   in	  Carstensen’s	   account	   the	   ideational	   basis	   of	   problem	   definition	   is	   not	   engaged	  with,	   and	   policy	   ideas	   are	   instead	   cast	   as	   being	   selected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   how	  acceptable	   they	   are	   to	   a	   policymaker’s	   party,	   the	   electorate,	   and	   how	  well	   they	  meld	  with	  the	  existing	  structures	  of	  the	  polity.	  	  	  It	  is	  when	  the	  issue	  of	  problem	  definition	  is	  re-­‐introduced	  that	  the	  difficulties	  with	  Carstensen’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   relative	   stability	   of	   the	   ideational	   context	   becomes	  apparent.	   To	   argue	   that	   problem	   definitions	   are	   subject	   to	   bricolage	   is	  considerably	   more	   problematic	   than	   the	   suggestion	   that	   policy	   ideas	   are.	   This	  represents	   a	   ‘pure’	   irrationalist	   conception	   of	   policymaking,	   for	   policymakers	  behaving	   in	   such	  a	  way	  make	  no	  attempt	   to	  achieve	   logical	   consistency	  between	  their	  past	  and	  present	  definitions	  of	  problems:	  an	  event	  that	  was	  deemed	  a	  crisis	  of	  insurmountable	  proportions	  in	  one	  instance	  might	  not	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  problem	  at	  all	  in	  the	  next.	  Yet	  while	  conceptually	  tenable	  this	  creates	  a	  distinctly	  unrealistic	  empirical	   picture	   of	   policymaking.	   Such	   chaotic	   behaviour	   would	   likely	   earn	  policymakers	  the	  contempt	  of	  their	  officials,	  the	  experts	  in	  the	  policy	  communities	  around	   them,	  and	   the	  general	  public	  on	  whose	  votes	   they	  depend.	   It	  also	   fails	   to	  explain	  the	  strong	  degree	  of	  consistency	  in	  the	  problems	  that	  British	  governments	  seek	  to	  address.	  Since	  1979,	   for	  example,	  British	  governments	  have	  cast	   inflation	  as	  a	  primary	  problem	  in	  macroeconomic	  policy	  and	  have	  sought	  to	  address	  it	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  instruments.	  	  Carstensen	  himself	  at	  some	  points	  seems	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  absurd	  consequences	  of	  conceiving	  of	  problem	  definitions	  as	  subject	  to	  bricolage.	  He	  notes,	  for	  instance,	  that	   ‘programmatic	   ideas’	   (ideas	  at	   a	  higher	   level	  of	   generality	   than	  policy	   ideas,	  equivalent	   to	  problem	  definitions)	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   slower	   tempo	  of	   change	   than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  For	  a	  review	  of	  this	  literature	  see	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations.	  130	  Kingdon	  (1984),	  Agendas,	  Alternatives,	  p.109.	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policy	  ideas.131	  Yet	  in	  making	  this	  concession	  Carstensen	  has	  arguably	  adopted	  the	  very	   position	   he	   is	   criticizing,	   for	   these	   slower	   changing	   problem	   defining	   ideas	  constitute	  the	  very	  (relatively)	  stable	  core	  of	  ideas	  to	  a	  coordinative	  discourse	  that	  he	   chides	   other	   approaches	   for	   assuming.	   Insofar	   as	   problem	  definitions	   remain	  relatively	  stable,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  exert	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  the	  policy	  ideas	  that	  policymakers	  deem	  relevant	  by	  defining	  what	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problems	  are	  and	  which	   kind	   of	   solution	   is	   likely	   to	   work.	   Consequently	   although	   problem	  definitions	   may	   be	   ‘outside	   the	   heads’	   of	   policymakers	   (or	   more	   accurately,	  distributed	  among	  their	  heads,	  and	  among	  the	  heads	  of	  experts	  and	  officials	  with	  which	  they	  consult),	  they	  are	  no	  less	  important	  an	  influence	  on	  policymaking	  and	  they	   serve	   to	   impose	   a	   level	   of	   coherency	   on	   the	   process.	   Insofar	   as	   this	   is	  accepted,	   Carstensen’s	   valuable	   critique	   of	   punctuated	   equilibrium	   models	   of	  ideational	   change	   and	   his	   observations	   about	   the	   ‘physical’	   externality	   of	   ideas	  from	   the	   minds	   of	   particular	   policymakers,	   their	   cognitive	   limits,	   and	   their	  practicing	   of	   bricolage	   in	   relation	   to	   policy	   ideas	   does	   not	   necessitate	   his	  irrationalist	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  actor	  and	  policymaking:	  he	  has	  overstated	   the	   implications	  of	  his	  arguments,	   and	   in	  doing	   so	   commits	   to	  an	  implausible	  conception	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  	  Carstensen’s	   ‘externalisation’	  of	  problem	  definitions	   from	  the	  minds	  of	  particular	  actors	   raises	   the	   interesting	   question	   of	   how	   it	   is	   that	   a	   relatively	   stable	   set	   of	  problem	   definitions	   can	   persist	   in	   a	   coordinative	   discourse	   over	   time?	   One	  potential	   answer	   for	   which	   there	   is	   considerable	   precedent	   in	   constructivist	  literature	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   communities	   of	   official	   advisors,	   interest	   groups	   and	  policy	  experts	  around	  policy	  areas	  –	  Kingdon’s	  ‘policy	  communities’	  –	  perform	  this	  sense-­‐making	   function	   and	   policymakers	   consult	   with	   them	   by	   including	   them	  within	   their	  coordinative	  discourse.	  Think	  tanks,	  economists,	  other	  organisations	  and	  individual	  scholars	  manifestly	  do	  devote	  their	  time	  and	  resources	  to	  producing	  theoretically	  consistent	  analyses	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  context	  so	  as	  to	  identify	  and	  interpret	  problems,	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  ideas	  for	  how	  to	  resolve	  them.	  The	  same	  can	  safely	  be	  assumed	  of	  the	  government’s	  own	  officials.	  These	  kinds	  of	  actor	  are	  absent	  from	  Carstensen’s	  framework	  in	  which	  it	  appears	  that	  ministers	  do	  most	  of	  the	   labour	   of	   economic	   analysis	   and	   policy	   formation	   themselves.	   By	   consulting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Carstensen	  (2011),	  'Paradigm	  Man’.	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groups	  that	  they	  regard	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  relevant,	  useful	  and	  politically	  viable	  ideas,	  policymakers	  save	  themselves	  the	  need	  to	  hold	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  problem	  definitions	  at	  play	  in	  their	  coordinative	  discourse	  in	  their	  memory	  at	  any	  one	  time,	  and	   can	   instead	   focus	   on	   the	  more	  mundane	   political	   activity	   of	   choosing	   policy	  ideas	  to	  solve	  these	  problems	  that	  will	  meet	  the	  political	  criteria	  (party,	  electoral,	  institutional)	  that	  Carstensen	  rightly	  suggests	  impact	  on	  such	  choices.	  	  	  There	  are	  some	  rare	  moments,	  however,	  in	  which	  Carstensen’s	  irrationalist	  notion	  of	  the	  bricolage	  of	  problem	  definitions	  may	  hold	  some	  empirical	  purchase.	  This	  is	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  a	  catastrophic	  failure	  in	  economic	  policy,	  such	  as	  the	  hellish	  fortnight	  faced	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government	  following	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers.	   The	   concept	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis	   (and	  my	   argument	   in	   this	   dissertation)	  relates	   primarily	   to	   the	  months	   and	   years	   following	   such	   an	   event,	   in	  which	   the	  failure	  in	  economic	  performance	  is	  ‘diagnosed’	  in	  coordinative	  discourse	  to	  yield	  a	  set	  of	  problem	  definitions	  and	   corresponding	  decisive	   interventions.	  However	   in	  the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   such	   an	   event	   a	   decidedly	   less	   orderly	   mode	   of	  policymaking	   could	   plausibly	   obtain.	   This	   ‘fire-­‐fighting’	   response	   might	   see	  policymakers	   making	   key	   decisions	   without	   the	   time	   to	   consult	   widely	   on	   an	  appropriate	  response	  or	  to	  formulate	  a	  complete	  analysis	  of	  what	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	   is	   that	   they	   are	   addressing.	   Here	   it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   that	   problem	  definitions	   are	   subject	   to	   a	   process	   of	   bricolage.	   Yet	   even	   in	   such	  moments	   this	  may	  be	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  rule.	  The	  British	  experience	  analysed	  in	  this	  dissertation	   would	   certainly	   suggest	   so,	   for	   although	   the	   policy	   ideas	   through	  which	  the	  banking	  crash	  were	  cauterised	  were	  clear	  adaptations	  of	  those	  used	  in	  2007	  and	  early	  2008	   to	   rescue	   individual	  banks	   (suggesting	  a	  bricolage	  of	  policy	  
ideas),	   the	   problem	   definition	   underlying	   these	   interventions	   was	   coherent	  diagnosis	   of	   a	   systemic	   threat	   to	   the	   domestic	   and	   world	   financial	   system	  necessitating	   the	   under-­‐writing	   of	   losses	   to	   maintain	   stability	   and	   restore	  confidence.	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Conclusions	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   outlined	   the	   distinctive	   features	   of	   a	   constructivist	  institutionalist	   approach	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   and	  highlighted	   a	   number	   of	   insights	   that	   existing	   analytical	   frameworks	   and	  conceptual	   writings	   can	   lend	   to	   the	   analytical	   framework	   I	   adopt	   in	   this	  dissertation.	  The	  distinctiveness	  of	  a	  constructivist	  approach	  in	  political	  economy	  arises	   from	  its	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  agent	  as	  situated	  in	  an	  ideational	   context	   as	   well	   as	   an	   institutional	   one,	   and	   the	   irreducible	   impact	   of	  intersubjective	   ideas	   on	   their	   perceived	   interests	   and	   decisions.	   The	   primary	  contribution	   that	   a	   constructivist	   approach	   can	   make	   to	   the	   institutionalist	  analysis	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   lies	   in	   its	   greater	   scope	   to	   explain	   the	  trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   and	   a	   broader	   range	   of	  means	   by	  which	  change	   is	   accomplished	   than	   ‘pure	   institutionalist’	   accounts.	   By	   examining	   the	  content	   and	   evolution	   of	   coordinative	   discourses	   and	   the	   construction	   of	  narratives	  in	  communicative	  discourses	  constructivist	  institutionalism	  can	  account	  for	  actors’	  interests	  and	  behaviour,	  while	  also	  incorporating	  the	  irreducible	  impact	  of	  both	  agency	  and	  institutional	  factors	  on	  this	  behaviour.	  	  As	   the	   previous	   chapter	   showed,	   critical	   social	   democrats	   have	   articulated	   a	  persuasive	  account	  of	  the	  institutional	  processes	  that	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  failure	  of	   economic	   performance	   in	   Britain	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   From	   this	  perspective,	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  represents	  a	  moment	  ripe	  for	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  crisis	   in	   which	   a	   dysfunctional	   growth	   model	   linked	   to	   neoliberal	   restructuring	  could	   be	   identified	   as	   the	  principal	   culprit.	   Yet	   from	  a	   constructivist	   perspective	  what	   is	  of	  greater	   importance	   is	  whether	  and	  how	  crisis	  has	  been	  diagnosed	  and	  narrated	   in	   this	   context.	   It	   is	   the	   outcomes	   of	   ideational	   processes	   that	   I	  empirically	   interrogate	   in	   order	   to	   build	   an	   account	   of	   the	   trajectory	   that	   the	  British	  political	  economy	  has	  undertaken	   in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  and	  the	  scope	  for	   contingency	   within	   it.	   Before	   doing	   so,	   however,	   it	   is	   first	   necessary	   to	  empirically	   operationalise	   the	   concepts	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis	   and	   crisis	   narration	   –	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  3.	  
Conceptualisations	  And	  Methodology	  	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  have	  introduced	  a	  number	  of	  concepts	  that	  are	  core	  to	  my	  argument:	   ‘crisis’	   (conceptualised	   as	   a	  moment	   of	   ‘decisive	   intervention’),	   ‘crisis	  diagnosis’	   through	   coordinative	   discourse,	   and	   ‘crisis	   narration’	   through	  communicative	  discourse.	  Although	  they	  have	  been	  notionally	  present	   in	  existing	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   analytical	   frameworks,	   the	   concepts	   of	   crisis	  diagnosis	   and	   crisis	   narration	   are	   not	   generally	   conceptualised	   explicitly,	   or	   in	  relation	   to	  one	  another	   in	  a	  way	   that	  can	  be	  readily	  operationalised	   in	  empirical	  research.	  Consequently,	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  revisit	  the	  concepts	  in	  order	   to	   address	   certain	   ambiguities	   in	   their	   specification	   and	   to	   empirically	  operationalise	   them.	   Having	   done	   so	   I	   state	   a	   series	   of	   more	   specific	   research	  questions	   that	   arise	   from	   these	   refined	   conceptualisations.	   The	   second	   section	  analyzes	   some	   epistemological	   controversies	   that	   arise	   when	   addressing	   these	  research	   questions	   and	   outlines	   the	   approaches	   I	   have	   taken	   to	   collecting	   and	  analyzing	  qualitative	  data.	  	  	  
1.	  
Conceptualisations	  	  Decisive	  Intervention,	  Crisis	  Diagnosis	  And	  Crisis	  	  From	  a	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  perspective,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  policymakers	  and	   opposition	   parties	   ‘diagnose’	   economic	   ‘symptoms’	   as	   indicative	   (or	   not)	   of	  crisis	   during	   periods	   of	   economic	   policy	   failure	   is	   a	   determining	   factor	   in	   the	  political-­‐economic	   changes	   that	   result.	   If	   economic	   failure	   is	   intensifying	   but	   no	  decisive	   intervention	   is	   made,	   such	   a	   situation	   constitutes	   ‘catastrophic	  equilibrium’.	   Yet	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   either	   ‘decisive	   intervention’	   or	  ‘catastrophic	   equilibrium’	   obtains	   require	   further	   specification	   if	   they	   are	   to	   be	  empirically	  operationalised.	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The	  criterion	  of	  ‘decisive	  intervention’	  is	  central	  to	  answering	  these	  questions	  and	  to	  identifying	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  crisis	  itself.	  Yet	  Hay’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  important	  concept	  is	  rather	  vague.	  Hay	  defines	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  as	  “a	  moment	  of	   thorough-­‐going	  transformation,	  of	  rupture”.1	  There	  is	   an	  ambiguity	  of	   scale	   inherent	  within	   this	  definition:	   just	  what	  kind	  of	   change	  constitutes	  the	  aforementioned?	  There	  is	  also	  an	  ambiguity	  of	  scope:	  is	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  a	  single	  act	  that	  ruptures	  the	  status	  quo,	  or	  a	  series	  of	   interventions	  across	   a	   range	   of	   policies	   and	   policy	   areas	   that	   collectively	   constitute	   a	  transformation?	   This	   latter	   possibility	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case	   in	   regard	   to	  Hay’s	  empirical	  case.	  The	  Thatcher	  government	  cumulatively	  instituted	  changes	  across	  a	  range	  of	   economic	  policy	   areas	   in	  order	   to	  bring	  about	   the	  decisive	   intervention	  that	   its	  crisis	  diagnosis	  deemed	  necessary	   in	  the	  British	  political	  economy.	  There	  was	   no	   singular	   act	   of	   neoliberalisation.	   Finally,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   connection	  between	  decisive	  intervention	  and	  the	  condition	  of	  crisis	  there	  is	  an	  ambiguity	  of	  actuality:	  does	  decisive	  intervention	  need	  to	  have	  been	  implemented	  in	  order	  for	  crisis	   to	  be	  said	   to	  obtain,	  or	  does	   it	  simply	  need	  to	  be	  professed	   in	  earnest	  by	  a	  government	  or	  opposition	  party	  capable	  of	  taking	  government?	  Hay	  attributes	  the	  condition	  of	  crisis	  to	  early	  1979,	  prior	  to	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Thatcher	  governments	  or	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   many	   decisive	   interventions	   that	   these	   governments	  undertook,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  actuality	  of	  decisive	   intervention	   is	  not	  necessary	  for	   the	   condition	   of	   crisis	   to	   obtain,	   but	   rather	   that	   a	   diagnosis	   of	   the	   need	   for	  decisive	   intervention	   needs	   to	   be	   present	   which	   is	   then	   subsequently	  implemented.	  	  	  To	  rectify	   these	  ambiguities	  of	  scope,	  scale	  and	  actuality,	   I	  propose	   the	   following	  conceptualisations	  of	  decisive	  intervention,	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  crisis.	  	  	  ‘Decisive	  intervention’	  obtains	  when	  a	  government	  conducts	  policy	  in	  a	  way	  that:	  	   1. Addresses	   what	   the	   government	   diagnoses	   to	   be	   ‘pathologies’	   of	   the	  institutions	  of	  political-­‐economic	  governance.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hay	  (1999a),	  'Crisis	  And	  The	  Structural’,	  p.323.	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2. Changes	   these	   institutions	   through	   the	   reform	  of	   existing	   institutions,	   the	  abolition	  of	  old	   institutions,	  and/or	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  ones	  in	  a	  way	  that…	  	   3. Contributes	   (perhaps	   cumulatively	   alongside	   other	   such	   interventions),	  through	  intended	  and	  unintended	  effects…	  	   4. Towards	   a	   change	   in	   the	   ‘trajectory’	   of	   a	   political	   economic	   restructuring	  compared	  to	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  decisive	   intervention	  being	  made	  (acting	  on	  either	  the	  ‘velocity’	  or	  ‘spatial’	  aspects	  of	  the	  trajectory	  metaphor).2	  	  A	  ‘crisis	  diagnosis’,	  meanwhile,	  is:	  	   5. The	   interpretation	   that	   a	   government	   or	   opposition	   party	   makes	   of	  economic	  performance	  failures	  where	  these	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  perceived	  need	  for	   decisive	   intervention,	   manifest	   as	   problem	   definitions	   in	   relevant	  policymaking	  coordinative	  discourses.	  	   6. In	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   opposition	   parties	   who	   have	   not	   yet	   entered	  government	   (but	   who	   must	   do	   so	   if	   they	   are	   to	   carry	   out	   ‘decisive	  interventions’	  as	  defined	  above),	  crisis	  diagnosis	  may	  be	  identified	  through	  their	   advocacy	   of	   decisive	   intervention.	   However	   the	   tendency	   of	  opposition	  parties	  to	  present	  even	  the	  most	  mundane	  proposals	  as	  radical	  and	  sweeping	  reforms	  is	  such	  that	  the	  analyst	  must	  exercise	  some	  judgment	  as	   to	   whether	   the	   proposed	   changes	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   significant	   to	   the	  trajectory	   of	   a	   political	   economic	   restructuring,	   a	   judgment	   that	   is	  unavoidably	  at	  its	  strongest	  in	  hindsight.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  On	  these	  aspects	  of	  the	  metaphor,	  see	  Footnote	  1	  in	  the	  Introductory	  chapter.	  3	  The	  Heath	  government,	  for	  instance,	  took	  power	  on	  the	  back	  of	  rhetoric	  that	  was	  explicitly	  more	  oriented	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  business,	  but	  failed	  to	  implement	  any	  decisive	  interventions	  in	  government	  and	  consequently	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  a	  crisis	  diagnosis.	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  1972	  Industrial	  Relations	  Act	  might	  have	  constituted	  a	  ‘decisive	  intervention’	  had	  it	  been	  successful	  is	  an	  interesting	  question,	  although	  not	  one	  within	  my	  scope	  to	  resolve	  here.	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  Crisis	  obtains	  where:	  	   7. A	  government	  or	  opposition	  party	  in	  possession	  of	  a	  crisis	  diagnosis	  seeks	  to	   bring	   about	   the	   institutional	   changes	   that	   their	   crisis	   diagnosis	   deems	  necessary	  by	  means	  of	  electoral	  contestation,	  crisis	  narration	  and	  decisive	  intervention.	  	  This	   final	   point	   warrants	   additional	   clarification.	   Crisis,	   defined	   here	   as	   an	  intersubjective	  perception	  of	   the	  need	   to	  decisively	   intervene,	   can	   in	  some	  sense	  be	   said	   to	   exist	   wherever	   any	   given	   group	   of	   actors	   perceive	   a	   crisis	   to	   be	  underway.	   Yet	   to	   leave	   one’s	   operationalised	   definition	   here	   is	   not	   particularly	  useful	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  political-­‐economic	  change.	  At	  any	  given	  moment	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  some	  or	  other	  actors	  will	  diagnose	  crisis:	  democratic	  political	  discourse	  involves	  the	  clash	  of	  competing	  visions,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  visions	  abhor	  the	  status	  quo	   and	   imply	   the	   urgent	   need	   for	   radical	   transformations.	   Yet	   it	   is	   only	   under	  certain	   circumstances	   that	   crisis	   diagnoses	   become	   relevant	   to	   the	   course	   of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  These	  conditions	  are	  found	  when	  actors	  who	  are	  capable	  of	   shaping	   the	  course	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  diagnose	  crisis,	  and	  where	  they	  succeed	  in	  getting	  other	  actors	  to	  share	  this	  perception.	  Where	  a	  crisis	   is	   resolved	   through	   an	   existing	   constitutional	   process	   (as	   opposed	   to	   a	  revolution)	   these	   more	   relevant	   actors	   simply	   must	   include	   members	   of	  government	   who	   are	   capable	   of	   making	   policy	   and	   advancing	   legislation,	   or	  opposition	  parties	  who	  may	  do	  the	  same	  upon	  reaching	  government.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  governments	  and	  opposition	  parties	  are	  necessarily	  the	  original	  architects	  of	   the	  crisis	  diagnoses	   that	   they	  come	  to	  endorse,	  or	   that	   theirs	   is	   the	  only	  crisis	  diagnosis	  present	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  govern.	  However	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  political-­‐economic	   change	  and	   the	   trajectory	  of	   restructuring	   it	   is	  the	  crisis	  diagnoses	  endorsed	  by	  government	  actors,	  and	  the	  problem	  definitions	  that	  these	  crisis	  diagnoses	  contain,	  that	  are	  of	  greatest	  relevance	  to	  understanding	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  	  Somewhat	  implicit	  in	  all	  of	  the	  foregoing	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  crisis	  –	  a	  crisis	  is	  always	  
a	   crisis	   of	   something.	   In	   its	   precise	   particulars	   this	   is	   something	   that	   a	   general	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constructivist	   conceptualisation	   of	   crisis	  must	   remain	   silent	   on	   because	   it	   is	   the	  concomitant	  crisis	  diagnosis	  that	  determines	  the	  perceived	  nature	  of	  the	  crisis	  that	  it	  diagnoses.	  Yet	  we	  can	  spell	  out	  certain	  general	  features.	  Crises	  that	  impact	  upon	  the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   are	   invariably	   crises	   of	   the	  reproduction	   of	   political	   economies,	   and	   historically	   they	   have	   occurred	   at	  moments	  where	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  has	  failed	  according	  to	  indicators	   that	   are	  believed	   to	  be	   important	   in	   the	   time	  and	  place	   that	   the	   crisis	  occurs.	   This	   was	   the	   case	   at	   certain	   points	   in	   the	   1930s	   and	   the	   1970s,	  conjunctures	   that	   have	   subsequently	   been	   interpreted	   as	  moments	   of	   crisis	   that	  gave	  rise	  to	  transformations	  in	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  marks	  such	  a	  crisis	  moment,	  although	  one	  marked	  by	   the	  reassertion	  of	  a	  more	  aggressive	   trajectory	  of	  neoliberalisation	   in	  response.	   Returning	   to	   the	   point	   at	   hand,	   however,	   we	   can	   note	   that	   political-­‐economic	  crises	  are	  crises	   in	  which	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  capitalist	  economy	   is	  implicated,	   and	   in	  which	   the	  meaning	   and	   causes	   of	   poor	   indicator	   performance	  are	   questioned	   and	   (re)interpreted.	   The	   objects	   of	   decisive	   interventions	   (that	  which	   a	   crisis	   diagnosis	   asserts	   to	   require	   transformation	   if	   the	   crisis	   is	   to	   be	  resolved)	   are	   the	   institutions	   of	   political-­‐economic	   governance.	   This	   is	   a	  deliberately	   broad	   category	   that	   can	   include	   public	   sector	   agencies	   and	  government	  practices	  (‘state	  institutions’),	  as	  well	  as	  informal	  institutions	  such	  as	  those	  private	  sector	  practices	  and	  organisational	  regularities	  analysed	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Precisely	  which	   institutions	  are	   implicated	  by	  a	  given	  crisis	  diagnosis,	   and	   the	  transformations	  that	  it	  deems	  necessary,	  is	  an	  open	  ended	  and	  contingent	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  sentient	  actors	  who	  enact	  it.	  	  	  One	  issue	  left	  implicit	  in	  the	  discussion	  so	  far	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  change	  in	  the	  problem	  definitions	  that	  constitute	  a	  government’s	  coordinative	  discourses	  for	  decisive	   intervention	  and	  crisis	  diagnosis	  to	  be	  said	  to	  obtain:	   is	   it	  possible	   that	   a	   crisis	   could	   be	   diagnosed	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   existing	   or	  moderately	   adapted	  problem	  definitions	   and	  yet	   still	   result	   in	   interventions	   that	  are	   classifiably	   ‘decisive’?	   There	   is	   in	   fact	   no	   clear	   answer	   to	   this	   in	   the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	   literature.	  One	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   constructivist	  institutionalists	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  moments	  of	  categorical	  ideational	  change.	  It	  has	  been	   the	  objective	  of	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   to	   show	   that	   ‘shifts’	   in	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the	   way	   that	   policymakers	   and	   other	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   interpret	   their	  context	   and	   define	   the	   ‘problems’	   of	   policymaking	   have	   shaped	   these	  transformational	  changes.	  	  	  The	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  as	   the	  subsequent	  chapters	  show,	  differs	   from	  these	  case	  studies	  in	  important	  ways.	  What	  has	  occurred	  in	  Britain	  is	  a	  very	  dramatic	  series	  of	  institutional	  transformations	  that	  are	  of	  enormous	  significance	  to	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  political	  economy.	  Yet	  these	  interventions	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos	   that	   I	   argue	   in	   the	  next	   chapter	   to	  have	  structured	  economic	  policymaking	  prior	  to	  2008.	  While	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  the	  instruments	  used	  to	  address	  them	  has	  changed,	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  ‘problems’	  that	  economic	  policy	   and	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   is	   intended	   to	   address	   exhibit	   only	   a	  bounded	  change	  and	  remain	  categorically	  neoliberal.	  The	  result	  is	  still	  a	  change	  in	  trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring,	   but	   one	   that	   acts	   on	   its	   ‘velocity’	  rather	   than	   its	   metaphorically	   ‘spatial’	   aspect:	   Britain	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	  continues	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  process	  of	  neoliberalisation,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  more	  rapid	  and	  less	   compromising	   form	  of	  neoliberalisation	   than	   that	  prior	   to	  2008.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  acceleration	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   that	   the	   profound	   political-­‐economic	  significance	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  lies.	  	  Can	  political-­‐economic	  change	   that	  accelerates	  an	  existing	  direction	  of	   reform	  be	  called	   ‘decisive’?	   Approaches	   that	   accept	   or	   dismiss	   such	   a	   premise	   have	  merits	  and	   drawbacks.	   By	   defining	   decisive	   intervention	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   categorical	  changes	   in	   problem	   definitions	  we	   gain	   a	   very	   clear	   empirical	  marker	   of	  where	  crisis	   obtains:	   those	   rare	   circumstances	   where	   problem	   definitions	   undergo	   a	  process	   loosely	   analogous	   to	   a	   ‘paradigm	   shift’.4	   Yet	   it	   also	   yields	   a	   highly	  specialised	  conception	  of	  crisis	  that	  would	  be	  unrecognisable	  to	  most	  users	  of	  the	  term,	  and	  which	  would	  leave	  us	  with	  the	  dubious	  notion	  that	  the	  years	  since	  2008	  have	   been	   a	   period	   of	   ‘normal	   policymaking’.	   A	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘decisive	  intervention’	   in	   which	   changes	   in	   problem	   definitions	   are	   not	   specified	   as	  necessary	  conditions	  reflects	  a	  more	  commonly	  understood	  meaning	  for	  the	  term.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  eroding	  the	  clear	  line	  between	  the	  conditions	  of	  ‘crisis’	  and	  ‘catastrophic	  equilibrium’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Hall	  (1993),	  'Policy	  Paradigms’.	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  This	   risk	   can	   be	   mitigated	   if	   we	   are	   precise	   in	   our	   use	   of	   terms.	   The	   kinds	   of	  ‘indecisive	   interventions’	   sanctioned	   during	   period	   of	   catastrophic	   equilibrium	  entail	  on-­‐going	  commitment	  to	  extant	  policy	  ideas	  and	  a	  reluctance	  to	  deviate	  from	  them	  in	  anything	  other	  than	  an	  adhoc	  and	  temporary	  way,	  whilst	  only	  minimal	  and	  adaptive	   changes	   to	   the	   institutional	   structure	   of	   the	   political	   economy	   are	  sanctioned.	  The	  goal	  of	  economic	  policy	  in	  such	  circumstances	  is	  the	  stabilisation	  and	  preservation	  of	  the	  institutional	  status	  quo	  –	  to,	  as	  it	  were,	  ‘ride	  out’	  the	  crisis.	  Decisive	   intervention,	   meanwhile,	   involves	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring,	  possibly	  (but	  not	  necessarily)	  reflecting	  changes	  in	  problem	  definitions.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  why	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  time	  of	  catastrophic	   equilibrium	   and	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   not.	   Despite	   recurring	  economic	  policy	  failures,	  policymakers	  of	  the	  1970s	  retained	  tools	  such	  as	  incomes	  policies	  and	  flirted	  only	  superficially	  and	  reluctantly	  with	  monetarist	  techniques.5	  The	  period	  since	  2008	  has	  been	  one	  of	  decisive	  intervention	  and	  crisis	  because,	  as	  I	  shall	  show	  in	  the	  subsequent	  research	  chapters,	  far-­‐reaching	  changes	  have	  been	  made	   to	   the	   instruments	   of	   economic	   policy	   and	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   British	  political	  economy.	  I	  therefore	  adopt	  this	  broader	  definition	  of	  decisive	  intervention	  throughout	  this	  dissertation.	  	  	  
Research	  Questions	  	  With	  these	  conceptualisations	  in	  mind	  it	   is	  possible	  now	  to	  articulate	  the	  general	  research	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  ‘crisis	  diagnosis’	  that	  I	  shall	  address	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  	  	   1. Do	  the	  two	  governments	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  possess	  crisis	  diagnoses,	  or	  is	  the	  situation	  better	  classified	  as	  one	  of	  catastrophic	  equilibrium?	  Have	  the	   two	   governments	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   sought	   to	   bring	   about	  decisive	  interventions?	  	   2. If	   so,	   how	   do	   these	   crisis	   diagnoses	   differ	   in	   ideational	   content	   from	   the	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   that	   characterised	   economic	   policymaking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Hay	  (2001),	  'The	  'Crisis'	  Of	  Keynesianism’.	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coordinative	  discourses	  prior	  to	  2008,	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  ideational	  change	  is	  this	  indicative	  of?	  Are	  any	  changes	  indicative	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  influence	  of	   the	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos	   and	   the	   emergence	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  of	  a	  non-­‐neoliberal	  form	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring?	  	   3. How	  do	  the	  crisis	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  differ	  from	  one	   another?	  Do	   they	   indicate	   convergence	   or	   divergence	   in	   the	   problem	  definitions	  that	  comprise	  their	  economic	  policy	  coordinative	  discourses?	  	  Crisis	  Narration	  	  
Agency	  In	  Crisis	  Narration	  And	  The	  Scope	  Of	  Individual	  Studies	  	  The	  issue	  of	  which	  actors	  constitute	  the	  mobilising	  agency	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  crisis	  narratives	  remains	  under-­‐specified	  in	  Chapter	  2:	  although	  Schmidt	  and	  Hay	  have	  constructed	  ostensibly	  similar	  analytical	  frameworks	  they	  have	  two	  different	  ‘narrators’	   in	  mind.	   Both	   regard	   opposition	   parties	   as	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   crisis	  narration/communicative	   discourse	   during	  moments	   of	   transformative	   political-­‐economic	   change;	   it	   constitutes	   for	   opposition	   parties	   a	  means	   to	   seek	   electoral	  support	  and	  enter	  government	  in	  order	  to	  enact	  decisive	  interventions.	  Yet	  for	  Hay	  it	  is	  the	  media	  that	  is	  the	  primary	  narrative	  producer,	  whilst	  Schmidt’s	  concept	  of	  communicative	  discourse	  concentrates	  on	  the	  narratives	  produced	  by	  government	  and	   opposition	   parties.	   She	   notes	   that	   in	   the	   British	   polity,	   with	   its	   long	  parliamentary	   terms	   and	   frequently	   large	   executive	   majorities,	   communicative	  discourses	  are	  likely	  to	  exert	  an	  independent	  effect	  most	  strongly	  during	  elections	  as	   it	   is	   only	   at	   this	   time	   that	   public	   opinion	   is	   a	   significant	   constraint	   on	   the	  preferred	   actions	   of	   the	   government	   (at	   least	   outside	   of	  moments	   of	  major	   civil	  disorder).6	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   political	   parties	   seeking	   (re)election	   that	   are	   the	  primary	   agents	   of	   communicative	   discourse	   in	   Schmidt’s	   empirical	   work	   on	   the	  UK.	  	  	  These	   contrasting	   points	   of	   focus	   may	   be	   considered	   complementary:	   crisis	  narration	   is	   a	   complicated	   process	   in	   which	   multiple	   actors	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Schmidt	  (2002),The	  Futures	  Of.	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implicated.	   Crisis	   narratives	   are	  mediated	   by	   news	   organisations,	   and	   it	   is	   very	  probable	   that	   such	  organisations	  are	   themselves	  narrative	  producers:	   they	  bring	  to	   the	   delivery	   of	   narratives	   their	   own	   political	   interests,	   but	   also	   non-­‐political	  ones	  (i.e.	   judgments	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  story	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  sell	  newspapers	  or	  attract	  viewers)	  and	  their	  own	  newsroom	  biases	  and	  cultures.7	  Yet	  the	  media	  also	  reports	   (as	  well	   as	   challenges)	   the	  narratives	  woven	  by	  politicians	  because	   their	  pronouncements	   themselves	   constitute	   ‘news’.	   Opposition	   parties	   and	   other	  political	   organisations	   are	   also	   participants,	   contesting	   the	   government’s	  communicative	  discourses	  and	  seeking	  to	  persuade	  the	  electorate	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  their	  own	  alternative	  ones.	  The	  upshot	  of	  these	  observations	  is	  that	  a	  full	  analysis	  of	  the	  narration	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  exceeds	  the	  scope	  of	  any	  one	  study,	   and	  will	   instead	   emerge	   from	  a	   variety	   of	   studies	  with	   different	   points	   of	  focus.	   The	   present	   study	   consequently	   makes	   only	   a	   modest	   but	   important	  contribution	  towards	  the	  overarching	  goal	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  input	  of	  one	  kind	  of	  narrative	  producer:	  incumbent	  governments.	  	  
The	  Aims	  Of	  Research	  On	  Crisis	  Narration	  In	  The	  Post-­2008	  Context	  	  Unlike	   Hay	   and	   Schmidt’s	   research	   on	   the	   British	   case,	   my	   focus	   is	   not	   on	   the	  moment	  of	   a	   general	   election	  and	   the	   impact	  of	   crisis	  narratives	  on	   its	  outcome,	  but	   instead	   on	   how	   incumbent	   governments	   sustain	   and	   shape	   a	   sense	   of	   crisis	  among	   the	   general	   public	   so	   as	   to	   maintain	   support	   for	   their	   decisive	  interventions.	  My	  choice	  of	   focus	  here	  partly	  reflects	   the	   findings	  of	  my	  research	  into	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  where	   I	   find	  strong	  parallels	   in	   the	  ways	   that	   the	   two	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  diagnosed	  crisis	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  This	   suggests	  that	  whilst	   crisis	   narration	  may	   very	  well	   have	  played	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   the	  outcomes	   of	   the	   2010	   general	   election,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   a	   factor	   determining	  whether	  or	  not	  decisive	  intervention	  has	  been	  implemented	  in	  the	  way	  Hay	  argues	  it	  to	  have	  been	  in	  1979.	  	  	  Consequently,	   I	   find	   the	   importance	   of	   crisis	   narration	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	  elsewhere	  –	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  governments	  have	  sought	  to	  maintain	  legitimacy	  during	  a	  major	  economic	  adjustment.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  economic	  policies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Hudson	  and	  Martin	  (2009),	  'Narratives	  Of	  Neoliberalism’.	  
	   130	  
pursued	  by	  the	  two	  governments	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  have	  exposed	  a	  society	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  to	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  programme	  of	  ‘structural	  adjustment’,	   including	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   availability	   and	   quality	   of	   public	  services	  and	  social	  security,	  and	  the	  protracted	  decline	  of	  real	  incomes.	  While	  left-­‐wing	   critics	   have	   pointed	   to	   class	   biases	   in	   the	   placement	   of	   the	   burden	   of	  economic	  adjustment,	   it	   remains	   the	  case	   that	  material	   costs	  have	  been	   imposed	  on	  a	  large	  swathe	  of	  the	  electorate.	  Although	  there	  are	  few	  formal	  mechanisms	  by	  which	   the	  electorate	   can	  prevent	  a	  government	   in	  possession	  of	   a	  majority	   from	  implementing	   its	   preferred	   policy	   responses,	   to	   dismiss	   the	   importance	   of	   crisis	  narration	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   is	   to	   discount	   the	   importance	   of	   sustaining	  legitimacy	  in	  avoiding	  ‘informal’	  pressure	  being	  placed	  on	  the	  government	  (in	  the	  form,	   for	   example,	   of	   large-­‐scale	   protest	   movements).	   Furthermore,	   a	   failure	   to	  sustain	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  ongoing	  neoliberalisation	  of	  the	  UK	  political	  economy	  in	  the	  troubled	  post-­‐2008	  context	  would	  also	  have	  major	  implications	  for	  the	  ability	  of	   any	   political	   party	   to	   continue	   on	   this	   trajectory	   after	   the	   2015	   election.	   The	  research	   thus	   contributes	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   conditions	   that	   have	   led	  public	  resistance	  to	  post-­‐2008	  reform	  to	  be	  relatively	  muted,	  contributing	  towards	  a	  broader	  agenda	  that	  assess	  the	  role	  of	  crisis	  narration	  on	  this	  outcome.	  	  
An	  Engagement	  With	  The	  Framing	  Approach	  	  When	  empirically	  operationalising	  the	  concept	  of	  crisis	  narration	  I	  have	  found	  an	  engagement	  with	   the	   ‘framing	   approach’	   to	   the	   study	  of	   social	  movements	   to	   be	  conceptually	   insightful.8	   The	   framing	   approach,	   like	   the	   study	   of	   crisis	   narration	  and	   communicative	   discourse,	   seeks	   to	   conceptualise,	   analyze,	   and	   establish	   the	  causal	   importance	   of	   processes	   of	   ‘persuasive	   mobilisation’.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  framing	   approach,	   the	   mobilizing	   agents	   in	   question	   are	   organisations	   that	  organise	   and	   promote	   social	   movements,	   while	   the	   process	   in	   question	   is	   the	  formation	   of	   and	   recruitment	   of	   the	   public	   to	  what	   are	   termed	   ‘collective	   action	  frames’	  –	  intersubjective	  ideas	  about	  the	  world	  that	  motivate	  political	  choices	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  On	  which	  see	  R.D.	  Benford	  and	  D.A.	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes	  And	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  And	  Assessment',	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology,	  pp.611-­‐39;	  D.A.	  Snow,	  et	  al.	  (1986),	  'Frame	  Alignment	  Processes,	  Micromobilisation,	  And	  Movement	  Participation',	  American	  Sociological	  Review,	  pp.464-­‐81;	  D.A.	  Snow	  and	  R.D.	  Benford	  (1988),	  'Ideology,	  Frame	  Resonance,	  And	  Participant	  Mobilisation',	  International	  Social	  
Movement	  Research,	  1	  (1),	  pp.197-­‐217.	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allegiances	  of	   the	  general	  public.9	  The	  collective	  action	  frame	  has,	   I	  shall	  argue,	  a	  strong	  affinity	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  crisis	  narrative.	  	  	  The	   substantive	   conceptual	   contributions	   that	   an	   engagement	   with	   the	   framing	  approach	  can	  generate	  for	  the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  perspective	   lie	   in	  the	  systematic	  clarity	  of	  the	  concepts	  with	  which	  the	  process	  of	  ‘framing’	  is	  described	  within	  this	  literature.10	  Yet	  a	  degree	  of	  caution	  is	  necessitated	  when	  attempting	  to	  transport	  concepts	  from	  one	  framework	  to	  the	  other.	  My	  intention	  here	  is	  modest	  in	   this	   regard:	   I	   utilise	   a	   small	   number	   of	   concepts	   from	   this	   literature	   (‘value	  amplification’,	   ‘frame	  bridging’	  and	   ‘counter	   framing’)	   to	  clarify	  and	  structure	  my	  empirical	   analysis	   of	   crisis	   narratives.	   Yet	   in	   demonstrating	   this	   transferability	   I	  maintain	   that	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   study	   of	   crisis	   narration	   is	  bolstered,	   for	   an	   impressive	   array	   of	   empirical	   and	   conceptual	   scholarship	   lies	  behind	  these	  concepts	  in	  the	  social	  movements	  context	  and	  lends	  credence	  to	  the	  view	   that	   similar	  processes	  are	  underway	   in	   the	  political-­‐economic	   context.	  This	  section	   shall	   briefly	   review	   the	   framing	   approach,	   highlighting	   points	   of	  commonality	  with	  Hay	  and	  Schmidt’s	  frameworks	  for	  the	  study	  of	  communicative	  discourse	   and	   crisis	   narration.	   Following	   this,	   the	   concepts	   that	   will	   inform	   the	  present	  study	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  	  
Commonalities	   And	   Differences	   Between	   Constructivist	   Institutionalism	   And	   The	  
Framing	  Approach	  	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  build	  upon	  the	  Goffmanian	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘frame’,	  which	  refers	  to	  ideational	  and	  subjective	  ‘schemata	  of	  interpretation’	  through	  which	  individuals	  are	  said	  to	  access	  and	  understand	  their	  world	  as	  they	  act	  within	  it.11	  The	  ‘Collective	  Action	   Frame’	   is	   an	   intersubjective	   and	   politically-­‐oriented	   corollary	   of	   this	  concept.	  It	  denotes	  shared	  ideas	  about	  the	  world	  that	  specify	  the	  basis	  for	  shared	  (political)	   behaviours	   within	   it.12	   Collective	   action	   frames	   are	   the	   ideational	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’.	  10	  A	  number	  of	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  analysts	  have	  already	  noted	  the	  affinity	  and	  potential	  for	  cross-­‐fertilisation	  between	  the	  two	  approaches.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  (2011),	  'Introduction’;	  Béland	  (2009),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions’.	  11	  Goffman,	  E.	  (1974),	  Frame	  Analysis:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Organisation	  of	  Experience	  (Harvard:	  Harvard	  University	  Press).	  12	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’.	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constituents	   of	   social	   movements	   in	   Benford	   and	   Snow’s	   account,	   serving	   the	  function	  of	  simplifying	  and	  explaining	  the	  world	  and	  specifying	  valued	  end	  states	  to	  their	  adherents.	  In	  particular,	  they	  accomplish	  three	  functions	  or	  ‘core	  framing	  tasks’.13	  They	  provide	  a	  ‘diagnostic	  framing’	  that	  specifies	  a	  problem	  that	  the	  social	  movement	   stands	   against	   and	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   cause	   of	   this	   problem,	   and	   a	  ‘prognostic	   framing’,	   articulating	   a	   proposed	   solution	   to	   the	   diagnosed	   problem.	  Together,	   these	   may	   be	   constructed	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   refute	   the	   rationale	   of	  other	   proposed	   diagnostic	   or	   prognostic	   framings.	   Finally,	   they	   offer	   a	  motivational	   framing,	   sustaining	   participation	   in	   a	   social	   movement.	   Crucially,	  however,	  the	  object	  of	  analysis	  in	  Benford	  and	  Snow’s	  account	  is	  not	  ‘frames’,	  but	  the	  process	  of	   ‘framing’	  through	  which	  adherents	  to	  social	  movements	  encourage	  hitherto	   unmobilised	   members	   of	   society	   to	   internalise	   their	   collective	   action	  frame	  and	  support	  the	  social	  movement’s	  cause.	  	  A	  core	  concept	  in	  this	  process	  is	  that	  of	  ‘resonance’:	  this	  is	  the	  variable	  of	  collective	  action	   frames	   that	   will	   determine	   their	   success	   in	   mobilizing	   adherents.14	   As	  ideational	  agents,	  social	  movement	  organisations	  are	  viewed	  as	  being	  able	  to	  take	  certain	   actions	   to	   increase	   the	   resonance	   of	   their	   collective	   action	   frames	   with	  those	   they	   seek	   to	   recruit.	   The	   means	   by	   which	   this	   occurs	   are	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘frame	  alignment	  processes’.15	  It	  is	  in	  these	  processes	  that	  the	  potential	  for	  synergy	  between	  the	  framing	  perspective	  and	  the	  constructivist	  analysis	  of	  crisis	  narration	  lies.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  collective	  action	  frame	  is	  analogous	  with	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘crisis	  diagnosis’	  and	  of	  ‘crisis	  narrative’	  as	  they	  have	  been	  developed	  here.	  Both	  represent	   action-­‐oriented	   intersubjective	   ideas	   that	   can	   facilitate	   collective	  behaviour.	   The	   reason	   that	   two	   separate	   concepts	   are	  warranted	   in	   the	  political	  economy	  context	  and	  not	  the	  social	  movements	  one	  is	  due	  to	  the	  necessity	  in	  the	  former	   of	   maintaining	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   government’s	   own	   ideas	   and	  those	  they	  seek	  to	  mobilise	  others	  with:	  framing	  scholars	  generally	  assume	  social	  movement	   organisations	   to	   speak	   in	   earnest	   in	   their	   communicative	   discourses,	  but	  the	  same	  supposition	  cannot	  be	  made	  by	  those	  who	  study	  the	  communicative	  discourses	  of	  governments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	  14	  Ibid.	  15	  Snow,	  et	  al.	  (1986),	  'Frame	  Alignment’.	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Yet	  while	  crisis	  diagnoses	  might	  be	  analogous	  to	  a	  collective	  action	  frame	  in	  some	  respects,	  the	  analogy	  is	  stronger	  and	  more	  useful	  in	  relation	  to	  crisis	  narratives.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  analogy	  is	  an	  imperfect	  one	  because	  of	  this	  asymmetric	  assumption	  of	  earnestness	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  mobilizing	  agency,	  and	  any	   concepts	   transported	   from	   the	   framing	   approach	   must	   be	   reflected	   upon	  critically	  in	  this	  light.	  To	  signify	  this	  distinction	  I	  propose	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  concepts	  that	  I	  transport	  from	  the	  framing	  approach	  by	  slightly	  altered	  names,	  substituting	  the	  term	  ‘narrative’	  for	  ‘frame’	  to	  signify	  the	  different	  application.	  	  	  
Concepts	  To	  Inform	  The	  Study	  Of	  Crisis	  Narration	  	  The	  first	  two	  concepts	  that	  I	  transport	  from	  the	  framing	  perspective	  are	  two	  ‘frame	  alignment’	  processes.	  Framing	  scholars	  have	  identified	  four	  such	  processes	  and	  a	  body	   of	   empirical	   literature	   has	   grown	   behind	   all	   of	   them.16	   It	   is	  my	   contention	  that	   two	   in	   particular	   are	   present	   in	   an	   analogous	   form	   in	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	  narration.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	   ‘value	   amplification’.17	   This	   refers	   to	   the	  “idealisation,	   embellishment,	   clarification	   or	   invigoration”	   of	   existing	   beliefs	   in	   a	  framing	   communication;	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   incorporating	  widely	  held	  values	   into	   the	  framing	  communication	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  points	  of	  resonance.18	  This	  strategy	  is	  of	  particular	   relevance	   where	   movement	   beneficiaries	   are	   strikingly	   different	   to	  those	   they	   seek	   to	   mobilise,	   for	   it	   elevates	   a	   plane	   of	   consensus	   that	   can	  compensate	  for	  the	  different	  social	  vantage	  points	  and	  material	  experiences	  of	  the	  mobilizing	   actor	   and	   the	   mobilisee.19	   This	   can	   be	   straightforwardly	   applied	   to	  crisis	   narratives:	   as	   was	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   these	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  constructed	   with	   reference	   to	   widely	   held	   values.	   The	   observation	   that	   such	  strategies	   are	   deployed	  when	   attempting	   to	   construct	   consensus	   among	   socially	  different	   and	   possibly	   materially	   unequal	   groups	   means	   that	   this	   particular	  narrative	   alignment	   strategy	   is	   likely	   to	   feature	   prominently	   in	   a	   narrative	  constructed	   to	   legitimise	   restructuring	   strategies	   in	   which	   material	   costs	   are	  unequally	  shared.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ibid;	  for	  a	  review	  see	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’.	  17	  Snow,	  et	  al.	  (1986),	  'Frame	  Alignment’.	  18	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’,	  p.624;	  Béland	  (2009),	  'Ideas,	  Institutions’.	  	  19	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’.	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The	  second	  concept	  on	  which	  I	  draw	  is	  ‘frame	  bridging’.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  strategic	  connection	  of	  a	  collective	  action	  frame	  to	  another	  regarding	  a	  different	  problem	  so	  as	  to	  mobilise	  those	  who	  are	  already	  mobilised	  around	  the	  secondary	  issue.20	  This	  could	  include,	  for	  example,	  the	  connection	  of	  labour	  or	  gender	  issues	  to	  a	  broader	  social	  movement	  so	  as	  to	  mobilise	  those	  politically	  active	  in	  these	  contexts.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  research	  on	  crisis	  narratives,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  ‘narrative	  bridging’	  is	  a	  means	  by	  which	  mobilizing	  agencies	  seek	  to	  encourage	  or	  capture	  those	  mobilised	  around	   an	   existing	   politicised	   issue	   by	   constructing	   a	   ‘bridge’	   between	   a	   crisis	  narrative	  and	  widely	  held	  interpretations	  of	  those	  politicised	  issues.	  	  Value	  amplification	  and	  narrative	  bridging	  represent	  two	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  way	   in	  which	   ‘empathic’	  modes	   of	   interpellation	   operate.	   A	   second	   contribution	  that	   the	   framing	   perspective	   might	   make	   is	   through	   providing	   a	   concept	   with	  which	   to	   gain	   purchase	   on	   the	   dynamics	   of	   crisis	   narration.	   ‘Counter	   framing’	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  by	  which	  collective	  action	  frames	  are	  influenced	  by,	  and	  are	  influencing	   of,	   the	   framing	   activities	   of	   opponents	   of	   a	   social	   movement.	   As	  Benford	   and	   Hunt	   usefully	   summarise,	   counter-­‐framing	   strategies	   “…ward	   off,	  contain,	   limit,	  or	  reverse	  potential	  damage	  to	   the	  movement’s	  previous	  claims	  or	  attributes”.21	   Re-­‐conceptualised	   as	   ‘counter	   narration’,	   this	   concept	   draws	   our	  attention	  to	  the	  cut	  and	  thrust	  of	  communicative	  discourse	  through	  which	  political	  parties	  try	  to	  neutralise	  the	  criticisms	  that	  their	  many	  opponents	  make	  of	  them.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  crisis	  narration,	  it	  will	  involve	  attempts	  to	  dispute,	  ridicule	  and	  de-­‐legitimise	   alternative	   crisis	   narratives	   offered	   by	   political	   opponents	   including	  (but	  not	  limited	  to)	  opposition	  parties.	  	  	  The	  concept	  of	  counter-­‐narration	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  unforeseen	  developments	   in	   the	   political-­‐economic	   context	   that	   impact	   upon	   the	   efforts	   of	  governments	  to	  narrate	  a	  crisis	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  Framing	  perspective	  scholars	  have	  noted	   the	   ‘dialectical’	   relationship	   of	   events	   in	   a	   context,	   and	   collective	   action	  frames	   that	  represent	   those	  events.22	  So,	   it	   seems	  reasonable	   to	  assume,	   it	   is	   the	  case	  with	  crisis	  narration.	  In	  Chapter	  7	  I	  find	  the	  biggest	  variable	  in	  this	  respect	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.	  21	  R.D.	  Benford	  and	  S.A.	  Hunt	  (1994),	  'Social	  Movement	  Counter-­‐framing	  And	  Reframing:	  Repairing	  And	  Sustaining	  Collective	  Identity	  Claims',	  Midwest	  Sociological	  Society	  
Conference	  (St	  Louis),	  quoted	  in	  Benford	  and	  Snow	  (2000),	  'Framing	  Processes’,	  p.626	  22	  Ibid.	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post-­‐2008	   crisis	   narratives	   has	   been	   the	   quarterly	   growth	   projections	   published	  by	  the	  ONS.	  	  	  
Research	  Questions	  	  It	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  reconstruct	  an	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  crisis	  narratives	  that	  draws	   on	   the	   work	   of	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   and	   framing	   scholars	  encountered	  in	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Each	  particular	  text	  inscribed	  with	  a	  crisis	   narrative	   exercises	   a	   ‘narrative	   selectivity’	   that	   foregrounds	   a	   selection	   of	  facts,	   interpretations	  and	  characterisations	  while	  excluding	  others.	   In	  doing	  so,	   it	  offers	  an	   interpretation	  of	   the	  causes	  and	  significance	  of	   the	  events	   to	  which	   the	  text	  relates.	  As	  part	  of	  a	   ‘crisis	  narrative’,	   this	   interpretation	  by	  definition	  signals	  the	   presence	   of	   a	   broader	   condition	   of	   crisis,	   and	   is	   situated	   in	   a	   broader	  metanarrative	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   and	   solutions	   to	   that	   crisis	   to	   which	   other	   texts	  relating	   to	   different	   facts	   and	   events	   also	   point.	   This	   metanarrative	   of	   crisis	   is	  inscribed	  with	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  preferences	  that	  points	  towards	  the	  need	  to	  support	  the	   government’s	   proposed	   decisive	   interventions.	   Readers	   may	   not	   necessarily	  accept	   the	   truth	   of	   these	   texts	   or	   the	   crisis	   narrative	   that	   they	   form.	   Their	  ideological	   effect	   arises	   from	   strategies	   of	   direct	   and	   empathic	   interpellation	  through	  which	  the	  reader	  is	  invited	  to	  recognise	  their	  own	  experiences	  and	  values	  in	   the	   text	   and	   so	   internalise	   their	   contestable	   assertion	   and	   interpretations	   of	  crisis	  as	  lived	  experience.	  Interpellation	  functions	  through	  successful	  maximisation	  of	  resonance.	  Value	  amplification	  and	  narrative	  bridging	  represent	  two	  strategies	  of	  empathic	  interpellation	  to	  this	  end.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  crisis	  narratives	   will	   exhibit	   dynamism	   as	   their	   authors	   defensively	   incorporate	   new	  elements	  to	  neutralise	  rival	  crisis	  narratives	  or	  respond	  to	  and	  explain	  unexpected	  changes	  in	  the	  economic	  context	  to	  which	  they	  relate.	  	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   not	   individual	   ideological	   texts	   that	   are	  my	   focus	   in	   this	  research,	   but	   the	   themes	   that	   emerge	   across	   texts	   as	   components	   of	   a	   broader	  metanarrative	   of	   crisis.	   It	   is	   this	   phenomenon	   to	  which	   the	   term	   crisis	   narrative	  applies	  in	  my	  research.	  I	  ask:	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1. What	   is	   the	   narrative	   selectivity	   of	   each	   government’s	   crisis	   narrative?	  Which	   issues	  and	   facts	  are	   fore-­‐grounded?	  Which	  are	  excluded?	  What	  are	  the	  central	  characters	  in	  the	  narrative’s	  plot	  and	  how	  are	  they	  represented?	  	  2. What	   strategies	   of	   direct	   interpellation	   are	   commonly	   invoked	  within	   the	  narrative?	  How	  are	   these	   used	   to	   create	   a	   sense	   of	   ‘peril’	   and	   anxiety	   for	  those	  who	  can	  readily	  identify	  or	  sympathise	  with	  the	  subject	  positions	  that	  are	  directly	  invoked?	  	   3. Is	   value	   amplification	  used	   as	   a	   strategy	   of	   empathic	   interpellation	   in	   the	  narrative?	  If	  so,	  how	  is	  this	  strategy	  pursued?	  	   4. Is	   narrative	   bridging	   used	   as	   a	   strategy	   of	   empathic	   interpellation?	   If	   so,	  how	  is	  this	  strategy	  pursued?	  	   5. What	   dynamics	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   each	   government’s	   crisis	   narrative?	  What	  strategies	  of	  counter-­‐narration	  do	  these	  suggest?	  	  	  	  
2.	  
Epistemological	  And	  Methodological	  Considerations	  	  The	   foregoing	   conceptualisations	   and	   research	   questions	   raise	   a	   number	   of	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  issues,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  empirical	  study	  of	  crisis	  diagnoses.	  This	  section	  shall	  review	  those	  pertaining	  to	  both	  sets	  of	  general	  research	  questions	  in	  turn.	  	  	  The	  Empirical	  Study	  Of	  Crisis	  Diagnoses	  	  The	   question	   that	   confronts	   those	  who	  would	  make	   claims	   about	   the	   content	   of	  governments’	   coordinative	   discourses	   and	   crisis	   diagnoses	   is	   how	   to	   attribute	  content	  to	  such	  phenomena	  when	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  directly	  observe	  them.	  In	  many	  cases	   we	   can	   anticipate	   that	   policymakers	   will	   be	   unwilling	   to	   discuss	   their	  politically	   sensitive	  perceptions	  with	  us,	   and	   it	   is	  unlikely	   that	  academics	  will	  be	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permitted	   to	   attend	   government	   meetings	   in	   order	   to	   sample	   coordinative	  discourses	  directly.	   23	  Consequently,	   it	   is	  often	   the	  case	   that	   the	  analyst	   can	  only	  access	   policymakers’	   coordinative	   discourses,	   and	   the	   problem	   definitions	  comprising	  them,	  indirectly	  and	  in	  mediated	  forms.	  	  	  A	   clear	   description	   of	   how	   inferences	   and	   attributions	   have	   been	   constructed	   is	  required	   if	   claims	   derived	   from	   such	   sources	   are	   to	   be	   considered	   robust.	   Yet	  existing	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  research	  is	  sometimes	  found	  wanting	  in	  this	  regard:	   it	   is	   not	   always	   made	   explicit	   how	   empirical	   data	   (which	   has	   been	  predominantly	   qualitative,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   documents,	   interviews	   and	   observed	  behaviours)	   is	  made	   into	   inferences	   about	   the	   ideas	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors	  and	   the	   ideational	   content	   of	   their	   coordinative	   discourses.24	   This	   lack	   of	   clarity	  serves	   as	   an	   unnecessary	   barrier	   to	  methodological	   advance	   of	   the	   perspective.	  More	  seriously,	  however,	   it	   leaves	  all	   involved	  in	  constructivist	  political	  economy	  exposed	   to	  a	  hostile	  anti-­‐constructivist	   critique	  –	  one	   that	  constructivist	  political	  economists	  are	  simply	  obliged	  to	  answer	  if	  the	  approach	  is	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  robust.	  	  	  Such	  a	  critique	  can	  be	  cast	  along	  two	   lines,	  but	   the	  essence	  of	  both	   is	   to	  call	   into	  question	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  securing	  valid	  knowledge	  claims	  about	  the	  content	  of	  coordinative	  discourses.	  Firstly,	  a	  critic	  might	  point	  to	  the	  difficulties	  observing	  elite	   ideas	   and	   coordinative	   discourses,	   and	   the	   problems	   that	   this	   raises	   for	  judging	  the	  comparative	  validity	  of	  two	  accounts	  making	  competing	  claims	  about	  the	   content	   of	   the	   same	   coordinative	   discourse.	   Constructivist	   institutionalists	  have	  no	  direct	  means	  of	   ‘testing’	   in	  order	   to	   adjudicate	   contrasting	   claims	  about	  the	   content	   of	   a	   coordinative	   discourse	   because	   the	   reality	   both	   purport	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Although	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  have	  made	  impressive	  steps	  in	  this	  direction	  by	  conducting	  ethnographic	  observational	  studies	  of	  civil	  servants.	  See	  M.	  Bevir	  and	  R.A.W.	  Rhodes	  (2003),	  Interpreting	  British	  Governance	  (London:	  Routledge);	  R.A.W.	  Rhodes	  (2005),	  'Everyday	  Life	  In	  A	  Ministry:	  Public	  Administration	  As	  Anthropology',	  The	  American	  
Review	  Of	  Public	  Administration,	  35	  (1),	  pp.3-­‐25.	  24	  In	  fairness	  to	  the	  perspective,	  methodological	  discussion	  is	  well	  developed	  in	  certain	  accounts,	  however	  these	  are	  the	  exception.	  See,	  for	  example,	  N.	  Smith	  and	  C.	  Hay	  (2008),	  'Mapping	  The	  Political	  Discourse	  Of	  Globalisation	  And	  European	  Integration	  In	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  And	  Ireland	  Empirically',	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Research,	  47	  (3),	  pp.359-­‐82,	  where	  the	  authors	  describe	  in	  depth	  the	  process	  through	  which	  they	  conducted	  an	  attitudinal	  survey	  of	  British	  MPs	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  globalisation.	  What	  is	  missing	  for	  the	  literature	  on	  constructivist	  political	  economy,	  however,	  is	  cross-­‐study	  consideration	  of	  methodological	  process	  to	  compliment	  the	  kind	  of	  cross-­‐study	  conceptual	  reviews	  offered	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Schmidt.	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describe	  cannot	  be	  accessed	  by	  a	   third	  party	   in	  order	   to	  determine	  their	  relative	  veracity.	  	  	  The	   second	   critique	   concerns	   the	   range	   of	   evidence	   available	   to	   constructivist	  institutionalists	   who	   seek	   to	   describe	   the	   ideas	   and	   coordinative	   discourses	   of	  policymakers	  of	  their	  own	  time,	  or	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  While	  a	  historian	  addressing	  similar	   research	   questions	   many	   years	   later	   might	   have	   access	   to	   numerous	  documentary	   sources	   (for	   instance	   private	   notes,	   de-­‐classified	   documents	   and	  interviews	   with	   relevant	   actors	   freed	   from	   the	   constraints	   of	   office),	   the	   most	  abundant	  evidence	  available	  to	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  in	  the	  present	  tense	  is	  the	  information	  that	  the	  actors	  under	  study	  are	  prepared	  to	  put	  into	  the	  public	  domain.	   Knowing	   that	   such	   information	   could	   be	   scrutinised	   by	   the	   media	   and	  their	  political	  foes	  alike,	  policymakers	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  be	  guarded,	  if	  not	  downright	  deceptive,	  about	  their	  intentions.25	  Examples	  of	  such	  discretion	   are	   too	   numerous	   to	   count	   –	   one	   need	   look	   only	   at	   the	  way	   in	  which	  parties	   guard	   their	   intended	   policy	   programmes	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   campaign	  period,	  and	  conversely,	  the	  promises	  that	  are	  broken	  following	  elections.	  Attempts	  to	   infer	  content	  to	  coordinative	  discourses	  from	  qualitative	  data	  that	   is	   flawed	  in	  this	  way	  would	  introduce	  into	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  the	  silences,	  uncertainties	  and	   deceptions	   that	   the	   originating	   political	   actor	   had	   strategically	   woven	   into	  them.	  	  It	  would	  be	  a	  sad	   irony	   if,	  having	  shown	  so	  powerfully	   that	   the	   interest-­‐oriented	  behaviour	  of	  political	  actors	  is	  conceptually	  dependent	  on	  ideas,	  it	  were	  to	  emerge	  that	   these	   vital	   explanatory	   factors	   are	   unobtainable	   to	   political	   analysts.	  Fortunately,	  we	  need	  not	  make	  any	  such	  concession.	  For	  although	  points	  such	  as	  those	  above	  ought	  to	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  engaged	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  it	  would	  be	  considerably	  overstating	  their	  implications	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  making	  valid	  claims	  about	  the	  content	  of	  elite	  ideas	  and	  coordinative	  discourses.	   The	   epistemological	   writings	   of	   Bevir	   and	   Rhodes	   and	   their	  collaborators	   are	   highly	   informative	   in	   developing	   an	   approach	   that	   is	   able	   to	  respond	   to	   such	   criticisms.	   Although	   these	   authors	   advocate	   an	   analytical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  K.	  Dowding	  (2004),	  'Interpretation,	  Truth	  And	  Investigation:	  Comments	  On	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes',	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Science	  And	  International	  Relations,	  6	  (2),	  pp.136-­‐42.	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approach	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  one	  on	  which	  my	  own	   research	   is	   based	   (albeit	   with	   very	   strong	   parallels),	   their	   writings	   on	   the	  broader	   issues	   of	   interpretivist	   epistemology	   are	   of	   great	   relevance	   to	  constructivists	  in	  all	  fields.26	  	  
Interpretivism	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  a	  defensible	  analysis	  of	  the	  content	  of	  policymakers’	  coordinative	  discourses	   is	   to	   adopt	   an	   appropriate	   degree	   of	  modesty	   in	   our	   epistemological	  goals.	  If	  our	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  inferences	  that	  are	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  correspondence	  with	  the	   content	   of	   a	   coordinative	   discourse	   (that	   is	   to	   say,	   to	   name	   and	   outline	  accurately	  and	  completely	  every	  idea	  that	  informs	  government	  thinking	  on	  a	  given	  subject	  –	  which	  would	  of	  course	  be	  a	  monumental	  task)	  then	  we	  invite	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	   that	   we	   need	   not	   confront	   were	   we	   more	   modest	   in	   our	   goals.	   An	  alternative	   enterprise	   is	   to	   make	   broader	   inferences	   regarding	   the	   categorical	  
character	  of	   the	  content	  of	  a	  coordinative	  discourse	  (whether	   it	  be	  neoliberal,	  or	  something	   else),	   and	   to	   identify	   the	   influence	   of	   particular	   problem	   definitions	  where	   the	   available	   data	   suffices	   to	   do	   so	   in	   order	   to	   substantiate	   our	  characterisation.	   The	   goal	   of	  my	   research	   is	   not	   to	   describe	   the	   entirety	   of	   each	  government’s	  post-­‐2008	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  but	  rather	  to	  capture	  enough	  information	  about	   them	   to	   facilitate	   comparisons	   and	   categorisation	   in	   relation	   to	  neoliberalism	  and	  to	  each	  other.	  	  The	  scaling	  of	  epistemological	  ambitions	   is	  a	  necessary	  but	  not	   sufficient	   step	   to	  answer	  the	  critiques	  posed	  above.	  A	  second	  move	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  explicitly	  the	  irreducibly	  interpretivist	  nature	  of	  the	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  enterprise	  in	  political	   economy,	   and	   to	   abandon	   the	   positivist	   pretence	   to	   be	   producing	  knowledge	  claims	  of	  the	  same	  category	  as	  those	  produced	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  An	   interpretivist	   approach	   to	   social	   science	   research	   is	   one	   that	   recognises	   not	  simply	   the	   impact	  of	   intersubjectivity	  and	  of	   ideational	   construction	  on	  political-­‐economic	   actors,	   but	   also	   their	   impact	   on	   political	   economists	   themselves.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  On	  synergies	  between	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes’	  interpretivism	  and	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalism,	  see	  C.	  Hay	  (2011c),	  'Interpreting	  Interpretivism	  Interpreting	  Interpretations:	  The	  New	  Hermeneutics	  Of	  Public	  Administration',	  Public	  Administration,	  89	  (1),	  pp.167-­‐82;	  M.	  Bevir	  and	  R.A.W.	  Rhodes	  (2006b),	  'Interpretive	  Approaches	  To	  British	  Government	  And	  Politics',	  British	  Politics,	  1	  (84),	  pp.84-­‐112.	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Following	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes,	   it	   is	  my	  contention	  that	  any	  approach	  that	  concedes	  the	  political-­‐economic	  reality	  to	  be	  constructed	  by	  the	  ideas,	  concepts	  and	  theories	  that	   actors	   bring	   to	   bear	   on	   it	  must	  make	   a	   similar	   concession	   in	   regard	   to	   the	  analysts	  who	  study	  these	  actors.27	  	  	  From	   this	   interpretivist	   perspective,	   the	   knowledge	   that	   political	   economists	  produce	   is	   always	   and	   unavoidably	   mediated	   and	   constructed	   by	   our	   concepts,	  theories	   and	   preconceptions.	   There	   is	   no	   ‘hypothetical	   view	   from	   nowhere’	   in	  political	  economy	  research;	  no	  means	  of	  reading	  documents,	  coding	  interview	  data	  or	  formulating	  a	  conclusion	  that	  is	  not	  informed	  by	  prior	  ontological	  assumptions	  about	  what	  exists	  to	  be	  measured,	  and	   its	  meaning	   in	  relation	  to	  other	  entities.28	  Furthermore,	   for	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   there	   is	   no	   means	   of	   ‘testing’	  knowledge	   claims	   through	   repeated	   application	   of	   theories	   to	   different	   contexts	  after	  the	  manner	  of	  ‘large-­‐n’	  quantitative	  studies,	  because	  the	  phenomena	  we	  seek	  to	   cast	   inference	   on	   (intersubjective	   ideas	   and	   coordinative	   discourses	   in	   the	  ideational	  context)	  are	  unique	  to	  particular	  times	  and	  places.	  	  	  Consequently,	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  reject	  the	  positivist	  conceptualisation	  of	  validity,	  which	  is	  premised	  on	  a	  direct	  correspondence	  between	  the	  analyst’s	  assertion	  and	  that	   which	   they	   seek	   to	   describe.	   All	   assertions	   regarding	   ‘the	   real’	   are,	   they	  suggest,	   irreducibly	   interpretations	   of	   the	   real,	   and	   insofar	   as	   constructivist	  analysts	   study	   actor	   interpretations,	   their	   enterprise	   consists	   of	   ‘interpreting	  interpretations’.29	  Abandoning	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘political	  science’	  as	  a	  misnomer,	  they	  recast	   explanation	   as	   a	   form	   of	   ‘narrative’	   (essentially	   the	   same	   form	   of	  explanation	   as	   those	   produced	   by	   historians)	   in	   which	   assertions	   about	   actor	  interpretations	   are	   always	   contingent,	   contestable,	   and	   hold	   potential	   for	  elaboration	  and	  revision.30	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  M.	  Bevir	  and	  R.A.W.	  Rhodes	  (1999),	  'Studying	  British	  Government:	  Reconstructing	  The	  Research	  Agenda',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  1	  (2),	  pp.215-­‐39;	  M.	  Bevir	  and	  R.A.W.	  Rhodes	  (2006a),	  'Defending	  Interpretation',	  European	  Political	  
Science,	  5	  (1),	  pp.69-­‐83.	  28	  On	  political	  ontology	  and	  directional	  dependence	  with	  epistemology,	  see	  Hay	  (2002),	  
Political	  Analysis.	  29	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  (2006a),	  ‘Defending	  Interpretation’,	  p.69.	  30	  Ibid.	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Explicitly	   adopting	   an	   interpretivist	   epistemology	   allows	   us	   to	   go	   some	   way	   to	  answering	   the	   first	   of	   the	   unfriendly	   critiques	   posed	   above.	   First,	   it	   provides	   a	  philosophical	  position	  from	  which	  to	  be	  sceptical	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  any	  approach	  can	  achieve	  what	  the	  criticism	  singles	  out	  constructivist	  research	  on	  elite	  ideas	  and	  coordinative	   discourses	   for	   failing	   to	   do.	   Because	   political	   analysts	   produce	  interpretations,	  and	  because	  interpretations	  are	  likely	  to	  cohere	  with	  the	  broader	  worldview	  of	  the	  analyst	  that	  makes	  them,	  having	  unmediated	  access	  to	  elite	  ideas	  and	   coordinative	   discourses	   might	   yield	   no	   better	   grounds	   to	   adjudicate	   the	  comparative	   purchase	   and	   correspondence	   of	   two	   knowledge	   claims	   with	   ‘the	  real’.	   Secondly,	   and	   lest	   this	   first	   point	   sound	   an	   invitation	   to	   epistemological	  relativism,	   adopting	   an	   explicitly	   interpretivist	   epistemology	   does	   in	   fact	   yield	   a	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  adjudicate	  competing	  knowledge	  claims	  –	  a	  different	  concept	  of	  validity,	  derived	  from	  ‘criteria	  of	  comparison’.	  	  	  Positivist	   research	   approaches	   the	   issue	   of	   validity	   through	   ‘the	   logic	   of	  vindication’:	   the	   notion	   that	   hypothesis	   testing	   derived	   from	   competing	   theories	  allows	  the	  predictions	  of	  one	  account	  to	  be	  proven	  to	  correspond	  with	  real	   facts,	  and	  the	  other	  one	  falsified	  by	  having	  been	  shown	  not	  to	  predict	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  political	  reality	   it	  purports	  to	  describe.	   Interpretivist	  research	  adheres	   instead	  to	  the	   somewhat	   more	   relaxed	   epistemological	   standard	   of	   the	   ‘criteria	   of	  comparison’.31	   These	   represent	   agreed	   intellectual	   standards	  with	  which	  we	   are	  able	   to	   differentiate	   between	   the	   epistemological	   status	   of	   accounts	   without	  appealing	   to	   some	   unmediated	   access	   to	   ‘the	   real’.	   These	   include,	   among	   many	  potential	   others:	   honesty	   of	   analysis	   and	   exposition	   (i.e.	   not	   making	   up	   one’s	  results),	   evidential	   scope,	   the	   plausibility	   of	   assumptions,	   the	   internal	   logical	  coherence	  of	   the	   arguments	   that	   comprise	   the	   account,	   and	   the	   ‘fit’	   between	   the	  account	  and	  ‘facts’	  that	  are	  agreed	  upon	  by	  advocate	  and	  critic.	  	  	  Adjudicating	   the	   validity	   of	   constructivist	   accounts	   from	   an	   interpretivist	  perspective	  involves	  the	  comparison	  of	  competing	  interpretations	  of	  the	  content	  of	  elite	   ideas	  and	   coordinative	  discourses.	  This	   can	   take	  a	   form	   that	   is	   superficially	  similar	  to	  ‘testing’	  in	  a	  positivist	  account,	  whereby	  we	  examine	  whether	  expected	  patterns	  of	  behaviour	  that	  arise	  from	  contrasting	  interpretations	  are	  exhibited	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  (1999),	  ‘Studying	  British	  Government’.	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practice.	  A	  behaviour	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  ideas	  attributed	  to	  an	  actor	  in	  one	  interpretation	  and	  inconsistent	  with	  that	  of	  a	  second	  interpretation	  would	  favour	  the	   first.	   Yet	   such	   ‘testing’	   does	   not	   yield	   incontestable	   truth,	   but	   rather	   a	  provisional	   preference	   for	   one	   contestable	   interpretation	   over	   another	   and	   an	  acknowledgment	  that	  both	  might	  be	   found	  wanting	  by	  a	  third	   interpretation	  at	  a	  later	   date.	   The	   perspective	   consequently	   rests	   on	   a	   form	   of	   ‘inference	   to	   best	  explanation’,	   a	   philosophical	   principle	   invoked	   in	   the	   natural	   as	   well	   as	   social	  sciences.32	  	  
	  
Analytical	  Enterprise:	  Process	  Tracing	  
	  Parsons	  has	  observed	  that	  the	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  ideational	  explanation	  is	  that	  it	  emphasises	   contingency	   in	   processes	   of	   change.33	   As	   ‘soft	   variables’,	   ideational	  factors	   are	   amenable	   to	   change	   in	   a	   way	   that	   ‘material’	   factors	   (such	   as	   the	  distribution	  of	  raw	  materials	  among	  nations)	  are	  not:	   in	  a	  constructivist	  account,	  things	   could	   always	   have	   been	   different	   had	   actors	   thought	   about	   the	   world	  differently.	   The	   result	   of	   conceiving	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   as	   sentient	  ideational	   agents	   is	   that	   ideas	   are	   in	   a	   state	   of	   constant,	   albeit	   often	   bounded,	  change	   as	   actors	   reflect	   critically	   on	   their	   experiences	   and	   adapt	   problem	  definitions	  through	  coordinative	  discourse.	  The	  epistemological	  implication	  of	  this	  point	  is	  that	  a	  predictive	  political	  science	  is	  not	  possible.	  As	  the	  contingent	  process	  of	  ideational	  change	  unfolds,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  problems	  are	  defined	  and	  the	  way	  that	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   behave,	   may	   change	   in	   ways	   that	   analysts	   cannot	  predict.	  At	  best,	  political	  analysts	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  informed	  conjecture	  as	  to	  how	  processes	   of	   political-­‐economic	   change	   will	   unfold.	   These	   informed	   conjectures	  must	   rest	   on	   clear	   assumptions	   that	   certain	   key	   actors	  will	   continue	   to	  perceive	  the	  world	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  do	  at	  the	  present	  time.	  	  Partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this,	   the	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   studies	   cited	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter	   have	   on	   the	  whole	   been	   oriented	   to	   a	   non-­‐predictive	  mode	   of	  analysis	  and	  explanation	  called	   ‘process	   tracing’	   (although	  many	  have	  done	  so	   in	  order	   to	   establish	   the	   truth	   of	   more	   general	   claims	   that	   various	   ideational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Wendt	  (1999),	  Social	  Theory;	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  (2006a),	  ‘Defending	  Interpretation’.	  33	  Parsons	  (2007),	  How	  To	  Map.	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processes	  that	  they	  chart	  ‘matter’).	  As	  invoked	  in	  the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  literature,	  process	  tracing	   involves	   identifying	  an	  outcome	  that	   is	  of	   interest,	  and	  then	   seeking	   to	  elucidate	   the	   ideational,	   institutional	   and	  agential	  processes	   that	  caused	  it	  to	  come	  about.34	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  explain	  why	  political-­‐economic	  actors	  have	  behaved	  the	  way	  that	  they	  have,	  and	  so	  why	  they	  have	  produced	  the	  political-­‐economic	   outcome	   that	   we	   seek	   to	   explain.	   	   Such	   an	   account	   can	   then	   inform	  future	  studies	  of	  different	  political	  outcomes	  at	   later	  points	   in	  time	  by	  explaining	  why	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   conditions	  were	   as	   they	  were	  when	   subsequent	  processes	   began.	   On	   this	   basis,	   constructivist	   institutionalists	   are	   party	   to	   a	  cumulative	   historical	   process	   of	   knowledge	   production.	   My	   own	   thesis	   occupies	  such	   a	   relationship	   with	   the	   CSDP	   and	   its	   ongoing	   institutionalist	   analysis	   of	  British	  political	  economy.	  
	  
Qualitative	  Data:	  Assumptions	  And	  Triangulations	  	  Acknowledging	  that	  our	  claims	  about	  policymakers’	  ideas	  and	  the	  content	  of	  their	  coordinative	   discourses	   are	   inherently	   contestable	   interpretations,	   and	  reconceptualising	  validity	  as	  arising	  from	  comparative	  criteria	  such	  as	  those	  cited	  above,	  allows	  one	  to	  address	  the	  second	  of	  the	  critiques	  noted	  above.	  If	  a	  plausible	  case	   can	   be	   made	   that	   certain	   kinds	   of	   data	   do	   allow	   one	   to	   formulate	  comparatively	   valid	   interpretations	   of	   the	   content	   and	   character	   of	   coordinative	  discourses	   then	   the	  burden	  of	   evidence	   shifts	   to	   the	   critic	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   a	  better	  interpretation	  can	  be	  constructed.	  What	  is	  demanded	  of	  the	  analyst	  is	  that	  they	  make	  clear	  the	  assumptions	  that	  underpin	  their	  analysis	  and	  interpretation	  of	  qualitative	  data	  so	  that	  criteria	  of	  comparison	  can	  be	  applied.	  	  Constructivist	   institutionalist	   research	   is	   eclectic	   on	   the	   sources	   of	   data	   that	   it	  draws	   upon.	   The	   speech-­‐acts	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors,	   various	   written	   and	  statistical	  documents	   that	   they	  produce,	   and	  observations	  of	   their	  behaviour	  are	  all	  frequently	  drawn	  upon.	  Indeed,	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  research	  places	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  emphasis	  upon	  behaviour	  as	  a	  ‘datum’	  through	  which	  to	  interpret	  the	  motives	   and	   ideas	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors.	   A	   misplaced	   criticism	   that	   is	  sometimes	   levelled	  at	  such	  constructivist	  explanation	  is	  that	   it	   is	  circular,	   insofar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Schmidt	  (2008),	  Discursive	  Institutionalism’.	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as	   an	   appeal	   is	   made	   to	   particular	   intersubjective	   ideas	   to	   explain	   an	   actor’s	  behaviour	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  holdingthat	   	  actor’s	  behaviour	  as	  evidence	  that	  they	  subscribe	  to	  that	  intersubjective	  idea.	  The	  circularity	  is	  clear	  if	  the	  argument	  is	  rendered	  in	  consecutive	  propositions:	  	  	   (1) Actor	   A	   did	   action	   X	   and	   not	   action	   Q	   because	   they	   subscribed	   to	   idea	   Y	  rather	  than	  idea	  Z;	  	   (2) We	   know	   Actor	   A	   subscribed	   to	   idea	   Y	   and	   not	   idea	   Z	   because	   they	   did	  action	  X	  and	  not	  action	  Q.	  	  	  Yet	  this	  critique	  is	  not	  fatal	  to	  a	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  account	  because	  of	  a	  prior	  ontological	  axiom	  that	  arrests	  the	  circularity:	  	  	   (1) A’s	  actions	  are	  conditioned	  by	  A’s	  ideas;	  	  (2) A	  did	  action	  X	  rather	  than	  action	  Q;	  	   (3) Action	  X	  is	  consistent	  with	  idea	  Y,	  but	  inconsistent	  with	  idea	  Z;	  	  	   (4) Therefore	   the	   fact	   that	   A	   did	   action	   X	   and	   not	   action	   Y	   suggests	   that	   A	  subscribes	  to	  idea	  Y	  and	  not	  idea	  Z.	  	  	  It	   is	  only	  if	  the	  axiom	  itself	  is	  under	  challenge	  that	  such	  reasoning	  would	  become	  circular.	  But	  as	  Chapter	  2	  serves	  to	  demonstrate,	  models	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  actor	  that	  reduce	  or	  foreclose	  the	  impact	  of	  ideas	  on	  behaviour	  fall	  victim	  to	  their	  own	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  problems.	  Consequently,	   this	   is	  not	  a	  debate	  that	  I	  shall	  revisit	  here.	  	  Yet	  whilst	  behavioural	  data	  provides	  a	  useful	  means	  of	   refining	  and	  adjudicating	  interpretations	   about	   which	   ideas	   an	   actor	   subscribes	   to,	   taken	   alone	   it	   is	   not	  always	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  ascertaining	  which	  ideas	  out	  of	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  ideas	  have	  shaped	  behaviour.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  a	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  account	  the	   behaviour	   of	   political-­‐economic	   actors	   is	   also	   conditioned	   by	   a	   strategically	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selective	   institutional	   context	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ideational	   context.	   Institutional	  conditions	  may	  constrain	  actors	  into	  making	  choices	  that	  are	  ‘sub	  optimal’	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  define	  policy	  problems,	  and	  this	  can	  introduce	  a	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  over	   why	   they	   have	   behaved	   the	   way	   that	   they	   have.	   In	   the	   debate	   over	   the	  character	  of	   the	   ‘New	  Labour’	   governments	   encountered	   in	   the	  next	   chapter,	   for	  instance,	   participants	   are	   divided	   over	   whether	   novel	   features	   of	   these	  governments’	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	   reflected	   structural	  constraints	  on	  otherwise	  social	  democratic	  intentions,	  or	  an	  internalisation	  of	  the	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos.	   A	   broader	   examination	   of	   behavioural	   data	   can	  often	   assist	   in	   the	   resolution	   of	   such	   debates	   (as	   it	   does	   in	   relation	   to	   that	  particular	  debate).	  A	  sequential	  exposition	  again	  makes	  this	  clearer:	  	   (1) In	  policy	  area	  1,	  Actor	  A	  did	  action	  X	  and	  not	  action	  Q;	  	  (2) In	  policy	  area	  1,	  action	  X	  is	  consistent	  with	  both	  Idea	  Y	  and	  Idea	  Z;	  	   (3) In	  policy	  area	  2,	  Actor	  A	  did	  action	  X1	  and	  not	  Q1;	  	   (4) In	  policy	  area	  2,	   action	  X1	   is	   consistent	  with	   idea	  Y	  and	   inconsistent	  with	  idea	  Z;	  	   (5) Therefore,	   the	   balance	   of	   behavioural	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   Actor	   X	  subscribes	  to	  idea	  Y	  and	  not	  idea	  Z.	  	  Yet	  there	  remains	  potential	  for	  ambiguity.	  One	  might	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  actions	  X	  and	  X1	  are	  consistent	  with	  idea	  W	  as	  well	  as	  idea	  Y,	  further	  compounding	  the	   interpretive	   dilemma.	   The	   potential	   for	   such	   ambiguities	   makes	   it	   useful	   to	  ‘triangulate’	  observations	  of	  behaviour	  with	  other	  kinds	  of	  qualitative	  data	  and	  not	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  behavioural	  observations.	  	  	  My	   own	   empirical	   research	   draws	   on	   policy	   documents	   to	   this	   end.	   These	   are	  technical	  rationales	  for	  policy	  produced	  for	  the	  consumption	  of	  experts	  rather	  than	  the	   general	   public.	   Here	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   articulate	   a	   key	   assumption	  underpinning	   my	   treatment	   of	   this	   empirical	   data:	   that	   such	   documents	   are,	   if	  
	   146	  
treated	   with	   due	   caution	   and	   alongside	   observations	   of	   behaviour,	   generally	   a	  good	   means	   of	   gaining	   insights	   about	   the	   problem	   definitions	   in	   policymakers’	  coordinative	   discourses.	   My	   reasons	   are	   twofold.	   Firstly,	   policy	   documents	  contrast	   in	   content	   with	   documents	   produced	   for	   consumption	   by	   the	   general	  public.	  As	  Chapter	  7	  shows,	   the	   latter	  kind	  of	  document	   is	   characterised	  by	  non-­‐technical	  and	  moralising	  arguments	  that	  seem	  calculated	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  mean	  of	  public	  opinion	  on	  any	  given	  issue.	  Policy	  documents,	   in	  contrast,	  are	  produced	  in	  order	   to	   state	   a	   rationale	   for	   government	   policies	   to	   experts,	   often	   with	   the	  intention	  of	  eliciting	  feedback	  rather	  than	  electoral	  support.	  Consequently,	  there	  is	  less	  of	  an	   incentive	   for	  deception	   in	  such	  documents.	  Secondly,	   the	  consumers	  of	  such	   documents	   are	   engaged	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   scrutiny	   of	   government	   policy	   in	  their	  areas	  of	  interest	  and	  it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  government	  could	  consistently	  and	  systematically	  mislead	  such	  actors	  over	  its	  definition	  of	  problems	  even	  if	  it	  had	  an	  incentive	   to	   do	   so.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   I	   make	   the	   assumption	   that	   inferences	  constructed	   from	   pieces	   of	   such	   data	   on	   relevant	   issues	   of	   post-­‐2008	   economic	  policy	   in	   combination	   with	   behavioural	   data	   will	   allow	   me	   to	   form	   generally	  accurate,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   complete,	   interpretations	   of	   the	   ideas	   that	   inform	  government	  thinking	  in	  the	  areas	  to	  which	  these	  documents	  relate.	  	  My	   approach	   to	   analysis	   involves	   combining	   observations	   of	   behavioural	   and	  document-­‐based	   data	   to	   characterise	   and,	   where	   possible,	   identify	   the	   problem	  defining	  ideas	  informing	  policymaking	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  and	  to	  formulate	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  crisis	  diagnosis	  that	  they	  underpin.	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  inferences	  I	  build	  regarding	  the	  ideational	  content	  of	  crisis	  diagnoses	  from	  documentary	   material	   represents	   a	   good	   interpretation	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   holds	  purchase	   on	   the	   decisions	   that	   these	   governments	   make.	   Insofar	   as	   my	  interpretations	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  exhibited	  strategies	  of	   these	  governments	  in	   the	  recent	  past,	   I	  assume	   that	   they	  are	  a	  good	   interpretation	  of	   the	  content	  of	  elite	  ideas	  and	  coordinative	  discourses.	  If	  it	  does	  not	  then	  the	  imperative	  is	  either	  to	  gather	  more	  documentary	  and	  behavioural	  evidence	  so	  as	  to	  establish	  a	  better	  picture	   of	   the	   government’s	   thinking	   or,	   if	   this	   is	   ineffective	   or	   impossible,	   to	  advance	   an	   interpretation	   based	   on	   behavioural	   data	   and	   what	   is	   already	  established	  about	  ideas	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  areas.	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Analytical	  Themes	  	  In	  assessing	  the	  character	  of	  the	  two	  governments’	  crisis	  diagnoses	  and	  comparing	  them	  to	  one	  another	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  a	  thematic	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  make	  this	  characterisation	  and	  comparison.	  My	  focus	  in	  this	  research	  is	  on	  economic	  policy	  as	  this	   is	  the	  area	  of	  government	  policy	  most	  directly	   implicated	  in	  the	  economic	  failures	  of	  2007-­‐08	  and	  subsequent	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  Yet	  economic	  policy	   itself	   is	   too	   wide	   an	   area	   on	   which	   to	   compare	   and	   characterise	   crisis	  diagnoses,	   as	   it	   covers	   a	   great	   range	   of	   issues	   and	   goals.	   Consequently	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   prioritise	   certain	   themes	   in	   order	   to	   focus	   my	   gathering	   of	  documentary	   data	   and	   behavioural	   observations.	   These	   themes	   must	   facilitate	  comparison	   between	   both	   post-­‐2008	   crisis	   diagnoses	   and	   the	   neoliberal	  coordinative	   discourse	   that	   structured	   economic	   policymaking	   prior	   to	   2008,	   as	  well	  as	  comparisons	  between	  the	  two	  crisis	  diagnoses	   themselves.	  However,	   it	   is	  also	   necessary	   that	   these	   themes	   should	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   particularity	   of	   the	  diagnoses	  that	  each	  government	  has	  made,	  capturing	  the	  issues	  that	  they	  regarded	  to	  be	  ‘pathologies’	  warranting	  treatment.	  	  To	  arrive	  at	  these	  themes	  in	  a	  non-­‐arbitrary	  manner	  I	  began	  by	  reading	  the	  budget	  reports	   and	   pre-­‐budget	   reports/autumn	   statements	   published	   by	   each	  government.	  These	  documents	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  economic	  policy	  and	  its	  accompanying	   technical	   rationales.	   From	   these	   documents	   five	   themes	   emerged	  that	  meet	  the	  criteria	  above:	  	   1. Stagnation:	   incorporating	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   macroeconomic	  variables	  of	  output/GDP,	  inflation	  and	  unemployment,	  and	  microeconomic	  preconditions	  of	  output/GDP	  and	  employment	  growth.	  	  2. The	  public	  finances	  	   3. Sectoral/microeconomic	  ‘re-­‐balancing’	  (that	  is,	  a	  perceived	  need	  to	  shift	  the	  reliance	   of	   the	   UK	   away	   from	   some	   areas	   of	   economic	   activity	   and	   on	   to	  others).	  35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  The	  rebalancing	  metaphor	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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   4. Macroeconomic	   ‘rebalancing’	   (that	   is,	   a	   perceived	   need	   to	   shift	   the	  composition	   of	   aggregate	   demand	   away	   from	   domestic	   consumption	   and	  towards	  business	  and	  foreign	  sources).	  	   5. Financial	  instability	  and	  reform	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  public	  finances	  each	  theme	  relates	  to	  or	  contains	  both	  a	  ‘macroeconomic’	   and	   ‘microeconomic’	   dimension.	   	   This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  organisation	  of	  Chapter	  4	  and	  of	  the	  subject	  matters	  of	  chapters	  5	  and	  6.36	  	  The	  Empirical	  Study	  Of	  Crisis	  Narratives	  	  The	   epistemological	   and	   methodological	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   the	   study	   of	   crisis	  narratives	   are	   more	   straightforward	   than	   those	   pertaining	   to	   crisis	   diagnosis	  because	   the	   phenomena	   under	   study	   are	   readily	   accessible.	   Yet	   the	   enterprise	  remains	   an	   inherently	   interpretivist	   one	   –	   analyses	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   involve	  looking	   ‘under	  the	  surface’	  of	  the	  texts	  for	  interpellative	  strategies	  that	  are	  by	  no	  means	  self-­‐evident.	  	  	  There	   are	   various	   sources	   in	   which	   crisis	   narratives	   are	   disseminated.	   Crisis	  narration	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  evident	  in	  ministerial	  speeches;	  in	  election	  manifestos	  and	  party	  political	  publications;	  in	  media	  appearances	  and	  newspaper	  articles;	  and	  on	  government	   and	   party	   websites.	   Ideally	   a	   study	   would	   incorporate	   all	   of	   these	  sources,	  however	  the	  analysis	  of	  qualitative	  data	  is	  a	  particularly	  time-­‐consuming	  process	   and	   the	   constraints	   of	   time	   do	   not	   allow	   me	   to	   pursue	   such	   an	  encompassing	   strategy.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   narrow	   down	   either	   a	  portion	   of	   these	   documents	   from	   each	   category,	   or	   to	   focus	   on	   one	   category	   of	  document.	  I	  have	  adopted	  the	  latter	  approach,	  focusing	  on	  newspaper	  articles	  that	  politicians	   have	   published	   throughout	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   Each	   category	   of	  document	  brings	  its	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks,	  however	  newspaper	  articles	  are	  the	  best	   suited	   because	   their	   intended	   audience	   is	   the	   general	   public.	   Political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  I	  discuss	  the	  distinction	  between	  macroeconomic	  and	  microeconomic	  policy	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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speeches	  made	  at	  particular	  events	  undoubtedly	  contain	  crisis	  narration,	  yet	  they	  are	   targeted	   to	   very	   specific	   audiences	   (to	   backbenchers,	   or	   to	   specific	  organisations	  that	  are	  hosting	  the	  politician	  as	  a	  speaker)	  and	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  discern	   from	   such	   documents	   what	   constitutes	   the	   general	   themes	   of	   the	   crisis	  narrative	   and	   which	   themes	   are	   chosen	   selectively	   to	   appeal	   to	   a	   particular	  audience.	  	  	  The	   next	   issue	   is	   which	   newspaper	   articles	   to	   select	   for	   analysis.	   Initially,	   my	  approach	   was	   to	   select	   those	   written	   by	   the	   senior	   minister	   at	   the	  Business/Industry	   Ministry,	   the	   Treasury,	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister.	   The	   senior	  ministers	   of	   these	   two	   departments	   were	   chosen	   because	   they	   above	   all	   others	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  economic	  policy	  and	  thus	  are	  central	  agents	  in	  attempts	  to	  legitimate	  it	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  articles	  were	  investigated	  because	  it	  was	  reasoned	  they	  would	  need	  to	  offer	  a	  narrative	  coherent	  with	  their	  officers,	  and	  consequently	  would	  be	  a	  good	  guide	  to	  the	  general	  crisis	  narratives	  advanced	  by	   the	   government	   where	   the	   stylistic	   caprices	   and	   interests	   of	   individual	  ministers	  might	  have	  otherwise	  made	  the	  sample	  less	  representative.	  The	  articles	  for	   these	   six	   ministers	   were	   initially	   sourced	   through	   the	   ‘NewsBank’	   website,	  which	  archives	  all	  newspaper	  articles	  published	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  allows	  researchers	  to	   filter	   their	   search	   results	   by	   author.	   As	   primary	   research	   was	   undertaken,	   it	  became	   clear	   that	   the	   Coalition	   government	   had	   articulated	   a	   crisis	   narrative	   in	  relation	   to	   social	   security	   that	  was	   central	   to	   the	   legitimisation	   of	   their	   broader	  economic	  strategy	  and	  decisive	  interventions.	  To	  gain	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  issue	  was	  being	  narrated,	  the	  sample	  was	  extended	  to	  also	  include	  the	  publications	  of	   the	  Work	  and	  Pensions	  Secretary	  of	   the	  Coalition	  government.	  At	   this	  point	   in	  my	   research	   the	   NewsBank	   website	   had	   ceased	   to	   be	   available,	   but	   a	   similar	  service	   is	   provided	  by	   the	   ‘Journalisted’	  website	   and	   this	  was	   used	   to	   locate	   the	  articles	   published	   by	   this	   particular	  minister.	   The	   selection	   criterion	   for	   articles	  was	   that	   they	   touched	   upon	   economic	   circumstances	   or	   that	   they	   offered	   a	  justification	   of	   economic	   policy	   between	   the	   3rd	   quarter	   of	   2008	   and	   the	   final	  quarter	  of	  2013.	  This	  yielded	  a	  sample	  of	  120	  articles,	  of	  which	  45	  were	  written	  during	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government	  and	  75	  during	  that	  of	  the	  Coalition.	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In	   order	   to	   levy	  purchase	   on	   the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	   narration	   the	  sample	  was	  divided	  by	  date	  of	  publication	   into	  quarterly	   segments,	   beginning	   in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2008,	  with	  the	  first	  article	  having	  been	  published	  in	  September	  of	  that	  year.	  This	  quarterly	  division	  is	  a	  pragmatic	  choice	  allowing	  me	  to	  ascertain	  changes	   in	   the	   crisis	   narratives	   over	   time	   whilst	   retaining	   enough	   data	   in	   each	  quarterly	  segment	   to	   track	  common	  themes	  between	  texts.	  A	   finer	  grain	  analysis	  might	  have	  divided	  texts	  according	  to	  months,	  or	  even	  weeks.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  texts	  to	  do	  so	  in	  my	  sample.	  A	  quarterly	  division	  facilitates	  some	  purchase	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  substance	  of	  narratives,	  and	  coincides	  with	  the	  release	  of	  quarterly	  GDP	  figures	  that	  emerged	  to	  be	  a	  major	  animating	  feature	  in	  the	  crisis	  narratives.	  	  	  The	  next	  step	  was	   to	  analyze	  each	   individual	   text	  and	  to	  ascertain	  which	   themes	  within	   them	  constitute	   the	   ‘meta-­‐narratives’	  of	   crisis.	  Each	   individual	  article	  was	  examined	   in	   line	   with	   the	   research	   questions	   listed	   above.	   Notes	   were	   taken	  regarding	   the	   narrative	   selectivity	   employed	   in	   the	   individual	   text,	   which	   direct	  interpellative	   strategies	   were	   evident,	   and	   which	   statements	   within	   the	   articles	  could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   empathic	   strategies	   of	   interpellation.	   These	   were	   then	  compared	  across	  notes	  to	  ascertain	  which	  were	  common	  themes	  and	  which	  were	  unique	   to	   a	   particular	   text.	   The	   themes	   were	   identified	   through	   a	   process	   of	  comparison	   of	   the	   narrative	   selectivities	   employed	   in	   the	   individual	   articles	   and	  the	  direct	  and	  empathic	  interpellative	  strategies	  present	  within	  them.	  Through	  this	  process	   I	   reconstructed	   a	   more	   abstract	   ‘story’	   that	   each	   government	   was	  developing	   between	   texts.	   Themes	   were	   classed	   as	   constitutive	   of	   the	   meta-­‐narrative	   of	   crisis	   if	   they	   appeared	   in	  more	   than	   one	   text	   and	  were	   repeated	   in	  more	   than	   one	   quarter.	   Themes	   that	   were	   not	   developed	   in	   this	   way	   were	  discounted	  unless	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  their	  under-­‐development	  contributed	  something	  significant	   to	   the	   analysis	   –	   such	   instances	   are	   highlighted	   in	   the	   report	   of	   my	  findings	  given	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  	  	  The	  analysis	   is	  premised	  on	  a	  number	  of	   initial	  presuppositions.	  The	   first	   is	   that	  government	   ministers	   collectively	   create	   consistent	   crisis	   narratives,	   and	  individual	  ministers	  who	  submit	  newspaper	  articles	  write	  them	  (or	  perhaps	  have	  them	   written	   for	   them)	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   government’s	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broader	  crisis	  narrative.	  It	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  claim	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  seek	  more	   abstract	   themes	   from	   a	   sample	   composed	   of	   articles	   written	   by	   multiple	  ministers.	   This	   presupposition	   is	   plausible	   because	   contemporary	   governments	  employ	   large	   numbers	   of	   communications	   staff	   to	   ensure	   precisely	   such	  consistency	   in	   public	   communications.	   This	   assumption	   was	   born	   out	   by	   my	  analysis	  of	  the	  sample:	  although	  ministers	  elaborate	  on	  their	  individual	  portfolios	  in	   the	   respective	   articles	   that	   they	   author,	   they	   draw	   upon	   a	   discernible	   ‘line’	  regarding	  core	  issues	  when	  doing	  so	  which	  rendered	  their	  article	  consistent	  with	  those	  articulated	  by	  their	  colleagues.	  At	  no	  point	  did	  the	  ministers	  undermine	  one	  another’s	   claims	   (except	   in	   very	   careful	   and	   qualified	   terms	   between	   Coalition	  colleagues,	  a	  point	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  7).	  	  	  	  The	   second	   pr-­‐supposition	   is	   that	   articles	   published	   in	   broadsheet	   and	   tabloid	  newspapers	   can	   be	   included	   in	   the	   same	   sample	   despite	   being	   written	   with	  different	  audiences	  in	  mind.	  Initially	  my	  approach	  was	  agnostic	  on	  this	  point	  and	  I	  anticipated	   perhaps	   carrying	   out	   separate	   analyses	   on	   articles	   from	   either	  category.	   However,	   while	   I	   found	   there	   to	   be	   discernible	   differences	   between	  broadsheet	   and	   tabloid	   articles,	   when	   subject	   to	   the	   process	   of	   abstraction	  discussed	  above	   the	  arguments,	  narrative	  selectivity	  and	   interpellative	  strategies	  adopted	   in	  both	  kinds	  of	   article	   emerged	   to	  be	   essentially	   the	   same.	  The	   former	  category	  of	  articles	  tended	  to	  be	  longer,	  and	  to	  offer	  a	  greater	  depth	  of	  economic	  analysis	  when	  such	  argumentation	  was	  invoked,	  while	  the	  latter	  was	  shorter	  and	  couched	  in	  more	  prosaic	  and	  sometimes	  hyperbolic	  language.	  Yet	  both	  made	  use	  of	  the	   same	   economic	   and	   normative	   arguments	   to	   discuss	   the	   same	   events	   and	  ‘characters’	   in	   the	  same	  way,	  and	  sought	  to	  directly	  and	   indirectly	   interpellate	  to	  the	   same	   groups	   (‘families’,	   ‘parents’	   etc)	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   social	   differences	   that	  might	   be	   expected	   to	   obtain	   between	   the	   two	   readership	   groups.	   This	   in	   turn	  supports	   the	   notion,	   revisited	   in	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Chapter	   7,	   that	   governments	  draw	  from	  a	  fairly	  limited	  narrative	  repertoire	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  widen	  the	  resonance	  of	  their	  narratives.	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Conclusions	  	  The	  conceptualisations	  and	  methodology	  that	  I	  propose	  in	  this	  chapter	  clarify	  the	  core	   concepts	   of	   my	   thesis	   and	   situate	   them	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   broader	  interpretivist,	   process-­‐tracing	   enterprise	   that	   I	   hold	   the	   constructivist	  institutionalist	   analysis	   of	   British	   political	   economy	   to	   be.	   The	   value	   of	   the	  research	   lies	   in	   enriching	   the	   critical	   social	  democrats’	   analysis	  of	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  situates	  post-­‐2008	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  in	  relation	  to	  crisis	  diagnoses	  and	  the	  problem	  definitions	  they	  contain,	  allowing	  the	  perspective	   to	   better	   interpret	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	  now	   and	   in	   the	   future.	   In	   particular,	   it	   examines	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   neoliberal	  problem	   definitions	   have	   been	   revised	   or	   rejected	   in	   this	   context,	   as	  neoliberalisation	   has	   been	   so	   central	   to	   the	   emergence	   and	   failure	   of	   Britain’s	  growth	  model	   according	   to	   the	   CSDP.	   Secondly,	   it	   locates	   the	   strategies	   of	   crisis	  narration	  that	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  deployed	  within	  this	  context.	  It	  is	  the	  intended	   and	   unintended	   outcomes	   of	   decisive	   intervention	   and	   narrative	  strategies	   that	  will	   in	   turn	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   future	   dynamics,	   failures	   and	   crisis	  episodes	  in	  the	  British	  political	  economy.	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Chapter	  4.	  
New	  Labour	  And	  Neoliberalism	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  2	   I	   showed	   that,	   from	  a	   constructivist	   institutionalist	  perspective,	   the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  problem	  definitions	  of	   economic	   policymaking	   coordinative	   discourses.	   In	   the	   introductory	   chapter	  and	  in	  Chapter	  1	  I	  endorsed	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats’	  view	  that	  the	  AGLM	  was	  the	  unintended	  and	  historically	  contingent	  outcome	  of	  the	  neoliberalisation	  of	  the	  British	   political	   economy,	   and	   suggested	   that	   the	   confidence	   bestowed	   upon	   its	  fragile	  and	  contradictory	  structure	  by	  policymakers	  reflected	  the	  internalisation	  of	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  by	  successive	  governments	  since	  1979.	  The	  claim	  is	  not,	   however,	   without	   controversy,	   as	   a	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   ‘New	  Labour’	   governments	   of	   1997-­‐2007	   quickly	   reveals.	   It	   is	   thus	   necessary	   to	  establish	   whether	   ‘neoliberal’	   constitutes	   an	   appropriate	   characterisation	   of	   the	  problem	  definitions	  underpinning	  the	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance	  and	   restructuring	   overseen	   by	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   before	   proceeding	  any	   further	   in	  my	  enquiry.	  Doing	  so	   facilitates	   the	  comparison	  between	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐2008	   problem	   definitions	   undertaken	   in	   my	   research	   on	   post-­‐2008	   crisis	  diagnoses	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  	  	  My	  task	   in	  the	  present	  chapter	   is	   thus	  to	  substantiate	  the	  claim	  that	  New	  Labour	  exhibited	  a	  neoliberal	  character,	  and	  to	  ascribe	  content	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  that	  I	  attribute	  to	  these	  governments.	  I	  draw	  critically	  upon	  the	  existing	  research	  literature	  on	  the	  ‘New	  Labour’	  governments	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  first	  two	   sections	   I	   explore	   some	   prominent	   characterisations	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	  governments	   and	   identify	   a	   category	   error	   in	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  neoliberalism	  within	   the	   debate,	   rendering	   it	  misconceived.	   I	   argue	   instead	   that	  much	  of	  what	  is	  held	  of	  as	  evidence	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  ‘non-­‐neoliberalism’	  is	  in	  fact	  consistent	   with	   a	   characterisation	   of	   these	   governments	   as	   having	   pursued	  strategies	   of	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation,	   and	   that	   the	   plausible	   enough	   claim	   that	  such	  strategies	  were	  adopted	  in	  pursuit	  of	  ‘socially	  progressive’	  ends	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  evidence	   to	   the	   contrary.	   I	   draw	   attention	   in	   particular	   to	   the	   microeconomic	  policies	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  government,	  which	  I	  argue	  to	  be	  more	  revealing	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  characterisation	  than	  the	  macroeconomic	  and	  welfare	  policies	  that	  are	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often	   the	   central	   terrain	  of	   the	  debate.	  Having	  advanced	   the	  broad	  contours	  of	   a	  neoliberal	  characterisation	  in	  these	  preceding	  sections,	   I	   turn	  in	  the	  third	  section	  to	   describe	   in	   greater	   specificity	   the	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   that	  underpinned	   the	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	   and	   trajectory	   of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  undertaken	  by	  these	  governments.	  	  A	  point	  of	  consensus	  in	  debates	  about	  ‘New	  Labour’	  is	  that	  the	  Labour	  Party	  under	  the	   leadership	   of	   Tony	   Blair	   distanced	   itself,	   at	   least	   presentationally,	   from	   the	  policies	   and	   ideological	   orientations	   that	   it	   held	   earlier	   in	   the	   20th	   century.	   The	  concept	   of	   ‘New	   Labour’	   has	   come	   to	   denote	   this	   self-­‐cultivated	   image	   in	  comparison	  to	  Labour’s	  past.	  Mindful	  of	  the	  ‘New/Old	  Labour’	  binary’s	  inadequacy	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  heuristic	  device,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  here	  only	  as	  shorthand	  to	  denote	  a	  specific	  period	  in	  the	  party’s	  history:	  between	  taking	  government	  in	  1997	  and	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   crises	   of	   2007-­‐08.1	   New	   Labour	   entered	   office	   after	   a	  protracted	  ‘modernisation	  phase’	  beginning	  with	  its	  1983	  general	  election	  defeat.	  Prior	  to	  this	  was	  the	  post-­‐war	  history	  of	  the	  party,	  derogatively	  periodised	  as	  ‘Old	  Labour’	  by	  New	  Labour	  spokespeople.	  The	  term	  ‘Old	  Labour’	  is	  too	  reductive	  to	  be	  of	  use	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  Labour	  Party	  prior	  to	  1983,	   for	   its	  character	  changed	  greatly	   between	   1945	   and	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   post-­‐1983	   modernisation	   phase.	  However	   it	   is	  a	  useful	  heuristic	  device	   for	   the	  present	  analysis.	   It	  denotes	  a	   time	  when	  the	  party	  espoused	  very	  different	  kinds	  of	  policies	  and	  problem	  definitions	  to	   the	   market-­‐affirming	   ones	   favoured	   by	   the	   right	   of	   the	   party	   during	   the	  modernisation	  phase,	  and	  which	  were	  embodied	  in	  the	  New	  Labour	  government’s	  economic	   policies	   after	   1997.	   In	   adopting	   this	   three-­‐part	   periodisation,	   I	   shall	  leave	  the	  ideational	  character	  of	  the	  latter	  Labour	  government	  between	  2008	  and	  2010	  (the	  Brown	  Government)	  to	  the	  subsequent	  research	  chapters.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  and	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  I	  make	  use	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	   ‘macro’	  and	   ‘microeconomic’	   policy	   as	   headings	   under	   which	   to	   structure	   comparisons	  between	  the	  ideational	  character	  of	  the	  coordinative	  discourses	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐2008	   governments.	   Macroeconomic	   policy	   refers	   to	   economic	   policies	   that	   are	  intended	  to	  shape	  macroeconomic	  aggregates	  such	  as	  ‘GDP	  growth’,	  ‘employment’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  the	  binary	  that	  prompts	  this	  qualification,	  see	  S.	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party:	  Continuity	  And	  Change	  In	  The	  Making	  Of	  'New'	  Labour	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan).	  
	   155	  
and	  ‘the	  composition	  of	  aggregate	  demand’.	  Microeconomic	  policy	  refers	  to	  those	  policies	  of	  (non)intervention	  undertaken	  by	  governments	  in	  particular	  parts	  of	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  to	  enhance	  their	  functioning.	  It	  is	  through	  such	  policies	  that	  the	  boundary	   of	   market	   and	   non-­‐market	   resource	   allocation,	   and	   the	   private	   and	  public	   sectors,	   are	   positioned,	   and	   thus	   through	  which	   the	   governance	   of	   either	  sphere	  is	  configured.	  In	  practice	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  modes	  of	  policy	  is	  something	   of	   an	   artifice:	  macroeconomic	   policy	   is	   frequently	   conducted	   through	  microeconomic	  policies	  (for	  example,	  a	  decrease	  in	  VAT	  relative	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  tax	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  aggregate	  demand).	  Yet	  the	  distinction	  is	  useful	  to	  signify	  the	  purposes	  of	  particular	  policies,	  and	  thus	  to	  structure	  the	  present	  analysis.	  	  	  
1.	  
Perspectives	  On	  New	  Labour	  	  Much	   of	   the	   debate	   concerning	   New	   Labour’s	   character	   can	   be	   accommodated	  within	   three	   categories.	   ‘Social	   democratic’	   characterisations	   stress	   continuities	  with	   ‘Old	   Labour’	   and/or	   social	   democracy,	   and	   characterise	   New	   Labour	  primarily	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   party’s	   pre-­‐1983	   past.2	   Neoliberal	   characterisations	  stress	   discontinuities	   with	   Labour’s	   past	   and	   continuities	   with	   the	   previous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party;	  S.	  Meredith	  (2006),	  'Mr	  Crosland's	  Nightmare?	  New	  Labour	  And	  Equality	  In	  Historical	  Perspective',	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  
International	  Relations,	  8	  (2),	  pp.238-­‐55;	  P.	  Diamond	  (2004),	  'Introduction',	  in	  P.	  Diamond	  (ed.),	  New	  Labour's	  Old	  Roots	  (Exeter:	  Imprint	  Academic),	  pp.1-­‐28;	  D.	  Coates	  (2001),	  'Capitalist	  Models	  And	  Social	  Democracy:	  The	  Case	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  
Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  3	  (3),	  pp.284-­‐307;	  M.	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2003),	  'From	  Reformism	  To	  Resignation	  And	  Remedialism?	  Labour's	  Trajectory	  Through	  British	  Politics',	  Journal	  Of	  Policy	  History,	  15	  (1),	  pp.26-­‐45;	  S.	  Driver	  and	  L.	  Martell	  (2006),	  New	  
Labour	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press);	  M.	  Bevir	  (2000),	  'New	  Labour:	  A	  Study	  In	  Ideology',	  The	  
British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  2	  (3),	  pp.277-­‐301;	  M.	  Rhodes	  (2000),	  'Desperately	  Seeking	  A	  Solution:	  Social	  Democracy,	  Thatcherism	  And	  The	  'Third	  Way'	  In	  British	  Welfare',	  West	  European	  Politics,	  23	  (2),	  pp.161-­‐86;	  C.	  Annesley	  and	  A.	  Gamble	  (2004),	  'Economic	  And	  Welfare	  Policy',	  in	  S.	  Ludlam	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (eds.),	  Governing	  As	  
New	  Labour:	  Policy	  And	  Politics	  Under	  Blair	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.144-­‐60;	  M.J.	  Smith	  (2013),	  'Globalisation	  And	  The	  Resilience	  Of	  Social	  Democracy:	  Reassessing	  New	  Labour's	  Political	  Economy',	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  16	  (4),	  pp.597-­‐623.	  The	  work	  of	  Driver	  and	  Martel	  straddles	  this	  and	  the	  third	  category	  because	  the	  authors	  are	  keen	  to	  stress	  the	  novelty	  of	  new	  Labour	  as	  a	  ‘post-­‐Thatcherite’	  project,	  yet	  also	  affirm	  an	  ongoing	  ‘social	  democratic	  instinct’	  and	  set	  of	  values	  derived	  from	  the	  Party’s	  past.	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Conservative	   administrations.3	   Finally,	   there	   are	   those	   who	   suggest	   that	   New	  Labour	  was	  marked	  more	  by	  novelty	  than	  continuity	  with	  either	  of	  these	  possible	  influences.	   This	   final	   group	   of	   accounts	   includes	   those	   that	   cast	   New	   Labour	   as	  having	   sought	   either	   a	   synthesis	   or	   pragmatic	   composite	   of	   neoliberalism,	   social	  democracy	   and	   other	   ideational	   and	   Ideological	   influences	   into	   a	   ’third	  way’.4	   It	  also	   includes	   the	  work	  of	   those	  who	  reject	   the	  usefulness	  of	   the	  debate	  over	   the	  Ideological	  and	  ideational	  character	  and	  origins	  of	  New	  Labour	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	   what	   they	   deem	   to	   be	   genuinely	   novel	   practical	   and	   ideational	   aspects.5	  Important	  as	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  latter	  perspectives	  are,	  the	  animating	  question	  of	  the	   present	   thesis	   –	   the	   influence	   or	   not	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   –	  necessitates	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  older	  debate	  over	  Ideological	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  C.	  Hay	  (1999b),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour:	  Labouring	  Under	  False	  Pretences?	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press);	  R.	  Heffernan	  (2000),	  New	  Labour	  And	  
Thatcherism:	  Political	  Change	  In	  Britain	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave);	  B.	  Jessop	  (2006),	  'The	  Third	  Way:	  Neo-­‐liberalism	  With	  A	  Human	  Face?',	  in	  S.	  Berg	  and	  A.	  Kaiser	  (eds.),	  New	  
Labour	  Und	  Die	  Modernisierung	  Gross	  Britanniens	  (Augsberg:	  Wissener	  Verlag),	  pp.333-­‐66;	  S.	  Hall	  (2003),	  'New	  Labour's	  Double-­‐Shuffle',	  Soundings,	  24	  (1),	  pp.10-­‐24;	  L.	  Panitch	  and	  C.	  Leys	  (2001),	  The	  End	  Of	  Parliamentary	  Socialism:	  From	  New	  Left	  To	  New	  Labour	  (London:	  Verso);	  C.	  Crouch	  (1997),	  'The	  Terms	  Of	  The	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Consensus',	  The	  
Political	  Quarterly,	  68	  (4),	  pp.352-­‐60;	  M.	  Kitson	  and	  F.	  Wilkinson	  (2007),	  'The	  Economics	  Of	  New	  Labour:	  Policy	  And	  Performance',	  Cambridge	  Journal	  Of	  Economics,	  31	  (6),	  pp.805-­‐16.	  4	  Driver	  and	  Martell	  (2006),	  New	  Labour;	  D.	  Richards	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (2004),	  'The	  'Hybrid	  State':	  Labour's	  Response	  To	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Governance',	  in	  S.	  Ludlam	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (eds.),	  Governing	  As	  New	  Labour:	  Policy	  And	  Politics	  Under	  Blair	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.106-­‐25;	  M.J.	  Smith	  (2004),	  'Conclusion:	  Defining	  New	  Labour',	  in	  S.	  Ludlam	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (eds.),	  Governing	  As	  New	  Labour:	  Policy	  And	  Politics	  Under	  Blair	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.211-­‐25;	  Giddens,	  A.	  (2002),	  Where	  Now	  For	  New	  
Labour?	  (London:	  The	  Fabian	  Society);	  S.	  Buckler	  and	  D.P.	  Dolowitz	  (2000),	  'Theorizing	  The	  Third	  Way:	  New	  Labour	  And	  Social	  Justice',	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Ideologies,	  5	  (3),	  pp.301-­‐20;	  R.	  Prabhakar	  (2004),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  The	  Reform	  Of	  Public	  Services',	  in	  S.	  Ludlam	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (eds.),	  Governing	  As	  New	  Labour:	  Policy	  And	  Politics	  Under	  Blair	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.161-­‐76;	  E.	  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	  Labour's	  Soul?	  
New	  Labour	  And	  The	  Blair	  Government	  1997-­2007	  (London:	  Routledge);	  Corry	  2010,	  'Labour	  And	  The	  Economy,	  1997-­‐2010:	  More	  Than	  A	  Faustian	  Pact',	  The	  Political	  
Quarterly,	  81	  (1),	  pp.123-­‐39.	  5	  A.	  Finlayson	  (2009b),	  'Planning	  People:	  The	  Ideology	  And	  Rationality	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  
Planning,	  Practice	  And	  Research,	  24	  (1),	  pp.11-­‐22;	  M.	  Freeden	  (1999),	  'The	  Ideology	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  70	  (1),	  pp.42-­‐51;	  M.	  Bevir	  (2003),	  'Narrating	  The	  British	  State:	  An	  Interpretive	  Critique	  Of	  New	  Labour's	  Institutionalism',	  Review	  Of	  
International	  Political	  Economy,	  10	  (3),	  pp.455-­‐80;	  M.	  Temple	  (2000),	  'New	  Labour's	  Third	  Way:	  Pragmatism	  And	  Governance',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  
Relations,	  2	  (3),	  pp.302-­‐25;	  R.	  Lister	  (2001),	  'New	  Labour:	  A	  Study	  In	  Ambiguity	  From	  A	  Position	  Of	  Ambivalence',	  Critical	  Social	  Policy,	  21	  (4),	  pp.425-­‐47;	  P.	  Burnham	  (2001),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  The	  Politics	  Of	  Depoliticisation',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  
International	  Relations,	  3	  (2),	  pp.127-­‐49.	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My	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  is	  the	  first	  and	  third	  perspectives.	  Importantly,	  both	  seek	  to	  elucidate	  and	  attribute	  an	  Ideology	  to	  these	  governments,	  which	  differs	  from	  my	  own	   objective	   of	   ascertaining	   the	   ideational	   character	   and	   content	   of	   their	  coordinative	  discourses	  on	  economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring:	  in	   the	   former	  enterprise	  normative	   ideas	   are	  more	   central.	  The	   term	   Ideology	   is	  rarely	   defined	   in	   this	   literature,	   but	   it	   is	   apparent	   from	   the	   contributors	   that	   it	  denotes	   for	   them	   a	   system	   of	   core	   normative	   and	   analytical	   ideas	   regarding	   the	  purpose	  of	  government	  that	  conditions	  the	  actions	  of	  leadership.	  My	  argument	  in	  response	   is	   that	   much	   of	   what	   is	   cited	   as	   evidence	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   non-­‐neoliberalism	   in	   this	   debate	   can	   also	   be	   interpreted	   as	   evidence	   of	   strategies	   of	  neoliberalisation	   of	   the	   ‘roll	   out’	   neoliberalisation	   if	   neoliberalism	   is	  conceptualised	   as	   a	   restructuring	   ethos	   rather	   than	   an	   Ideology.	   Roll	   out	  neoliberalisation,	  recall,	  represents	  the	  reaction	  by	  neoliberalising	  governments	  to	  the	  economic	  pathologies	  and	  crisis	   tendencies	  that	  emerge	  from	  initial	  waves	  of	  roll	   back	   neoliberalisation.	   It	   refers	   to	   the	   processes	   and	   policies	   by	   which	  government	  tries	  to	  stabilise	  ongoing	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  in	  various	  domains	  and	   in	   the	  political	   economy	  as	   a	  whole	   through	   the	   construction	  of	  non-­‐market	  and	  quasi-­‐market	  ‘flanking	  mechanisms’,	  thereby	  rendering	  it	  sustainable	  and	  able	  to	  continue.	  Such	  interventions	  remain	  neoliberal	  because	  they	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	   thrust	   of	   neoliberalisation	   as	   a	   restructuring	   ethos	   aiming	   to	   expand	  market	  and	  market-­‐like	  forms	  of	  governance,	  yet	  they	  can	  imply	  a	  greater	  role	  and	  activity	  for	  government	  in	  ensuring	  this	  outcome.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  perspectives	  I	  review,	  I	  argue	   that	   such	   strategies	   do	   not	   preclude	   a	   ‘socially	   progressive’	   intent	   on	   the	  part	  of	  the	  government	  that	  enacts	  them.	  	  
Social	  Democratic	  Characterisations	  	  Those	  who	  characterise	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  same	  social	  democratic	  Ideology	  that	  they	  attribute	  to	  ‘Old	  Labour’	  constitute	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  literature.	  For	  these	  authors,	  New	  Labour,	  and	  the	  modernisation	  process	  that	   it	  emerged	  from,	  reflects	  a	  tradition	  of	  social	  democratic	   ‘revisionism’	   that	   has	   long	   characterised	   the	   Labour	   Party.6	   In	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Meredith	  (2006),	  'Mr	  Crosland's	  Nightmare’;	  Bevir	  (2000),	  'New	  Labour:	  A	  Study’;	  Diamond	  (2004),	  'Introduction';	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party.	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terms	  adopted	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  this	  process	  involves	  the	  re-­‐assessment	  of	  policy	  ideas	  and	   problem	   definitions	   in	   the	   light	   of	   new	   circumstances,	   but	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  essential	   normative	   ideas	   underpinning	   problem	   definitions	   remain	   constant.7	  Advocates	  of	  this	  perspective	  emphasise	  the	  constraints	  placed	  on	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	   by	   a	   domestic	   and	   an	   international	   political	   economic	   context	   that	  had	   changed	   dramatically	   since	   Labour	   had	   last	   held	   governing	   power,	   but	   play	  down	   change	   in	   the	   party’s	   normative	   orientation	   and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   its	   policy	  ideas	   too.	   Instead,	   they	   suggest	   that	   New	   Labour’s	   apparent	   concessions	   to	   the	  post-­‐Thatcherite	   political	   economy,	   its	   adoption	   of	  market-­‐oriented	   policies	   and	  market-­‐liberal	   restructuring,	   and	   its	   use	   of	   pro-­‐business	   and	   anti-­‐class	   rhetoric	  reflected	  unavoidable	  constraints	  and	  strategic	  choices	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maximise	  the	  space	  for	  recognisably	  social	  democratic	  objectives.	   In	  an	  explicit	  articulation	  of	  the	  thesis,	  Fielding	  calls	  the	  strategy	  ‘accommodating	  to	  shape’:	  the	  notion	  that	  by	   accommodating	   demands	   and	   practices	   that	   are	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   social	  democratic	   tradition	   New	   Labour	   was	   accumulating	   time	   in	   which	   to	   shape	  electoral	   opinion	   and	   institutional	   constraints	   in	   a	   way	   that	   favoured	   social	  democratic	  values	  and	  policies	  in	  the	  longer	  term.8	  	  Problematically,	  many	  contributors	  to	  this	  perspective	  define	  social	  democracy	  so	  broadly	   as	   to	   include	   almost	   any	   tendency	   in	   20th	   century	   British	   politics	  regardless	   of	   its	   relationship	   to	   the	   Party	   or	   to	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   labour	  movement.9	   Defining	   social	   democracy	   as	   a	   ‘reformist	   orientation’	   or	   by	   the	  endorsement	   of	   public	   services	   and	   a	  welfare	   state	   does	   not	   distinguish	   it	   from	  other	   distinct	   ideologies	   and	   traditions	   of	   thought.10	   Gamble	   and	   Wright’s	  definition	   –	   a	   desire	   to	   reform	   social	   and	   economic	   institutions	   so	   as	   to	   curb	  perceived	  injustices	  and	  promote	  greater	  equality	  –	  is	  a	  great	  improvement,	  but	  its	  ahistoricity	   renders	   it	   problematically	   permissive:	   its	   terms	   are	   so	   broad	   as	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Meredith	  (2006),	  'Mr	  Crosland's	  Nightmare’.	  8	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party.	  9	  In	  a	  more	  historically	  informed	  account	  than	  some	  of	  the	  others	  reviewed	  here,	  Prezworski	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  lineage	  to	  the	  development	  of	  contemporary	  European	  Social	  Democracy,	  see	  Przeworski	  (1985),	  Capitalism	  And	  Social	  Democracy.	  	  10	  M.	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (1995),	  'Recasting	  Social	  Democracy:	  A	  Note	  On	  Hay	  and	  Smith',	  
Political	  Studies,	  43	  (4),	  pp.698-­‐702;	  Smith	  (2013),	  'Globalisation	  And	  The	  Resilience’;	  Throughout	  the	  20th	  century	  governments	  influenced	  by	  all	  traditions	  of	  political	  thought	  have	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  social	  institutions	  in	  various	  ways,	  whilst	  the	  idea	  of	  public	  services	  is	  one	  to	  which	  the	  liberal	  tradition	  can	  also	  lay	  claim	  (as	  Beveridge	  himself	  would	  remind	  us).	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accommodate	   a	   host	   of	   centre-­‐left	   and,	   indeed,	   some	   moderate	   centre-­‐right	  political-­‐economic	   projects	   that	   lack	   any	   relevant	   historical	   connection	  with	   one	  another.11	   The	   broad	   disposition	   shared	   by	   such	   Ideologies	   to	   ameliorate	   the	  effects	   of	   economic	   and	   societal	   structure	   on	   the	   life-­‐chances	   of	   individuals	   and	  groups	  could	  helpfully	  be	  termed	  ‘progressive’.	  Yet	  a	  movement	  that	  makes	  some	  measurable	   claim	   to	   progressiveness	   need	   not	   be	   classifiably	   social	   democratic,	  nor	  need	  it	  have	  all	  (or	  indeed	  any)	  of	  its	  antecedents	  in	  social	  democratic	  thought.	  	  This	  stretching	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  democracy	  is	  often	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  dubious	   notion	   that	   problem	   definitions	   can	   be	   revised	   without	   concomitant	  revision	  of	  normative	   ideas.	  As	  stressed	   in	  Chapter	  2,	  analytical	   ideas	  bring	  with	  them	  normative	  presuppositions:	  change	  in	  one	  necessitates	  change	  in	  the	  other.12	  Over	   successive	   rounds	   of	   revision,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   both	   the	   analytical	   and	  normative	   content	   of	   problem	   definitions	   inherited	   by	   a	   once	   social	   democratic	  party	   would	   change	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘social	   democracy’	   is	  stretched	  beyond	   its	  useful	   limits.	  This	   is	  especially	   so	   in	  cases	  where	  neoliberal	  problem	   definitions	   have	   been	   incorporated	   into	   a	   broader	   Ideology,	   for	   this	  fundamentally	  changes	  the	  character	  and	  ‘ends’	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  and	  necessitates	  revision	  of	  both	  normative	  and	  analytical	  ideas	  amongst	  which	  it	  is	  situated	  –	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  return	  presently.	  At	  such	  a	  point	  new	  labels	  such	  as	  ‘third	  way’	  become	  necessary	  (at	  least	  as	  heuristic	  devices)	  to	  denote	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   ideational	   content	   of	   an	   Ideology	   has	   transformed	   in	   ways	   that	   render	   it	  categorically	  distinct	  from	  previous	  incarnations.	  	  Leaving	  aside	  the	  issue	  of	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  democracy	  begins	  and	  ends,	  there	   is	   some	   evidence	   that	   suggests	   that	   New	   Labour’s	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   had	   a	   stronger	   relationship	   to	   problem	   definitions	  espoused	  by	  the	  party	  in	  the	  past	  than	  it	  did	  to	  neoliberal	  ones,	  and	  these	  might	  be	  recruited	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   extent	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   revisionism	   has	   been	  exaggerated.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   powerful	   piece	   of	   evidence	   is	   the	   substantial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  A.	  Gamble	  and	  T.	  Wright	  (1999),	  'Introduction:	  The	  New	  Social	  Democracy',	  The	  Political	  
Quarterly,	  70	  (Supplement	  1),	  pp.1-­‐9.	  12	  On	  the	  co-­‐transformative	  relationship	  of	  ‘values’	  (normative	  ideas)	  and	  ‘means’	  (analytical	  ideas)	  in	  Labour	  Party	  revisionism,	  see	  K.	  Hickson	  (2007),	  'Reply	  To	  Stephen	  Meredith,	  'Mr	  Crosland's	  Nightmare?	  New	  Labour	  And	  Equality	  In	  Historical	  Perspective'',	  
The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  9	  (1),	  pp.165-­‐68.	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expansion	  of	  redistribution	  through	  the	  social	  security	  and	  public	  services	  under	  New	   Labour	   from	   2000	   onwards.	   Despite	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   budgetary	   ‘prudence’,	  New	  Labour	  pursued	  ‘good	  by	  stealth’	  and	  ‘taxed	  and	  spent’	  more	  than	  any	  Labour	  government	   of	   the	   past.13	   Social	   security	   spending	   increased	   by	   21.1%	   between	  1997	   and	   2005	   in	   spite	   of	   falling	   unemployment,	   whilst	   funding	   in	   the	   state	  education	  system	  and	  the	  NHS	  increased	  by	  45%	  and	  54%	  respectively.14	  Viewed	  at	   this	   level	  New	  Labour’s	   practices	   in	   government	   appear	   inconsistent	  with	   the	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos.	   Such	   redistribution	   impinges	   upon	   individual	  property	   rights	   and	   market	   relations,	   whilst	   social	   security	   spending,	   public	  service	  expansion	  all	  have	   the	  superficial	   trappings	  of	  de-­commodifying	   and	  non-­‐market	   modes	   of	   resource	   allocation.	   If	   this	   were	   the	   whole	   story	   New	   Labour	  could	  perhaps	  be	  argued	   to	  have	  pursued	  a	   (bounded)	   ‘de-­‐neoliberalisation’.	  Yet	  upon	  examination	  of	   the	  details	  of	  New	  Labour’s	   redistributive	  principle,	   and	   its	  broader	  approach	  to	  public	  service	  reform,	  what	  emerges	  is	  a	  restructuring	  project	  that	   is	   predominantly	   consistent	   with	   an	   overarching	   strategy	   of	   ‘roll	   out	  neoliberalisation’	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  reformulated	  concept	  of	  social	  justice	  that	  is	  subordinate	  to	  the	  imperatives	  of	  that	  strategy.	  	  	  Shaw	   offers	   an	   analysis	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   redistributive	   principle	   and	   the	  conception	   of	   social	   justice	   that	   it	   served	   from	   the	   vantage	   point	   of	   2007,	  comparing	  it	  with	  those	  espoused	  by	  different	  traditions	  within	  the	  party	  prior	  to	  modernisation.15	   This	   principle	   was	   premised	   on	   the	   promotion	   of	   a	   ‘thin’	  meritocracy	   in	   which	   the	   social	   democratic	   concept	   of	   social	   justice	   (re-­‐termed	  ‘fairness’)	   was	   redefined	   as	   equal	   access	   to	   initial	   labour	   market	   positions	   for	  those	  able	  to	  work	  (‘equality	  of	  opportunity’)	  as	  well	  as	  support	  for	  those	  unable	  to.16	  This	  conception	  differed	  markedly	  from	  that	  espoused	  by	  the	  Party	  in	  earlier	  decades,	  which	  was	  articulated	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  market	  income	  distributions	  under	  capitalism	  and	  as	  an	  imperative	  to	  remedy	  initial	  distributions	  through	  democratic	  non-­‐market	   mechanisms,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   pursue	   a	   more	   meritocratic	   social	   pre-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  R.	  Lister	  (2002),	  'Doing	  Good	  By	  Stealth:	  The	  Politics	  Of	  Poverty	  And	  Inequality	  Under	  New	  Labour',	  New	  Economy,	  8	  (2),	  pp.65-­‐70;	  Driver	  and	  Martell	  (2006),	  New	  Labour;	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party;	  Smith	  (2013),	  'Globalisation	  And	  The	  Resilience’.	  14	  M.	  Mullard	  and	  R.	  Swaray	  (2008),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  Public	  Expenditure',	  in	  M.	  Beech	  and	  S.	  Lee	  (eds.),	  Ten	  Years	  Of	  New	  Labour	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.35-­‐49.	  15	  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	  Labour's	  Soul?	  16	  Ibid.	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stratification.17	  For	  New	  Labour,	  social	  justice	  demanded	  that	  the	  negative	  (but	  not	  positive)	   impact	   of	   initial	   socio-­‐economic	   location	   upon	   a	   person’s	   earning	  potential	  be	  mitigated,	  and	  this	  was	  to	  be	  achieved	  through	  a	  range	  of	  policies	  that	  aimed	   at	   increasing	   the	   ‘inclusion’	   of	   various	   marginalised	   social	   groups	   in	   the	  labour	  market.	   ‘Exclusion’	  was	  cast	  as	  a	  structural	   socio-­‐economic	  problem,	  with	  poverty	  and	  inequalities	  of	  opportunity	  (that	  is,	  social	  injustice)	  reproduced	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next.	  	  Rather	  than	  de-­‐commodifying	  the	  members	  of	  its	  working	  class	  constituency,	  New	  Labour	  explicitly	  sought	  to	  make	  them	  active	  and	  prosperous	  stakeholders	  in	  their	  own	   commodification.	   The	   role	   of	   government	   and	   state	   institutions	   in	   this	  formula	   was	   to	   ensure	   that	   opportunities	   for	   human	   capital	   improvement	   were	  available	  for	  those	  willing	  to	  take	  them,	  and	  to	  incentivise	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  was	  to	  this	  end	  that	  an	  extensive	  infrastructure	  of	  targeted	  social	  intervention	  in	  deprived	  neighbourhoods,	   adult	   training	   and	   a	   growing	   degree	   of	   conditionality	   and	  scrutiny	  in	  relation	  to	  working-­‐age	  benefits	  was	  deployed.	  Only	  for	  those	  incapable	  of	  work	  would	  unconditional	  support	  be	  available.18	  Indeed,	  New	  Labour’s	  rhetoric	  of	   ‘rights	   and	   responsibilities’	   and	   development	   of	   a	   ‘welfare	   to	  work’	   approach	  placed	  a	  duty	   to	   labour	  market	  participation	  upon	  all	  working	  class	  people.	  This	  was,	  of	  course,	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  opportunities	  for	  socio-­‐economic	  advancement	  through	  labour-­‐market	  participation	  were	  available	  to	  all	  who	  were	  physically	   capable	   of	   working	   and	   willing	   to	   invest	   sufficient	   time	   and	   effort	   in	  improving	  their	  human	  capital	  through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  skills	  –	  or,	  put	  differently,	  that	   the	   opportunity	   to	   compete	   in	   labour	   markets	   is	   indeed	   synonymous	   with	  social	  justice.19	  	  	  Inequalities	   of	   outcome	   arising	   from	   labour	  markets	   that	  were	   ‘inclusive’	   in	   this	  way	  were	   viewed	   as	   just.	   This	   is	   perhaps	   reflected	   in	   Labour’s	   unwillingness	   to	  extend	  the	  redistributive	  principle	   to	  high	  earners	  and	  the	  wealthy.20	   Income	  tax	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid;	  although	  Shaw	  notes	  that	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  equality	  and	  its	  purpose	  within	  a	  Labourite	  political	  economy	  was	  a	  battleground	  between	  competing	  factions	  within	  the	  party	  and	  that	  consensus	  was	  far	  from	  present	  within	  the	  leadership	  throughout	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Lister	  (2001),	  'New	  Labour:	  A	  Study	  In	  Ambiguity’.	  20	  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	  Labour's	  Soul?	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remained	   at	   the	   historic	   low	   of	   40%.	   21	   Instead,	   New	   Labour	   redistributed	   from	  middle-­‐income	  earners	  to	  lower	  income	  earners,	  utilizing	  higher	  rates	  of	  national	  insurance,	  ‘regressive’	  techniques	  such	  as	  fiscal	  drag	  (where	  tax	  bands	  are	  not	  up-­‐rated	   with	   inflation)	   and	   a	   range	   of	   consumption	   taxes.22	   Yet	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  infrastructure	  of	  targeted	  support,	  public	  services	  and	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  implicated	  in	  the	  new	  redistributive	  agenda	  combined	  to	  increase	  the	  percentage	  increase	  in	  real	  ‘final	  income’	  (post-­‐tax	  income	  incorporating	  transfer	  payments	  and	  the	  value	  of	   public	   services)	   gained	   by	   the	   lower	   deciles	   of	   the	   income	   distribution	   above	  that	  of	  the	  top	  between	  1996-­‐97	  and	  2006-­‐07,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  stagnation	  in	  the	  real	  median	  wage	  growth	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1.23	  The	  pursuit	  of	  labour	  market	  inclusivity	  and	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   in	   New	   Labour’s	   approach	   to	   social	   justice	  consequently	  implied	  material	  gains	  for	  lower	  income	  earners	  with	  families.	  	  The	  re-­‐conceptualisation	  of	  social	  justice	  as	  inclusion	  and	  self-­‐advancement	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  as	  well	  
as	   one	   that	   responds	   to	  perceived	   societal	   injustices.	  This	   is	  because	   it	   explicitly	  responds	  to	  the	  politically	  unpalatable	  and	  economically	  sub-­‐optimal	  outcomes	  of	  earlier	   strategies	   of	   ‘roll	   back	   neoliberalisation’,	   but	   does	   so	   in	   a	   way	   that	  preserves	   and	   builds	   on	   the	   advances	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   that	   those	  previous	  strategies	  represent.	  Specifically,	   it	  responds	  both	  to	  the	  costs	  of	   labour	  market	   liberalisation	   and	   de-­‐industrialisation	   for	   the	   poor	   and	   precariously	  employed,	   and	   also	   to	   a	   perceived	   ‘market	   failure’	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   human	  capital.24	   Both	  were	   integrated	   into	   a	   single	   problem	   definition	   that	   proposed	   a	  market-­‐conforming	   framing	   and	   resolution	   of	   the	   ‘progressive’s	   dilemma’	   of	   the	  competing	   demands	   of	   economic	   efficiency	   and	   social	   justice.25	   Labour	   market	  flexibility	   was	   deemed	   of	   importance	   to	   ensuring	   competitiveness,	   yet	   it	   was	  recognised	   that	   employers	   tend	   to	   under-­‐invest	   in	   ‘human	   capital’	   and	   this	  was	  deemed	   a	   barrier	   not	   simply	   to	   labour-­‐market	   participation	   and	   re-­‐employment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Driver	  and	  Martell	  (2006),	  New	  Labour.	  22	  P.	  Gregg	  (2010),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  inequality',	  The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  81	  (s1),	  p.16-­‐30.	  	  23	  T.	  Sefton,	  J.	  Hills,	  and	  H.	  Sutherland	  (2009),	  'Poverty,	  Inequality	  And	  Redistribution',	  in	  J.	  Hills,	  T.	  Sefton,	  and	  K.	  Stewart	  (eds.),	  Towards	  A	  More	  Equal	  Society?	  Poverty,	  Inequality	  
And	  Policy	  Since	  1997	  (Bristol:	  The	  Policy	  Press),	  Fig.	  2.8.	  24	  C.	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness	  And	  The	  Business	  Cycle	  In	  'Third	  Way'	  Political	  Economy:	  A	  Critical	  Evaluation	  Of	  Economic	  Policy	  In	  Britain	  Since	  1997',	  New	  
Political	  Economy,	  9	  (1),	  pp.39-­‐56.	  25	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?’,	  but	  we	  shall	  see	  they	  dispute	  the	  applicability	  of	  ‘neoliberalism’.	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prospects	  (and	  therefore	  social	  justice),	  but	  to	  economic	  performance	  as	  well.26	  By	  making	   citizens	   stakeholders	   in	   their	   own	   commodification	   and	   by	   providing	  opportunities	   and	   incentives	   to	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   own	  human	   capital,	  New	  Labour	  was	  seeking	  to	  reconcile	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  demands	  of	  ongoing	  neoliberalisation	  for	  labour	  market	  flexibility	  and	  supply	  of	  appropriately	  re-­‐skilled	  workers	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  its	  progressive	  ambitions	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  citizens	  and	  social	  justice	  on	  the	  other.	  27	  	  New	  Labour’s	  preference	  for	  flexible	  labour	  markets	  is	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  governments	  either	  reinforced	  or	  extended	  the	  institutional	  outcomes	  of	  previous	   processes	   of	   roll	   back	   neoliberalisation.	   Some	   of	   these,	   namely	   New	  Labour’s	   orientation	   to	   industrial	   relations	   and	   its	   ‘modernisation’	   of	   public	  services,	   have	   been	   held	   by	   exponents	   of	   social	   democratic	   characterisations	   to	  indicate	  the	  very	  opposite.28	  Regarding	  the	  first	  of	  these,	  New	  Labour’s	  preference	  was	   for	   an	   individualised	   model	   of	   industrial	   relations	   in	   which	   workers	   were	  protected	  from	  exploitation	  by	  unscrupulous	  employers	  by	  statutory	  rights	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  collective	  exercise	  of	  economic	  power.29	  These	  rights,	  however,	  were	   carefully	   framed	   to	   be	   compatible	   with	   a	   flexible	   labour	   market	   and	   a	  macroeconomic	   policy	   architecture	   oriented	   to	   the	   control	   of	   product	   price	  inflation.30	   The	   prioritisation	   of	   these	   aspects	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   impose	  the	   costs	   of	   labour	   market	   adjustment	   and	   macroeconomic	   management	   on	  employees	  in	  terms	  of	  job	  security	  and	  incomes.	  The	  principal	  gains	  for	  individual	  workers	  under	  New	  Labour	  were	  a	  minimum	  wage	  that	  was	  set	  in	  support	  of	  the	  control	  of	  product	  price	   inflation,	  enhanced	  maternity	  and	  paternity	   leave	  rights,	  and	  a	  reduction	  (now	  reversed)	  in	  the	  time	  before	  an	  employee	  could	  claim	  against	  an	   employer	   for	   unfair	   dismissal.	   Insofar	   as	   these	   reflect	   a	   departure	   from	   the	  norms	   of	   ‘roll	   back	   neoliberalisation’	   by	   imposing	   new	   constraints	   on	   the	  operational	   liberty	   of	   firms,	   they	   do	   not	   do	   so	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   existing	  realisation	   of	   neoliberal	   restructuring.	   Indeed,	   they	   serve	   to	   entrench	   it	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’;	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?’.	  27	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?’.	  	  28	  Corry	  (2010),	  'Labour	  And	  The	  Economy’;	  Smith	  (2013),	  'Globalisation	  And	  The	  Resilience’.	  29	  C.	  Howell	  (2004),	  'Is	  There	  A	  Third	  Way	  For	  Industrial	  Relations?',	  British	  Journal	  Of	  
Industrial	  Relations,	  42	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐22.	  30	  Howell	  (2004),	  'Is	  There	  A	  Third	  Way’.	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regulating	   the	   potential	   for	   politically	   unpalatable	   outcomes	   (such	   as	   extremely	  low	  wages	   for	   vulnerable	   parts	   of	   the	  workforce)	   and	   so	   represent	   strategies	   of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  alongside	  their	  progressive	  intent.	  	  In	   relation	   to	   public	   services,	   New	   Labour	   embraced	   (after	   some	   initial	  equivocation)	   the	   further	   ‘marketisation’	   of	   public	   sector	   monopolies	   and	   the	  involvement	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   in	   their	   finance,	   delivery	   and	   operation.	   A	  totemic	   example	   of	   this	   changed	   orientation	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Private	   Finance	  Initiative’,	   an	   instrument	   inherited	   from	   the	   previous	   Conservative	  administrations	  through	  which	  private	  sector	  consortiums	  invest	   in	  public	  sector	  capital	  projects	  (and	  in	  many	  cases	  also	  operate	  and	  deliver	  the	  ancillary	  services	  related	   to	   them)	   in	   return	   for	   a	   fixed	   term	   of	   re-­‐payments.	   Yet	   its	   political-­‐economic	   implications	   are	   relatively	   minor	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   approach	   to	  	  ‘modernisation’	  deployed	  within	  established	  public	  service	  monopolies	   like	  those	  that	  comprise	  the	  NHS.31	  In	  order	  to	  promote	  improvements	  in	  productivity	  New	  Labour	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  the	  quasi-­‐market	  agenda	  bequeathed	  to	  it	  by	  the	  previous	  government,	  introducing	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  internal	  competition	  between	  hospitals	   for	  patients	  and	  funds,	  empowering	  patients	  to	  make	  a	  much	  expanded	  range	   of	   choices	   regarding	   their	   treatment	   and	   the	   places	   it	   was	   to	   be	  administered,	   and	   allowing	   private	   health	   providers	   to	   compete	   with	   NHS	  hospitals	   and	   secondary	   health	   services.	   A	   greater	   degree	   of	   financial	   and	  administrative	   autonomy	   was	   also	   devolved	   to	   ‘foundation	   trust	   hospitals’,	   and	  these	  institutions	  were	  in	  turn	  allowed	  to	  raise	  their	  own	  funds	  and	  compete,	  to	  a	  proscribed	  extent,	  in	  private	  healthcare	  markets.	  	  	  The	  result	  has	  been	  a	  model	  of	  the	  ‘welfare	  state’	  in	  which	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	   public	   and	   private	   sectors,	   and	   between	   market	   and	   non-­‐market	   forms	   of	  governance,	  have	  been	  blurred.	  	  This	  marks	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  view	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  as	   the	   neutral	   arbiter	   of	   collective	   public	   interest	   often	   attributed	   to	   social	  democrats	  of	  the	  past.32	  For	  New	  Labour,	  it	  was	  subject	  to	  the	  inefficiencies,	  rent-­‐seeking	   and	   stagnationary	   tendencies	   attributed	   to	   it	   by	   neoliberal	   critics	   and	   it	  was	   these	   that	   constituted	   the	   principal	   barrier	   to	   the	   improvement	   of	   public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	  Labour's	  Soul?	  32	  Ibid.	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services.33	   The	   introduction	   of	   market	   and	   quasi-­‐market	   forms	   within	   and	  between	   public	   service	   providers	  was	   argued	   to	   create	   an	   incentive	   to	   innovate	  and	  improve	  that	  was	  otherwise	  lacking.	  	  	  Yet	   somewhat	   paradoxically,	   there	   was	   a	   strong	   role	   for	   central	   government	   in	  New	  Labour’s	  welfare	  state	  as	  the	  location	  through	  which	  collective	  interest	  would	  be	   defined	   and	   defended.	   It	   would,	   after	   all,	   require	   the	   firm	   conviction	   of	   a	  ‘modernizing’	   government	   to	   take	   on	   the	   entrenched	   interests	   to	   whom	   New	  Labour	  attributed	  the	  inadequate	  performance	  of	  public	  services	  and	  ensure	  high	  standards.	   Smith	   and	   Richards	   correctly	   characterise	   the	   outcome	   as	   a	   ‘hybrid	  state’,	   in	   which	   New	   Labour	   stopped	   short	   of	   internalizing	   the	   full-­‐blown	  neoliberal	  critique	  of	  collectivist	  provision	  because	  of	  their	  willingness	  to	  maintain	  elements	  of	   both	   central	   control	   and	  newer	   ‘partnership’	   approaches	   to	  delivery	  that	   include	   a	   range	   of	   nonprofit-­‐driven	   voluntary	   sector	   providers	   as	   well.34	  Whether	  a	  genuinely	  coherent	  and	  novel	  form	  of	  welfare	  state	  has	  or	  can	  emerge	  from	  the	  trajectory	  of	  reform	  New	  Labour	  put	   in	  motion,	  or	  whether	   it	   reflects	  a	  moment	  in	  the	  progress	  towards	  further	  privatisation	  of	  public	  services,	  remains	  a	  live	  debate	  among	  the	  various	  perspectives	  examined	  here.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  characterisation,	  the	  precise	  form	  that	  reform	  of	  public	  services	  has	  taken	  under	  New	  Labour	   reflects	   the	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   ‘sediment’	  with	  which	   the	   neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos	   necessarily	   co-­‐habits	   and	   which	  constrains	  and	  conditions	  its	  contextual	  expression.	  Neoliberal	  problem	  definition	  and	  strategies	  of	  neoliberalisation	  played	  a	  part	  in	  this	  process	  where	  market	  and	  market-­‐like	  forms	  of	  governance	  have	  been	  deemed	  appropriate	  means	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  perceived	  failings	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  welfare	  state.	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  Ibid;	  Diamond	  (2004),	  'Introduction';	  Richards	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (2004),	  'The	  'Hybrid	  State';	  Prabhakar	  (2004),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  The	  Reform’.	  34	  Richards	  and	  M.J.	  Smith	  (2004),	  'The	  'Hybrid	  State';	  Prabhakar	  (2004),	  'New	  Labour	  And	  The	  Reform’.	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Critical	  Continuity	  Perspectives	  	  A	  second	  perspective	  emphasizing	  the	  links	  between	  ‘Old’	  and	  New	  Labour	  might	  be	   termed	   a	   ‘critical	   continuity	   perspective’.35	   These	   authors	   argue	   that	   ‘Old	  Labour’	  in	  government	  rarely	  lived	  up	  to	  it	  social	  democratic	  rhetoric,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  actually	   this	   failure	   to	   achieve	   social	   democracy	   that	   constitutes	   the	   relevant	  continuity	  between	  ‘Old’	  and	  New	  Labour.36	  The	  view	  is	  often	  premised	  on	  one	  or	  other	  variant	  of	  the	  ‘structural	  dependence’	  thesis	  which	  casts	  social	  democracy	  as	  a	   difficult	   and	   likely	   impossible	   project	   to	   bring	   to	   fruition	   in	   the	  medium	   term	  because	  of	   the	  competing	  requirements	   to	  maintain	   investment	  and	  stability	   in	  a	  capitalist	   economy	   and	   the	   interventions	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   social	   justice	  (understood	   both	   as	   ‘fairness’	   and	   protection	   from	   an	   excessive	   burden	   of	  commodification):	   it	   is	  argued	   that	  one	  eventually	  pursues	  one	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  the	   other.37	   Coates	   argues	   that	   the	   electoral	   costs	   associated	   with	   economic	  performance	  failure	  combined	  with	  the	  need	  to	  sustain	  an	  electoral	  coalition	  wider	  than	  a	  working	  class	  base	  consistently	  conspire	  to	  push	  Labour	  governments	  away	  from	   the	   pursuit	   of	   social	   justice	   and	   into	   deflationary	   and	   commodifying	  economic	   strategies	   aimed	   at	   securing	   economic	   stability	   and	   growth.38	   He	  concludes	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   Old	   and	   New	   Labour	   is	   not	   one’s	  commitment	  to	  social	  democracy	  and	  one’s	  departure	  from	  it,	  but	  rather	  that	  New	  Labour	   recognised	   the	   impossibility	   of	   more	   expansive	   social	   democratic	  ambitions	  prior	  to	  election	  and	  scaled	  its	  objectives	  accordingly.	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  is	  somewhat	   more	   forgiving	   in	   his	   assessment	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   progressive	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  This	  categorisation	  is	  inspired	  by	  Legget’s	  categorisation	  of	  social	  democratic	  analyses	  of	  New	  Labour.	  See	  W.	  Leggett	  (2007),	  'British	  Social	  Democracy	  Beyond	  New	  Labour:	  Entrenching	  A	  Progressive	  Consensus',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  
Relations,	  9	  (3),	  pp.346-­‐64.	  36	  Coates	  (2001),	  'Capitalist	  Models	  And	  Social	  Democracy’;	  M.	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2003),	  'From	  Reformism	  To	  Resignation’;	  M.	  Rhodes	  (2000),	  'Desperately	  Seeking	  A	  Solution’.	  37	  Przeworski	  (1985),	  Capitalism	  And	  Social	  Democracy;	  for	  a	  critical	  reformulation	  see	  M.	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2002),	  'British	  Labour,	  European	  Social	  Democracy	  And	  The	  Reformist	  Trajectory:	  A	  Reply	  To	  Coates',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  4	  (3),	  pp.465-­‐78.	  38	  Coates	  (2001),	  'Capitalist	  Models	  And	  Social	  Democracy’.	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credentials	  and	  appeals	  to	  a	   less	  constrictive	  analysis	  of	  structural	  dependence.39	  Yet	   like	  Coates	  he	   sees	  New	  Labour’s	   approach	   to	   economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   as	   substantially	   conditioned	   by	   the	   requirements	   and	  preferences	  of	  local	  and	  international	  capital.40	  	  There	   is	   truth	   in	  the	  observation	  of	  a	  recurring	  tension	  between	  professed	  social	  democratic	  aspirations	  and	  economic	  realities	  in	  Britain.	  However,	  these	  authors’	  accounts	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  constraints	  on	  government	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  rest	  more	  on	  theoretically	   informed	   supposition	   than	   empirical	   evidence.	   It	   is	   the	   ideas	   and	  preferences	   of	   ‘capital’	   that	   are	   significant	   in	   determining	   political-­‐economic	  outcomes	  for	  these	  authors,	  yet	  little	  evidence	  is	  offered	  of	  a	  collective	  preference	  for	  New	  Labour’s	   turn	  to	  more	  orthodox	  forms	  of	  economic	  policy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  any	   fraction	  of	   capital.	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   demonstrably	   the	   case	   that	   the	  Labour	  Party	  publicly	  entertained	  far	  less	  orthodox	  approaches	  to	  economic	  policy	  only	  a	  short	   time	   before	   entering	   government.41	   That	   these	   ideas	   were	   not	   brought	   to	  fruition	  makes	  it	  a	  speculative	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  capital	  would	  have	  accepted	  them	   or	   not.	   Yet	   there	   is	   an	   important	   implication	   in	   this	   point	   for	   the	   present	  argument:	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   evidence	   to	   the	   contrary	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   it	  was	  New	  Labour’s	  perceptions	  of	  what	  would	   and	  would	  not	  prove	   economically	   effective	  (and	  perhaps	  what	  capital	  would	  and	  would	  not	  tolerate)	  that	  shaped	  its	  choice	  of	  economic	   strategy	   and	   placed	   constraints	   on	   its	   progressive	   ambitions,	   not	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2002),	  'British	  Labour,	  European	  Social	  Democracy’;	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2003),	  'From	  Reformism	  To	  Resignation’;	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  argues	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  space	  can	  be	  generated	  for	  social	  democratic	  aspirations,	  noting	  of	  new	  Labour’s	  time	  in	  office	  that	  while	  there	  is	  much	  evidence	  of	  ‘resignation	  and	  remedialism’	  (the	  idea	  that	  formerly	  social	  democratic	  parties	  confine	  their	  ambitions	  in	  government	  to	  curbing	  the	  worst	  social	  impacts	  capitalist	  economy)	  there	  is	  also	  a	  degree	  of	  successful	  but	  limited	  redistribution.	  From	  this	  he	  suggests	  that	  not	  all	  progressive	  aspiration	  need	  be	  abandoned	  in	  the	  face	  of	  structural	  dependence,	  although	  the	  lingering	  doubts	  of	  both	  market	  actors	  and	  the	  electorate	  make	  the	  kind	  of	  historical	  iconoclasm	  that	  characterise	  New	  Labour’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Party’s	  past	  all	  the	  more	  important	  so	  as	  to	  generate	  credibility	  with	  both.	  Both	  authors,	  however,	  share	  the	  view	  that	  capital	  mobility	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  electorate	  served	  to	  severely	  constrain	  any	  social	  democratic	  aspiration	  that	  Labour	  might	  have	  held,	  perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  had	  been	  the	  case	  for	  ‘Old	  Labour’.	  40	  Ibid.	  41	  Hay	  (1999b),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour;	  See	  for	  instance	  Labour	  Party	  (1994),	  Winning	  For	  Britain:	  Labour's	  Strategy	  For	  Industrial	  Success	  (London:	  Labour	  Party).	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clearly	  articulated	  demand	  of	  capitalists.42	  Neoliberal	  coordinative	  discourses	  and	  problem	  definitions	  are	  thus	  likely	  to	  be	  implicated	  in	  the	  outcome.	  	  
	  
Synthetic	  Interpretations	  	  Beyond	   those	   accounts	   that	   characterise	   New	   Labour	   largely	   in	   terms	   of	   its	  relationship	   to	   Old	   Labour	   are	   those	   that	   characterise	   it	   in	   novel	   terms.	   Such	  accounts	   are	  more	   attuned	   to	  New	  Labour’s	   self-­‐characterisation	   as	   practicing	   a	  ‘third	   way’.	   They	   examine	   the	   ways	   that	   New	   Labour	   synthesised	   previously	  opposing	   normative	   and	   analytical	   ideas	   into	   new	   problem	   definitions.	   Such	  accounts	   thus	   entertain	   the	   possible	   influence	   of	   ideas	   and	   problem	   definitions	  that	  were	  previously	  alien	  to	  the	  Labour	  party.	  For	  the	  present	  account	  this	  raises	  the	  possibility	  that	  New	  Labour	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  fusion	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos	  alongside	   socially	  progressive	  normative	   ideas	   in	   the	  kind	  of	  parasitic	   relationship	   alluded	   to	   in	   the	   introduction:	   that	   it	   sought	   to	   fuse	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   with	   the	   pursuit	   of	   a	   (reformulated)	   concept	   of	   social	  justice.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  first	  subsection,	  the	  position	  is	  principally	  divided	  between	  those	  accounts	   which	   suggest	   New	   Labour	   to	   have	   formulated	   a	   coherent	   ‘third	   way’	  through	  a	  synthesis	  of	  market-­‐liberal	  and	  social	  democratic	  ideas,	  and	  those	  which	  suggest	   New	   Labour	   was	   characterised	   by	   ideational	   eclecticism,	   a	   pragmatic	  problem-­‐solving	  orientation,	  and	  possibly	  an	  incoherence	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  classify	   in	   existing	   ideal-­‐types.	  Whether	   or	   not	   the	   ‘progressive’	   element	   of	  New	  Labour’s	   ideology	   is	   coherent	   and	   readily	   classifiable	   is	  not	  my	  primary	   concern	  here.	   However,	   I	   maintain	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   were	   a	   consistent	  influence	   on	   New	   Labour’s	   approach	   to	   economic	   policy	   and	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring,	  and	  that	  they	  gave	  the	  project	  an	  element	  of	  coherency	  (at	   least	   in	  its	   own	   terms).	   Others,	   notably	   Buckler	   and	   Dolowitz,	   make	   a	   very	   similar	  argument	  but	  maintain	  the	  inapplicability	  of	  the	  term	  ‘neoliberal’.43	  It	  is	  thus	  these	  authors	   with	   whom	   I	   engage	   in	   this	   and	   the	   following	   section,	   for	   it	   is	   my	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  has	  incorporated	  this	  point	  into	  his	  own	  account.	  See	  Wickham-­‐Jones	  (2002),	  'British	  Labour,	  European	  Social	  Democracy’.	  43	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?	  
	   169	  
contention	  that	  if	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  restructuring	  ethos	  rather	  than	  an	  Ideology	  the	   importance	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   in	   shaping	   New	   Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance	  becomes	  apparent.	  	  Regarding	  the	  normative	  ideas	  underpinning	  the	  New	  Labour	  project	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	   identify	   commonalities	   with	   ‘social	   liberalism’.44	   The	   term	   denotes	   a	  broad	   tradition	   of	   progressive	   political	   philosophies	   that	   have	   their	   lineage	   in	  classical	  liberalism,	  but	  which	  conceptualise	  social	  justice	  in	  market-­‐critical	  terms.	  Citing	  Rawls	   as	   an	   exemplar	   of	   this	   philosophy	   and	   a	  possible	   influence	  on	  New	  Labour,	   the	   two	   authors	   suggest	   that	   New	   Labour’s	   procedural	   re-­‐conceptualisation	  of	   social	   justice	  as	   the	  outcome	  of	  a	   ‘fair’	   and	   inclusive	  market	  economy	  reflects	  the	  social	  liberal	  belief	  in	  the	  equal	  worth	  of	  individuals	  and	  the	  moral	  imperative	  that	  social	  arrangements	  should	  benefit	  the	  least	  well-­‐off	  in	  the	  long	   term.	   In	   this	   perspective	   the	   liberal	   emphasis	   on	   the	   individual	   and	   on	  property	  rights	  is	  rendered	  consistent	  with	  social	  policy	  arrangements	  that	  entail	  a	  degree	  of	  redistribution	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  economic	  opportunity	  for	  those	  who	  would	   otherwise	   be	   disadvantaged.	   It	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	   the	   provision	   of	  income	   to	   those	   incapable	  of	  working.	  To	   fail	   to	   embrace	   these	  meritocratic	   and	  compassionate	   objectives	   would,	   from	   this	   perspective,	   be	   to	   dismiss	   the	   equal	  worth	  of	  individuals.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  capitalism	  and	  the	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  unjust	  or	  contributing	  to	  injustice	  so	  long	  as	  these	  initial	  preconditions	  of	  procedural	  justice	  obtain.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  denial	  of	  access	  to	  market	  positions	  for	  individuals	  to	  realise	  their	  potential	  that	  can	  render	  capitalism	  procedurally	  unjust	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  	  	  For	   Buckler	   and	  Dolowitz,	   it	   is	   partly	   the	   influence	   of	   social	   liberalism	   that	   sets	  New	   Labour	   apart	   from	   neoliberalism	   as	   they	   understand	   it.	   The	   imposition	   of	  ‘rights’	   and	   ‘duties’	   above	   those	   implied	   in	  market	   exchange,	   and	   the	  potentially	  quite	   expansive	   role	   for	   government	   in	   ensuring	   this	   moral	   order,	   is	   deemed	  antithetical	  to	  neoliberalism.	  However,	  this	  supposed	  mutual	  exclusivity	  is	  suspect.	  Understood	   as	   a	   restructuring	   ethos,	   neoliberalism	   certainly	   has	   recurrent	  normative	   themes	   of	   its	   own,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   constitute	   a	   complete	   moral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2000),	  'Theorizing	  The	  Third	  Way’;	  A.	  Vincent	  (1998),	  'New	  Ideologies	  For	  Old?',	  The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  69	  (1),	  pp.48-­‐58.	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approach	   in	   the	  way	   that	   Rawlsian	   social	   liberalism	  does.	   These	   themes	   include	  the	  strong	  anti-­‐collectivist	  emphasis	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  individual	  effort,	  of	  mercantile	   liberty,	  and	  of	  the	  individual’s	  right	  of	  disposal	   in	  relation	  to	  earned	  income	  and	  property.	  To	  an	  extent	  these	  do	  stand	  in	  tension	  with	  a	  social	  liberal	  emphasis	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  social	  whole	  to	  guarantee	  procedures	  that	   benefit	   the	   least	  well	   off	   in	   the	   longterm.	  However,	   a	   degree	   of	   tension	   has	  historically	   been	   a	   trait	   of	   ‘actually	   existing’	   neoliberalisms.	   New	   Labour’s	  approach	   is	   no	   less	   coherent	   than	   the	   marriage	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   restructuring	  ethos	   (and	   the	   transformative	   dynamism	   that	   the	   neoliberal	   dissembedding	   of	  markets	  implies)	  with	  socially	  and	  institutionally	  conservative	  themes	  comprising	  Thatcherism.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   arguably	  more	   coherent:	   the	   circle	   is	   squared	   through	  the	  idea	  of	  meritocracy,	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  procedural	  injustice	  under	  a	  capitalism	  that	  fails	  to	  produce	  meritocratic	  outcomes	  is	  also	  a	  ‘market	  failure’	  that	  will	  harm	  economic	  performance,	   thereby	  reconciling	  neoliberal	  practices	  with	  progressive	  norms.45	  The	   imprint	  of	   social	   liberalism	   is	  not,	   then,	   evidence	  of	   the	   absence	  of	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions,	  but	  a	  means	  of	   accommodating	  a	  notion	  of	   social	  justice	  alongside	  a	  neoliberal	  trajectory	  of	  capitalist	  restructuring.	  	  	  Turning	  to	  economic	  policies,	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  see	  New	  Labour	  as	  attempting	  to	  address	  anew	  the	  social	  democrat’s	  dilemma	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  subsection.	  They	  argue	  that	  New	  Labour	  had	  internalised	  the	  Thatcherite	  critique	  of	  post-­‐war	  economic	  policy	  and	  accepted	   the	  post-­‐Thatcherite	  political-­‐economic	  settlement	  through	   which	   the	   burden	   of	   economic	   stability	   would	   fall	   on	   wage	   earners	  through	   counter-­‐inflationary	   central	   bank	   and	   liberal	   labour	   market	   policies.46	  Consequently,	   Keynesianism	   and	   nationalisation	   were	   ruled	   out	   as	   a	   means	   of	  promoting	   economic	   efficiency	   whilst	   redistribution	   was	   constrained	   by	   the	  perceived	   need	   to	   maintain	   capital	   and	   high-­‐earner	   friendly	   rates	   of	   taxation.	  Instead,	   Buckler	   and	   Dolowitz	   argue	   that	   New	   Labour	   turned	   to	   ‘endogenous	  growth	   theory’	   (EGT)	   as	   a	   means	   to	   marry	   their	   progressive	   aspirations	   to	   the	  post-­‐Thatcherite	  political-­‐economic	  settlement.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?;	  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	  Labour's	  
Soul?	  46	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?	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There	  is	  no	  unitary	  theory	  of	  endogenous	  growth.47	  The	  term	  refers	  to	  a	  range	  of	  economic	  arguments	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  neoclassical	  orthodoxy	  that	  posit	  that	  government	   investment	   in	   human	   capital	   via	   specific	   skills	   training,	   as	   well	   as	  investments	   in	   the	   development	   of	   innovative	   technologies	   and	   processes,	   can	  raise	  the	  trend	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  an	  economy.	  The	  various	  EGTs	  are	  sceptical	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  liberal	  market	  economy	  is	  necessarily	  at	  an	  optimal	  resource	  usage	  equilibrium,	   a	   view	   that	   Buckler	   and	   Dolowitz	   ascribe	   to	   neoliberalism.	   Instead,	  EGT	  posits	  a	  role	  for	  government	  as	  a	  vital	  and	  active	  component	  in	  achieving	  this	  outcome	  through	  supply-­‐side	  investments	  in	  (among	  other	  things)	  human	  capital,	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  technology	  base.	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  locate	  the	  influence	  of	   these	   ideas	   under	   New	   Labour	   in	   a	   microeconomic	   agenda	   centred	   on	   the	  promotion	   of	   the	   ‘competitiveness’	   of	   regional	   economies	   through	   such	  investment.48	  	  	  For	   these	   two	   authors	   the	   attribution	   of	   some	   form	   of	   EGT	   approach	   to	   New	  Labour	   necessarily	   places	   the	   character	   of	   these	   governments	   beyond	  neoliberalism.	   They	   argue	   that	   New	   Labour	   seized	   upon	   EGT	   because	   of	   its	  perceived	  potential	  not	  simply	  to	  promote	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  activity	  (and	  consequently	   higher	   living	   standards,	   employment	   opportunities	   for	   the	  population	  and	  greater	  revenues	  to	  fund	  social	  spending),	  but	  also	  because	  some	  of	  the	  policies	  by	  which	  it	  was	  promoted	  were	  the	  very	  ones	  that	  were	  perceived	  to	  ensure	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  and	  social	  justice:	  namely	  interventions	  designed	  to	  increase	   labour	   market	   inclusion.	   Through	   this	   integration	   of	   liberal	   economic	  policy	  and	  fairness-­‐oriented	  social	  policy,	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  characterise	  New	  Labour	   as	   presenting	   a	   new	   framework	   through	   which	   social	   justice	   would	   be	  pursued	  within	  a	  post-­‐Thatcherite	  liberal	  economy.	  	  Many	  of	   the	  policies	   that	   the	   two	  authors	  hold	  as	   indicative	  of	   the	   influence	  of	  a	  novel	   EGT-­‐inspired	   New	   Labourite	   political	   economy	   actually	   have	   their	  antecedents	   in	   the	   microeconomic	   policy	   of	   the	   Major	   government,	   or	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Watson	  (2004),	  'Endogenous	  Growth	  Theory’.	  48	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  (2004),	  'Can	  Fair	  Be	  Efficient?	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straightforward	  continuations	   thereof.	   49	  However,	   they	  may	  be	   correct	   to	  assert	  the	   novelty	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   marriage	   of	   progressivist	   social	   policy	   aspirations	  with	   these	   microeconomic	   policies.	   One	   might	   add	   that	   it	   was	   through	   this	  marriage	  that	  New	  Labour	  was	  able	  to	  present	  the	  constraints	  that	   ‘globalisation’	  was	   argued	   to	   place	   on	   social	   democratic	   ambitions	   as	   being	   benign:	   flexible	  labour	   markets	   were	   quite	   consistent	   with	   rising	   wages,	   improving	   working	  conditions	  and	  improved	  individual	   life-­‐chances	  if	   their	  EGT-­‐influenced	  approach	  to	   human	   capital	   formation	   could	   indeed	   attract	   higher	   levels	   of	   inward	  investment.	  Yet	   there	   is	  a	  question	  as	  to	  how	  far	  an	  endorsement	  of	  EGT	  reflects	  the	   absence	  of	  neoliberal	   influences,	   and	  how	   far	   it	   is	   actually	   indicative	  of	   such	  influence.	   It	   is	   to	   the	   tendency	   of	   both	   of	   the	   approaches	   reviewed	   so	   far	   to	  misconstrue	   evidence	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   neoliberalism	   as	   the	   opposite	   that	   the	  next	  section	  turns.	  	  	  
2.	  
A	  Misconceived	  Debate	  
	  The	   relevance	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   neoliberalism	   in	   characterizing	   New	   Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance	  turns	  on	  a	  supposed	  mutual-­‐exclusivity	  between	   this	   category	   and	   Ideological	   categories	   such	   as	   ‘Social	   Democracy’	   or	  ‘Social	   Liberalism’.	   I	   argue	   here	   that	   such	   an	   exclusivity	   rests	   on	   a	   problematic	  conceptualisation	   of	   neoliberalism	   as	   though	   it	   were	   a	   coherent	   Ideology	   itself,	  rather	  than	  a	  restructuring	  ethos.	  As	  a	  restructuring	  ethos,	  neoliberalism	  lacks	  the	  scope	   of	   an	   Ideology	   as	   a	   coherent	   vision	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	  governmental	  power.	  In	  isolation,	  the	  restructuring	  ethos	  is	  merely	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	   dissembedding	   and	   extension	   of	  market	   processes.	   It	   is	   through	   its	   parasitic	  integration	   into	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   of	   existing	   Ideologies	   that	  neoliberalism	   gains	   scope	   as	   a	   vision	   of	   governmental	   purpose	   able	   to	   hold	  traction	  with	  moderate	  politicians	  and	  the	  voting	  public.	  This	  opens	  the	  possibility	  that	  New	  Labour	  was	  a	  historically	  particular	  incarnation	  of	  neoliberalism,	  fused	  to	  reformulated	  concepts	  drawn	  from	  a	  socially	  progressive	  heritage.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  For	  a	  historical	  overview	  of	  ‘competitiveness’	  policies	  that	  highlights	  this,	  see	  D.	  Bailey	  and	  N.	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy,	  FDI	  And	  Employment:	  Still	  'Missing	  A	  Strategy'',	  
Journal	  Of	  Industry,	  Competition	  And	  Trade,	  7	  (3-­‐4),	  pp.189-­‐211.	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  Neoliberal	  characterisations	  of	  New	  Labour	  note	  the	  considerable	  overlap	  in	  policy	  and	  rhetoric	  between	  New	  Labour	  and	  the	  previous	  Conservative	  administrations,	  and	  they	  hold	  this	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  degree	  of	  ideational	  convergence	  between	  the	  two	  around	  the	  restructuring	  ethos.50	  From	  this	  perspective	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   ‘modernisation’	   process	   the	   Labour	   leadership	   had	   come	   to	  internalise	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   into	   their	   coordinative	   discourses,	  thereafter	   accepting	   that	   the	   appropriate	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  would	  be	  oriented	  to	  an	  expanded	  realm	  of	  market	  and	  quasi-­‐market	  governance.	   Whatever	   progressive	   ambitions	   the	   New	   Labour	   leadership	   had	  would	   consequently	   be	   pursued	   through	   the	   perceived	   constraints	   that	   these	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   painted,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   institutional	   constraints	  arising	   from	  a	  post-­‐Thatcherite	   political-­‐economic	   settlement	   that	  would	   remain	  unreformed.51	   To	   be	   clear,	   the	   claim	   is	   emphatically	   not	   that	   New	   Labour	   had	  internalised	   a	   ‘Thatcherite’	   ideology.	  What	   had	   been	   internalised,	   however,	   was	  the	  claim	  expounded	  by	  the	  Thatcher	  governments	  that	  a	  new	  phase	  had	  arisen	  in	  the	  development	  of	  capitalism	  that	  made	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  an	  inevitability,	  alongside	   the	   novel	   notion	   that	   such	   restructuring	   could	   be	   reconciled	   with	   a	  reformulated	  conception	  of	  social	  justice.52	  	  	  The	  gap	  between	  this	  position	  and	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowtiz’s	  is	  narrow:	  both	  regard	  New	  Labour	  as	  seeking	  to	  marry	  economic	  efficiency	  to	  a	  reformulated	  concept	  of	  social	   justice	   through	  microeconomic	   interventions	   in	   a	  market-­‐liberal	   economy.	  The	   difference	   is	   that	   what	   the	   latter	   interpret	   as	   a	   non-­‐neoliberal	   approach	   to	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   is	   interpreted	  by	   the	   former	   as	   a	   set	   of	   ‘roll	   out	  neoliberalisation’	  strategies.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  noted,	  New	  Labour’s	  redistributive	  principle	  coheres	  with	  such	  an	  analysis	  regarding	  the	  supply	  of	  human	  capital.	  A	  similar	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  New	  Labour’s	  more	  general	  approach	  to	  microeconomic	  policy	  and	  its	  embrace	  of	  policies	  that	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz	  cast	  as	  ‘EGT’.	  As	  the	  next	  section	  more	  fully	  explores,	  New	  Labour	  microeconomic	  policy	  sought	  to	  compensate	  for	  a	  shortage	  of	  private	  sector	  investment	  in	  public	  goods	  deemed	  necessary	   for	   the	   optimal	   functioning	   of	   the	  market	   economy,	   including	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’;	  Jessop	  (2002),	  'Liberalism,	  Neoliberalism’.	  51	  Hay	  (1999b),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour.	  52	  Ibid;	  Heffernan	  (2011),	  'Labour's	  New	  Labour	  Legacy’.	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(among	  other	  things)	  the	  formation	  of	  human	  capital	  and	  investment	   in	  research	  and	  development.	  In	  deploying	  government	  interventions	  in	  these	  and	  other	  areas,	  the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   were	   responding	   to	   failures	   of	   earlier	   neoliberal	  restructuring	   to	   resolve	   long-­‐standing	   pathologies	   of	   the	   British	   economy	   (low	  investment	  and	  low	  productivity)	  and	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  difficulties	  that	  had	  emerged	  during	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   such	  as	   enduring	  disparities	   in	   regional	  output	  and	  of	  quality	  of	   life	   in	  de-­‐industrialised	  regional	  economies.53	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ALGM,	  which	  served	  to	  stave	  off	  a	  politicisation	  of	  the	  social	  impact	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  and	  mitigated	  what	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  much	  worse	   performance,	   it	   remained	   necessary	   for	   the	   government	   to	   address	  these	   issues	   and	   also	   to	   offer	   a	   positive	   vision	   of	   how	   a	   neoliberal	   political	  economy	   could	   serve	   the	   interests	   of	   all	   members	   of	   society.	   The	   resulting	  interventions	   were	   the	   ‘flanking	   mechanisms’	   that	   were	   erected	   around	   British	  neoliberal	  political	  economy	  as	  it	  matured	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  new	  millennium.	  	  	  The	  characterisation	  of	   this	   interventionist	  microeconomic	  policy	   in	  terms	  of	  roll	  out	   neoliberalisation	   might	   appear	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   broader	   concept	   of	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	  restructuring	  ethos	  dedicated	  to	  extending	  market	  relations	  and	  commodification.	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  here,	  although	  not	  an	  insurmountable	  one,	  of	  conceptual	   stretching.	   To	   avoid	   such	   stretching	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   specify	   the	  qualitatively	  specific	  kind	  of	  interventionism	  entailed	  in	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation.	  In	   understanding	   its	   nature,	   the	   conceptual	   binaries	   of	   ‘discretionary	   vs.	   non-­‐discretionary’	   and	   ‘strategic	   vs.	   non-­‐strategic’	   industrial	   policy	   are	   useful.	   These	  categories	   are	   a	   development	   of	   the	   common	   two-­‐part	   categorisation	   of	  government	  intervention	  as	  either	  being	  ‘horizontal’	  or	  ‘selective’,	  with	  the	  former	  referring	   to	   policies	   that	   do	   not	   systematically	   privilege	   particular	   industries	   or	  sectors	   but	   which	   instead	   seek	   to	   improve	   the	   general	   business	   environment.	  When	   considering	   the	   relationship	   of	   particular	   interventions	   to	   the	   neoliberal	  restructuring	  ethos,	  however,	  it	  is	  more	  helpful	  to	  categorise	  them	  using	  categories	  that	  denote	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  market	  is	  being	  expanded	  or	  supplanted	  as	  the	  mechanism	  of	  resource	  allocation	  in	  an	  economy,	  for	  it	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  market	  and	  market-­‐like	  governance	  and	  resource	  allocation	  that	  marks	  out	  neoliberalism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  D.	  Coates	  (2008),	  '"Darling,	  It	  Is	  Entirely	  My	  Fault!"	  Gordon	  Brown's	  Legacy	  To	  Alistair	  And	  Himself',	  British	  Politics,	  3	  (1),	  pp.3-­‐21.	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as	   a	   distinct	   restructuring	   ethos.	   It	   is	   this	   aspect	   that	   the	   four-­‐point	   framework	  proposed	  here	  is	  intended	  to	  capture.	  	  Non-­‐discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  is	  a	  market-­‐facilitating	  form	  of	  interventionism	  characterised	  by	  policymakers	   refraining	   from	  discretionary	   judgment	   regarding	  the	   commercial	   viability	   of	   private	   sector	   projects.	   Instead,	   such	   intervention	   is	  premised	  on	  the	  view	  that	  the	  allocation	  of	  economic	  resources	  made	  by	  (correctly	  functioning)	  markets	  reflects	  an	  optimal	  assessment	  of	  the	  commercial	  viability	  of	  private	   sector	   projects.	   Such	   interventions	   consequently	   seek	   to	   correct	   market	  failures	   to	   better	   facilitate	   the	   market	   allocation	   of	   economic	   resources.	   In	  withholding	   such	   discretionary	   judgement,	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventionism	   is	  oriented	   to	   market-­‐led	   industrial	   development	   –	   it	   is	   a	   non-­‐dirigiste	   approach	  where	  the	  role	  of	  government	  intervention	  is	  to	  facilitate	  an	  optimal	  environment	  for	   market-­‐led	   industrial	   development	   to	   occur	   in,	   rather	   than	   to	   intentionally	  steer	  the	  economy	  towards	  a	  particular	  direction	  of	  industrial	  development.	  	  	  In	   principle,	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventionism	   limits	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   public	  sector	   on	   the	   trajectory	   of	   industrial	   development	   to	   a	   passive	   one	   that	   arises	  through	   the	   impact	   of	   its	   purchasing	   decisions	   and	   public	   service	   provision	   (for	  example,	  the	  impact	  of	  NHS	  procurement,	  spending	  and	  provision	  on	  markets	  for	  related	   goods	   and	   services),	   or	   through	   the	   kind	   of	  market-­‐enabling	   supply-­‐side	  policies	  noted	  by	  Buckler	  and	  Dolowitz.	  In	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  no	  ‘pure’	  strategy	  of	  market-­‐led	   industrial	   development	   free	   from	   the	   influence	   of	   public	   sector	  activities,	  for	  the	  state	  itself	  is	  a	  buyer,	  a	  producer,	  a	  rentier	  and	  a	  source	  of	  rules	  that	   organise	  markets.	   However	   governments	   can	   choose	  whether	   to	   utilise	   the	  impact	   of	   public	   sector	   activities	   and	   decision	   making	   to	   deliberately	   support	  particular	   suppliers,	   industries	   or	   technologies,	   or	   whether	   instead	   to	   allow	  market	  resource	  allocation	   to	  arbitrate	   the	  commercial	  viability	  of	  private	  sector	  projects.	   This	   choice	   reflects	   the	   difference	   between	   ‘discretionary’	   and	   ‘non-­‐discretionary’	  intervention.	  	  The	  market-­‐facilitating	  nature	  of	  non-­‐discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  means	  that	  it	  has	   an	   inherent	   affinity	  with	   neoliberalism.	  Roll	   back	  neoliberalisation	   is	   itself	   a	  form	   of	   non-­‐discretionary	   intervention	   insofar	   as	   it	   places	   activities	   into	   the	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private	   sector	   and	   introduces	   markets	   where	   they	   were	   previously	   absent.	  However,	  non-­‐discretionary	  interventionism	  can	  also	  encompass	   ‘active’	   forms	  of	  interventionism	   associated	   with	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation	   where	   non-­‐market	  institutional	  forms	  are	  deployed	  as	  ‘flanking	  mechanisms’	  to	  support	  the	  growing	  domain	  of	  market	  resource	  allocation	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  neoliberalisation.	  These	  interventions	  can	  be	  categorised	  as	  non-­‐discretionary	  insofar	  as	  their	  objective	  is	  to	   facilitate	   the	   market	   in	   making	   judgments	   about	   the	   commercial	   viability	   of	  private	   sector	   projects,	   rather	   than	   for	   industrial	   policymakers	   to	   make	   such	   a	  judgment	  themselves.	  	  	  Another	   way	   of	   stating	   this	   is	   to	   say	   that	   non-­‐discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   is	  organised	   around	   addressing	   ‘market	   failures’	   –	   scenarios	   in	   which	   the	   market	  economy	   is	   found	   to	   under-­‐produce	   resources	   required	   by	   all	   firms	   in	   the	  economy,	   and	   so	   undermine	   the	   conditions	   of	   its	   own	   optimal	   reproduction.54	  There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   general	   forms	   that	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventionism	  commonly	  takes.	  The	  first	  involves	  the	  public	  production	  of	  the	  resources	  that	  the	  private	   sector	  under-­‐produces.	  Examples	   include	  education	  and	  skills	   training	   (a	  supply	  of	  human	  capital),	  transport	  and	  other	  civil	  infrastructure,	  and	  science	  and	  technology	  research.	  In	  areas	  such	  as	  these	  the	  public	  sector	  often	  takes	  a	  leading	  role	   in	   planning,	   organising	   and	   producing	   the	   resource	   in	   question.	  Neoliberalisation	   has	   seen	   the	   introduction	   of	   private	   ownership,	   private	   co-­‐investment	  and	  quasi-­‐market	  forms	  in	  many	  former	  public	  sector	  monopolies.	  As	  yet,	   however,	   the	   areas	   described	   above	   have	   not	   been	   subject	   to	   a	   full-­‐scale	  privatisation.	   These	   kinds	   of	   intervention	   are	   non-­‐discretionary	   insofar	   as	   their	  rationale	  is	  to	  sustain	  the	  broader	  private	  economy.	  	  A	  second	  form	  of	  non-­‐discretionary	  intervention	  involves	  the	  use	  of	   incentives	  to	  prompt	   the	   private	   production	   of	   resources	   subject	   to	  market	   failure.	   Examples	  include	  research	  and	  development	  tax	  allowances,	  capital	  depreciation	  allowances	  for	  manufacturing	  industries,	  and	  techniques	  for	  stimulating	  the	  supply	  of	  finance	  to	  small	   firms	  through	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	   ‘credit	  easing’	   in	   the	  post-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  This	  broad	  definition	  incorporates	  the	  many	  more	  formally	  specified	  market	  failures	  identified	  by	  the	  neoclassical	  orthodoxy	  in	  economics,	  such	  as	  collective	  action	  problems	  that	  impact	  on	  the	  production	  of	  public	  goods.	  See	  P.	  Arestis	  and	  M.	  Sawyer	  (2001),	  'The	  Economic	  Analysis	  Underlying	  The	  'Third	  Way'',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  6	  (2),	  pp.255-­‐78.	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  context.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  government	  seeks	  to	  leverage	  higher	  levels	  of	  private	  investment	   and	   resource	   production	   through	   the	   market	   system	   for	   allocating	  economic	   resources,	   but	   does	   not	   exercise	   discretion	   as	   to	  which	   private	   sector	  projects	  will	  develop.	  	  Both	   forms	   of	   non-­‐discretionary	   intervention	   imply	   a	   proscribed	   role	   for	   the	  policymakers	   as	   facilitating	   the	   market	   allocation	   of	   economic	   resources	   and	  market-­‐led	   industrial	   development.	   By	   contrast	   discretionary	   forms	   of	  interventionism	   involve	   policymakers	   making	   such	   judgements	   themselves,	  playing	   the	   part	   reserved	   for	   market	   participants	   in	   the	   non-­‐discretionary	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  purposefully	  bring	  about	  developmental	  outcomes	  that	  even	  a	   correctly	   functioning	   market	   would	   not	   have.	   Insofar	   as	   discretionary	  interventions	  constitute	  a	  part	  of	  a	  strategy	  to	  realise	  the	  government’s	  economic	  policy	  goals	  it	  is	  a	  ‘strategic	  discretionary’	  form	  of	  interventionism,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  ‘industrial	  strategy’.55	  	  The	   reason	   for	   the	   neoliberal	   antipathy	   towards	   strategic-­‐discretionary	  interventionism	   is	   that	   it	   violates	   the	   core	   principle	   bound	   up	   in	   the	   view	   that	  market	   and	   market-­‐like	   forms	   of	   governance	   and	   resource	   allocations	   are	   the	  optimal	   ones:	   the	   claim	   that	   competition	   in	   free	   markets	   facilitates	   the	   most	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  economic	  resources.	  The	  view	  rests	  on	  two	  notions.	  The	  first	  could	  be	   termed	   ‘market	  epistemology’.	  This	  notion	   is	   similar	   in	  general	   form	  (if	  not	   conceptual	   specifics)	   to	   the	   Hayekian	   epistemological	   argument	   that	  competition	  in	  markets	  constitutes	  a	  ‘discovery	  procedure’	  by	  which	  many	  rational	  assessments	  of	  many	  participating	   individuals	  are	  aggregated	   into	  well	   informed	  judgements	  about	  the	  worth	  and	  prospects	  of	  firms,	  technologies	  and	  industries.56	  The	  second	  is	  the	  concomitant	  notion	  –	  widely	  held	  in	  contemporary	  mainstream	  economics	   –	   that	  policymakers	   are	  unable	   to	  better	   the	   judgement	   that	   emerges	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	  56	  F.A.	  Hayek	  (2002),	  'Competition	  As	  A	  Discovery	  Process',	  Quarterly	  Journal	  Of	  Austrian	  
Economics,	  5	  (3),	  pp.9-­‐23.	  
	   178	  
from	   this	   market	   process	   regarding	   allocation	   of	   economic	   resources.57	   The	  implication	   of	   this	   view	   is	   that	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   that	   privileges	  certain	   industries,	   firms	   and	   technologies	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   maximise	   economic	  policy	  objectives	  such	  as	  growth	  or	  employment	  will	  yield	  an	  inferior	  trajectory	  of	  economic	   development	   to	   that	   which	   would	   have	   emerged	   from	   a	   market-­‐led	  approach	   to	   resource	   allocation.	   This	   view	   is	   further	   reinforced	   by	   neoliberal	  analyses	   of	   political	   economy	   influenced	   by	   variants	   of	   public	   choice	   theory,	   in	  which	   policymakers	   are	   deemed	   to	   be	   subject	   to	   perverse	   incentives	   that	   lead	  discretionary	   resource	   allocation	   to	   reflect	   political	   and	   rent-­‐seeking	   logics	   that	  deviate	  from	  economically	  efficient	  ones.58	  	  	  Discretionary	  interventions	  can	  also	  be	  non-­‐strategic.	  In	  such	  cases	  they	  constitute	  
ad	  hoc	  and	  often	  pragmatic	  interventions,	  or	  relate	  to	  strategies	  other	  than	  those	  pertaining	   to	   economic	  policy	   (for	   instance,	   the	  preservation	  of	   jobs	   in	  marginal	  constituencies	  or	  a	  perceived	  need	  to	  secure	  food	  security).	  Such	  intervention	  is	  no	  less	  problematic	   from	  a	  neoliberal	  perspective,	  yet	   intervention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  non-­‐economic	  policy	  rationale	  does	  not	  necessarily	   indicate	  a	   lack	  of	   influence	  of	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  on	  a	  government’s	  approach	  to	  economic	  policy	  and	  restructuring.	  Rather,	   it	  suggests	  that	   in	  some	  situations	  these	  governments	  have	  prioritised	   other	   political,	   security	   or	   perhaps	   even	   environmental	   objectives	  above	  that	  of	  immediate	  economic	  efficiency.	  	  	  With	  these	  and	  the	  points	  made	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  in	  mind,	  a	  basis	  emerges	  from	   which	   to	   assess	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   New	   Labour	   can	   be	   appropriately	  deemed	  an	  expression	  of	  neoliberalism.	  This	  basis	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  degree	  to	   which	   the	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	   and	   restructuring	  pursued	  by	  these	  governments	  was	  framed	  by	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  microeconomic	  policy,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  interventions	  were	  non-­‐discretionary	  in	  nature.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  task	  that	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  turns.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  For	  critical	  outline	  and	  discussion	  of	  these	  views,	  see	  R.	  Wade	  (2012),	  'Return	  Of	  Industrial	  Policy?',	  International	  Review	  Of	  Applied	  Economics,	  26	  (2),	  pp.223-­‐39;	  H.J.	  Chang	  (2011),	  'Industrial	  Policy:	  Can	  We	  Go	  Beyond	  an	  Unproductive	  Confrontation?',	  
Annual	  World	  Bank	  Conference	  on	  Development	  Economics:	  Lessons	  From	  East	  Asia	  and	  the	  
Global	  Financial	  Crisis	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  The	  World	  Bank),	  pp.83-­‐109.	  58	  W.	  Grant	  (2011),	  'Was	  There	  Ever	  An	  Anglo-­‐American	  Model	  Of	  Capitalism?',	  in	  T.	  Casey	  (ed.),	  Legacy	  Of	  The	  Crash:	  How	  The	  Financial	  Crisis	  Changed	  America	  And	  Britain	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.19-­‐37.	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3.	  
New	  Labour	  And	  Neoliberal	  Problem	  Definitions	  	  Macroeconomic	  Policy	  	  The	  macroeconomic	   policy	   approach	   of	   the	  New	  Labour	   governments	   embodied	  several	  prominent	  continuities	  and	  entrenchments	  of	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  previous	  Conservative	   administrations,	   and	   these	   in	   turn	  were	   significant	   elements	   of	   the	  roll	   back	   neoliberalisation	   of	   the	   British	   economy:	   through	   these	   means	   the	  responsibility	  of	  government	  to	  maintain	  ‘full	  employment’	  and	  regulate	  the	  credit	  cycle	  was	  scaled	  back	  in	   favour	  of	  different	  priorities.	  The	  area	   is	  consequently	  a	  site	  of	  contention	  between	  those	  who	  perceive	  neoliberalism	   in	  New	  Labour	  and	  those	  who	   instead	   see	  a	   strategic	   ‘accommodate	   to	   shape’	   strategy.	   I	   shall	   stress	  the	  underlying	  and	  distinctly	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  that	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  conduct	  in	  this	  area	  and,	  against	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  ‘accommodating	  to	  shape’	   logic,	   a	   distinct	   lack	   of	   ‘shaping’	   of	   the	   economic	   constraints	   on	   non-­‐neoliberal	  economic	  policy	  ambitions.	  	  A	  widely	  noted	  continuity	  was	  the	  elevation	  of	  monetary	  policy	  over	  fiscal	  policy	  as	  the	  primary	  instrument	  of	  macroeconomic	  management,	  and	  the	  elevation	  of	  a	  stable	   rate	   of	   product	   price	   inflation	   above	   other	   macroeconomic	   objectives.59	  Superficially,	  at	   least,	  New	  Labour	  dispensed	  with	  attempts	   to	  achieve	  objectives	  relating	   to	   other	   macroeconomic	   variables	   (namely	   the	   rates	   of	   unemployment	  and	   economic	   growth)	   outside	   of	   recessionary	   moments.	   Fiscal	   policy	   was	  assigned	   only	   a	   passive	   function	   in	   macroeconomic	   management	   (through	   the	  operation	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘automatic	  stabilisers’	  over	   the	  course	  of	   the	  economic	  cycle	  or	  in	  support	  of	  monetary	  policy	  during	  a	  recession).	  The	  primary	  means	  by	  which	   the	   manipulation	   of	   aggregate	   demand	   was	   conducted	   was	   through	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness	  And’;	  Arestis	  and	  M.	  Sawyer	  (2001),	  'The	  Economic	  Analysis’;	  D.	  Hodson	  and	  D.	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy	  And	  The	  Global	  Financial	  Crisis:	  Paradigm	  Lost?',	  Journal	  Of	  Common	  Market	  Studies,	  47	  (5),	  pp.1041-­‐61.	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operations	   of	   an	   independent	   Bank	   of	   England	   tasked	  with	  maintaining	   product	  price	  stability,	  not	  incomes	  or	  employment.60	  	  New	   Labour	   also	   continued,	   with	   some	   important	   nuances,	   the	   trend	   towards	  rules-­‐based	   economic	   policies	   begun	   by	   the	   previous	   Conservative	  administrations.	   Control	   of	   monetary	   policy	   was	   passed	   to	   an	   independent	  Monetary	   Policy	   Committee	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   tasked	   to	  maintain	   a	   stable	  rate	  of	  product	  price	  inflation	  (initially	  at	  3%	  in	  the	  RPIX	  measure	  of	  inflation,	  then	  2.5%	  at	  the	  CPI	  measure	  after	  2003).	  A	  ‘Code	  of	  Fiscal	  Stability’	  was	  also	  published	  in	  1998	   in	  which	  a	  number	  of	   rules	   to	  govern	   the	  conduct	  of	  public	  expenditure	  were	   made	   transparent,	   including	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘golden	   rule’	   pledging	   the	  government	   to	   finance	   only	   investment	   and	   not	   current	   spending	   through	  borrowing	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   economic	   cycle,	   and	   a	   ‘sustainable	   investment	  rule’	  pledging	  the	  government	  to	  maintain	  public	  sector	  net	  debt	  at	  a	  stable	  40%	  of	  GDP.61	  	  	  However	   New	   Labour	   took	   a	   more	   nuanced	   stance	   on	   rules-­‐based	  macroeconomics	   than	  these	  policies	  might	  suggest.	  As	   the	  discussion	  below	  shall	  underline,	  New	  Labour	  spokespeople	  maintained	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  discretionary	   manoeuvre	   is	   required	   to	   maintain	   macroeconomic	   stability,	   and	  argued	   that	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	   framework	  of	   rules	  was	   to	  earn	   ‘credibility’	   from	  financial	   market	   actors	   who	   would	   thereafter	   permit	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   fiscal	  latitude	   than	   they	   might	   otherwise	   do.62	   Moreover,	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	  unwillingness	   to	   accept	   the	   self-­‐imposed	   constraints	   on	   fiscal	   discretion	   was	  apparent	   following	   the	   first	   two	   years	   of	   New	   Labour	   government:	   occasional	  redefinitions	   of	   the	   economic	   cycle	   allowed	   current	   spending	   to	   be	   brought	  forward.63	  Yet	  while	  clearly	  not	  averse	  to	  public	  expenditure	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  or	  to	  exercising	   discretionary	   spending,	   New	   Labour	   was	   at	   pains	   to	   maintain	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  For	  a	  dissenting	  view,	  engaged	  with	  below,	  see	  B.	  Clift	  and	  J.	  	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?	  New	  Labour	  Macroeconomic	  Policy	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Coarse	  Tuning',	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  37	  (1),	  pp.47-­‐69.	  61	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (1998),	  The	  Code	  For	  Fiscal	  Stability	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  62	  B.	  Burkitt	  (2006),	  'Constrained	  Discretion:	  New	  Labour's	  Third	  Way	  For	  Economic	  And	  Social	  Policy?',	  International	  Journal	  Of	  Social	  Economic	  As,	  33	  (1),	  pp.4-­‐10;	  E.	  Balls	  and	  G.	  	  O'Donnell	  (2002),	  Reforming	  Britain's	  Economic	  And	  Financial	  Policy:	  Towards	  Greater	  
Economic	  Stability	  (London:	  Palgrave).	  63	  Clift	  and	  J.	  	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’;	  Watson	  (2008a),	  'The	  Split	  Personality	  Of	  Prudence’.	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appearance	  of	  adherence	  to	  their	  spending	  rules,	  bound	  perhaps	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  cycle	  could	  be	  manipulated	  without	  a	  loss	  of	  credibility.	  	  	  Appeals	   to	   external	   economic	   constraint	   were	   something	   of	   a	   lynchpin	   in	   New	  Labour’s	   communicative	   discourses	   on	   its	   political-­‐economic	   project,	   exhibiting	  something	   of	   the	   ‘TINA’	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   previous	   Conservative	   administrations.64	  The	  New	  Labour	  governments	  proved	  enthusiastic	  proponents	  of	  financial	  market	  liberalisation,	  and	  endorsed	  capital	  mobility	  and	  trade	  liberalisation.	  They	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  extend	  government	  control	  over	  the	  credit	  cycle	  or	  the	  allocation	  of	  credit	  by	   liberal	   financial	   markets	   and	   sought	   instead	   to	   capitalise	   on	   the	   asset-­‐price	  inflation	   that	   occurred	   during	   their	   tenure	   by	   incorporating	   the	   ownership	   of	  speculatively	  priced	  assets	  into	  their	  social	  policy	  agenda.65	  Although	  not	  a	  process	  initiated	   by	   New	   Labour,	   the	   enthusiasm	   of	   these	   governments	   for	   ‘light-­‐touch’	  regulation	   and	   their	   failure	   to	   question	   the	   assumed	   benignity	   of	   financial	  innovation	   or	   the	   unbalanced	   growth	   model	   that	   it	   sustained	   makes	   clear	   the	  strength	  of	  their	  endorsement.66	  	  
Neoliberal	  Problem	  Definitions	  	  	   	  A	  neoliberal	  characterisation	  of	  New	  Labour	  holds	   this	  macroeconomic	  stance	   to	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  internalisation	  of	  problem	  definitions	  that	  have	  strong	  parallels	  with	   dominant	   ‘New	   Keynesian’	   and	   ‘Neo-­‐Classical’	   approaches.67	   Although	  distinct,	   these	   broad	   schools	   of	   thought	   are	   agued	   to	   form	   a	   complementary	  orthodoxy	   on	   issues	   of	   post-­‐monetarist,	   post-­‐Thatcherite	   macroeconomic	   policy	  that	  prescribe	   the	  primacy	  of	  price	  stability	  as	   the	  end	  of	  macroeconomic	  policy,	  with	   the	   use	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   confined	   to	   a	   largely	   passive	   role	   in	   support	   of	  monetary	   policy	   objectives.	   In	   particular,	   the	   orthodoxy	   embodies	   a	   number	   of	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions.	   A	   key	   problem	   defining	   idea	   here	   is	   a	   long-­‐run	  Say’s	   Law	  which,	   in	  modern	   guise,	   states	   that	   the	  market	   economy	   tends	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  An	  acronym	  of	  the	  slogan	  ‘there	  is	  no	  alternative’.	  M.	  Watson	  and	  C.	  	  Hay	  (2003),	  'The	  Discourse	  Of	  Globalisation	  And	  The	  Logic	  Of	  No	  Alternative:	  Rendering	  The	  Contingent	  Necessary	  In	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  Policy	  And	  Politics,	  31	  (2),	  pp.289-­‐305.	  65	  Watson	  (2013b),	  'New	  Labour's	  'Paradox’.	  66	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	  67	  Arestis	  and	  Sawyer	  (2001),	  'The	  Economic	  Analysis	  Underlying’;	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’.	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long	   run	   towards	   a	   full	   resource	   use	   equilibrium	   (a	   state	   in	   which	   all	   available	  factors	  of	  production,	  including	  labour,	  are	  being	  put	  to	  use	  productively)	  and	  that	  macroeconomic	  variables	  tend	  to	  perform	  optimally	  relative	  to	  a	  given	  supply-­‐side	  structure,	   providing	   that	   a	   low	   and	   stable	   rate	   of	   product	   price	   inflation	   is	  
maintained.68	   Consequently,	   the	   Keynesian	   notion	   of	   the	   indefinite	   ‘sub-­‐optimal’	  equilibrium	   is	   ruled	   out	   by	   theoretical	   fiat	   and	   there	   is	   no	   rationale	   to	   the	   ‘fine	  tuning’	  of	  aggregate	  demand.	  Because	  persistent	  aggregate	  demand	  shortfalls	  are	  ruled	  out	   by	   theoretical	   fiat,	   economic	   stability	   is	   seen	   as	   best	   achieved	   through	  the	   cultivation	   of	   stable	   inflationary	   expectations	   across	   the	   economy,	   as	   this	  allows	  consumers,	  producers	  and	  investors	  to	  make	  long	  term	  plans	  and	  enact	  the	  most	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  them.69	  Uncertainty	  over	  the	  rate	  of	  inflation	  is	  therefore	  the	  primary	  macroeconomic	  problem	  in	  this	  view,	  as	  it	  brings	  about	  undulations	  of	   investment	  and	  production	  as	  market	  actors	  attempt	  to	   haphazardly	   gauge	   the	   likely	   future	   value	   of	   the	   currency	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  emerging	  (incomplete)	  information	  and	  revealed	  government	  preferences.	  	  Attached	  to	  this	  is	  a	  second	  problem	  definition	  premised	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  rate	  of	   unemployment	   dictated	   by	   the	   supply-­‐side	   structure	   of	   the	   labour	   market,	  below	  which	  an	  accelerating	  inflationary	  dynamic	  emerges:	  the	  ‘Non-­‐Accelerating	  Inflation	   Rate	   of	   Unemployment’	   (‘NAIRU’).	   In	   a	   seminal	   rendition	   of	   this	   idea,	  Friedman	  posits	  that	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  accelerating	  inflation	  occurs	  is	  the	  lagged	  effects	  of	  increases	  in	  the	  money	  supply	  resulting	  from	  stimulatory	  policies,	  combined	  with	   the	   adaptive	   expectations	   of	   economic	   agents.70	   Such	   agents,	   the	  argument	  goes,	  may	  enter	  the	  labour	  market	  as	  a	  result	  of	  stimulus,	  but	  voluntarily	  withdraw	  upon	  perceiving	  the	  inflationary	  off-­‐setting	  of	  increased	  wages,	  and	  are	  afterwards	   disinclined	   to	   re-­‐enter	   in	   anticipation	   of	   further	   rounds	   of	   the	   same	  process	   unless	   additional	   (inflationary)	   incentives	   are	   offered.	   Such	   a	   problem	  does	  not	  exist	  within	  the	  Keynesian	  definitions	  of	  the	  same	  problem,	  which	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Arestis	  and	  Sawyer	  (2001),	  'The	  Economic	  Analysis	  Underlying’;	  Kitson	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007),	  'The	  Economics	  Of	  New’.	  69	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2001),	  'The	  Conditions	  For	  High	  And	  Stable	  Growth	  And	  Employment',	  The	  Economic	  Journal,	  111	  (471),	  pp.30-­‐44;	  A.	  Glyn	  and	  S.	  Wood	  (2001),	  'Economic	  Policy	  Under	  New	  Labour:	  How	  Social-­‐Democratic	  Is	  The	  Bair	  Government?',	  The	  Political	  Quarterly,	  72	  (1),	  pp.50-­‐66.	  70	  M.	  Friedman	  (1976),	  'Inflation	  And	  Unemployment',	  Nobel	  Memorial	  Lecture	  (Chicago	  December	  13,	  1976).	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post-­‐war	  years	  had	  postulated	  a	   stable	   relationship	  between	  unemployment	  and	  inflation.71	  	  	  The	   neoliberal	   definition	   of	   this	   problem	   arising	   from	   such	   analysis	   (in	   essence	  that	  unemployment	  is	  a	  supply-­‐side	  problem	  and	  in	  a	  large	  part	  voluntary	  outside	  of	   recessionary	   moments,	   and	   that	   higher	   levels	   of	   unemployment	   should	   be	  tolerated	  as	  a	  means	  to	  controlling	  product	  price	  inflation)	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  policy	  ideas	  that	  neoliberal	  policymakers	  may	  utilise.	  Policy	  that	  seeks	  to	  raise	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  or	  lower	  the	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  is	  relocated	  to	  microeconomic	  policy	   such	   as	   reforms	   to	   labour	  markets	   that	   seek	   to	   lower	   the	  NAIRU:	  policies	  that	  raise	  the	  cost	  of	  unemployment	  (through,	  for	  example,	  welfare	  conditionality),	  remove	  ‘frictional	  barriers’	  to	  labour	  market	  adjustment,	  and	  (in	  later	  thinking	  on	  the	   subject)	   policies	   that	   raise	   the	   quality	   of	   human	   capital	   and	   of	   the	   business	  environment	   more	   generally	   to	   facilitate	   growth	   and	   attract	   demand	   for	   labour	  from	  abroad.	  	  	  The	   NAIRU	   thesis	   that	   New	   Labour	   subscribed	   to	   was	   not	   identical	   to	   the	  Friedmanite	  one,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  endorsement	  of	  this	  latter	  category	  of	  ‘active’	  microeconomic	  interventions	  aimed	  at	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  the	  NAIRU.72	  However	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  NAIRU	  concept	  on	  these	  governments’	  problem	  definition	  in	  this	  area	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   publicly	   articulated	   re-­‐definition	   of	   unemployment	   as	   a	  supply-­‐side	  problem,	  as	  well	  as	   these	  governments’	   tolerance	  of	   the	  same	  higher	  range	   of	   rates	   of	   unemployment	   that	   the	   Conservative	   administrations	   had.73	  Sceptical	  of	  this	  position,	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  hold	  the	  element	  of	  plasticity	  in	  New	  Labour’s	   conception	   of	   the	   NAIRU,	   and	   particularly	   their	   claim	   that	   it	   could	  undergo	   persistent	   rises	   following	   periods	   of	   heightened	   unemployment,	   as	  evidence	  of	  a	  latent	  Keynesianism	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  macroeconomics.74	  	  This	   is	  because	   it	   implies	   that	  aggregate	  demand	  manipulation	   is	  not	  confined	  to	  maintaining	  a	  stable	  rate	  of	  product	  price	  inflation,	  but	  also	  to	  maintaining	  levels	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Hay	  (2001),	  'The	  'Crisis'	  Of	  Keynesianism’.	  	  72	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’;	  Kitson	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007),	  'The	  Economics	  Of	  New’;	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’;	  Glyn	  and	  Wood	  (2001),	  'Economic	  Policy	  Under	  New	  Labour’;	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’.	  73	  Brown	  (2001),	  'The	  Conditions	  For	  High’;	  Balls	  and	  O'Donnell	  (2002),	  Reforming	  
Britain's	  Economic.	  74	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’.	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of	  employment	  during	  recessionary	  moments.	  Yet	  as	  I	  shall	  emphasise	  below,	  it	  is	  quite	   consistent	  with	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   to	   utilise	   stimulus	   during	   a	  recessionary	  moment	   so	   as	   to	   preserve	   human	   and	   physical	   capital	   (Friedman’s	  own	  analysis	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  made	  exactly	  such	  a	  prescription,	  although	  it	  was	  to	  be	  a	  purely	  monetary	  stimulus).75	  	  	  	  	  	  
External	  Constraint	  	  	  The	  notion	  of	   ‘credibility’	   is	   at	   the	  heart	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  macroeconomic	   stance	  and	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  it	  was	  cast	  as	  a	  core	  problem	  facing	  economic	  policymakers	  by	  New	  Labour	  spokespeople.76	  It	  featured	  prominently	  in	  the	  legitimation	  of	  the	  macroeconomic	   policy	   architecture	   that	   these	   governments	   had	   adopted.77	   Yet	  there	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  about	  exactly	  what	  conception	  of	  ‘credibility’	  lay	  at	  the	   root	   of	   this	   problem	   definition.78	   This	   arises	   because	   the	   operational	  independence	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  presented	  publicly	  in	  terms	  drawn	  from	  a	  derivative	  of	  public	  choice	  theory	  centred	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  ‘political	  business	  cycle’	   –	   the	   ‘rational	   expectations’	   thesis.79	   By	   the	   logic	   of	   this	   approach,	   only	  severe	  forms	  of	  institutional	  de-­‐politicisation	  can	  serve	  to	  ensure	  the	  credibility	  of	  governments	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   market	   participants,	   and	   so	   ensure	   macroeconomic	  stability.80	  Yet	   there	   is	  another	  definition	  of	   the	  problem	  that	  better	  accounts	   for	  New	   Labour’s	   own	   stance.	   For	   Mosley,	   governments	   obtain	   ‘credibility’	   by	  satisfying	   a	   (possibly	   quite	   small)	   number	   of	   historically	   contingent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’.	  76	  Balls	  and	  O'Donnell	  (2002),	  Reforming	  Britain's	  Economic.	  77	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (2003),	  'The	  Discourse	  Of	  Globalisation’;	  D.	  Coates	  and	  C.	  Hay	  (2001),	  'The	  Internal	  And	  External	  Face	  Of	  New	  Labour's	  Political	  Economy',	  Government	  And	  
Opposition,	  36	  (4),	  pp.447-­‐71.	  78	  Some	  possible	  interpretations	  are	  reviewed	  in	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’.	  79	  Hay	  (2004a),	  'The	  Normalizing	  Role’.	  80	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’;	  on	  rational	  expectations	  and	  its	  place	  alongside	  other	  neoliberal	  arguments	  of	  the	  1970s,	  see	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  
Transformations.	  As	  Blyth	  observes,	  the	  positions	  is	  actually	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  NAIRU,	  which	  rests	  on	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  actor	  as	  having	  ‘adaptive’	  expectations	  instead.	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preconceptions	  that	  market	  actors	  hold	  regarding	  what	  constitutes	  ‘good’	  policy.81	  Governments	   need	   do	   no	   more,	   and	   a	   government	   aware	   of	   this	   might	  purposefully	  and	  strategically	  cultivate	  market	  confidence/credibility	  in	  this	  way.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  certain	  policy	  concessions	  to	  market	  sentiments	  of	  which	  central	  bank	   independence	   is	  one.	   In	   this	  view	  New	  Labour’s	  acts	  of	   institutional	  ‘depolitisisation’	   (such	   as	   central	   bank	   independence	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   rules-­‐based	  macroeconomic	  policy)	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  conservative	  spending	  plans	  were	   strategically	  motivated	   to	   court	  market	   confidence	   and	   did	   not	   reflect	   the	  internalisation	  of	  a	  full-­‐blooded	  rational	  expectations	  thesis.	  	  For	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson	   it	   is	   this	   latter	   ‘strategic’	   conception	   of	   credibility	   that	  constituted	   New	   Labour’s	   problem	   definition	   on	   the	   matter.	   They	   note	   the	  familiarity	   of	   key	   policymakers	   with	   Mosely’s	   thesis,	   and	   although	   this	   piece	   of	  evidence	   alone	   is	   circumstantial,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   the	   strategic	   conception	   of	  credibility	   chimes	   more	   closely	   with	   New	   Labour’s	   own	   articulation	   of	   the	  ‘constrained	   discretion’	   noted	   above.82	   The	   ‘flexibility’	   with	   which	   New	   Labour	  approached	   its	   own	   rules	   also	   favour	   this	   interpretation:	  while	   advocates	   of	   the	  rational	  expectations	  thesis	  might	  plausibly	  point	  to	  New	  Labour’s	  manipulation	  of	  the	   definition	   of	   the	   business	   cycle	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   political	  business	   cycle,	   this	   conduct	   does	   rather	   militate	   against	   the	   view	   that	   the	   New	  Labour	  Governments	  subscribed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  discretion	  was	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  credibility.83	  	  	  A	   closely	   related	   and	   equally	   important	   theme	   in	   New	   Labour’s	   communicative	  discourses	  on	  macroeconomic	  policy	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  external	  constraint,	  manifest	  in	   the	   form	   of	   appeals	   to	   an	   un-­‐disaggregated	   process	   of	   ‘globalisation’.84	   Here	  again	  there	  is	  ambiguity	  regarding	  the	  way	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  defined	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  coordinative	  discourses,	   for	  two	  quite	  distinct	  problem	  definitions	  were	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  L.	  Mosley	  (2000),	  'Room	  To	  Move:	  International	  Financial	  Markets	  And	  National	  Welfare	  States',	  International	  Organisation,	  54	  (4),	  pp.737-­‐73.	  82	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’.	  83	  Hay	  (2004a),	  'The	  Normalizing	  Role’.	  84	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (2003),	  'The	  Discourse	  Of	  Globalisation’.	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publicly	  articulated.85	  In	  one	  discourse	  globalisation	  was	  a	  non-­‐negotiable	  process	  placing	   constraints	   on	   the	   social	   policy	   ambitions	   of	   the	   government	   (although	  these	  were	  cast	  as	  benign	  constraints	  because	  it	  was	  claimed	  that	  social	  justice	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  employment	  were	  consistent	  with	  them	  within	  the	  economic	  policy	  architecture	  that	  New	  Labour	  had	  adopted).	  In	  the	  other,	  globalisation	  was	  cast	  as	  a	   fragile	   political	   project	   that	   required	   and	   merited	   defence	   from	   potential	  challenges,	  and	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  other	  governments	  needed	  to	  be	  encouraged	  to	  embrace	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  their	  economies	  so	  as	  to	  realise	  its	  benefits.	  This	  second	  problem	  definition	  is	  no	  less	  neoliberal	  than	  the	  first	  because	  of	  its	  assertion	  of	  the	  straightforward	   benignity	   of	   economic	   openness	   and	   its	   intellectual	   heritage	  among	   enthusiasts	   of	   free	   trade	   and	   capital	   market	   liberalisation.	   Yet	   the	   two	  propositions	  are,	  of	  course,	  contradictory.	  	  	  There	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  New	  Labour	  was	  an	  enthusiastic	  proponent	  of	  open	  market	   economies,	   as	   is	   shown	   by	   the	   international	   advocacy	   of	   free	   trade	   and	  open	  capital	  accounts.86	  This	   then	  raises	   the	  question	  of	  what	  constraints,	   if	  any,	  the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   believed	   globalisation	   pose?	   It	   could	   plausibly	   be	  suggested	   that	   the	   role	  may	  have	   changed	  over	   the	   course	  of	   the	  Labour	  Party’s	  modernisation.	   Once	   in	   office,	   however,	   New	   Labour	   had	   come	   to	   embrace	   a	  strategic	   conception	   of	   credibility	   and	   understanding	   of	   external	   economic	  constraint,	  as	  evident	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘constrained	  discretion’	  discussed	  above.	  The	  considerable	   expansion	   of	   public	   spending	   that	   occurred	   under	   New	   Labour	  suggests	   that	   ‘small	   government’	   was	   not	   perceived	   to	   be	   a	   demand	   of	  international	   financial	   markets.87	   Through	   control	   of	   inflation	   and	   the	  appeasement	   of	   market	   sentiment	   through	   totemic	   acts	   such	   as	   the	   granting	   of	  operational	   independence	   to	   the	  Bank	  of	  England,	   the	  New	  Labour	   governments	  sought	   credibility,	   knowingly	   retaining	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  policymaking	  autonomy.	  How	   then	   to	  account	   for	  New	  Labour’s	   claims	   to	   the	   contrary?	  One	  possibility	   is	  that	   these	   governments	   appealed	   to	   external	   economic	   constraint	   as	   part	   of	   a	  strategy	   for	   public	   expectations	   management,	   and	   a	   way	   to	   shield	   their	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  Ibid;	  M.	  Watson	  (2002b),	  'Sand	  In	  The	  Wheels,	  Or	  Oiling	  The	  Wheels,	  Of	  International	  Finance?	  New	  Labour's	  Appeal	  To	  A	  'New	  Bretton	  Woods'',	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  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  
International	  Relations,	  4	  (2),	  pp.193-­‐221.	  86	  Watson	  (2002b),	  'Sand	  In	  The	  Wheels’.	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  Shaw	  (2008),	  Loosing	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macroeconomic	   stance	   from	   the	   demands	   for	   yet	   greater	   levels	   of	   public	  spending.88	  	  	  
A	  Death	  Exaggerated?	  	  The	   argument	   so	   far	   suggests	   that	   continuities	   in	   the	   macroeconomic	   policy	  approaches	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  and	  their	  Conservative	  predecessors	  reflected	   the	   internalisation	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions.	   They	   were	   not	  foisted	  upon	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  by	  external	  economic	  forces	  (although	  
perceptions	  of	   the	  demands	  of	   external	   economic	   forces	   and	  domestic	  producers	  conditioned	  by	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  played	  a	  key	  role),	  but	   rather	  was	  endorsed	  and	  enacted	   in	   its	   own	   terms.	  However,	   this	  neoliberal	  characterisation	   is	   contested.	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson	   argue	   that	   New	   Labour’s	  supposed	  rejection	  of	  Keynesian	  problem	  definitions	  has	  been	  over-­‐stated.89	  The	  reluctance	  of	   the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  to	  engage	   in	  overtly	   full-­‐employment	  oriented	  demand	  management	  is	  viewed	  by	  the	  authors	  as	  reflecting	  the	  very	  type	  of	   strategic	   credibility	   enhancement	   noted	   above:	   a	   concession	   on	   the	   parts	   of	  these	  governments	  that	  financial	  actors	  would	  no	  longer	  deem	  ‘fine	  tuning’	  or	  the	  running	   of	   substantial	   budget	   deficits	   to	   be	   credible	   under	   conditions	   of	  heightened	   capital	  mobility,	   given	   the	   international	   orthodoxy	   that	   such	   policies	  will	   lead	   to	   accelerating	   inflation.90	   Instead,	   Clift	   and	  Tomlinson	   argue	   that	  New	  Labour	  had	  come	  to	  prioritise	   its	  pursuit	  of	  strategic	  credibility	  over	   fine-­‐tuning,	  but	  continued	  to	  ‘coarse	  tune’	  the	  economy	  when	  it	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  at	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  equilibrium	  rather	  than	  risking	  the	  longer-­‐tem	  pathologies	  that	  Keynesian	  problem	   definitions	   suggested	   would	   result	   from	   allowing	   such	   a	   scenario	   to	  persist.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Watson	  and	  Hay	  (2003),	  'The	  Discourse	  Of	  Globalisation’;	  Burnham	  (2001),	  'New	  Labour	  And’.	  89	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’;	  B.	  Clift	  and	  J.	  Tomlinson	  	  (2007b),	  'Complexity.	  	  Constraint	  And	  New	  Labour's	  Putative	  Neo-­‐Liberalism:	  A	  Reply	  To	  Colin	  Hay',	  British	  	  
Journal	  Of.	  	  
Political	  Science,	  37	  (2),	  pp.378-­‐81.	  90	  This	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  ‘accommodate	  to	  shape’	  logic	  attributed	  to	  New	  Labour’s	  strategy	  in	  Fielding	  (2003),	  The	  Labour	  Party.	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This	   view	   has	   some	   parallels	   with	   New	   Labour’s	   publicly	   stated	   rationale	   for	  ‘constrained	  discretion’,	  although	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  a	  Keynesian	  rejection	  of	  Say’s	  Law	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  latter	  argument.	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson’s	  thesis	  draws	  on	  a	  number	  of	  early	  theoretical	  pronouncements	  from	  the	  New	  Labour	  Treasury.	  They	   note	   that	   certain	   ideas	   associated	  with	   the	   new-­‐Keynesian/neo-­‐monetarist	  macro-­‐economic	   orthodoxy,	   such	   as	   the	   ‘crowding	   out’	   thesis,	   did	   not	   figure	  prominently	   in	   the	   public	   communications	   of	   New	   Labour	   ministers.	   They	   also	  note	   the	   recurring,	   if	   somewhat	   ambiguous,	   appeals	   to	   financial	   and	   economic	  	  ‘instability’	   in	  New	  Labour	  communicative	  discourse.	  From	  this	   they	  surmise	   the	  possibility	   that	   New	   Labour	   continued	   to	   perceive	   endogenous	   sources	   of	  instability	  in	  international	  financial	  markets	  and	  an	  independent	  long-­‐term	  role	  for	  depressed	   aggregate	   demand	   in	   exacerbating	   low	   levels	   of	   economic	   activity	  following	  an	  endogenous	  or	  exogenous	  financial	  shock.	  	  	  The	   contrast	   between	   this	   interpretation	   and	   the	   neoliberal	   characterisation	   is	  reflected	  in	  the	  combative	  exchange	  between	  the	  two	  scholars	  and	  Hay.91	  For	  their	  part,	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson	   suggested	   that	   the	   expansion	   in	   public	   services	  expenditure	  following	  the	  first	  New	  Labour	  term	  might	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  its	  counter-­‐cyclical	   potential:	   the	   resulting	   job	   creation	   could,	   they	   suggest,	   have	  formed	   part	   of	   a	   concerted	   strategy	   to	   maintain	   consumer	   demand	   during	   the	  post-­‐9/11	   and	   post-­‐‘dotcom	   bubble’	   period,	   mitigating	   any	   longer-­‐term	  suboptimal	  equilibrium	  that	  might	  have	  resulted.	  Speaking	  against	  this	  view,	  Hay	  suggested	  such	  a	  move	  might	  equally	  be	  seen	   in	   light	  of	   the	  political	   rather	   than	  the	  economic	  cycle:	  a	   strategic	   investment	   in	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  2001	  and	  2005	  general	   elections	  which	  was	  deemed	  practical	   because	  of	   the	   credibility	   ‘earned’	  over	   the	   previous	   years.92	   Both	   sides	   felt	   obliged	   to	   concede	   that	   the	   available	  evidence	   could	   sustain	   both	   interpretations	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   set	   of	  unambiguously	   stagnant	   economic	   circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   New	   Labour	  governments’	  willingness	  to	  coarse	  tune	  might	  be	  observed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’;	  C.	  Hay	  (2007),	  'What's	  In	  A	  Name?	  New	  Labour's	  Putative	  Keynesianism',	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Science,	  37	  (1),	  pp.187-­‐92;	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007a),	  'Credible	  Keynesianism?’;	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  (2007b),	  'Complexity,	  Constraint’.	  92	  Hay	  (2004a),	  'The	  Normalizing	  Role’;	  Hay	  (2007),	  'What's	  In	  A	  Name?’.	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However,	  the	  whole	  debate	  may	  be	  somewhat	  misconceived.	  Upon	  inspection	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson’s	  operational	  criteria	  of	  ‘Keynesianism’	  differs	  markedly	  from	  that	  Hay’s	   and	   overlaps	   with	   what	   Hay	  would	   consider	   to	   signal	   neoliberal	   problem	  definitions.	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson	   empirically	   identify	   New	   Labour’s	   supposed	  Keynesianism	   through	   two	   conditions:	   a	   willingness	   to	   utilise	   fiscal	   policy	   in	   a	  counter-­‐cyclical	   role	   during	   times	   of	   deflationary	   pressures,	   and	   an	   analysis	   of	  financial	   markets	   and	   a	   liberal	   international	   economy	   that	   sees	   a	   capacity	   for	  endogenous	   instability	   that	  might	   bring	   about	   a	   recession.	   This	   contrasts	  with	   a	  more	   conventional	   understanding	   of	   Keynesianism	   which	   locates	   the	  distinctiveness	   of	   the	   approach	   in	   its	   rejection	   of	   Say’s	   Law	   and	   a	   belief	   that	  macroeconomic	  policy	  has	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  maintaining	  full	  resource	  utilisation	  at	  all	  times,	  not	  simply	  in	  stagnant	  or	  recessionary	  moments.	  A	  willingness	  to	  utilise	  stimulus	  of	  either	  the	  fiscal	  or	  monetary	  variety	  (or	  both)	  to	  preserve	  productive	  and	  human	  capital	  during	  a	  downturn	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  Keynesian	  approaches	  but	  is	   something	   endorsed	   by	   most	   contemporary	   economic	   theory,	   including	  Friedman’s	  own	  monetarist	  writings.93	  The	  difference	  between	  Keynesian	  and	  neo-­‐Keynesian/neoclassical	   approaches	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   endorses	   Say’s	   Law	   and	  consequently	   sees	   stimulus	   as	   an	   exceptional	   policy	   for	   use	   in	   unusual	  circumstances.	  	  	  The	   two	   authors	   do	   not	   produce	   adequate	   evidence	   of	   such	   a	   rejection.	   The	  writings	   of	  Gordon	  Brown	   that	   they	   cite	   in	   evidence	   of	   the	  proposition	   show	  an	  acceptance	   that	   a	   low	   employment,	   low	   growth	   equilibrium	   could	   in	   principle	  occur	   in	  historically	  exceptional	  circumstances	  and	  that	  counter-­‐cyclical	  stimulus	  is	  required	  to	  ward	  off	  such	  an	  event.94	  But	  there	  is	  also	  an	  explicit	  rejection	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  such	  events	  were	  likely	  in	  the	  historical	  conditions	  in	  which	  he	  wrote,	  and	  a	  scepticism	  that	  Say’s	  Law	  is	  violated	  in	  anything	  other	  than	  very	  exceptional	  circumstances.	   He	   identifies	   ‘long-­‐term	   stability’	   to	   be	   the	   appropriate	   goal	   for	  macroeconomic	  policy	  in	  all	  other	  circumstances,	  and	  the	  prescription	  offered	  is	  a	  macroeconomics	  premised	  on	  the	  pursuit	  of	  credibility,	  the	  control	  of	  inflation	  and	  a	   microeconomic	   definition	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   unemployment.	   Neither	   do	   the	  examples	  of	   ‘coarse	   tuning’	   that	   the	   authors	  point	   to	   suggest	   a	   rejection	  of	   Say’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’.	  94	  Brown	  (2001),	  'The	  Conditions	  For	  High’.	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Law	   because	   they	   take	   place	   precisely	   when	   the	   economy	   was	   perceived	   to	   be	  under	   deflationary	   pressure.	   Consequently,	   their	   account	   does	   not	   refute	   an	  interpretation	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  macroeconomic	  approach	  as	  being	  framed	  around	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions.	  	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  are	  not	  unaware	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  Say’s	  Law	  to	  debates	  over	  the	  presence	  or	   absence	  of	  Keynesianism.	  Their	   suggestion	   is	   that	  New	  Labour’s	  apparent	  embrace	  of	  Say’s	  Law	  was	   largely	  the	  product	  of	  strategic	  acquiescence	  and	  the	  fortune	  to	  preside	  over	  a	  non-­‐depressionary	  period,	  rather	  than	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  general	  applicability	  of	   the	   law.	  Yet	   if	   it	  were	  truly	  the	  case	  that	  New	  Labour	  perceived	   the	   economy	   thus	   or	   feared	   endogenous	   instability	   in	   international	  financial	   markets	   then	   we	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   a	   long-­‐term	   component	   to	   the	  strategic	  behaviour	  that	  Clift	  and	  Tomlinson	  attribute	  to	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  an	  ‘accommodate	  to	  shape’	   logic	  was	  at	  play	  in	  New	  Labour	  macroeconomics,	  as	  the	  authors	   implicitly	   suggest,	   then	  we	  would	  expect	   to	   find	  evidence	  of	   ‘shaping’	   of	  political,	   economic	   and	   institutional	   constraints	   that	   reflects	   Keynesian	   problem	  definitions.	   In	   particular,	  we	  would	   expect	   to	   find	   these	   governments	   seeking	   to	  secure	   international	   consensus	   on	   greater	   regulation	   of	   capital	   mobility	   in	   the	  same	   way	   that	   Keynes	   himself	   did	   so	   as	   to	   enhance	   the	   scope	   for	   demand	  management	   and	   limit	   the	   potential	   for	   financial	   instability.	   The	   notion	   of	   a	  distinctive	  Keynesian	  coordinative	  discourse	  on	  macroeconomic	  policy	  might	  find	  consequently	  find	  some	  support	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  orientation	  to	  financial	  markets.	  	  	  
A	  Faustian	  Pact?	  	  A	   popular	   metaphor	   among	   journalists	   depicting	   the	   relationship	   between	   New	  Labour	   and	   financial	   markets	   is	   of	   a	   ‘Faustian	   pact’:	   a	   decade	   of	   growth	   and	  expanding	   public	   spending	   bargained	   for	   the	   liberal	   regulation	   of	   a	   financial	  services	   industry	   that	  would	   eventually	   bring	   down	   Britain’s	   growth	  model.	   Yet	  the	  metaphor	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  appropriate.	  Mephistopheles	  was	  at	   least	  clear	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  his	  master’s	  services	  and,	  crucially,	  the	  timescale	  of	  repayment.	  If	  New	  Labour	  policymakers	  were	  strategically	  silenced	  Keynesians	  who	  perceived	  a	  threat	  of	  endogenous	   instability	   in	   financial	  markets	   then	  they	  would	   likely	  have	  inferred	   the	   inevitability	   of	   a	   future	   financial	   crisis	   for	   themselves,	  making	   their	  
	   191	  
signing	  of	  the	  contract	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  did	  a	  rather	  nihilistic	  act	  (I	  would	  argue	  implausibly	  so).	  Yet	  if	  their	  coordinative	  discourses	  in	  this	  area	  were	  influenced	  by	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   that	   assert	   the	   allocative	   efficiency	   and	   stability-­‐promoting	   nature	   of	   liberal	   financial	  markets	   and	   financial	   innovation	   then	   they	  would	  not	  have	  perceived	  any	  such	  risk.	  	  Engelen	   et	   al.	   offer	   an	   account	   of	   the	   ideas	   that	   facilitated	   elite	   complacence	   on	  financial	   sector	   activities	   in	   the	   years	   preceding	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   all	   of	  which	  nurtured	   a	   profound	   confidence	   in	   the	   benignity	   of	   liberally	   instituted	   financial	  markets.95	  The	  authors	  group	  these	  ideas	  under	  the	  headings	  of	  ‘Bernanke’s	  Story’	  and	  the	   ‘Social	  Value	  of	  Finance	  Narrative’.	  They	   locate	   the	  origins	  of	   these	   ideas	  among	   financial	   lobbyists	   and	   ‘econocrats’	   (particularly	   academic	   economists	   at	  the	   nexus	   of	   central	   banks)	   in	   the	   post-­‐Thatcher	   era,	   and	   argue	   that	   Treasury	  policymakers	  so	  comprehensively	  internalised	  them	  that	  they	  entirely	  constituted	  the	  governments’	  coordinative	  discourses	  on	  matter	  of	  financial	  regulation	  policy.	  	  	  The	   ideas	   Engelen	   et	   al	   trace	   are	   problem	   definitions	   that	   support	   the	  institutionalisation	   of	   liberal	   financial	   markets.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   notion	   that	  ‘financial	   innovation’	   (innovative	   products	   and	   processes	   within	   the	   financial	  services	   industry)	   is	   an	   unambiguously	   positive	   thing	   because	   of	   its	   supposed	  capacity	   to	  allow	  risk	   to	  be	  managed	  more	  effectively,	   thereby	   freeing	  up	  capital	  for	   investment	   that	   would	   otherwise	   have	   been	   tied	   to	   risk	   management	   and	  increasing	   the	   efficiency	   of	   capital	   allocation	   to	   the	   household	   and	   non-­‐financial	  private	   sectors.	   Securitisation	   was	   attributed	   this	   capacity	   and	   celebrated	   as	  having	  ‘democratised	  credit’	  by	  making	  it	  more	  widely	  available	  to	  consumers	  who	  might	   not	   otherwise	   have	   been	   eligible.	   In	   this	   there	   is	   the	   imprint	   of	   efficient	  market	   theory,	   which	   attributes	   a	   capacity	   to	   correctly	   functioning	   financial	  markets	   to	   incorporate	   all	   available	   information,	   and	   consequently	   to	   reflect	  rational	   calculations	   by	   market	   participants	   through	   which	   risk	   is	   distributed	  safely.96	   The	   upshot	   of	   these	   problem	   definitions	   is	   that	   providing	   market	  discipline	  and	  competition	  was	  ensured,	  Britain’s	  permissive	  approach	  to	  financial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	  96	  An	  excessive	  confidence	  in	  efficient	  market	  theory	  is	  also	  identified	  as	  an	  implicated	  factor	  by	  the	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  in	  its	  own	  valedictory	  on	  the	  financial	  instability	  of	  2007-­‐2008.	  See	  A.	  Turner	  (2009),	  The	  Turner	  Review:	  A	  Regulatory	  Response	  To	  The	  
Global	  Banking	  Crisis	  (London:	  Financial	  Services	  Authority).	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regulation	  would	  enhance,	  not	  undermine,	  financial	  stability	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  productive	  economy.	  Financial	  regulation	  was	  thus	  re-­‐cast	  as	  a	  microeconomic	  problem	  to	  be	  pursued	  at	  the	  firm	  level,	  rather	  than	  a	  macroeconomic	  problem	  to	  be	  pursued	  through	  the	  purposeful	  regulation	  of	  asset	  prices	  by	  means	  such	  as	  the	  manipulation	  of	   the	   credit	   cycle.	  This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   transference	  of	   financial	  regulatory	  responsibilities	   to	  the	  FSA	  which	  had,	  until	  2009,	  no	  explicit	  objective	  to	  ensure	  systemic	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  problem	  definition	  is	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  Keynesian	  one	  attributed	  to	  New	  Labour	   by	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson,	   in	   which	   financial	   instability	   is	   cast	   as	   an	  endogenous	  property	  of	  financial	  markets	  because	  financial	  market	  actors	  are	  seen	  to	  rely	  as	  much	  on	  convention	  and	  hubris	  as	  rational	  calculation	   in	  conditions	  of	  constant	  information	  uncertainty.97	  	  	  The	  second	  set	  of	   ideas	   identified	  by	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  are	  rather	  more	   instrumental	  than	   theoretical.	   They	   constitute	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   liberal	   regime	   of	   financial	  regulation	   is	   at	   the	   root	   of	   the	   British	   financial	   services	   industry’s	   international	  competitiveness	  and	  prosperity,	  and	  that	  this	  prosperity	  is	  pivotal	  to	  the	  country’s	  prosperity.	   The	   upshot	   of	   this	   problem	   definition	   in	   a	   context	   where	   a	   liberal	  regime	  of	   financial	  market	  regulation	  is	  seen	  to	   increase	  financial	  stability	   is	  that	  economic	  policy	  must	   in	  no	  way	   jeopardise	   the	   ‘competitiveness’	  of	   the	   financial	  services	  industry	  if	  economic	  policy	  objectives	  are	  to	  be	  achieved.	  	  	  It	  is	  the	  centrality	  of	  liberally	  instituted	  financial	  markets	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  New	   Labour	   presided	   over	   that	   lends	   credence	   to	   the	   view	   that	   they	   had	  internalised	  problem	  definitions	  attributed	  to	  them	  by	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  New	  Labour’s	  endorsement	  of	   the	   light	   touch	  approach	  and	  advocacy	  of	   it	   in	   international	   fora	  suggest	  New	  Labour’s	  problem	  definitions	  in	  relation	  to	  financial	  regulation	  were	  at	   odds	   with	   the	   Keynesian	   view	   attributed	   to	   them	   by	   Clift	   and	   Tomlinson.	  Moreover,	  through	  the	  integration	  of	  citizens	  into	  financial	  markets	  through	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  New	  Labour	  made	  a	  clear	  commitment	  to	  the	  view	  that	  house	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  On	  which	  see	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  W.W.	  Widmaier	  (2003),	  'The	  Keynesian	  Bases	  of	  a	  Constructivist	  Theory	  of	  the	  International	  Political	  Economy',	  
Millennium	  Journal	  of	  International	  Studies,	  32	  (1),	  pp.87-­‐107.	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share	   prices	   were	   on	   a	   sustainable	   upward	   trajectory	   rather	   than	   subject	   to	  inflationary	  pressures	  arising	  from	  a	  credit	  boom	  and	  speculative	  mania.	  	  Now,	  to	  be	  sure,	  a	  good	  political	  rationale	  can	  be	  made	  for	  New	  Labour’s	  embrace	  of	   liberal	   finance	  markets.	   I	   have	   noted	   in	   Chapter	   1	   that	   the	   ALGM,	  which	  was	  yielding	  good	  performance	  of	  key	   indicators	   for	  a	   time,	  depended	  upon	   financial	  innovation	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   credit.	   Watson	   has	   also	   observed	   that	   the	  entrenchment	   of	   capital	   mobility	   internationally	   served	   to	   bolster	   the	   UK’s	  precarious	   balance	   of	   payments	   position	   during	   New	   Labour’s	   tenure.98	  Furthermore,	   the	   integration	   of	   speculatively	   priced	   financial	   assets	   into	   social	  policy	  through	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  represented	  a	  ‘loss	  free’	  and	  non-­‐redistributive	  means	   of	   delivering	   material	   gains	   to	   middle	   class	   voters.	   Yet	   it	   is	   far	   from	  plausible	   that	   a	   government	   possessed	   of	   a	   genuinely	   Keynesian	   assessment	   of	  financial	  markets	  would	  have	  deemed	  these	  advantages	  sustainable	  and	  therefore	  worth	  the	  risk.	  	  	  Microeconomic	  Policy	  	  The	   microeconomic	   policy	   approach	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   is	   less	  prominent	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   New	   Labour,	   but	   it	   is	   an	   equally	   important	   and	  arguably	   rather	  more	   complex	   feature.	   As	   noted	   above,	   there	  was	   an	   active	   and	  interventionist	  quality	  to	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  industrial	  and	  labour	  market	  policy,	  and	  a	  fusion	  of	  both	  with	  a	  progressivist	  social	  agenda.	  The	  question	  asked	  here	   is	   where	   these	   sit	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ideal-­‐typical	   categories	   of	  discretionary/non-­‐discretionary	   and	   strategic/non-­‐strategic	   intervention,	   for	  upon	  this	  rests	  their	  categorisation	  as	  strategies	  of	  ‘roll	  out	  neoliberalisation’.	  	  
Non-­Discretionary	  Microeconomic	  Policies	  	  New	   Labour	   lacked	   an	   encompassing	   national	   discretionary	   level	   industrial	  strategy	  and	  was	  (rhetorically	  at	  least)	  committed	  to	  a	  non-­‐discretionary	  (and	  thus	  classifiably	   neoliberal)	   approach	   to	   microeconomic	   reform	   framed	   around	   the	  related	   goals	   of	   ‘competitiveness’	   and	   the	   attraction	  of	   foreign	  direct	   investment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Watson	  (2002b),	  'Sand	  In	  The	  Wheels’.	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(FDI).99	  The	  party	  distanced	   itself	   from	  what	   it	   cast	  as	   the	  outdated	   ‘Old	  Labour’	  notions	   of	   nationalisation,	   ‘protectionism’	   and	   ‘picking	  winners’	   in	   the	   run	  up	   to	  the	  1997	  general	  election.100	  These	  were	  deemed	  both	  ineffective	  and	  impossible	  in	  a	  context	  of	  globalisation.	  Instead,	  New	  Labour	  embraced	  many	  of	  the	  changes	  that	   the	   previous	   Conservative	   administrations	   had	   undertaken.101Like	   so	  many	  other	   aspects	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	   project,	   industrial	   policy	   was	   subject	   to	   a	  rebranding,	   becoming	   ‘competitiveness	   policy’	   instead,	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	  ‘competitiveness’	   became	   the	   leitmotif	   of	   New	   Labour	   microeconomics.102	   The	  precise	   conceptualisation	   of	   ‘competitiveness’	   with	   which	   the	   New	   Labour	  governments	   worked	   was	   somewhat	   vague,	   variably	   denoting	   productivity	  growth,	   supply-­‐side	   conditions	   that	   would	   allow	   British	   firms	   to	   compete	  internationally,	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  regions	  to	  inward	  investors,	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	   the	  national	   economy	  was	   capable	   of	   reconciling	   rising	   real	   incomes	  with	  the	  production	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  would	  withstand	  foreign	  competition.103	  	  	  The	  policies	  through	  which	  the	  competitiveness	  agenda	  was	  expressed	  amount	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  non-­‐discretionary	  approach	  to	  industrial	  policy	  and	  supply-­‐side	  reform	  framed	  around	  perceived	  market	  failures.	  Interventions	  sought	  to	  promote	  ‘entrepreneurialism’	  (an	  intangible	  property	  in	  which	  the	  British	  political	  economy	  was	   said	   to	   be	   deficient),	   and	   to	   address	   market	   failures	   in	   ‘innovation’	   (the	  development	   of	   new	   technologies	   and	   processes);	   skills	   (the	   supply	   of	   human	  capital),	   infrastructure	   and	   industrial	   finance.	   These	   sat	   alongside	   the	   other	  aspects	   of	   competitiveness	   policy	  more	   readily	   classifiable	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘roll	   back	  neoliberalisation’	  such	  as	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  competition	  as	  a	  spur	  to	  innovation,	  and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   flexible	   labour	   markets	   in	   which	   employees	   could	   be	  quickly	   hired	   and	   dismissed	   as	   market	   conditions	   changed.	   Together,	   these	  constituted	   so-­‐called	   ‘drivers	   of	   growth’	   that	   constituted,	   for	   New	   Labour,	   the	  appropriate	  means	  by	  which	  to	  pursue	  higher	  levels	  of	  growth	  and	  employment.104	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’;	  D.	  Williams	  (2010),	  'Industrial	  Policy',	  Local	  
Economy,	  25	  (8),	  pp.612-­‐21;	  J.	  Payne	  and	  E.	  Keep	  (2011),	  'One	  Step	  Forward,	  Two	  Steps	  Back?	  Skills	  Policy	  In	  England	  Under	  The	  Coalition	  Government',	  SKOPE	  Research	  Papers	  (Cardiff:	  SKOPE,	  Cardiff	  University).	  100	  Hay	  (1999b),	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour.	  101	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	  102	  Hay	  (2004c),	  'Credibility,	  Competitiveness’.	  103	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	  	  104	  Kitson	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007),	  'The	  Economics	  Of	  New	  Labour’.	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These	   interventions	   were	   co-­‐constitutive	   with	   the	   FDI	   agenda	   because	   it	   was	  assumed	  that	  the	  improved	  business	  environment	  that	  they	  brought	  about	  would	  attract	   investment	   from	   mobile	   multinational	   producers	   in	   the	   UK	   that	   would	  contribute	   further	   to	   competitiveness	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	  technologies	  and	  skills.	  105	  	  Intervention	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  human	  capital	  was	  something	  of	  a	  theoretical	  and	  practical	   lynchpin	   in	   New	   Labour’s	   political	   economy	   as	   the	   means	   by	   which	  economic	  efficiency	  was	  to	  be	  married	  to	  a	  progressive	  agenda.106	  Here,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  innovation	  as	  well,	   the	  market	  failure	  in	  question	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  one	   of	   under-­‐investment	   in	   a	   public	   good,	   necessitating	   public	   investment	   and	  production.107	   Yet	   consistent	   with	   the	   broad	   contours	   of	   EGT	   and	   Say’s	   Law-­‐influenced	   problem	   definitions	   that	   organised	   this	   and	   other	   areas	   of	   New	  Labour’s	   economic	   policy	   coordinative	   discourse	   there	   is	   also	   an	   appeal	   to	   a	  ‘supply-­‐push’	  effect.108	  The	  notion	  was	  that	  firms	  would	  respond	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  publicly	  provided	  human	  capital	  by	  utilizing	  skilled	  employees	  to	  move	  to	  higher	  value	   business	   strategies,	   enabling	   higher	   levels	   of	   employment	   and	   GDP	  growth.109	   Consequently	   further	   and	   higher	   education	   establishments	   were	   a	  major	  spending	  priority	  for	  these	  governments	  throughout	  their	  time	  in	  office,	  and	  were	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  beneficiaries	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  expanding	  levels	  of	  public	  spending	  following	  the	  2001	  election.110	  Ambitious	  targets	  were	  set	  for	  university	  intake	   while	   programmes	   such	   as	   the	   ‘train	   to	   gain’	   scheme	   and	   Individual	  Learning	   Accounts	   sought	   to	   utilise	   government	   subsidies	   to	   leverage	   employer	  and	   employee	   investments	   in	   vocational	   qualifications	   as	   part	   of	   an	   expanded	  adult	  education	  agenda.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	  106	  E.	  Keep	  and	  K.	  Mayhew	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  Labour	  made	   a	   positive	   virtue	   of	   the	   status	   of	   ‘innovations’	   as	   (ultimately)	   non-­‐excludable	   public	   goods	   because	   of	   their	   capacity	   to	   ‘spill	   over’	   and	   enhance	  productivity	   among	   multiple	   firms	   and	   sectors.111	   In	   response	   to	   the	   relative	  decline	  of	  UK	  business	  expenditure	  on	  research	  and	  development	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  the	  incoming	  Labour	  government	  implemented	  ‘R&D	  Tax	  Credits’	  to	  SMEs	  in	  2000,	  and	  then	  in	  2002	  extended	  these	  to	  larger	  businesses.112	  These	  tax	  credits	  allowed	  firms	  to	  offset	  expenditure	  on	  research	  and	  development	  against	  taxation	  to	  a	  more	  generous	  extent	  than	  other	  capital	  investment	  allowances.	  New	  Labour	  policy	  on	  innovation	  also	  substantially	  benefited	  the	  ‘research	  base’,	  constituted	  in	  the	  UK	  by	  the	  publically	  financed	  nexus	  of	  research	  councils	  and	  universities.	  The	  science	  budget	  had	  increased	  by	  £2bn	  by	  the	  end	  of	  their	  first	  term.113	  	  	  A	   less	   prominent	   feature	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	   government’s	   approach	   to	  competitiveness	   policy	   was	   the	   recognition	   of	   market	   failures	   impacting	   on	  industrial	   finance,	   particularly	   regarding	   investment	   in	   small	   and	  medium-­‐sized	  firms	   (SMEs).114	  Whilst	   not	   perceiving	   the	   pathological	   relationship	   that	   critical	  social	   democrats	   assert	   to	   exist	   between	   liberal	   financial	   markets	   and	   non-­‐financial	  businesses,	   these	  governments	  did	  acknowledge	  systematic	  problems	  in	  the	   provision	   of	   loans	   and	   venture	   capital	   to	   SMEs,	   and	   in	   the	   rate	   of	   business	  investment	   more	   generally.115	   The	   former	   problem	   was	   attributed	   to	   the	   risk	  profile	   of	   such	   ventures,	   which	   was	   seen	   as	   making	   small	   firms	   unappealing	  borrowers	   for	   many	   banks,	   and	   from	   informational	   asymmetries	   that	   both	  restricted	   firms’	   awareness	   of	   sources	   of	   venture	   capital	   and	   restricted	   the	  willingness	  of	  higher	  risk	  investors	  to	  participate.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  role	   for	   government	   in	   stimulating	   the	   supply	   of	   private	   finance	   to	   such	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ventures.116	  Measures	   included	  government	  guaranteeing	  of	   loans	  made	   to	  SMEs	  through	   the	   small	   loans	   guarantee	   scheme	   and	   investments	   including	   a	   suite	   of	  publicly-­‐backed	  venture	  capital	  funds	  –	  notably	  the	  nine	   ‘regional	  venture	  capital	  funds’	   and	   the	   related	   six	   ‘enterprise	   capital	   funds’	   –	   which	   were	   mandated	   to	  invest	   in	  SMEs	  on	  a	   commercial	  basis	   in	  order	   to	   leverage	   further	  private	   sector	  investment.	  The	  New	  Labour	  governments	  also	  continued	  to	   incentivise	  business	  investment	   through	   fiscal	   policy	   using	   a	   variety	   of	   ‘capital	   allowances’,	   through	  which	  firms	  could	  offset	  a	  portion	  of	  capital	  equipment	  depreciation	  against	  taxes.	  
	  
Discretionary	  Microeconomic	  Policies	  	  What	  these	  interventions	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  non-­‐discretionary	  nature.	  They	  achieve	  economic	  policy	  objectives	  through	  the	  enabling	  of	  market	  processes	  and	  market	   resource	   allocation.	   The	   competitive,	   correctly	   functioning	   market	  economy	  is	  positioned	  as	  the	  arbiter	  of	  worthwhile	  private	  sector	  projects	  and	  the	  rudder	  of	  industrial	  development.	  As	  such,	  these	  interventions	  and	  the	  arguments	  offered	   for	   them	   are	   quite	   consistent	   with	   the	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	  regarding	   microeconomic	   policy	   and	   a	   microeconomic	   strategy	   of	   roll	   out	  neoliberalisation.	   However	   it	   must	   be	   conceded	   that	   some	   of	   New	   Labour’s	  microeconomic	  policies	  do	  not	  fit	  this	  pattern	  and	  are	  identifiably	  discretionary	  in	  nature.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  observations,	  particularly	  where	  it	  relates	  to	  defence	  industries,	  some	  dissenting	  voices	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  instead.117	  	  Before	  entering	   this	  debate	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  clarify	  a	   few	  potentially	  misleading	  points	   of	   contention.	   A	   criticism	   of	   non-­‐discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   (rightly)	  made	  by	  those	  who	  advocate	  strategic	  discretionary	  forms	  of	   intervention	  is	  that	  no	   industrial	   policy	   is	   ‘purely’	   non-­‐discretionary	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   having	   a	  completely	   sector-­‐neutral	   impact.118	   By	   necessity,	   a	   degree	   of	   tailoring	   of	   non-­‐	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discretionary	   interventions	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   economy	   as	   it	   is	   presently	  constituted	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  such	  a	  policy.	  It	  is	  seen,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  design	  of	  a	  national	  curriculum	  that	  favours	  some	  general	  skill	  sets	  over	  others.	  It	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Manufacturing	  Advisory	  Service,	   which	   have	   long	   used	   public	   funds	   to	   address	   sector-­‐specific	   market	  failures	   arising	   from	   informational	   asymmetries	   in	   manufacturing	   markets.	   Yet	  such	  interventions	  were	  not	  in	  themselves	  reflective	  of	  a	  discretionary	  approach	  –	  they	   do	   not	   involve	   policymakers	   making	   discretionary	   judgments	   about	   the	  merits	   of	   private	   sector	   projects	   in	   relation	   to	   economic	   policy	   objectives,	   but	  instead	   compensate	   for	   problems	   that	   firms	   in	   a	   particular	   sector	  disproportionately	   face	  owing	   to	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  activity	  undertaken	   in	   that	  or	  other	   sectors.	   For	   those	   who	   would	   ascribe	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	  policy	   to	   the	  New	  Labour	   governments	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   show	   that	   such	   efforts	  formed	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   dirigiste	   strategy	   to	   shape	   the	   trajectory	   of	   economic	  development	   in	   which	   policymakers	   play	   a	   discretionary	   rather	   than	   market-­‐enabling	  role.	  	  With	   this	   point	   in	  mind	  we	   are	   able	   to	   address	   several	   red	   herrings	   that	  might	  otherwise	   influence	   our	   characterisation	   of	   New	   Labour.	   One	   such	   false	   lead	   is	  found	   in	   the	   tendency	   of	   the	  New	   Labour	   governments	   to	   react	   to	   the	   threat	   of	  closure	   of	   major	   employers	   by	   utilising	   the	   influence	   of	   public	   officials	   and	  deploying	  public	  funds.	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  failing	  Rover	  brand	  in	  2000	  and	  2005.	   Interventions	   such	   as	   these	   are	   certainly	   discretionary,	   yet	   they	   are	   not	  strategic.	  Were	  this	  the	  case	  then	  we	  would	  anticipate	  a	  systematic	  quality	  to	  such	  investments	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  coherent	  strategy.	  Instead,	  they	  represent	  an	  ad	  hoc	  and	  reactive	   form	  of	   intervention,	   reflecting	  unforeseen	  events	  rather	   than	  a	  broader	   set	   of	   preferences	   for	   the	   direction	   of	   industrial	   development.	   This	  reactive	  quality	  has	  a	   long	  pedigree	   in	  British	   industrial	  policy.119	   It	   is	   likely	   that	  such	  interventions	  reflect	  the	  political	   interests	  of	  the	  incumbent	  government	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Rover,	  avoiding	   the	  controversy	  arising	   from	  the	  demise	  of	  a	  historic	  British	   brand	   and	   the	   loss	   of	   jobs	   in	   Labour-­‐supporting	   constituencies).120	   It	  should	   be	   born	   in	   mind	   that	   even	   ardently	   neoliberal	   Thatcher	   governments	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responded	   to	   the	   politically	   problematic	   threat	   of	   unemployment	   in	   marginal	  constituencies	   and	   the	   demise	   of	   symbolically	   significant	   British	   brands	   in	  ways	  that	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  broader	  industrial	  policy.	  	  Some	   have	   also	   pointed	   to	   ongoing	   subsidy	   support	   for	   inward	   investors,	  particularly	   those	   in	   the	   automotive	   industry,	   as	   evidence	   of	   a	   dirigiste	   bone	  within	   New	   Labour’s	   industrial	   policy.121	   Many	   of	   the	   details	   of	   these	   kinds	   of	  subsidy	  are	  not	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  yet	  Girma	  et	  al.	  give	  some	  insight	  into	  their	  scale,	  reporting	  $30,000	  per	  worker	  spent	  on	  attracting	  Samsung	  production	  to	  the	  northeast	   of	   England,	   and	   $50,000	   spent	   attracting	   Siemans.122	   Again	   however,	  these	   discretionary	   responses	   are	   better	   interpreted	   as	   reactive	   rather	   than	  strategic:	   in	   this	   case	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   realities	   of	   the	   open	   economy	   that	   New	  Labour	  championed	  to	  domestic	  and	  international	  audiences	  alike	  as	   it	  sought	  to	  attract	   FDI.	   The	   difficulties	   that	   these	   macroeconomic	   realities	   impose	   on	   the	  maintenance	   of	   coherence	   for	   a	   non-­‐discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   is	  demonstrated	   in	   Bailey	   and	  Driffield’s	   rather	   unedifying	   example	   of	   two	  English	  regions	  engaging	  in	  a	  bidding	  war	  to	  attract	  investment	  from	  Acer:	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  national	  or	  regional	  business	  environment	   is	  no	  guarantee	  of	   inward	  investment,	  and	  sometimes	  additional	  incentives	  are	  required.	  	  	  In	  other	  areas	  a	  less	  reactive	  approach	  is	  evident,	  such	  as	  the	  consistent	  granting	  of	  privileged	  support	  and	  ministerial	  advocacy	  to	  firms	  involved	  in	  the	  manufacture	  of	   weapons.123	   In	   this,	   New	   Labour	   followed	   the	   conduct	   of	   its	   Conservative	  predecessors.	  Yet,	   importantly	   for	   the	  present	   argument,	   it	   is	   far	   from	  clear	   that	  the	   strategic	   imperatives	   implicated	   in	   such	   interventions	   related	   primarily	   or	  even	  directly	  to	  economic	  policy	  objectives,	  but	  may	  in	  fact	  represent	  the	  need	  of	  the	   ‘warfare	   state’.124	   Such	   was	   very	   likely	   the	   case	   in	   one	   of	   the	  more	   notable	  cases	   of	   discretionary	   intervention	   undertaken	   by	   neoliberal	   governments	   in	  Britain	  –	   the	  Al	  Yammama	  arms	  deal.125	  Yet	   there	  was	  more	  at	   stake	   in	   the	  deal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Williams	  (2010),	  'Industrial	  Policy'.	  122	  S.	  Girma,	  D.	  Greenaway,	  and	  K.	  Wakelin	  (2001),	  'Who	  Benefits	  From	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  in	  the	  UK?',	  Scottish	  Journal	  Of	  Political	  Economy,	  48	  (2),	  pp.119-­‐33.	  123	  S.	  Lee	  (2008),	  'The	  British	  Model	  Of	  Political	  Economy',	  in	  M.	  Beech	  and	  S.	  Lee	  (eds.),	  
Ten	  Years	  Of	  New	  Labour	  (London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan),	  pp.17-­‐34.	  124	  Ibid.	  125	  Williams	  (2010),	  'Industrial	  Policy'.	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than	  the	  success	  of	  a	  British	  arms	  exporter	  and	  the	  industry	  to	  which	  it	  belonged.	  Such	   instances	   are	   heavily	   intertwined	   with	   diplomatic	   and	   national	   security	  considerations,	   and	   the	   ‘problems’	   that	   such	   policies	   intend	   to	   solve	   are	   not	  necessarily	  ones	  of	  economic	  policy.	  	  	  Yet	   not	   all	   discretionary	   aspects	   of	   New	   Labour’s	   industrial	   policy	   can	   be	  dismissed	   as	   red	   herrings.	   Two	   features	   stand	   out	   as	   distinctly	   strategic	  expressions	   of	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy:	   the	   nine	   English	   Regional	  Development	   Agencies	   (RDAs)	   and	   the	   Technology	   Strategy	   Board	   (TSB).	   The	  RDAs	  reflected	  a	  devolving	  strand	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance.	   They	   assumed	   responsibility	   for	   a	   range	   of	   industrial	   policy	   and	  regional	  policy	  functions	  (although	  not	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  those	  devolved	  to	  the	  Scottish	   government).	   Each	   agency	   was	   charged	   with	   promoting	   the	   economic	  performance	   of	   their	   region	   and	   attracting	   inward	   investment	   to	   it,	   formulating	  regional	   economic	   strategies	   for	   this	   purpose.	   Many	   of	   these	   were	   simply	  regionally-­‐attuned	  applications	  of	  the	  non-­‐discretionary	  competitiveness	  oriented	  interventions	   discussed	   above.	   Examples	   of	   such	   interventions	   include	   the	  provision	   of	   regionally-­‐attuned	   business	   advice	   and	   networking	   opportunities,	  promotion	   of	   the	   government’s	   ‘enterprise	   education’	   agenda,	   and	   raising	   the	  profile	  of	  the	  region	  to	  prospective	  inward	  investors.	  	  	  However	  a	  second	  aspect	  of	   their	  regional	  economic	  strategy	  making	  has	  a	  more	  discretionary	  bent.	  Underpinning	  many	  of	  their	  interventions	  was	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  geographically	   bounded	   ‘cluster’.	   The	   ‘cluster’	   is	   a	   once-­‐vogue	   concept	   denoting	  groups	  of	  interlinked	  firms	  in	  close	  geographical	  proximity	  to	  one	  another.	  These	  inter-­‐linkages	   manifest	   either	   ‘vertically’,	   through	   their	   positions	   in	   the	   supply	  chains	   of	   particular	   industries,	   or	   ‘horizontally’	   across	   industries	   and	   sectors	  through	  requirements	  for	  similar	  tangible	  or	  intangible	  inputs	  (technologies,	  skills	  or	  the	  like).126	  RDAs	  were	  to	  be	  tasked	  to	  judge	  which	  clusters	  were	  central	  to	  the	  economic	  development	  of	   their	   regions	  and	   to	  prioritise	   their	  needs	   through	   the	  agency’s	   industrial	   policy	   capacities.	   Interventions	   to	   this	   end	   included	   co-­‐financing	   collaborative	   projects	   undertaken	   between	   firms	   to	   create	   research,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Department	  Of	  Trade	  And	  Industry	  (2003a),	  A	  Practical	  Guide	  To	  Cluster	  Development	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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development	  and	  proto-­‐typing	  facilities	  (discussed	  further	   in	  Chapter	  6);	  directly	  grant-­‐financing	   projects	   undertaken	   by	   individual	   firms	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  cluster	  as	  a	  whole;	  and	  channelling	  funds	  granted	  from	  the	  EU	  level	  to	  both	  of	  these	  ends.	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  both	  strategic	  and	  discretionary	  in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   policymakers’	   judgments	   about	  which	   clusters	   and	  private	  sector	   projects	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   yield	   an	   optimal	   trajectory	   of	   economic	  development	  and	  secure	  the	  government’s	  economic	  policy	  objectives.	  	  	  The	   willingness	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   to	   sanction	   such	   intervention	  demonstrates	   that	   something	   more	   complex	   than	   an	   out-­‐an-­‐out	   rejection	   of	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy.	  Yet	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  observation	  for	  a	   characterisation	   of	   New	   Labour	   should	   not	   be	   overstated.	   While	   RDAs	  represented	   a	   potential	   infrastructure	   by	   which	   a	   nationally	   coherent	  discretionary	  industrial	  strategy	  might	  have	  been	  delivered,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  potential	  was	  realised	  or	  that	  it	  was	  ever	  intended	  to	  be	  realised.	  The	  development	  of	   regional	   economies	   under	   New	   Labour	   was,	   critics	   charge,	   marred	   by	   a	  persistent	  lack	  of	  national	  coordination	  among	  the	  regional	  economic	  strategies	  of	  the	  nine	  RDAs	  prior	  to	  2008,	  leading	  to	  the	  inefficient	  replication	  of	  interventions	  and	   competition	   among	   regions.127	   This	   reflected	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   national	  equivalent	   of	   the	   RDAs’	   regional	   economic	   strategies	   through	   which	   regional	  discretionary	  interventions	  could	  be	  aggregated	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  national-­‐level	  economic	   policy	   objectives.	   Paradoxically	   Bailey	   and	   Driffield	   also	   note	   that	   the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  did	  appear	  to	  set	  rather	  tight	  constraints	  on	  the	  areas	  in	  which	   the	   RDAs	   were	   permitted	   to	   exercise	   strategic	   discretion,	   serving	   to	  compound	   the	   repetition	  of	   functions.128	  Yet	   these	  national-­‐level	  preferences	  did	  not	   amount	   to	   anything	   like	   a	   national	   dirigiste	   strategy	   of	   supply-­‐chain	  construction	   or	   regional	   specialisation	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   establishing	   national	  comparative	  advantages	  as	  a	  strategic	  discretionary	  approach	  implies.129	  	  The	  view	  that	  the	  discretionary	  capacity	  of	  the	  RDAs	  was	  not	  a	  central	   feature	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  industrial	  policy	  is	  given	  further	  weight	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	  128	  Ibid.	  	  129	  Kitson	  and	  Wilkinson	  also	  note	  this	  limited	  focus	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  high	  tech	  industries,	  see	  Kitson	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007),	  'The	  Economics	  Of	  New	  Labour’.	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discretionary	   capacity	   of	   the	   RDAs	   was	   not	   extensively	   resourced	   by	   central	  government.	   The	   total	   annual	   funds	   allocated	   to	   the	   nine	   agencies	   was	   around	  £2.3bn.	  Each	   individual	  RDA’s	   funds	  would	  then	  be	  allocated	  among	  the	  agency’s	  various	  functions,	  many	  of	  which	  did	  not	  relate	  to	  discretionary	  intervention	  at	  all.	  	  	  The	  RDAs	  were,	   at	  most,	   a	   proto-­‐strategic	   strand	   to	  New	  Labour’s	   discretionary	  interventionism.	   Yet	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   infrastructure	   by	   which	   discretionary	  industrial	   strategy	  might	   be	   delivered	   is	   rendered	  more	   significant	   by	   a	   second:	  the	  Technology	  Strategy	  Board.	  This	  agency	  exists	  to	  facilitate	  the	  private	  research	  and	   development	   of	   innovative	   products	   and	   processes	  within	   the	   UK	   economy.	  Unlike	   the	   research	   councils,	   it	   operates	   primarily	   by	   funding	   and	   co-­‐investing	  with	  firms	  in	  private	  sector	  projects.	  It	  seeks	  to	  overcome	  collective	  action	  barriers	  that	  are	  judged	  to	  impact	  upon	  research	  and	  development	  investment	  by	  funding	  primarily	   multi-­‐firm	   collaborations	   on	   projects	   of	   mutual	   interest.	   The	   board	  operates	  a	  ‘challenge	  led’	  approach	  through	  which	  it	  seeks	  private	  sector	  proposals	  for	  projects	   that	  utilise	   and	  develop	   ‘platform	   technologies’.	  These	  proposals	   are	  then	  judged	  by	  the	  board	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  hold	  the	  potential	  to	  a	  positively	  impact	  on	  the	  productivity,	  economic	  and	  employment	  growth	  potential	  of	  the	  UK	  economy.	  	  	  The	   TSB	   became	   an	   independent	   agency	   in	   2007.	   For	   two	   years	   previously	   the	  TSB’s	   forerunner	   (a	   committee	   within	   the	   Business/Industry	   Ministry)	   had	  conducted	   a	   similar	   role	   and	   had	   already	   established	   the	   TSB’s	   technological	  strategy.	  This	  committee	  in	  turn	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  a	  review	  undertaken	  earlier	  in	  the	  decade.130	  The	  report	  documents	  show	  a	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  towards	  a	  strategic	  and	  discretionary	   approach	   as	   a	   means	   to	   overcoming	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘innovation	   gap’	  between	  invention	  and	  commercialisation.	  The	  ‘problem’	  identified	  here	  is	  similar	  to	   that	   for	   which	   the	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions	   into	   ‘innovation’	   are	  directed:	  namely	  of	  a	   tendency	   for	   the	  private	  sector	   to	  under-­‐invest	   in	  research	  and	   development.	   Yet	   the	   problem	   is	   defined	   in	   rather	   different	   terms:	   not	   as	   a	  shortfall	  in	  investment	  arising	  from	  the	  status	  of	  innovations	  as	  public	  goods,	  but	  rather	   the	   need	   for	   industrial	   policymakers	   to	   identify	   and	   actively	   support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Department	  Of	  Trade	  And	  Industry	  (2003b),	  Competing	  In	  The	  Global	  Economy:	  The	  
Innovation	  Challenge	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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emerging	   ‘disruptive’	   (in	   the	  Schumpeterian	  sense)	   technologies	  and	  products	   to	  ensure	  British	  firms	  realise	  their	  economic	  benefits	  and	  are	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  their	  commercialisation.	   In	   this	   ‘diagnosis’	   industrial	   policymakers	   are	   attributed	   the	  epistemological	   resources	   with	   which	   to	   judge	   the	   importance	   of	   emerging	  technologies,	   the	  developmental	  value	  of	  private	  sector	  projects	  and,	   implicitly,	  a	  conceptualisation	   of	   what	   the	   direction	   of	   industrial	   development	   ought	   to	   be.	  Both	  features	  are	  an	  anathema	  to	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions.	  	  
The	  Significance	  of	  Strategic	  Discretionary	  Strands	  	  Like	  the	  RDAs,	  the	  TSB	  is	  subject	  to	  funding	  constraints	  that	  place	  boundaries	  on	  its	   scope	   as	   an	   instrument	  of	   discretionary	   intervention:	  TSB	  annual	   funds	  were	  around	  £3-­‐400mn.	  Yet	  the	  TSB	  is	  perhaps	  a	  rather	  more	  significant	  manifestation	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	  approach	  than	  the	  RDAs	  because	  it	  represents	  a	  coherent	  national	  level	  strategy,	  and	  because	  it	  purposefully	  aims	  to	  bring	  to	  fruition	  private	  sector	  projects	  and	  a	  trajectory	  of	  development	  that	  might	  not	  have	  been	  brought	  to	   fruition	  had	  the	  market	  been	  the	  arbiter	  of	  developmental	  prospects.	  The	  TSB	  and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   the	   RDAs,	   thus	   pose	   an	   interesting	   interpretive	   question	  regarding	  the	  character	  and	  content	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  economic	  policy	  coordinative	  discourses.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  problem	  definitions	  that	  are	   at	   odds	  with	   neoliberal	   ones	   –	   namely	   that	   the	   pursuit	   of	   optimal	   economic	  performance	   demands	   that	   the	   government	   make	   allocative	   decisions,	   arbitrate	  developmental	   prospects	   and	   purposefully	   shape	   the	   trajectory	   of	   industrial	  development.	  These	  are	  precisely	  the	  beliefs	  that	  New	  Labour	  disavowed	  publicly	  as	  being	   ‘Old	  Labour’	   and	   incompatible	  with	   a	   globalised	  economy.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   financial	   resources	   made	   available	   limited	   the	   scope	   of	   strategic	  discretionary	   industrial	   policy,	   and	   the	   bulk	   of	   microeconomic	   policy	   was	   non-­‐discretionary	   in	   nature	   and	   premised	   upon	   problem	   definitions	   that	   assert	   the	  need	  to	  enable	  market	  resource	  allocation.	  Whilst	  not	  necessarily	  contradictory	  in	  practice,	   the	   two	   approaches	   do	   suggest	   the	   presence	   of	   contrasting	   problem	  definitions:	  one	  would	  expect	  a	  government	  that	  attributed	  to	  itself	  the	  capacity	  to	  carry	   out	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   to	   have	   committed	   greater	  resources	   across	   a	   greater	   range	   of	   issue	   areas	   in	  which	   related	   problems	  were	  acknowledged	   to	   exist	   (for	   example,	   by	   addressing	   shortfalls	   in	   the	   provision	   of	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finance	  to	  SMEs	  through	  a	  national	  investment	  bank	  which	  could	  align	  investments	  to	  those	  of	  the	  TSB).	  	  	  The	   question	   thus	   arises	   as	   to	   why	   the	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   strand	   remained	  relatively	  under-­‐developed?	  One	  possible	  means	  of	  answering	   this	  question	   is	   to	  disaggregate	  economic	  policy	  coordinative	  discourse	  along	  departmental	  lines	  and	  to	   analyse	   the	   problem	   definitions	   informing	   industrial	   policymakers	   separately	  from	  those	  informing	  macroeconomic	  policy	  (largely	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	  Treasury).	  Insofar	   as	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   informing	   the	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   agenda	   were	   confined	   to	   the	   Business/Industry	   Ministry	   then	   the	  under	  development	  of	   the	  strategic-­‐discretionary	  strand	  may	  reflect	   the	  differing	  priorities	   of	   the	   two	   groups	   of	   economic	   policymakers,	   and	   an	   actual	   or	   latent	  conflict	  between	  them	  arising	  from	  the	  institutional	  dominance	  of	  the	  former	  over	  the	  latter.	  There	  is	  a	  good	  historical	  precedent	  for	  such	  a	  claim:	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Business/Industry	  Ministry’s	  departmental	   forebears	  have	   long	  been	  at	  odds	  over	   the	   issue	   of	   discretionary	   interventionism	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	   public	  resources	   in	   industrial	   modernisation,	   with	   the	   Treasury	   tending	   to	   favour	  financial	   and	   monetary	   orthodoxy	   and	   utilising	   its	   control	   of	   macroeconomic	  policy	  priorities	  to	  subordinate	  industrial	  interventionism	  to	  these	  ends.131	  Under	  New	   Labour	   this	   divergence	   in	   problem	   definitions	   was	   revealed	   anew	   –	   to	   a	  
limited	  extent.	  	  	  The	   adherence	   of	   the	  New	   Labour	   Treasury	   to	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   is	  suggested	   by	   the	   approach	   to	   macroeconomic	   policy	   described	   above.	  Furthermore,	   it	   also	   retained	   control	   of	   a	   number	   of	   industrial	   policy	  interventions,	   including	   the	   regional	   venture	   capital	   funds	   and	   the	   various	   fiscal	  concessions	  made	  to	  businesses	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  R&D	  and	  capital	  investment.	  I	  would	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   not	   coincidental	   that	   these	   are	   non-­‐discretionary	   in	  character,	  for	  such	  interventions	  are	  quite	  consistent	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	   implicit	   in	   its	   broader	   approach.132	   The	   Business/Industry	   Ministry	  meanwhile	   also	   pursued	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions	   and	   its	   agenda	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  C.	  Clifford	  (1997),	  'The	  Rise	  And	  Fall	  Of	  The	  Department	  Of	  Economic	  Affairs	  1964-­‐69:	  British	  Government	  And	  Indicative	  Planning',	  Contemporary	  British	  History,	  11	  (2),	  pp.94-­‐116;	  P.	  Kerr	  (1999),	  'The	  Post-­‐War	  Consensus:	  The	  Woozle	  That	  Wasn't',	  in	  D.	  Marsh,	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  Postwar	  British	  Politics	  In	  Perspective	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press),	  pp.66-­‐86.	  132	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy’.	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predominantly	   in	   coherence	   with	   the	   broader	   neoliberal	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	   attributed	   to	   New	   Labour	   thus	   far.	   Yet	   its	   willingness	   to	  sanction	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   measures	   suggests	   that	  certain	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   were	   entertained	   in	   relation	   to	  innovation	   and	   (to	   a	   more	   limited	   extent)	   regional	   development	   that	   were	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  ones	  held	  by	  the	  Treasury	  because	  they	  attributed	  capacities	  and	  responsibilities	   to	  policymakers	   that	  are	  markedly	  non-­‐neoliberal.	  In	   this	   view	   the	   coordinative	   discourses	   of	   macroeconomic	   and	   industrial	  policymakers	  differed	  in	  small	  but	  categorically	  significant	  ways.	  	  The	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   relatively	   limited	   expression	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  interventionism	  under	  New	  Labour	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  departments	  is	  not	  something	  that	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  New	  Labour	  equips	  us	  to	  adjudicate	  with	  any	   certainty.	  The	  Treasury	  under	  New	  Labour	  was,	   as	   it	  had	  been	   the	   past,	   the	   more	   institutionally	   endowed	   of	   the	   two	   departments.	   Lee	  suggests	  that	   its	  powers	  had	  proportionally	   increased	  within	  the	  macroeconomic	  policy	   framework	   that	   New	   Labour	   enshrined	   because	   it	   granted	   Treasury	  personnel	  new	  means	  of	  control	  over	  departmental	  spending	  through	  means	  such	  as	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  budgetary	  reviews.133	  The	  restriction	  of	  the	  strategic-­‐discretionary	  agenda	  might	   thus	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	   result	   of	   the	   funding	   constraints	  placed	  upon	   the	   Business/Industry	   Ministry	   by	   a	   Treasury	   that	   saw	   little	   value	   in	  expanding	  the	  budgets	  of	  strategic-­‐discretionary	  organs.	  As	  noted	  already,	  were	  it	  not	  for	  these	  constraints	  our	  intuitive	  expectation	  of	  industrial	  policymakers	  who	  attributed	   to	   themselves	   the	   capacities	   implicit	   in	   the	   strategic-­‐discretionary	  approaches	   would	   be	   to	   have	   intervened	   across	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   areas	   and	  channelled	   more	   funding	   into	   the	   existing	   instruments.	   The	   result	   would	   have	  been	   a	   rather	   different	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   to	   the	  neoliberal	  one	  in	  evidence	  under	  New	  Labour.	  	  	  Naturally,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   counterfactual	   or	   evidence	   of	   an	   inter-­‐departmental	   conflict	   such	   a	   statement	   is	   unavoidably	   speculative.	   Yet	   it	   does	  point	   to	   an	   important	   and	   firmer	   conclusion:	   a	   latent	   conflict	   existed	   between	  approaches	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	   premised	   on	   neoliberal	   and	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Lee	  (2008),	  'The	  British	  Model’.	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neoliberal	  problem	  definitions,	  centred	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  spending	  priorities	  associated	   with	   the	   former	   conflict	   with	   those	   of	   the	   latter.	   If	   non-­‐neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  were	  indeed	  confined	  to	  the	  Business/Industry	  Ministry	  then	  such	  a	  conflict	  was	  latent	  within	  New	  Labour.	  In	  chapter	  6	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  latent	  conflict	   has	   been	   visibly	   actualised	   as	   the	   fiscal	   demands	   of	   a	   neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	   have	   served	   to	   constrain	   a	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   agenda	   that	   has	  expanded	  in	  scope.	  	  What	   significance,	   then,	   ought	   we	   to	   attribute	   to	   these	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   in	   our	   characterisation	   of	   New	   Labour?	   Certain	   elements	   of	   the	  ‘Huttonite	   moment’	   in	   Labour	   Party	   thinking	   during	   the	   early	   1990s	   appear	   to	  have	  survived	  into	  office	  with	  less	  moderation	  than	  is	  sometimes	  supposed.134	  Yet	  the	   extent	   of	   these	   pre-­‐neoliberal	   continuities	   and	   the	   radicalism	   of	   the	  Business/Industry	  Ministry	  in	  relation	  to	  New	  Labour’s	  wider	  approach	  should	  not	  be	   exaggerated.	   There	   is	   little	   evidence	   of	   an	   internalisation	   of	   the	  more	   radical	  proposals	  of	  the	  1990s’	  Industry	  Forum;	  a	  substantive	  ‘stakeholderism’	  was	  never	  entertained;	  and	  in	  other	   issue	  areas	  the	  ministry	  was	  an	  enthusiastic	  proponent	  of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   as	   seen	   by	   its	   endorsement	   of	   flexible	   labour	  markets	   and	   its	   antipathy	   to	   contrary	   directives	   emanating	   from	   the	   EU.135	  Moreover,	  the	  testimony	  of	  some	  insiders	  points	  to	  an	  ongoing	  hostility	  on	  the	  part	  of	   some	   Business/Industry	   Ministry	   officials	   to	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   strategic	  discretionary	  agenda	  as	  of	  2009,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  department	  was	  itself	  divided	  on	   the	   necessity	   of	   such	   interventions.136	   The	   vision	   of	   political	   economic	  restructuring	   that	   New	   Labour	   industrial	   policymakers	   sanctioned	   was	  consequently	  not	  far	  removed	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Treasury’s	  endorsement	  of	  the	  post-­‐Thatcherite	   political-­‐economic	   settlement,	   but	   involved	   a	   different,	   discretionary	  framing	   of	   certain	   problems.	   The	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring	  that	  emerged	  from	  New	  Labour’s	   time	   in	  office	  was	  therefore	  a	  neoliberal	  one	   in	  the	  aggregate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  N.	  Thompson	  (1996),	  'Supply	  Side	  Socialism:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Of	  New	  Labour',	  
New	  Left	  Review,	  1	  (216),	  pp.37-­‐54.	  135	  Thompson	  (1996),	  'Supply	  Side	  Socialism’;	  Krieger	  (2007),	  'The	  Political	  Economy’;	  Howell	  (2004),	  'Is	  There	  A	  Third	  Way’.	  136	  P.	  Diamond	  (2011),	  'Governing	  As	  New	  Labour:	  An	  Inside	  Account	  Of	  The	  Blair	  And	  Brown	  Years',	  Political	  Studies	  Review,	  9	  (2),	  pp.145-­‐62.	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Conclusions	  	  I	   have	   argued	   that	   New	   Labour	   was	   both	   neoliberal	   and	   committed	   to	   socially	  progressive	   notions,	   but	   also	   that	   there	   were	   certain	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   present	   in	   these	   government’s	   coordinative	   discourses	   on	   economic	  policymaking	   as	   well.	   This	   renders	   the	   governments’	   character	   complex:	   both	  neoliberal,	  and	  more	  than	  neoliberal.	  However	  by	  conceptualising	  neoliberalism	  as	  a	   restructuring	  ethos	   rather	   than	  an	   Ideology,	   and	  by	  adopting	  a	  departmentally	  disaggregated	   view	   of	   coordinative	   discourses,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   how	   these	  contrasting	  elements	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	  governance	  need	   not	   lead	   us	   to	   view	   New	   Labour	   as	   incoherent,	   or	   non-­‐neoliberal.	   At	   the	  centre	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  political	  economy	  was	  an	  approach	  to	  economic	  policy	  and	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   that	   was	   predominantly	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions.	   The	   result	   was	   an	   entrenchment	   of	   the	   post-­‐Thatcherite	   political-­‐economic	   settlement	   and	   the	   deployment	   strategies	   of	   roll	  out	   neoliberalisation	   through	   which	   it	   sought	   to	   contain	   some	   of	   the	   economic	  dysfunctions	  arising	  from	  earlier	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  of	  the	  British	  economy.	  This	   approach	   to	   economic	   policy	   framed	   and	   constrained	   New	   Labour’s	  progressive	  agenda,	  which	  sought	  to	  address	  social	  injustice	  through	   instruments	  that	  were	   predominantly	   consistent	  with	   this	   approach.	   That	   this	   synthesis	  was	  achieved	   in	   policy	   design	   (if	   not	   in	   practice)	   means	   that	   New	   Labour	   can	   be	  characterised	  as	  both	  an	  expression	  of	  neoliberalism	  and	  of	  progressivism	  without	  any	  contradiction.	  	  	  The	  strategies	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  undertaken	  by	  these	  governments	  also	  placed	   at	   least	   a	   latent	   constraint	   on	   the	   development	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  policies	  that	  were	  premised	  on	  rather	  different	  problem	  definitions.	  There	  was	  no	  synthesis	   between	   this	   agenda	   and	   the	   neoliberal	   one	   because	   the	   two	   share	  different,	  antagonistic	  problem	  definitions.	  In	  the	  event,	  it	  was	  strategies	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  that	  formed	  the	  mainstays	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  political-­‐economic	   governance.	   Consequently,	   the	   presence	   of	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   and	   a	   limited	   range	   of	   interventions	   that	   reflect	   them	   are	   not	   of	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significance	   to	   the	   characterisation	   of	   New	   Labour	   developed	   in	   this	   and	   the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  	  Yet	   this	   aspect	   is	   not	   insignificant	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   trajectory	   of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  Its	  significance	  lies	  in	  its	  very	  presence:	  non-­‐neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  were	  available	  to	  policymakers	  in	   the	   event	   that	   the	   neoliberal	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   governance	  adopted	   by	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   ever	   came	   under	   strain.	   In	   the	  subsequent	  research	  chapters	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  this	  is,	  in	  essence,	  exactly	  what	  has	  occurred	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   have	   served	   as	   resources	  with	  which	   the	   Business/Industry	  Ministry	  has	   constructed	   a	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   and	   an	   expanded	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   agenda,	   and	   that	   the	   ongoing	   power	   of	   the	   Treasury	   and	   its	  preference	   for	  a	  neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	  has	  been	   instrumental	   in	   shaping	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  trajectory	  of	  UK	  economic	  development.	  It	  is	  to	  arguments	  such	  as	  these	  that	  the	  following	  research	  chapters	  now	  turn.	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Chapter	  5.	  
Post-­2008	  Crisis	  Diagnosis:	  A	  Macroeconomic	  Perspective	  
	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   examine,	   compare	   and	   interpret	   the	   crisis	  diagnoses	   of	   the	   two	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   where	   they	   pertain	   to	  macroeconomic	  policy,	  and	  to	  consider	  their	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	   trajectory	   of	   post-­‐2008	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   The	   analysis	   is	  structured	   according	   to	   four	   themes:	   the	   core	   macroeconomic	   triad	   of	   growth,	  (un)employment	   and	   inflation;	   the	   public	   finances;	   macroeconomic	   rebalancing	  (which	   in	   this	   context	   pertains	   to	   the	   composition	   of	   aggregate	   demand)	   and	  financial	  stability.	  In	  the	  subsequent	  chapter	  I	  examine	  the	  microeconomic	  policies	  of	   the	   two	  governments	   along	   the	   related	   themes	  of	   growth,	  unemployment	  and	  sectoral	   rebalancing	   (which	   in	   that	   context	   pertains	   to	   the	   rebalancing	   of	   the	  composition	  of	  economic	  activity).	  	  	  Much	  of	  the	  public	  and	  academic	  debate	  concerning	  change	  and	  continuity	  in	  post-­‐2008	   political-­‐problem	   definitions	   and	   restructuring	   has	   focused	   on	  macroeconomic	   policy.	   Some	   have	   entertained	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   moment	   of	  ideational	  rupture	  and	  contingency	  in	  late	  2008,	  and	  in	  some	  accounts	  even	  a	  brief	  but	  thwarted	  resurgence	  of	  Keynesian	  ideas.1	  Others	  have	  posited	  straightforward	  continuity	   arising	   from	   either	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   or	   a	  state	  of	  catastrophic	  equilibrium.2	  Most	  of	   these	  contributions	   focus	  primarily	  on	  the	  issue	  of	   ‘deficit	  reduction	  verses	  fiscal	  stimulus’	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  how	  the	  diagnosis	   of	   a	   range	   of	   issues	   that	   confronted	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   might	  influence	   our	   characterisation	   of	   them.	   I	   examine	   a	   range	   of	   themes	   here	   to	   ask	  whether	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  crisis	  diagnosis	  has	  emerged	  is	  warranted	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  the	  problem	  definitions	  that	  constitute	  it	  might	  be	  characterised.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A.	  	  Kaya	  and	  G.	  Herrera	  (2014),	  'Why	  The	  2008	  Crisis	  Was	  A	  Bad	  Crisis	  For	  New	  Ideas',	  
Journal	  Of	  International	  Relations	  And	  Development,	  Online	  Pre-­‐Publication	  (DOI:	  10.1057/jird.2014.8);	  Smith	  (2013),	  'Globalisation	  And	  The	  Resilience’.	  2	  M.	  Blyth	  (2013),	  Austerity:	  The	  History	  Of	  A	  Dangerous	  Idea	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press);	  Hodson	  and	  Mabbett	  (2009),	  'UK	  Economic	  Policy’;	  Hay	  (2011a),	  'Pathology	  Without	  Crisis?’;	  Cf.	  C.	  Hay	  (2013b),	  'Treating	  The	  Symptom	  Not	  The	  Condition:	  Crisis	  Definition,	  Deficit	  Reduction	  And	  The	  Search	  For	  A	  New	  British	  Growth	  Model',	  The	  British	  
Journal	  Of	  Politics	  And	  International	  Relations,	  15	  (1),	  pp.23-­‐37.	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What	  emerges	  from	  the	  present	  analysis	  is	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  similarity	  (but	  not	   identity)	  between	   the	   two	  governments’	   crisis	  diagnoses,	   and	  between	   these	  and	   pre-­‐2008	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   regarding	   economic	   policy	   and	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   These	   diagnoses	   point	   their	   subscribers	   to	  decisive	  interventions	  that	  have	  reconfigured	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  activity	  and	  responsibility	  in	  a	  range	  of	  areas,	  changes	  that	  I	  argue	  facilitate	   a	   thoroughly	   neoliberal	   strategy	   for	   macroeconomic	   adjustment	   by	  means	  of	  wage	  deflation,	  the	  placation	  of	  perceived	  financial	  market	  sentiment	  and	  a	   tentative	   re-­‐regulation	   of	   the	   credit	   cycle.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   constitutes	   a	   new	  phase	   in	   the	  neoliberalisation	  of	   the	  British	  political	   economy,	  premised	  on	  new	  strategies	  of	  roll	  out	  and	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	  and	  a	  faster,	  ‘deeper’	  trajectory	  of	  restructuring	  than	  prior	  to	  2008.	  	  These	  arguments	  do,	  of	  course,	  suppose	  that	  a	  comparison	  can	  be	  made	  between	  the	  two	  governments’	  crisis	  diagnoses.	  The	  political	  economic	  circumstances	  that	  they	   confronted	   –	   the	   early	   and	   latter	   post-­‐2008	   contexts	   –	   were	   indeed	  characterised	  by	  important	  differences,	  namely	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  crisis	  and	  the	  end	  of	   the	  deep	  recession	  of	  2009.	  However	   in	  many	   important	  respects	  the	   contexts	   have	   posed	   similar	   challenges	   to	   policymakers.	   Both	   governments	  confronted	  recession	  (or	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  case,	  three	  consecutive	  quarters	  of	  zero	  but	  not	  consecutively	  negative	  growth),	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  return	  to	  recession	  has	  haunted	   the	   Coalition’s	   time	   in	   office.	   Both	   presided	   over	   falling	   real	  wages	   and	  uncertain	  prospects	  of	  employment,	  while	  the	  stated	  goal	  of	  a	  ‘rebalancing’	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  economic	  activity	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  aggregate	  demand	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  achieved.3	  The	  financial	  reforms	  proposed	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government	  had	  been	  truncated	   and	   were	   largely	   unimplemented	   by	   the	   time	   the	   Coalition	   came	   to	  office,	  meaning	  that	  financial	  instability	  was	  also	  an	  issue	  over	  which	  the	  Coalition	  has	  had	  to	  formulate	  policy.	  In	  sum,	  the	  context	  that	  the	  Coalition	  government	  has	  administered	   has	   been	   one	   of	   stagnation,	   not	   recovery,	   and	   the	   economic	  pathologies	  and	  uncertainties	  within	  it	  are	  sufficiently	  similar	  to	  those	  confronted	  by	   the	   Brown	   Government	   as	   to	   make	   a	   comparison	   along	   the	   selected	   themes	  appropriate.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  C.	  Berry	  (2013),	  'Are	  We	  There	  Yet?	  Growth,	  Rebalancing	  And	  The	  Pseudo-­‐Recovery',	  
SPERI	  Papers	  (7;	  Sheffield:	  SPERI,	  University	  Of	  Sheffield).	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  The	  macroeconomic	  interventions	  and	  crisis	  diagnoses	  of	  both	  governments	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  sustained	  decline	  in	  real	  wages	  that	  is	  unprecedented	  in	   the	   history	   of	  modern	  British	   capitalism.4	   Between	   June	   2008	   and	   September	  2014	  there	  have	  been	  just	  4	  months	  in	  which	  average	  weekly	  earnings	  rose	  at	  or	  above	   the	   rate	   of	   inflation.5	   The	   mean	   pay	   cut	   was	   10.3%,	   while	   lower	   skilled	  workers	   experienced	   an	   average	   cut	   of	   13.5%.6	   Whilst	   aggregate	   demand	   is	   a	  recurring	   theme	   in	   those	   aspects	   of	   the	   two	   governments’	   crisis	   diagnoses	  examined	   in	   Sections	   1,	   2	   and	   3,	   neither	   government	   has	   cast	   this	   deflationary	  labour	   market	   adjustment	   as	   a	   problem.	   Stimulus	   measures	   in	   2008-­‐2010	   and	  2012	   onwards	   have	   sought	   to	   stabilise	   it,	   yet	   the	   month-­‐on-­‐month	   falls	   in	   real	  earnings	   have	   been	   continually	   tolerated	   and	   have	   not	   featured	   prominently	   in	  either	  government’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  economic	  context.	  I	  suggest	  this	  pattern	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  is	  quite	  consistent	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  that	  I	  identify	   as	   underpinning	   the	   two	   governments’	   post-­‐2008	   economic	   strategies.	  These	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   labour	   market	   flexibility	   and	   adjustment	   to	  macroeconomic	   stability	   and	   growth.	   The	   two	   governments’	   macroeconomic	  strategies	   are	   to	   incorporate	   and	   manage	   wage-­‐deflationary	   macroeconomic	  adjustment.	  	  	  
1.	  
The	  Relationship	  Between	  Growth,	  Employment	  And	  Monetary	  Policy	  	  The	   three	   themes	   of	   economic	   growth,	   unemployment	   and	   monetary	   policy	  pressures	   constitute	   the	   core	   ‘triad’	   of	   macroeconomic	   policy	   issues	   that	   early	  advocates	   of	   neoliberalism	   sought	   to	   problematise	   as	   they	   engaged	   the	   ideas	  underpinning	   Keynesian	  macroeconomics.7	   In	   the	   context	   of	   arguments	   that	   see	  the	  imprint	  of	  (thwarted)	  ideational	  change	  or	  contingency	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A	  claim	  put	  by	  the	  TUC	  drawing	  upon	  Bank	  of	  England	  Data.	  Trades	  Unions	  Congress	  (2014),	  'UK	  Workers	  Suffering’.	  5	  The	  figure	  reflects	  mean	  weekly	  earnings	  minus	  bonuses.	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2014),	  Economic	  Review,	  December	  2014	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  Fig	  6.	  6	  Ibid,	  p.8.	  7	  Blyth	  (2002),	  Great	  Transformations;	  Peck	  and	  Tickell	  (2007),	  ‘Conceptualising	  Neoliberalism’.	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financial	   sector	   instability	   of	   2008	   this	   is	   an	   interesting	   theme	   along	   which	   to	  examine	  post-­‐2008	  crisis	  diagnoses,	  specifically	  that	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government.	  	  Brown	  Government	  	  Had	   the	   problem	   definitions	   that	   structure	   these	   aspects	   of	   macroeconomic	  policymaking	  changed	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  we	  would	  expect	  this	  change	  to	  be	  apparent	   in	   the	  re-­‐ordering	  of	  macroeconomic	  goals.	  Those	  who	  suggest	   that	   the	  Brown	   Government	   (either	   through	   thwarted	   contingency	   or	   ad	   hoc	   ‘inter-­‐paradigm	   borrowing’)	   briefly	   deployed	   Keynesian	   ideas	   and	   policies	   in	   effect	  predict	   such	   an	   outcome.	   In	   such	   a	   case	   we	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   evidence	   of	   a	  rejection	  of	  Say’s	  Law	  and	  the	  NAIRU	  concept,	  and	  the	  prioritisation	  and	  targeting	  of	  growth	  rates	  and	  employment	  levels	  through	  macroeconomic	  means.	  	  	  The	   adjudication	   of	   this	   debate	   is	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Brown	  Government	   presided	   over	   a	   deflationary	   and	   recessionary	   context.	   As	   noted	   in	  Chapter	   4,	   where	   the	   economy	   is	   ‘out	   of	   equilibrium’	   Keynesian	   and	   neoliberal	  prescriptions	   are	   similar,	  with	   both	   asserting	   the	  need	   for	   stimulus	  measures	   to	  preserve	  viable	  businesses	  through	  the	  downturn	  and	  to	   limit	  the	  degradation	  of	  physical	   and	   human	   capital	   until	   growth	   returns.	   Despite	   this	   ambiguity,	   the	  findings	   reported	   here	   do	   nevertheless	   favour	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	   crisis	   diagnosis	   as	   being	   characterised	   by	   continuity	   with	   the	  problem	  definitions	  inscribed	  in	  the	  pre-­‐2008	  neoliberal	  coordinative	  discourse.	  	  	  
Fiscal	  And	  Monetary	  Stimulus	  	  From	   December	   2007,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   adopted	   a	   loose	   monetary	   policy,	  acknowledging	  the	  threat	  of	  deflation.	  In	  October	  2008	  the	  monetary	  stimulus	  was	  ratcheted	   up,	   with	   the	   base	   rate	   falling	   from	   4.5%	   to	   0.5%	   in	   the	   space	   of	   five	  months.	  At	  this	  point,	  with	  little	  room	  left	  for	  monetary	  policy	  to	  combat	  deflation,	  the	   government	   authorised	   the	   use	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   recently	   established	   ‘Asset	  Purchase	  Facility’	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  unorthodox	  monetary	  stimulus	  –	  the	  policy	  of	  so-­‐called	   ‘quantitative	  easing’.	  Successive	  rounds	  have	  since	   increased	  the	  size	  of	   the	  APF	   to	   £375bn.	  However	   by	   the	   end	  of	   2008	   the	  Brown	  Government	   had	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concluded,	  along	  with	  other	  parties	  to	  the	  G20	  summit	  of	  November	  that	  year,	  that	  the	   global	   and	   domestic	   economies	   had	   entered	   a	   profound	   recession	   that	  exceeded	   the	   capacity	   of	   monetary	   policy	   alone	   to	   respond	   to.	   The	   response	   in	  Britain	  was	  a	  period	  of	  expansionary	   fiscal	  policy	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	   fiscal	  stimulus	  programme,	  outlined	  in	  the	  December	  2008	  Pre-­Budget	  Report.8	  	  
	  The	   programme	   amounted	   to	   around	   a	   £20bn	   fiscal	   loosening.	   Factoring	   in	   the	  ‘passive’	   fiscal	   loosening	   that	   arises	   through	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   ‘automatic	  stabilisers’	   (that	   is,	   support	   for	   aggregate	   demand	   in	   the	   economy	   arising	   from	  unemployment	   benefits	   and	   the	   like	   as	   economic	   conditions	   deteriorate),	   the	  counter-­‐cyclical	   fiscal	   support	  provided	  by	   the	  package	  was	  around	  5%	  of	  GDP.9	  Such	   conduct	   of	   macroeconomic	   policy	   was	   unprecedented	   in	   the	   UK’s	   recent	  economic	  history,	  although	  not	  large	  by	  the	  international	  standards	  of	  the	  time.10	  The	   package	   consisted	   of	   three	   broad	  measures.	   The	   first	  was	   a	   yearlong	   cut	   in	  VAT	  from	  17.5%	  to	  15%.	  A	  tax	  cut	  was	  justified	  as	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  because	  of	  the	   speed	   with	   which	   such	   a	   measure	   could	   be	   introduced	   and	   withdrawn.11	  Capital	  spending	  –	  perhaps	  more	  readily	  associated	  with	  the	  grand	  fiscal	  stimulus	  projects	  in	  the	  US	  of	  nearly	  a	  century	  earlier	  –	  performed	  a	  secondary	  role.	  £3bn	  of	  capital	  spending	  was	  brought	  forward	  from	  the	  fiscal	  year	  2010-­‐11	  to	  2008-­‐09	  and	  2009-­‐10.	   A	   range	   of	   discretionary	   spending	   measures	   were	   also	   undertaken	   as	  part	  of	  the	  package	  to	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  household	  and	  private	  non-­‐financial	  sectors,	  including	  a	  range	  of	  mortgage	  and	  tax	  reliefs.	  	  Unemployment	   rose	  sharply	   in	   the	   last	  quarters	  of	  2008,	   continuing	   to	   rise	  until	  the	   end	   of	   2011.12	   The	   government’s	   response	   was	   to	   strengthen	   its	  unemployment	  policy	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  The	   ‘Future	   Jobs	  Fund’	  (FJF)	  was	  the	  most	   novel,	   encompassing	   as	   it	   did	   new	   responsibility	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  government	  to	  counter	  the	  impacts	  of	  prolonged	  unemployment	  through	  the	  direct	  manipulation	  of	  demand	  in	  the	  labour	  market.	  The	  FJF	  provided	  subsidies	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008:	  Facing	  Global	  Challenges:	  Supporting	  
People	  Through	  Difficult	  Times	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  9	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March):	  Securing	  The	  Recovery	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  2.6.	  10	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (2009a),	  Update	  On	  Fiscal	  Stimulus	  And	  Financial	  Sector	  
Measures,	  April	  26,	  2009	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  International	  Monetary	  Fund).	  11	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  2.40.	  12	  British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  (2014a),	  ‘Economy	  Tracker'.	  
	   214	  
creation	   of	   170,000	   jobs	   for	   those	   who	   had	   been	   in	   receipt	   of	   Job	   Seekers	  Allowance	   for	   more	   than	   six	   months.	   120,000	   of	   these	   jobs	   were	   allocated	   to	  under-­‐25s.	  During	  the	  election	  of	  2010,	   the	  Labour	  Party	  pledged	  to	   increase	  the	  number	  of	  FJF	  placements	  to	  200,000,	  and	  to	  extend	  eligibility	  for	  the	  scheme	  to	  all	  adults	   out	   of	  work	   for	  more	   than	   two	   years.13	  While	   the	   FJF	   represents	   a	   novel	  demand-­‐side	  intervention,	  most	  of	  the	  unemployment	  policies	  of	  this	  time	  were	  of	  a	  more	   familiarly	   neoliberal	   hue,	   targeting	   ‘frictional’	   barriers	   so	   as	   to	   facilitate	  rapid	   labour	  market	  adjustment.	  These	  measures	   included	  a	  substantial	  boosting	  of	   the	   ‘Job	   Centre	   Plus’	   architecture,	   with	   15,000	   civil	   servants	   deployed	   to	  administer	   it	   and	  a	   ‘rapid	   response’	   service	  being	  established	   to	  deal	  with	   large-­‐scale	   redundancies.	   Also	   in	   this	   vein,	   a	   ‘better	   off	   through	  work’	   tax	   credit	   was	  established	  to	  incentivise	  labour	  market	  participation.	  The	  tax	  credit	  established	  a	  principle	  that	  those	  previously	  in	  receipt	  of	  Job	  Seekers	  Allowance	  would	  have	  an	  income	  £40	   a	  week	  higher	   than	   they	  would	   have	   had	   on	   benefits	   upon	   entering	  work.	   Finally,	   and	   on	   a	   longer	   time	   horizon,	   there	   was	   a	   strengthening	   of	   the	  existing	  public	  sector	  interventions	  in	  human	  capital	  formation.	  This	  last	  category	  of	  intervention	  is	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
A	  ‘Keynesian’	  Stimulus?	  	  The	  demand-­‐side	  orientation	  of	  the	  stimulus	  and	  FJF	  programmes	  are	  novel	  in	  the	  recent	   history	   of	   UK	   economic	   policy,	   and	   they	   both	   have	   a	   certain	   intuitive	  association	  with	  Keynesianism.	   But	   although	   unprecedented	   in	   recent	   times,	   the	  fiscal	   stimulus	  was	   a	   foreseen	   possibility	   in	   the	   economic	   policy	   architecture	   of	  New	   Labour.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   the	   rationale	   with	   which	   New	   Labour	  presented	   its	   Code	   for	   Fiscal	   Stability	   was	   the	   cultivation	   of	   ‘credibility’	   with	  financial	  market	  actors	  so	  as	  to	  render	  short	  periods	  of	  expansionary	  fiscal	  policy	  possible	  during	  a	  downturn.	  The	  bolstering	  of	  demand	  during	  a	  recession	  through	  monetary	   and	   fiscal	   policy	  was	   thus	   a	   foreseen	   but	   unrealised	   possibility,	   and	   I	  have	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  4	  that	  it	  was	  no	  less	  neoliberal	  for	  that.	  In	  the	  Pre-­Budget	  
Report	  of	  2008,	  the	  government	  drew	  on	  the	  very	  same	  argument	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  its	  stimulus	  policy,	  but	  this	  time	  claimed	  that	  a	  sufficient	  foundation	  of	  credibility	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Labour	  Party	  (2010),	  A	  Future	  Fair	  For	  All:	  2010	  Election	  Manifesto	  (London:	  Labour	  Party).	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had	   been	   established	   for	   the	   programme	   to	   prove	   effective	   as	   a	   short-­term	  measure.14	   The	   rationale	   offered	   for	   these	   demand-­‐side	   interventions	   was	  precisely	   to	   preserve	   viable	   businesses,	   the	   quality	   of	   human	   capital	   and	   the	  livelihoods	  of	  citizens	  during	  what	  the	  government	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  short	  period	  of	  poor	   economic	   performance.15	   The	   time-­‐limited	   and	   exceptional	   nature	   of	   the	  stimulus	   was	   stressed	   from	   the	   outset:	   the	   makings	   of	   what	   would	   become	  Labour’s	   proposal	   for	   a	   deficit	   reduction	   programme	   during	   the	   2010	   general	  election	  were	  already	  outlined	  in	  the	  2008	  Pre-­Budget	  Report,	  and	  were	  elaborated	  further	  six	  months	  later	  in	  the	  2009	  Budget	  Report.16	  It	  was	  argued	  from	  this	  early	  point	  that	  an	  indefinite	  departure	  from	  the	  normal	  conduct	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  (i.e.	  the	  nominally	   ‘cyclically	   balanced’	   and	   passive	   regime	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	  governments)	   would	   result	   in	   a	   loss	   of	   market	   confidence	   in	   the	   government’s	  finances	  that	  would	  simply	  neutralise	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  stimulus.17	  	  	  Although	   superficially	   displaying	   the	   strongest	   trappings	   of	   a	   Keynesian	   ‘make	  work	   scheme’	   out	   of	   all	   post-­‐2008	   interventions,	   the	   FJF	   was	   similarly	  conceptualised	   in	   relation	   to	   existing	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   through	  which	   unemployment	   is	   cast	   as	   a	   microeconomic	   supply-­‐side	   problem	   under	  normal	  economic	  conditions.	  The	  scheme	  was	  articulated	  as	  a	  means	  to	  avoid	  the	  damaging	  impact	  of	  prolonged	  unemployment	  on	  human	  capital	  and	  the	  prospects	  for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   citizens	   in	   labour	   markets	   once	   the	   economy	   recovered.18	  Consequently,	  it	  represents	  an	  internally	  coherent	  strengthening	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  reconciliation	   of	   ‘efficiency’	   and	   ‘fairness’	   through	   labour	   market	   inclusion,	   and	  would	  do	  so	  even	  if	   it	  had	  not	  been	  executed	  in	  a	  recessionary	  moment.	   In	  many	  respects	  it	  is	  an	  archetypal	  strategy	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation:	  a	  means	  through	  which	   government	   seeks	   to	   ensure	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   correct	   functioning	   of	  flexible	   labour	   markets	   by	   mitigating	   their	   negative	   impact	   on	   citizens/human	  capital	  without	  resorting	  to	  de-­‐commodifying	  or	  market-­‐constraining	  strategies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraphs	  1.6	  and	  2.115.	  15	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  2.30-­‐2.32,	  4.1	  and	  5.36;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraph	  5.6.	  16	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  1.8;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  Budget	  
Report	  2009:	  Building's	  Britain's	  Future	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  2.63-­‐2.73.	  17	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  2.40	  18	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraph	  5.6.	  
	   216	  
Both	  the	  FJF	  and	  the	  broader	  stimulus	  programme	  are	  thus	  quite	  consistent	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  attributed	  to	  Labour	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  Although	  the	  Brown	   government	   did	   not	   offer	   any	   formal	   estimate	   of	   the	   NAIRU,	   the	  interventions	  reflected	  the	  view	  that	  the	  downturn	  would	  exert	  a	   ‘scarring’	  effect	  on	  human	  and	  physical	  capital	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  have	  negative	  implications	  for	  the	   non-­‐inflationary	   growth	   and	   employment	   potential	   of	   the	   economy	   once	   it	  returned	   to	   a	   state	   of	   full	   resource	   utilisation.	   Nowhere	   in	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	   economic	   policy	   choices,	   commentary	   or	   forecasts	   do	   we	   find	  evidence	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  shortfall	  in	  demand	  was	  expected	  to	  last	  beyond	  the	  short-­‐term,	   casting	   doubt	   on	   any	   notion	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   Say’s	   Law	   or	   the	  NAIRU	   had	   ceased	   to	   organise	   the	   government’s	   thinking	   on	   the	   relationship	  between	  growth,	  unemployment	  and	  monetary	  policy.	  	  	  Exactly	   how	   the	   Brown	   Government	   would	   have	   approached	   macroeconomic	  policy	   as	   the	   economy	   came	   out	   of	   recession	   and	   entered	   the	   long	   period	   of	  stagnation	   that	   has	   characterised	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   is,	   of	   course,	   something	  we	  cannot	  know.	  However,	  we	  can	  gain	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  insight	  into	  what	  might	  have	   transpired	   in	  2010-­‐11	  by	  observing	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  Brown	  Government’s	  deficit	  reduction	  plan	  and	  the	  proposed	  timing	  of	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  demand-­‐side	  support	  –	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  Coalition	  Government	  	  No	   equivalent	   debate	   exists	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Coalition	  Government.	   Indeed,	   the	  government	  was	  quite	  explicit	  about	  its	  commitment	  to	  neoliberal	  macroeconomic	  orthodoxy:	   a	   stable	   rate	   of	   product	   price	   inflation	   and	   a	   balanced	   budget	   was	  deemed	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   macroeconomic	   stability	   under	   normal	   economic	  
conditions,	   and	   it	  was	   from	   such	   a	   regime	   that	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   growth	   and	  employment	  consistent	  with	  the	  economy’s	  microeconomic	  structure	  were	  held	  to	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obtain.19	   Consistent	   with	   this	   view,	   wherever	   the	   Coalition	   has	   addressed	  unemployment	  it	  has	  treated	  it	  as	  a	  microeconomic	  and	  supply-­‐side	  problem,	  to	  be	  responded	   to	   through	   skills	   policy,	   welfare	   reform	   and	   labour	   market	  liberalisation.	   The	   Coalition’s	   tolerance	   of	   a	   protracted	   period	   of	   wage	   deflation	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  quite	  consistent	  with	  an	  ongoing	  commitment	  to	  a	  NAIRU	  problem	  definition.	  	  	  However,	  the	  Coalition’s	  tolerance	  of	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  inflation	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  period	  poses	  an	   interesting	  question	  as	  to	  the	  relationship	   it	  assigns	  to	  these	  variables.	  Throughout	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	   the	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  has	  judged	   acting	   on	   inflationary	   pressures	   and	   withdrawing	   monetary	   stimulus	   to	  pose	   a	   greater	   risk	   to	  macroeconomic	   stability	   than	   allowing	   it	   to	   continue.	   The	  withdrawal	  of	  demand	  represented	  by	  the	  Coalition’s	  deficit	  reduction	  programme	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  counter-­‐inflationary	  measure,	  yet	  I	  argue	  below	  that	  it	  is	  better	   interpreted	   as	   a	  means	  of	   securing	   credibility	   and	   growth	   instead.	  This	   is	  because	  since	  2011	  the	  Coalition	  has	  itself	  fashioned	  new	  expansionary	  monetary	  policy	   instruments	   through	   its	   policy	   of	   ‘credit	   easing’.	   As	   I	   discuss	   in	   Section	  3,	  this	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  de-­‐politicisation	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  Britain,	  as	  the	  Coalition	   appears	   to	   have	   actively	   re-­‐cast	   monetary	   policy	   as	   a	   de	   facto	   quasi-­‐discretionary	  instrument	  of	  economic	  expansion.	  Yet	  such	  a	  strategy	  is	  consistent	  with	   the	   view	   that	   stimulatory	   policies	   are	   an	   appropriate	   response	   when	   the	  economy	  is	  out	  of	  its	  presumed	  equilibrium	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (June):	  Responsibility,	  Freedom,	  Fairness:	  A	  
Five	  Year	  Plan	  To	  Re-­Build	  The	  Economy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.27;	  a	  similar	  statement	  is	  made	  in	  the	  opening	  chapter	  of	  subsequent	  budget	  reports	  and	  autumn	  statements,	  the	  principal	  difference	  being	  a	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  various	  ‘credit	  easing’	  measures	  along	  side	  quantitative	  easing	  for	  the	  meeting	  of	  monetary	  policy	  objectives	  from	  Autumn	  Statement	  of	  2011	  onwards,	  an	  issue	  to	  which	  I	  turn	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2011a),	  Budget	  Report	  2011	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.9;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2011c),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2011	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.44;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2012a),	  Budget	  Report	  
2012	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.3;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  Autumn	  
Statement	  2012	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.26;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2013a),	  
Budget	  Report	  2013	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.25.	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2.	  
Public	  Sector	  Finances	  	  The	  issue	  of	  deficit	  reduction	  is	  central	  to	  political,	  public	  and	  academic	  debates	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  Fiscal	  consolidation	  represents	  perhaps	   the	  most	  decisive	  post-­‐2008	   intervention	   because	   of	   its	   impact	   on	   the	   range	   of	   issues	   for	   which	  government	  is	  able	  to	  take	  responsibility.	  	  	  The	  Brown	  Government	  	  In	  2009	  the	  Brown	  Government	  became	  more	  vocal	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  need	  for	  fiscal	  consolidation	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  recovery.	  The	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  
2008	  had	  made	  a	  temporary	  alteration	  to	  the	  budgetary	  rules	  in	  which	  New	  Labour	  governments	  had	  conducted	  macroeconomic	  policy	  so	  as	  to	  facilitate	  the	  stimulus	  programme.	  The	  ‘Temporary	  Fiscal	  Operating	  Rule’,	  allowed	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  general	   commitments	  comprising	   the	  1998	  Code,	   but	   committed	   the	  government	  to	   a	   programme	   of	   fiscal	   consolidation	   in	   the	   medium	   and	   long	   term	   so	   as	   to	  restore	   ‘sustainable	   public	   finances’.20	   The	   transition	   from	   one	   mode	   of	   fiscal	  policy	   to	   the	   other	   was	   to	   occur	   at	   the	   Chancellor’s	   discretion,	   resting	   on	   the	  judgment	  that	  the	  recovery	  path	  of	  the	  economy	  had	  become	  self-­‐sustaining.	  The	  stability	   of	   the	   financial	   markets	   and	   the	   anticipated	   normalisation	   of	   credit	  conditions	  were	  to	  be	  integral	  to	  this	  judgment.21	  In	  the	  Pre-­‐Budget	  Report	  of	  2009	  and	   the	   Budget	   Report	   of	   2010	   the	   government	   began	   to	   articulate	   their	   fiscal	  consolidation	  programme	  in	  more	  detail.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009	  the	  view	  of	  Treasury	  forecasters	  was	  that	  growth	  would	  return	  in	  2010,	  followed	  by	   a	   period	   of	   above	   trend	   growth	   in	   2011.	   It	   was	   deemed	   that	   the	   criteria	   for	  fiscal	  consolidation	  would	  be	  met	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  2010-­‐11,	  and	  that	   consolidation	   could	   begin	   in	   2011-­‐12	   in	   spite	   of	   growth	   having	   been	   lower	  than	   forecast	   in	   Budget	   2009.22	   The	   consolidation	   was	   envisioned	   as	   bringing	  about	   a	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   decrease	   in	   cyclically	   adjusted	   deficit	   with	   the	   target	   of	  cutting	  PSNB	  by	  more	  than	  50%	  by	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  2013-­‐14.	  At	  the	  time	  it	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  2.102.	  21	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraphs	  2.23-­‐2.30.	  22	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009:	  Securing	  the	  Recovery:	  Growth	  and	  
Opportunity	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  2.70.	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believed	  that	  this	  would	  bring	  about	  a	  balanced	  cyclically-­‐adjusted	  budget	  by	  the	  fiscal	  year	  2017-­‐18.	  	  Fiscal	   consolidation	   was	   to	   be	   brought	   about	   by	   a	   mixture	   of	   tax	   rises	   and	  spending	  growth	  cuts,	  at	  a	  ratio	  of	  one	  third	  to	  the	  latter’s	  two.	  As	  well	  as	  cuts	  to	  departmental	   budgets	   (the	   details	   of	   which	   the	   government	   remained	   guarded	  over,	   having	   declined	   to	   hold	   a	   comprehensive	   spending	   review	   prior	   to	   the	  election),	   the	   non-­‐tax	   component	   of	   the	   deficit	   reduction	   plan	   included	   a	   public	  sector	  pay	   freeze	   in	  which	  senior	  public	  sector	  salaries	  would	  be	   frozen,	  and	  the	  rest	  subject	  to	  caps	  of	  1%	  (or	  2%	  for	  the	  armed	  forces).	  The	  achievement	  of	  these	  targets	  and	  timeframe	  was	  legislated	  in	  the	  Fiscal	  Responsibility	  Act	  (2010).	  Under	  the	  act	  a	  change	  in	  fiscal	  policy	  would	  ostensibly	  require	  primary	  legislation,	  and	  a	  failure	   to	   achieve	   the	   targets	   would	   trigger	   parliamentary	   scrutiny	   and	   the	  production	  of	  a	  new	  fiscal	  consolidation	  plan.	  Yet	  on	  close	  inspection	  the	  act	  was	  carefully	  worded.	  Although	  not	  widely	  commented	  upon	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  bound	  the	  government	   to	   its	   fiscal	   consolidation	   plan	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   was	   deemed	  consistent	  with	  the	  broader	  Code	  for	  Fiscal	  Stability.23	  This	  in	  turn	  committed	  the	  government	   to	  operating	  a	   fiscal	  policy	   consistent	  with	   ‘high	  and	  stable	   levels	  of	  growth	   and	   employment’.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   primary	   legislation	   would	  actually	   have	   been	   required	   for	   a	   discretionary	   suspension	   of	   the	   fiscal	  consolidation	  programme	  is	  thus	  open	  to	  speculation.	  	  As	  with	  fiscal	  stimulus,	  the	  argument	  for	  consolidation	  was	  articulated	  within	  the	  terms	  of	   the	  Code	   for	  Fiscal	  Stability	  and	   its	  stress	  on	  credibility	  and	  constrained	  discretion.	  The	  action	  that	   the	  government	  perceived	  the	  context	   to	  demand	  was	  not	  deficit	  reduction	  per	  se,	  but	  the	  articulation	  of	  a	  credible	  commitment	  to	  deficit	  reduction	  at	  a	  future	  time.	  An	  orthodox	  argument	  was	  appealed	  to	  in	  articulating	  the	  dangers	  of	  not	  committing	  to	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  without	  a	  firm	  commitment	  to	  pay	  back	  sovereign	  debt,	  financial	  market	  confidence	  would	  soon	   give	   way	   and	   investors	   would	   demand	   greater	   compensation	   for	   holding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  T.	  Dolhpin	  and	  A.	  	  Lent	  (2011),	  Deficit	  Reduction	  Averaging:	  A	  Plan	  B	  For	  Fiscal	  
Tightening	  (London:	  Institute	  for	  Public	  Policy	  Research).	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sterling	  denominated	  securities,	  harming	  macroeconomic	  stability,	  consumers	  and	  businesses.24	  	  Yet	   for	   the	   Brown	   Government	   the	   credibility	   of	   such	   a	   commitment	   was	  contingent	   upon	   the	   conditions	   for	   recovery	   noted	   above	   being	   in	   place.	   The	  reservation	  of	  Chancellery	  discretion,	  and	  the	  presumption	  that	  financial	  markets	  already	   invested	   the	   government	   with	   sufficient	   credibility	   for	   macroeconomic	  policy	  to	  move	  from	  stimulus	  to	  consolidation	  on	  the	  proposed	  timetable,	  suggests	  a	  potentially	   rather	   relaxed	  perception	  of	   the	  constraints	  posed	  by	   the	  deficit	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  the	  commitment	  to	  deficit	  reduction	  that	  the	  government	  deemed	  credible	  was	  actually	  a	  very	  inflexible	  one.	  History	  has	   shown	   the	   government	   to	  have	  been	   extremely	  over-­‐confident	   in	   its	  recovery	   forecasts.	   Although	   Labour	   shadow	  ministers	   would	   later	   boast	   of	   the	  little	  discussed	  ‘back	  door’	  in	  the	  Fiscal	  Responsibility	  Act	  observed	  above,	  a	  better	  analogy	  might	  be	  a	   fire	  escape:	   the	  abandonment	  of	   its	   fiscal	   strategy	  during	   the	  long	   stagnation	   of	   the	   next	   three	   years	   would	   have	   caused	   a	   hypothetical	   re-­‐elected	  Brown	  Government	   great	   embarrassment,	   and	   could	   have	   done	  much	   to	  erode	   the	   financial	   market	   confidence	   that	   it	   saw	   itself	   as	   requiring	   if	   further	  stimulus	  was	  to	  be	  carried	  out.	  The	  target	  of	  an	  over	  50%	  reduction	  in	  PSNB	  –	  an	  unadjusted	   aggregate	   –	   made	   the	   plan	   particularly	   susceptible	   to	   the	   economic	  climate	  that	  would	  follow	  because	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  automatic	  stabilisers	  would	  count	  against	  it.	  	  	  The	  failure	  to	  incorporate	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  discretion	  into	  their	  deficit	  reduction	  programme,	   or	   an	   explicit	   means	   of	   suspension	   should	   economic	   conditions	  deteriorate,	   suggests	   that	   the	   Brown	   Government	   really	   believed	   that	   the	  economic	   cycle	   would	   turn	   decisively	   upwards	   in	   2010.	   This	   confidence	   is,	   of	  course,	   quite	   consistent	   with	   the	   ongoing	   influence	   of	   the	   pre-­‐2008	   neoliberal	  problem	   definitions	   on	   the	   government’s	   crisis	   diagnosis.	   From	   this	   viewpoint	  recession	   is	   always	   a	   short-­‐term	   phenomenon	   provided	   correct	   macroeconomic	  policy	  is	  observed	  in	  downturn	  and	  recovery.	  The	  government	  did	  not	  consider	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraph	  2.63;	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­
Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  2.32.	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protracted	  period	  of	  inadequate	  demand	  to	  constitute	  a	  risk	  because	  the	  concepts	  of	  Say’s	  Law	  and	  the	  NAIRU	  had	  never	  ceased	  to	  be	  an	  influence	  on	  its	  thinking.	  	  	  Coalition	  Government	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  threat	  that	  the	  Coalition	  identifies	  in	  this	  area	  is	  similar,	  but	  not	  identical,	   to	  that	   identified	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government.	  Yet	  neither	  has	  the	  role	  of	  deficit	   reduction	   in	   the	   Coalition’s	   crisis	   diagnosis	   been	   static,	   and	   a	   change	   of	  emphasis	  over	  time	  revealed	  in	  this	  theme	  suggests	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  divergence	  between	  the	  two	  governments’	  crisis	  diagnoses	  narrowed	  around	  the	  end	  of	  2011.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  change	  I	  discuss	  the	  two	  phases	  under	  separate	  sub-­‐headings.	  	  
Coalition	  Macroeconomic	  Crisis	  Diagnosis	  Prior	  To	  2012	  	  Prior	   to	   2012	   the	   elimination	   of	   the	   budget	   deficit	   formed	   the	   lynchpin	   of	   the	  Coalition’s	   strategy	   for	  macroeconomic	   stability	   and	  macroeconomic	   rebalancing	  of	   the	   UK’s	   demand	   structure.	   The	   demand	   side	   interventions	   of	   the	   Brown	  Government	  were	  consequently	  wound	  up.	  In	  their	  place,	  the	   ‘Emergency	  Budget’	  of	  2010	  announced	  a	  plan	  to	  eliminate	  the	  government	  deficit	  by	  2015-­‐16,	  bound	  by	  a	   fixed	   commitment	   that	  debt	  would	   fall	   as	   a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  by	   the	   same	  year.	  Indeed,	  the	  plan	  actually	  envisioned	  the	  budget	  balanced	  a	  year	  earlier	  than	  this.	   	   Approximately	   75%	   of	   the	   consolidation	  was	   to	   be	   accounted	   for	   through	  spending	   reductions	   over	   the	   course	   of	   five	   years.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   2010	  
Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review,	   this	  was	  deemed	  to	  require	  spending	  reductions	  of	   £81bn,	   with	   only	   a	   few	   select	   areas	   being	   ‘ring	   fenced’	   (namely	   the	   health,	  foreign	  aid	  and	  science	  budgets).25	  	  In	   some	   respects	   the	   Coalition	   can	   justly	   claim	   to	   have	   enacted	   a	   more	  economically	  sensitive	  approach	  to	  deficit	  reduction	  than	  its	  Labour	  predecessor.26	  Under	   the	   Coalition	   the	   burden	   of	   deficit	   reduction	  was	   placed	   on	   the	   ‘cyclically	  adjusted	  current	  deficit’	  –	  a	  measure	  which,	  unlike	  the	  Brown	  Government’s	  target,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2010e),	  Spending	  Review	  2010	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.11.	  26	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (June),	  paragraph	  1.18;	  Dolhpin	  and	  Lent	  (2011),	  
Deficit	  Reduction	  Averaging.	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would	  permit	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  automatic	  stabilisers	  during	  a	  second	  recession	  without	  requiring	   the	  government	   to	  concede	  the	   loss	  of	   its	   fiscal	  path.27	   Indeed,	  the	  Coalition	  was	  well	  aware	   that	   the	   immediate	   implication	  of	   its	   fiscal	   strategy	  would	   be	   to	   constrain	   domestic	   consumption	   demand,	   bringing	   with	   it	   the	  economic	  and	  political	  risks	  implied	  in	  a	  second	  recession.28	  Yet	  in	  the	  two	  years	  to	  2012	  the	  Coalition	  demonstrated	  a	  strong	  inclination	  to	  persevere	  with	  its	  ‘Plan	  A’	  in	   spite	   of	   these	   risks.	   When	   placed	   alongside	   the	   falling	   wage	   costs	   that	  characterised	   the	   period,	   the	   Coalition’s	   pre-­‐2012	   macroeconomic	   strategy	   can	  thus	   be	   characterised	   as	   a	   highly	   ambitious	   deflationary	   macroeconomic	  adjustment	  softened	  only	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  ongoing	  monetary	  stimulus.	  	  	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  divergence	  between	  the	  Coalition’s	  pre-­‐2012	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  Brown	  Government’s	  becomes	  apparent.	  As	  already	  noted,	  the	  latter	  regarded	  the	   economic	   risk	   of	   recession	   as	   a	   risk	   to	   the	   UK’s	   future	   economic	   fortunes	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  long-­‐run	  growth	  potential	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	   Coalition,	   by	   contrast,	   was	   initially	   less	   concerned	  with	   this	   risk,	   viewing	   a	  rapid	   private	   sector	   and	   export-­‐led	   recovery	   as	   the	   likely	   outcome	   of	   their	  deflationary	  adjustment	  strategy.29	  Given	  the	  economic	  risks	  and	  political	  costs	  of	  failure,	   an	   interesting	   question	   is	   thus	   raised	   as	   to	   the	   cause	   of	   these	   diverging	  assessments	   of	   the	   economically	   necessary	   and	   politically	   possible.	   From	   a	  constructivist	  perspective	  it	  suggests	  a	  differing	  interpretation.	  	  	  The	   factor	   that	   accounts	   for	   these	   differing	   interpretations	   is	   the	   brief	  internalisation	  by	  the	  Coalition	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘expansionary	  fiscal	  consolidation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Although	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  reckoning	  –	  2015-­‐16	  –	  at	  this	  point	  represented	  an	  inflexible	  constant	  in	  the	  OBR’s	  assessments	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  government	  meeting	  its	  fiscal	  mandate.	  28	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (June),	  Box	  1.3.	  29	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  1.7-­‐1.8;	  Department	  For	  Business	  Innovation	  Skills	  (2011),	  The	  Plan	  
For	  Growth	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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thesis’	   (EFCT).30	   Succinctly	   stated,	   the	   thesis	  posits	   the	   existence	  of	   an	  empirical	  regularity	   between	   spending	   reduction-­‐based	   fiscal	   consolidation	   focused	   on	  transfer	  payments,	  public	  sector	  wages	  and	  public	  services	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  rapid	  return	  to	  growth	  and	  decline	  in	  debt	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  mechanism	  through	  which	  this	  is	  said	  to	  function	  is	  an	  ‘expectations	  channel’:	  that	  is,	  that	  the	  rational	  assessments	  of	  consumers	  and	  businesses	  regarding	  future	  levels	  of	  taxation	  and	  interest	  rates	  amid	  a	  decisive	  signal	  of	  governmental	  commitment	  to	  such	  a	  fiscal	  path	   will	   result	   in	   an	   increase	   in	   spending	   and	   investment	   that	   exceeds	   the	  deflationary	   impact	  of	   tight	   fiscal	  policy.31	  The	  prescription	  of	   the	  thesis	   is	   that	  a	  signalled	  intention	  to	  make	  reductions	  in	  public	  spending	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  at	  its	  most	  credible	  during	   a	  downturn,	   and	   thus	   that	   governments	   should	  proceed	   to	   fiscal	  consolidation	   at	   once,	   rather	   than	   waiting	   for	   signs	   of	   recovery	   to	   appear	   (the	  inverse	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government’s	  proposal).	  	  	  Blyth	  casts	  the	  EFCT	  as	  the	  latest	  iteration	  of	  the	  ‘dangerous	  idea’	  of	  austerity	  –	  the	  notion	   that	   withdrawing	   public	   sector	   and	   consumer	   demand	   is	   an	   appropriate	  response	  to	  recession.32	  He	  identifies	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ‘Bocconi	  School’,	  particularly	  that	  of	  Alesina	  and	  his	  collaborators,	  as	  having	  supplied	  the	  EFCT	  analysis	  that	  has	  since	   been	   deployed	   by	   European	   Union	   institutions,	   finance	   ministers	   and	  governments	   since	   early	   2010	   in	   support	   of	   deflationary	   adjustment	   strategies.	  The	  Coalition’s	  pre-­‐2012	  deficit	   reduction	   strategy	   certainly	   conforms	  well	   to	   its	  dictates	   both	   in	   its	   scale	   and	   in	   the	   rapid,	   clear	   and	   decisive	   signal	   of	   the	  government’s	   intent	   (which,	   from	   a	   broadly	   Keynesian	   perspective,	   might	   have	  been	   expected	   to	   have	   deflationary	   effects	   in	   and	   of	   itself).33	   Moreover,	   the	  Coalition	   directly	   appealed	   to	   Alesina	   and	   Perotti’s	   1995	   paper	   in	   the	   2010	  
Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review,	  whilst	   IMF	  research	  that	  drew	  on	  this	  work	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  F.	  Giavazzi	  and	  M.	  Pagano	  (1990),	  'Can	  Severe	  Fiscal	  Contractions	  Be	  Expansionary?	  Tales	  Of	  Two	  Small	  European	  Countries',	  in	  O.J.	  Blanchard	  and	  S.	  Fischer	  (eds.),	  NBER	  
Macroeconomics	  Annual	  1990,	  Volume	  5	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press),	  pp.75-­‐122;	  A.	  Alesina	  and	  R.	  Perotti	  (1995),	  'Fiscal	  Expansions	  And	  Adjustments	  In	  OECD	  Countries',	  
Economic	  policy,	  10	  (21),	  pp.205-­‐48;	  A.	  Alesina	  and	  S.	  Ardagna	  (1998),	  'Tales	  Of	  Fiscal	  Adjustment',	  Economic	  Policy,	  13	  (27),	  pp.488-­‐545;	  A.	  Alesina	  and	  S.	  Ardagna	  (2010),	  'Large	  Changes	  In	  Fiscal	  Policy:	  Taxes	  Versus	  Spending',	  in	  J.R.	  Brown	  (ed.),	  Tax	  Policy	  And	  
The	  Economy,	  Volume	  24	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press),	  pp.35-­‐68;	  for	  critical	  discussion	  and	  historical	  context	  see	  Blyth	  (2013),	  Austerity:	  The	  History.	  31	  Alesina	  and	  Ardagna	  (1998),	  'Tales	  Of	  Fiscal	  Adjustment';	  Alesina	  and	  Ardagna	  (2010),	  'Large	  Changes	  In	  Fiscal’.	  32	  Blyth	  (2013),	  Austerity:	  The	  History.	  33	  Ibid.	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also	  cited	  in	  the	  Emergency	  Budget	  in	  support	  of	  the	  view	  that	  fiscal	  consolidation	  would	   promote	   growth.34	   More	   generally,	   the	   purported	   confidence-­‐enhancing	  effects	   of	   deficit	   reduction	   were	   repeatedly	   asserted	   in	   all	   budget	   reports	   and	  autumn	  statements	  prior	  to	  2012.35	  	  	  The	   demonstrable	   familiarity	   of	   the	   Coalition	   Treasury	   with	   the	   ECFT,	   the	  conformity	   of	   the	   deficit	   reduction	   plan	   to	   its	   prescriptions,	   and	   the	   high-­‐risk	  nature	  of	   the	   strategy	   (at	   least	  when	  viewed	   from	   the	  point	  of	   view	  of	   the	  more	  established	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   which	   advocate	   stimulus	   measures)	  suggests	  that	  a	  stimulatory	  effect	  was	   indeed	  the	  expected	  outcome	  of	  the	  deficit	  reduction	   plan.36	   The	   endorsement	   of	   the	   EFCT	   by	   the	   Coalition	   served	   to	  configure	   the	   role	   of	   deficit	   reduction	   in	   its	   crisis	   diagnosis	   as	   the	   means	   to	  stabilise	  and	  stimulate	  economic	  activity,	  for	  it	  was	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  belief	  that	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   risks	   of	   such	   immediate	   and	   decisive	   fiscal	  consolidation	   could	   be	   prudently	   set	   aside.	   This	   in	   turn	   implies	   a	   degree	   of	  ideational	   divergence	   in	   the	   coordinative	   discourse	   of	   the	   pre-­‐2012	   Coalition	  Government	  when	   compared	   to	   that	  of	   the	  Brown	  Government	   and	  New	  Labour	  governments	   before	   it.	   While	   the	   EFCT	   is	   quite	   consistent	   with	   the	   broader	  neoliberal	   restructuring	   ethos,	   it	   departs	   from	   the	  more	   ‘neo-­‐Keynesian’	   infused	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Treasury	  (2010e),	  Spending	  Review	  2010,	  paragraph	  1.8;	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  
Report	  2010	  (June),	  paragraph	  1.32;	  The	  IMF	  report	  in	  question	  is	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (2009b),	  United	  Kingdom:	  Staff	  Report	  For	  The	  2009	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  International	  Monetary	  Fund).	  35	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (June),	  Box	  1.3;	  Treasury	  (2010e),	  Spending	  
Review	  2010,	  paragraph	  1.8;	  Treasury	  (2011a),	  Budget	  Report	  2011,	  paragraph	  1.9;	  Treasury	  (2011c),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2011,	  paragraph	  1.47.	  36	  One	  avenue	  of	  future	  research	  that	  may	  further	  re-­‐enforce	  this	  conclusion	  would	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  the	  think-­‐tank	  Policy	  Exchange	  in	  informing	  and	  influencing	  Conservative	  Party	  coordinative	  discourses	  on	  economic	  policy.	  Pautz	  has	  noted	  the	  exchange	  of	  personnel	  between	  the	  two	  organisations,	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  organisation	  to	  David	  Cameron,	  and	  the	  research	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  organisation	  on	  several	  prominent	  coalition	  policies	  prior	  to	  the	  Coalition	  taking	  government,	  including	  free	  schools	  and	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  welfare	  reform	  agenda.	  See	  H.	  Pautz	  (2013),	  'The	  Think	  Tanks	  Behind	  'Cameronism'',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  15	  (3),	  pp.362-­‐77.	  To	  this	  list,	  we	  might	  also	  add	  the	  deficit	  reduction	  plan,	  certain	  features	  of	  which	  (such	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  cuts	  to	  tax	  rises)	  were	  foreseen	  in	  a	  series	  of	  documents	  that	  the	  think-­‐tank	  produced	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2009	  and	  early	  2010	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘Controlling	  Public	  Spending’.	  The	  work	  of	  Alesina	  and	  Ardanga	  features	  in	  the	  arguments	  offered	  in	  these	  reports,	  and	  this	  may	  indicate	  one	  possible	  channel	  by	  which	  the	  EFCT	  came	  to	  influence	  Conservative	  and	  then	  Coalition	  coordinative	  discourses	  on	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  See	  Policy	  Exchange	  (2009),	  Controlling	  Spending	  And	  Government	  
Deficits:	  Lessons	  From	  History	  And	  International	  Experience	  (London:	  Policy	  Exchange).	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neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  in	  its	  antipathy	  to	  stimulus	  measures	  during	  macroeconomic	  disequilibrium.	  	  
Macroeconomic	  Policy	  2012	  Onwards	  	  From	   the	   last	   months	   of	   2011	   the	   macroeconomic	   strategy	   of	   the	   Coalition	  government	  underwent	  a	  substantial	  reconfiguration,	  transitioning	  to	  one	  centred	  (overtly)	  on	  stimulating	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  to	  the	  private	  and	  household	  sectors,	  and	   (covertly)	   on	   the	   reflation	   of	   the	   housing	   market	   and	   the	   resumption	   of	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  (the	   latter	  of	  which	   I	   take	  up	   in	   the	  next	  section).	  From	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2012	  budget	  a	  change	  can	  be	  discerned	  in	  the	  arguments	  offered	  as	  a	   rationale	   for	   macroeconomic	   strategy:	   appeals	   to	   the	   EFCT	   and	   growth-­‐enhancing	  properties	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation	  ceased.	   Instead,	   the	  rationale	  offered	  for	  consolidation	  was	  primarily	  as	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  a	  debt	  crisis	  and	  providing	  a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   macroeconomic	   stability	   from	   which	   economic	   and	  employment	  growth	  could	  later	  emerge.	  37	  	  This	  reconfiguration	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  arguments,	  alongside	  policy	  changes	  noted	  presently,	   suggests	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   EFCT	   as	   an	   influence	   on	   the	   government’s	  economic	   policy	   coordinative	   discourses	   and	   a	   re-­‐diagnosis	   of	   macroeconomic	  circumstances.	   The	   reason	   for	   the	   EFCT’s	   declining	   influence	   is	   likely	   to	   have	  reflected	   economic	   performance:	   it	   would	   have	   become	   apparent	   to	   the	  government,	  as	  it	  had	  to	  an	  increasingly	  impatient	  IMF,	  that	  the	  strategy	  had	  failed	  to	  produce	   the	  stimulatory	  effect	   that	   its	  authors	  had	  once	  attributed	  to	   it.38	  The	  final	  quarter	  of	  2011	  saw	   the	  beginning	  of	   three	  quarters	  of	   consecutive	  zero	  or	  negative	  GDP	  growth.	  The	  balance	  of	  trade	  position	  underwent	  little	  improvement,	  despite	   a	   substantial	   depreciation	   of	   sterling.39	   The	   promised	   renaissance	   of	  manufacturing	   showed	   no	   signs	   of	   materialising.	   Once	   the	   EFCT	   ceased	   to	   be	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Treasury	  (2012a),	  Budget	  Report	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.43-­‐1.45;	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  
Autumn	  Statement	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.39-­‐1.41;	  Treasury	  (2013a),	  Budget	  Report	  2013,	  
paragraphs	  1.45-­‐1.46;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2013c),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2013	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  1.65-­‐1.66.	  38	  Reauters	  (2012),	  'IMF	  Renews	  Call	  On	  UK	  To	  Boost	  Growth,	  But	  Osborne	  Gets	  Austerity	  Backing',	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/17/britain-­‐imf-­‐idUKL9N0CP05E20130717	  >,	  accessed	  04/09/2012.	  39	  Office	  For	  National	  Statistics	  (2013),	  Explanation	  Beyond	  Exchange	  Rates:	  Trends	  in	  UK	  
Trade	  Since	  2007	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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conditioning	   factor	   on	   the	   Coalition’s	   expectations	   of	   the	   outcomes	   of	   its	  macroeconomic	   strategy	   the	   government	   was	   forced	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   same	  economic	  and	  political	  risks	  of	  protracted	  stagnation	  that	  the	  Brown	  government	  had	   perceived,	   and	   a	   corresponding	   imperative	   to	   adopt	   a	   rather	   different	  macroeconomic	  stance.	  Against	  calls	  from	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  to	  adopt	  a	  ‘Plan	  B’	   for	  economic	  recovery	   the	  Coalition	  protested	   the	  need	   to	  continue	  with	  ‘Plan	  A’	  –	  by	  which	  it	  meant	  simply	  maintaining	  the	  path	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation.40	  	  However,	   the	   plan	  was	   indeed	   changed,	   and	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   broadly	   consistent	  with	   a	   reversion	   to	   pre-­‐2008	   problem	   definitions:	   a	   return	   was	   made	   to	  discretionary	  (primarily	  monetary)	  stimulus.	  	  	  The	  Coalition	  attributed	   the	  UK’s	  poor	  economic	  performance	  over	   the	  course	  of	  late	  2011	  and	  2012	  in	  part	  to	  headwinds	  from	  the	  Eurozone	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  fuel	  inflation.41	   However,	   another	   economic	   pathology	   was	   also	   moved	   to	   the	  foreground	   of	   the	   Coalition’s	   argumentation	   at	   around	   this	   time:	   the	   restricted	  supply	   of	   credit	   to	   the	   non-­‐financial	   economy.42	   A	   perceived	   deficiency	   in	   the	  supply	   of	   bank	   lending	   to	   business	   and	   households	   had	   been	   a	   feature	   of	   the	  Coalition’s	   commentary	  on	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	   from	   the	   time	   it	   took	  office.	   In	  early	  2011	  the	  Coalition	  had	  continued	  the	  Brown	  Government’s	  practice	  of	  using	  what	   were	   in	   effect	   voluntary	   lending	   targets	   for	   the	   ‘nationalised’	   banks,	  formalising	   these	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘project	   Merlin’	   agreements.	   However,	   by	   late	  2011	  the	  Coalition	  had	  concluded	  that	  a	  deficient	  supply	  of	  lending	  to	  businesses,	  which	   it	   attributed	   to	   the	   impacts	   of	   the	   euro-­‐zone	   crisis,	   was	   constraining	   the	  growth	   of	   firms	   (particularly	   SMEs)	   and	   was	   hampering	   a	   private	   sector-­‐led	  recovery.43	  	  	  The	   government’s	   response,	   and	   the	   core	   of	   its	   post-­‐2012	   macroeconomic	  strategy,	  has	  been	  a	  programme	  of	   ‘credit	  easing’.	   In	  general	   terms,	  credit	  easing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  Guardian	  (2012),	  'Dear	  George	  Osborne,	  It’s	  Time	  For	  Plan	  B,	  Say	  Top	  Economists',	  <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/aug/17/top-­‐economists-­‐advice-­‐george-­‐osborne>,	  accessed	  05/09/2012.	  41	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.18-­‐1.21;	  Treasury	  (2013a),	  
Budget	  Report	  2013	  paragraphs	  1.7	  and	  1.15-­‐1.19.	  42	  Treasury	  (2012a),	  Budget	  Report	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.61-­‐1.65;	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  
Autumn	  Statement	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.16,	  1.22	  and	  1.28-­‐1.31.	  43	  Treasury	  (2011c),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2011,	  paragraphs	  1.67-­‐1.68;	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  
Autumn	  Statement	  2012,	  paragraphs	  1.18-­‐1.20.	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refers	  to	  government	  efforts	  to	  limit	  the	  risk	  exposure	  of	  lenders.	  The	  Coalition	  has	  implemented	   this	   principle	   through	   three	   methods:	   by	   offering	   guarantees	   on	  lending	   to	  consumers	  and	  businesses;	  by	   facilitating	  access	   to	  cheaper	  wholesale	  lending	  to	  private	  banks;	  and	  by	  deploying	  public	  funds	  in	  commercially-­‐operated	  investment	   funds.	   The	   last	   of	   these,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   has	   a	   long	  precedent	   in	   microeconomic	   policy.	   The	   former	   two,	   however,	   are	   novel	  instruments	  in	  a	  macroeconomic	  policy	  setting.44	  With	  the	  stimulatory	  potential	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  having	  failed	  to	  materialise	  to	  a	  sufficient	  extent,	  credit	  easing	  represents	   a	   concerted	   effort	   by	   the	   government	   to	   direct	   private	   bank	   lending	  into	   the	   non-­‐financial	   economy	   in	   order	   to	   raise	   business	   investment	   and	  consumer	   demand.45	   Through	   this	   turn	   to	   credit	   easing	   the	   pace	   of	   the	   wage-­‐deflationary	   adjustment	   strategy	   has	   been	  moderated,	   and	   an	   element	   of	   short-­‐term	  stimulus	  brought	  in.	  	  There	  are	  two	  distinct	  aspects	  to	  the	  credit-­‐easing	  programme.	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  on	  which	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   section	   dwells,	   are	   policies	   targeting	   the	   flow	   of	  credit	  to	  businesses,	  mortgage	  borrowers	  and	  consumers.	  The	  second	  -­‐	  the	  ‘Help	  to	  Buy’	  scheme	  of	  2013	  –	  has	  sought	  specifically	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  mortgage	  credit.	  The	  macroeconomic	  policy	  implications	  and	  motives	  of	  this	  second	  scheme	  are	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  credit	  easing	  in	  support	  of	  macroeconomic	  policy	  was	  announced	  in	  the	  
Autumn	   Statement	   of	   2011.	   The	   initial	   form	   was	   the	   ‘national	   loan	   guarantee	  scheme’	  (NLGS),	  which	  used	  public	  funds	  to	  guarantee	  a	  selected	  group	  of	  banks’	  own	  borrowing	  on	  the	  proviso	  that	  the	  saving	  facilitated	  was	  passed	  on	  to	  lending	  to	   businesses	  with	   a	   turnover	   of	   less	   than	   £51mn.	   £20bn	  was	   committed	   to	   the	  scheme,	  from	  which	  the	  government	  expected	  to	  see	  up	  to	  a	  1%	  fall	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  borrowing	   for	   such	   businesses.	   A	   second	   scheme	   –	   the	   ‘business	   finance	  partnership’	   –	   sought	   to	   stimulate	   the	   provision	   of	   non-­‐bank	   finance	   to	   SMEs	  through	   a	   government-­‐private	   £1bn	   co-­‐investment	   in	   managed	   loan	   funds	   that	  lend	   directly	   to	   SMEs	   and	   ‘Mid-­‐Cap’	   firms.	   The	   government	   defended	   its	   deficit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  A	  small	  firm	  loan	  guarantee	  scheme	  (since	  expanded	  into	  the	  ‘Enterprise	  Finance	  Guarantee)	  predates	  2008,	  but	  it	  is	  better	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  non-­‐discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  because	  it	  had	  no	  macroeconomic	  stimulatory	  intent	  until	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  45	  Treasury	  (2012b),	  Autumn	  Statement	  2012,	  paragraph	  1.30.	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reduction	  programme	   from	   the	   fiscal	   implications	  of	   this	  policy	  by	  offsetting	   the	  new	  guarantees	  against	  others	  that	  had	  alreadybeen	  made	  available	  to	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  asset	  purchase	  facility.	  	  	  The	  NGLS	  was	  subsequently	  superseded	  by	  the	  larger	  ‘funding	  for	  lending	  scheme’	  (FLS).	   The	   FLS	   is	   a	   monetary	   policy	   rather	   than	   fiscal-­‐monetary	   intervention,	  operated	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  The	  scheme	  permits	  commercial	  banks	  to	  swap	  certain	  assets	   for	   treasury	  bills	   in	  order	   to	   raise	   funds	  more	  cheaply	   than	  would	  otherwise	  be	  the	  case.	  Beyond	  an	  initial	  allowance	  (estimated	  to	  be	  around	  £68bn	  at	  the	  time	  the	  policy	  was	  announced),	  the	  quantity	  of	  funds	  that	  could	  be	  accessed	  by	  participating	  banks	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  growth	  in	  net	  lending	  to	  households	  and	  private	  non-­‐financial	  firms,	  thus	  incentivizing	  banks	  to	  expand	  lending	  to	  the	  non-­‐financial	  economy.	  The	  scheme	  has	  been	  extended	  twice	  –	  in	  late	  2013	  and	  2014.	  The	   2013	   extension	   removed	   the	   incentives	   for	  mortgage	   lending	   a	   year	   earlier	  than	  planned,	  a	  rather	  significant	  event	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  final	  section,	  whilst	  the	   2014	   extension	   subsequently	   focused	   the	   incentive	   entirely	   upon	   SME	  lending.46	  	  	  The	  choice	  of	  a	  novel	  set	  of	  monetary	  stimulatory	  instruments	  is	  likely	  in	  part	  to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  the	  earlier	  failed	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  was	  articulated:	   having	   constructed	   a	   communicative	   discourse	   so	   unswervingly	  premised	  on	  the	  absolute	  and	  unavoidable	  necessity	  of	  immediate	  deficit	  reduction	  the	  political	  costs	  of	  a	   ‘U-­‐turn’	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  very	  high	   indeed,	  particularly	   in	  a	  context	  where	   the	  opposition	  has	   consistently	   called	   the	  government’s	   economic	  competence	   into	  question	   (on	  which	   see	  Chapter	  7).	  Yet	   a	  degree	  of	  undisclosed	  fiscal	   loosening	   has	   in	   fact	   taken	   place	   since	   2012,	   evident	   in	   a	   slowing	   of	   the	  decline	   of	   borrowing	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   from	   2011-­‐12	   onwards	   and	   the	  repeated	  revisions	  of	  the	  government’s	  deficit	  reduction	  target	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	   concession	  of	   the	   original	   2010	   fiscal	  mandate.47	  The	   goal	   of	   eliminating	   the	  structural	  deficit	  is	  now	  projected	  long	  into	  the	  next	  parliament.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Bank	  Of	  England	  (2013),	  Funding	  For	  Lending	  Scheme	  Extension:	  Explanatory	  Note	  (London:	  Bank	  of	  England);	  M.	  Carney	  (2014),	  Letter	  To	  The	  Chancellor	  Of	  The	  Exchequer,	  
02/12/2014	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  47	  See	  ONS	  and	  OBR	  data	  plotted	  in	  J.	  Portes	  (2014),	  'Fiscal	  Policy,	  "Plan	  A"	  And	  The	  Recovery:	  Explaining	  The	  Economics',	  <http://niesr.ac.uk/blog/fiscal-­‐policy-­‐plan-­‐and-­‐recovery-­‐explaining-­‐economics#.VLaoyqNTsuJ>,	  accessed	  20/12/2014,	  Chart	  1.4.	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  As	  Chapter	  2	  highlighted,	  from	  a	  constructivist	  perspective	  economic	  performance	  failure,	   particularly	   when	   associated	   with	   a	   particular	   approach	   to	   economic	  policymaking,	  provides	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  actors	  can	  become	  more	  receptive	  to	  new	  ideas	  and	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  problem	  definitions.	  Yet	  while	  the	  Coalition	  has	  moderated	  its	  highly	  rationalist	  assumptions	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  deficit	  reduction	   as	   a	   stimulant	   of	   economic	   activity,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   in	   this	  particular	  theme	  of	  a	  categorical	  change	  in	  the	  character	  of	  coordinative	  discourse.	  The	   government	   retains	   a	   strong	   neoliberal	   belief	   in	   the	   allocative	   efficiency	   of	  markets:	  the	  assumption	  underpinning	  the	  strategy	  of	  credit	  stimulus	  is	  that,	  once	  the	   price	  was	   reduced,	   there	  would	   be	   demand	   for	   credit	   from	   firms	   seeking	   to	  grow.	  Consequently	  (and	  perhaps	  unsurprisingly)	  the	  Coalition	  continues	  to	  reject	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  deficiency	  of	  aggregate	  demand	  can	  be	  anything	  but	  a	  short-­‐term	  malady	   of	   the	   economy	   providing	   correct	   monetary	   conditions	   are	   maintained.	  This,	   along	   with	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   market-­‐based	   method	   of	   allocating	   this	   credit,	  means	   that	   the	   programme	   is	   thus	   quite	   consistent	  with	   the	   neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   attributed	   earlier	   to	   the	   Brown	   and	  New	   Labour	   governments.	  What	  has	   been	   witnessed	   is	   a	   reversion	   from	   one	   form	   of	   neoliberal	   macroeconomic	  strategy	  to	  another.	  	  
3.	  
Re-­balancing	  	  Both	  governments	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  have	  emphasised	  the	   ‘rebalancing’	  of	  the	  UK	  economy,	  away	  from	  what	  was	  characterised	  as	  a	  flawed	  and	  unsustainable	  model	  of	  growth,	  towards	  a	  sustainable	  and	  ‘balanced’	  one.48	  Both	  have	  appealed	  to	   the	   ‘rebalancing’	  metaphor	   in	  multiple	   contexts,	   including	   the	   public	   finances	  (the	  proportion	  of	  borrowing	  to	  revenues	  in	  public	  spending),	  the	  composition	  of	  economic	   activity	   (the	  proportions	  of	   financial	   and	  public	   sector	   activity	   to	  non-­‐financial	  private	  sector	  activity	  in	  GDP	  and	  employment	  figures),	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  aggregate	  demand	  (the	  relative	  proportions	  of	  consumer,	  foreign,	  business	  and	  public-­‐sector	  spending	  and	   investment	   in	  the	  composition	  of	  aggregate	  demand).	  It	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  is	  my	  emphasis	  here,	  for	  it	  is	  a	  specifically	  macroeconomic	  issue.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Froud,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  'Rebalancing	  The	  Economy’.	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The	  second	  is	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  which	  addresses	  microeconomic	  dimensions	  of	  post-­‐2008	  crisis	  diagnoses.	  Along	  this	  theme	  we	  directly	  encounter	  the	   two	  post-­‐2008	  governments’	  orientation	   to	  Britain’s	  pre-­‐2008	  growth	  model	  and	   their	   hopes	   for	   a	   transition	   to	   a	   new	   one	   premised	   on	   export	   demand	   and	  higher	  levels	  of	  business	  investment.	  	  Brown	  Government	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government,	  the	  rebalancing	  metaphor	  generally	  referred	  to	   the	   structure	   of	   aggregate	   demand.49	   In	   a	   context	   of	   impaired	   household	  spending	  it	  was	  envisioned	  that	  sterling	  depreciation	  and	  growth	  in	  export	  sectors	  would	   contribute	   towards	   such	   a	   rebalancing	   as	   recovery	   commenced.50	   Yet	   the	  government	  apparently	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  decisively	  intervene	  to	  bring	  this	  outcome	  about.	   Instead,	   and	   in	   line	   with	   the	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   of	   the	   New	  Labour	   governments	   on	   the	   same	   issue,	   the	   government’s	   discussions	   treated	  rebalancing	   as	   an	   automatic	   outcome	   of	   an	   open	   and	   liberally	   instituted	  market	  economy	  as	   external	   economic	   conditions	   changed:	   that	   in	   the	   long	   run	  an	  open	  and	   liberal	  market	   economy	  would	   tend	   towards	   a	   sustainable	   balance	   of	   trade	  position.51	   The	   conditions	   of	   an	   orderly	   rebalancing	   of	   demand,	   and	   the	  improvement	  of	  the	  trade	  account,	  were	  thus	  already	  thought	  to	  be	  present	  in	  late	  2008,	  with	  no	  imperative	  to,	  for	  example,	  purposefully	  manipulate	  the	  price	  of	  the	  currency.	  52	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraphs	  2.55	  and	  A.77;	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  
Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraphs	  2.20,	  4.19	  and	  B.75;	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  
2009,	  paragraphs	  2.31	  and	  A.57;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraphs	  2.14	  and	  B.48	  As	  time	  wore	  on	  the	  rebalancing	  metaphor	  was	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  public	  and	  private	  spending,	  perhaps	  reflecting	  the	  increasing	  role	  that	  the	  deficit	  was	  playing	  in	  the	  Brown	  government’s	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  see	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraph	  A.45;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  
(March),	  paragraph	  2.14.	  50	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraphs	  A.76-­‐A.90;	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  
Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraphs	  B.106-­‐B.111;	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraphs	  A.96-­‐A.112;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraphs	  B.58-­‐B.66.	  	  51	  B.	  Clift	  and	  J.	  Tomlinson	  (2008),	  'Whatever	  Happened	  To	  The	  Balance	  Of	  Payments	  'Problem'?	  The	  Contingent	  (Re)Construction	  Of	  British	  Economic	  Performance	  Assessment',	  The	  British	  Journal	  Of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations,	  10	  (4),	  pp.607-­‐29.	  52	  Treasury	  (2008),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2008,	  paragraph	  A.77;	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  Budget	  
Report	  2009	  ,	  paragraph	  2.20;	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraph	  A.57;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraph	  B.48.	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Yet	  the	  government’s	  broader	  economic	  policy	  suggests	  a	  more	  complicated	  set	  of	  intentions	  than	  these	  observations	  do	  if	  taken	  in	  isolation.	  A	  series	  of	  interventions	  (or	   perhaps	  more	   accurately,	   non-­‐interventions)	   undertaken	   in	   the	   housing	   and	  financial	   markets	   were	   arguably	   inconsistent	   with	   its	   stated	   desire	   to	   allow	   a	  rebalancing	  of	  demand	  to	  occur.	  These	  interventions	  share	  a	  common	  feature:	  they	  reenforce	   some	   of	   the	   institutional	   conditions	   that	   underpinned	   house	   price	  inflation	  and	  privatised	  Keynesianism	   in	   the	  Anglo-­‐liberal	   growth	  model.	   Insofar	  as	   this	   represents	   a	   deliberate	   strategy	   it	   would	   suggest	   that	   a	   rebalancing	   of	  Britain’s	   demand	   structure	   was	   not	   an	   immediate	   priority	   for	   the	   Brown	  Government.	  	  
Policy	  In	  The	  Service	  Of	  House	  Price	  Inflation?	  	  The	   government	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   UK	   housing	   market	   had	   not	   been	   on	   a	  sustainable	  price	  trajectory	  prior	   to	  2007,	  and	  that	  housing	  production	  had	  been	  subject	   to	   constraints	  which	  had	   led	  demand	   to	  outpace	   supply	   in	   some	  parts	  of	  the	   country.53	   This	   had	   been	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   government’s	   own	   Barker	  
Review	   four	  years	  earlier.54	  In	  response	  to	  these	  supply-­‐side	  constraints,	  and	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  stimulating	  economic	  activity,	  the	  government	  undertook	  a	  number	  of	   measures	   aimed	   at	   supporting	   the	   construction	   industry.	   These	   included	   a	  £7.5bn	   package	   of	   discretionary	   spending	   aimed	   at	   bringing	   112,000	   ‘affordable	  homes’	  and	  15,000	  private	  sector	  new-­‐builds	  to	  completion	  over	  two	  years,	  as	  well	  as	   4000	  new-­‐built	   units	   of	   social	   housing.	   Yet	   insofar	   as	   this	   approach	  was	   only	  part	   of	   the	   temporary	   stimulus	   measures	   of	   2008-­‐09	   it	   did	   not	   constitute	   a	  ‘decisive	  intervention’	  to	  arrest	  the	  supply-­‐side	  conditions	  of	  house	  price	  inflation	  or	   address	   their	   underlying	   causes.	   A	   shared	   equity	   scheme	   aimed	   at	   first-­‐time	  buyers	  of	  newly	  built	  homes	  (‘home	  buy	  direct’)	  was	  arguably	  a	  more	  consistent	  response	   in	   this	   respect,	   yet	   its	   purpose	   was	   to	   facilitate	   access	   to	   housing	   at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraphs	  5.58,	  5.59	  and	  Box	  B5;	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  term	  ‘bubble’	  is	  not	  used.	  However,	  that	  the	  Brown	  Government	  considered	  prices	  in	  the	  relatively	  subdued	  post-­‐2008	  housing	  market	  to	  be	  approximating	  their	  long-­‐run	  averages	  suggests	  that	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  previous	  five	  years	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  inflationary	  aberration.	  54	  K.	  Barker	  (2004),	  Review	  Of	  Housing	  Supply:	  Delivering	  Stability:	  Securing	  Our	  Future	  
Housing	  Needs	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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present	   price	   levels	   and	   so	   did	   not	   constitute	   an	   intervention	   in	   the	   service	   of	  housing	  market	  adjustment.	  	  	  The	  emphasis	  of	  housing	  market	  intervention	  fell	  on	  the	  demand	  side.	  During	  the	  recession	   of	   2008-­‐09	   the	   government	   implemented	   a	   number	   of	   emergency	  measures	   to	   support	   mortgage	   holders	   who	   were	   at	   risk	   of	   financial	   distress.55	  Attempts	  were	  made	  to	  secure	  lending	  commitments	  from	  the	  banks	  that	  had	  been	  taken	  into	  public	  ownership	  during	  the	  financial	  crash	  of	  2008.56	  To	  further	  boost	  access	   to	   the	   housing	   market	   at	   its	   present	   values	   the	   government	   temporarily	  raised	   the	   threshold	   at	   which	   stamp	   duty	   is	   paid	   by	   £50,000	   (a	   measure	   later	  increased	  further	  and	  extended	  by	  the	  Coalition).	  Given	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  found	  itself,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  government	  chose	  to	  defend	  the	  supply	  of	  mortgage	  credit	  and	  the	  housing	  market	   from	  a	  disorderly	  adjustment:	  de-­‐stabilizing	  ‘feedback	  loops’	  operating	  between	  over-­‐leveraged	  households	  with	  uncertain	   income	   prospects	   and	   holders	   of	   mortgage	   debt	   were	   identified	   as	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  financial	  and	  macroeconomic	  stability.57	  Yet	  insofar	  as	  it	  acted	  in	  this	  way	  without	   an	   alternative	  means	  of	   facilitating	  macroeconomic	   adjustment	  the	  Brown	  Government	  was	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  militated	  against	  the	  rebalancing	  of	  the	  demand	  structure	  that	  it	  elsewhere	  advocated.	  	  	  More	   generally,	   Watson	   observes	   that	   the	   government’s	   approach	   to	   financial	  reform	   (discussed	   at	   greater	   length	   below)	   defended	   the	   financial	   market	  conditions	  that	  had	  facilitated	  the	  expansion	  of	  credit	  that	  underpinned	  privatised	  Keynesianism	   prior	   to	   2008.58	   The	   government	   resisted	   calls	   from	   the	   Bank	   of	  England	  Governor	  to	  countenance	  the	  ring-­‐fencing	  of	  the	  deposit	  taking	  and	  retail	  operations	   of	   universal	   banks.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   claimed	   to	   be	   defending	   the	  conditions	  for	  financial	  innovation	  and	  the	  broadening	  of	  access	  of	  households	  to	  borrowing	   and	   investment	   opportunities.59	   The	   government	   also	   remained	  committed	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   residential	   mortgage	   securitisation	   as	   a	   means	   of	  funding	   mortgage	   lending.	   While	   acknowledging	   the	   role	   that	   the	   secondary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  See	  Treasury	  (2009a),	  Budget	  Report	  2009,	  Box	  5.6	  and	  paragraphs	  5.66-­‐5.71.	  56	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  3.38-­‐3.39.	  57	  Ibid,	  B.113;	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  Box	  2.1.	  58	  Watson	  (2013a),	  'The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	  59	  Ibid;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  5.31-­‐5.38.	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markets	  for	  securitised	  debt	  had	  played	  in	  the	  near-­‐collapse	  of	  the	  banking	  system,	  it	  was	  asserted	  that	  greater	  transparency,	  standardisation	  and	  a	  wider	  investment	  base	  would	  render	  securitisation	  a	  safe	  funding	  source	  for	  mortgage	  lending.60	  	  	  What	  these	  interventions	  and	  non-­‐interventions	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  defence	  of	  the	  institutional	  bases	  of	  rising	  levels	  of	  demand	  in	  a	  supply-­‐constricted	  housing	  market,	  with	  potentially	   inflationary	   implications.	   The	  question	   thus	   arises	   as	   to	  what	   the	   government’s	   motives	   were	   in	   carrying	   out	   these	   interventions,	   and	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   constitute	   an	   overt	   strategy	   to	   revive	   privatised	  Keynesianism?	   For	  Watson,	   it	   is	   more	   readily	   interpretable	   as	   a	   defence	   of	   the	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  agenda	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  political	  costs	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  maintain	   house	   prices.61	   If	   correct,	   this	   would	   suggest	   that	   there	   was	   no	  intentional	   strategy	   to	   revive	   privatised	   Keynesianism,	   for	   a	   strategy	   of	   asset-­‐based	  welfare	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   contrary	   assumption	   that	   capital	   gains	  will	   be	  treated	  as	  savings	  or	  as	  capital	  for	  long-­‐maturity	  investments,	  rather	  than	  diverted	  to	   consumption	   spending	   or	   held	   to	   offset	   falling	   savings	   (as	   privatised	  Keynesianism	  implies).	  Others	  are	  sceptical	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  government	  remained	   ignorant	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   and	   suggest	   it	   to	   have	   formed	   a	  conscious	   part	   of	   the	   New	   Labour	   governments’	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	  governance	   even	   prior	   to	   2007-­‐2008.62	   The	   evidence	   examined	   here	   does	   not	  permit	   a	   firm	   conclusion	   one	  way	   or	   the	   other,	   yet	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   the	  Brown	  Government	  was	  reluctant	  to	  decisively	  intervene	  to	  alter	  the	  institutional	  conditions	  that	  had	  sustained	  privatised	  Keynesianism,	  and	  thus	  that	  it	  was	  likely	  that	   a	   (possibly	   unintentionally)	   revived	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   would	   have	  resulted	  from	  the	  government’s	  strategy	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  Coalition	  Government	  	  By	  contrast	  the	  pre-­‐2012	  phase	  of	  the	  Coalition’s	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  in	  support	  of	  macroeconomic	  rebalancing.	  The	  Coalition	  anticipated	  a	  rapid	  rebalancing	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  its	  ‘expansionary	  fiscal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Treasury	  (2009b),	  Pre-­Budget	  Report	  2009,	  paragraphs	  3.11-­‐3.12;	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  
Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraph	  3.32.	  61	  Watson	  (2013a),	  'The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	  62	  Hay	  (2011a),	  'Pathology	  Without	  Crisis?’.	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consolidation’.	   Interestingly,	   the	   crisis	   diagnosis	   prior	   to	   2012	   foregrounded	   a	  critique	   of	   the	   pre-­‐2008	   growth	   model	   that	   bears	   striking	   similarity	   to	   that	  advanced	  by	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  A	  number	  of	  key	  elements	  are	  shared,	  including	  an	  acknowledgment	  that	  a	  positive	  feedback	  effect	  between	  a	   financial	  bubble	  and	  a	  supply-­‐constricted	  housing	  market	  had	  yielded	  an	   unsustainable	   house	   price	   bubble.63	   Falling	   household	   savings	   and	   consumer	  and	  private	  sector	  indebtedness	  were	  also	  linked	  to	  economic	  growth,	  suggesting	  an	   awareness	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism,	   or	   at	   least	   the	   role	   of	   consumer	  indebtedness	  in	  sustaining	  demand	  prior	  to	  2007.64	  Finally,	  the	  Coalition	  noted	  the	  dependence	   of	   employment	   and	   private	   sector	   activity	   in	   certain	   regions	   on	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  public	  sector	  –	  and	  somewhat	  counter-­‐intuitively	  used	   this	  as	  a	  justification	   for	   public	   sector	   retrenchment	   and	   deficit	   reduction.65	   This	  “unbalanced	  growth	  model”	  was	  said	   to	  have	  upheld	  an	  ultimately	  unsustainable	  dynamic	  of	  economic	  growth	  that,	  when	  the	  flow	  of	  credit	  contracted,	   left	  the	  UK	  particularly	   exposed	   to	   the	   global	   recession.66	   The	   result	   was	   said	   to	   be	   the	  growing	  balance	  of	  trade	  deficit	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  public	  and	  private	  indebtedness	  that	  posed	  an	  imminent	  risk	  to	  macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  recovery.	  	  	  Yet	  this	  is	  about	  as	  far	  as	  the	  agreement	  between	  the	  Coalition	  government	  and	  the	  critical	   social	   democrats	   goes.	   Viewed	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	  definitions,	   a	   rather	   different	   set	   of	   causes	   and	   solutions	   are	   attributed	   to	   these	  problems.	   For	   the	   Coalition,	   the	   unbalanced	   growth	   model	   prior	   to	   2008	   was	  almost	  entirely	  the	  result	  of	  government	  complacency	  in	  regard	  to	  public	  spending	  and	  financial	  sector	  oversight.	  The	  solution	  to	  the	  problems,	  thus	  defined,	  is	  fiscal	  consolidation,	  public	  sector	  retrenchment,	  and	  improved	  market	  discipline	  within	  liberally	  instituted	  financial	  markets.	  The	  neoliberal	  faith	  in	  the	  rapid	  adjustment	  of	  resource-­‐efficient	  markets	  contrasts	  to	  the	  critical	  social	  democrat	  belief	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  indefinite	  stagnation	  due	  to	  deficient	  aggregate	  demand,	  inadequate	  industrial	  policy	  and	  pathological	  finance-­‐industry	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Department	  For	  Communities	  and	  Local	  Government	  (2011),	  Laying	  The	  Foundations:	  A	  
Housing	  Strategy	  For	  England	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  85-­‐86.	  64	  Treasury	  (2010c),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (June),	  paragraphs	  1.1-­‐1.6;	  Treasury	  (2011a),	  
Budget	  Report	  2011,	  paragraphs	  1.1-­‐1.7.	  65	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  1.1-­‐1.7.	  66	  Ibid.	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The	   return	   to	   stimulus	   in	   late	   2011	   creates	   a	   tension	   in	   the	   Coalition’s	   crisis	  diagnosis.	  While	  continuing	   to	  profess	   the	   importance	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation	  and	  macroeconomic	   rebalancing,	   the	   Coalition’s	   approach	   to	   credit	   easing	   and	   its	  housing,	  planning	  and	  financial	  reform	  policies	  serve	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  very	  growth	  model	  that	  it	  criticised	  its	  Labour	  predecessors	  for	  presiding	  over.	  The	  Funding	  for	  Lending	  Scheme	  sought	  initially	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  and	  lower	  the	  price	  of	   secured	   lending	   to	   individuals	   as	  well	   as	   to	  businesses,	   and	  was	  not	  instituted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  prioritise	  the	  latter	  until	  2013.	  Indeed,	  until	  this	  time	  the	   stimulation	   of	   domestic	   consumer	   demand	   was	   an	   explicit	   objective	   of	   the	  policy.	  The	  ‘Help	  to	  Buy’	  scheme,	  discussed	  presently,	  serves	  to	  stimulate	  demand	  in	   the	   housing	   market	   by	   lowering	   the	   cost	   of	   credit	   to	   mortgage	   borrowers.	  Intervening	   to	   lower	   the	   cost	   and	   increase	   the	   supply	   of	   lending	   available	   for	  domestic	   consumption	   stands	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   Coalition’s	   project	   of	  macroeconomic	  adjustment,	  and,	  moreover,	  reverts	  to	  a	  structure	  of	  demand	  that	  the	   government	   had	   previously	   defined	   as	   pathological.	   This,	   I	   suggest,	   is	  indicative	   of	   an	   intentional	   revival	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	  political	  and	  economic	  palliative	  to	  the	  longer-­‐term	  strategy	  of	  wage-­‐deflationary	  adjustment.	  	  
Help	  to	  Buy	  	  Given	   the	   role	   that	   the	   Coalition	   had	   identified	   for	   house	   price	   inflation	   and	  housing	   market	   volatility	   in	   the	   production	   of	   macroeconomic	   instability,	   a	  demand-­‐side	  stimulus	  of	  the	  housing	  market	  seems	  a	  most	  unlikely	  intervention	  to	  have	  undertaken.	  Yet	  an	  unprecedented	  housing	  market	  stimulus	  was	  announced	  in	  the	  2013	  Budget	  –	   the	   ‘Help	  to	  Buy’	  scheme.	  The	  scheme	  followed	  the	  general	  form	  of	   the	  government’s	  other	  credit	  easing	   interventions,	  granting	  government	  guarantees	  of	  £12bn	  on	  new	  lending	  in	  defined	  markets	  –	  in	  this	  case	  on	  high	  loan-­‐to-­‐value	  mortgage	   lending	   –	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   £3.5bn	   programme	   of	   equity	   loans	  intended	  to	  cover	  up	  to	  20%	  of	  house	  purchases.	  The	  scheme	  was	  to	  unfold	  in	  two	  phases	  between	  2013	  and	  2017.	  The	   first	   restricted	   support	   to	   first-­‐time	  buyers	  buying	  newly	  built	  houses.	  The	  second	  phase,	  which	  became	  operational	  in	  2014,	  extended	  support	  to	  buyers	  of	  existing	  homes	  worth	  up	  to	  £600,000.	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The	  rationale	  offered	  for	  the	  Help	  to	  Buy	  scheme	  was	  two-­‐fold.	  Firstly,	  it	  was	  said	  to	   fulfil	   a	   ‘fairness’	   objective	   by	   assisting	   the	   increasing	   number	   of	   UK	   citizens	  excluded	   from	   home	   ownership	   due	   to	   inflated	   house	   prices.	   The	   scheme	  addressed	  what	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  high-­‐price/low-­‐transaction	  equilibrium	  that	  was	  exacerbating	  generational	  barriers	   to	  housing	  market	  entry.67	  However	  (and	  perhaps	   counter-­‐intuitively	   in	   what	   the	   Coalition	   conceded	   to	   be	   a	   supply-­‐constricted	  market)	  the	  second	  rationale	  offered	  for	  the	  Help	  to	  Buy	  scheme	  was	  as	  a	  stimulant	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  newly	  built	  housing.68	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  clear	  enough	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  programme,	  which	  targeted	  the	  purchase	  of	  newly	  built	  properties.69	  However,	  it	  is	  less	  obvious	  how	  the	  second	  phase	  would	  work	   to	   this	   end.	   To	   understand	   the	   logic	   behind	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Coalition’s	  claim	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  set	  it	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  broader	  assessment	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  ‘supply	  gap’	  in	  the	  housing	  market.	  	  	  The	  Coalition’s	  Housing	  Strategy	  touches	  on	  three	  broad	  factors	  to	  which	  the	  lack	  of	  housing	  supply	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  is	  attributed.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  output	  of	  the	  house	  building	  industry,	  and	  to	  a	  tendency	  for	  development	  to	  stall	  on	   sites	   where	   planning	   permission	   has	   already	   been	   granted.	   The	   Coalition	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  historic	  volatility	  of	  the	  UK	  housing	  market.	  Uncertainty	  over	  the	   future	   value	   of	   land	   and	   of	   output	   is	   argued	   to	   mute	   the	   house	   building	  industry’s	  responsiveness	   to	  demand.70	  The	  volatility	  of	   the	  housing	  market	   is	   in	  turn	   attributed	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   oversight	   of	   credit	   creation	   in	   the	   UK’s	   mortgage	  markets.71	  To	  address	  the	  problem	  the	  Coalition	  has	  established	  a	  ‘Financial	  Policy	  Committee’	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   tasked	   with	   conducting	   discretionary	  regulation	  of	  the	  credit	  cycle	  and	  granted	  powers	  to	  impose	  area-­‐specific	  counter-­‐cyclical	  credit	  controls	  on	  what	   it	  deems	  to	  be	  excessive	  credit	  growth	  (a	  change	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  This	  apparatus	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  solution	  for	  managing	  a	  destabilising	  expansion	  of	  mortgage	  credit	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  DCLG	  (2011),	  Laying	  The	  Foundations,	  paragraph	  14.	  68	  Treasury	  (2013a),	  Budget	  Report	  2013,	  paragraph	  1.36.	  69	  It	  was	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  scheme	  coincided	  with	  a	  rise	  in	  house	  prices	  in	  general,	  suggesting	  its	  impact	  went	  beyond	  newly	  built	  properties	  through,	  perhaps,	  its	  confidence	  enhancing	  effects.	  70	  DCLG	  (2011),	  Laying	  The	  Foundations,	  paragraph	  10.	  71	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  12,	  17,	  93,	  and	  95.	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  The	  second	  factor	  relates	  to	  the	  supply	  of	  land	  available	  for	  development,	  and	  the	  maldevelopment	   of	   some	   of	   the	   land	   that	   is	   made	   available.	   This	   is	   partly	  attributed	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   home	   building	   targets	   on	   local	   authorities	   by	  central	   government,	  which	   is	   said	   to	   have	   led	   to	   substandard	   types	   and	   level	   of	  land	   release	   and	   an	   oversupply	   of	   homes	   that	   do	  not	  match	   those	  which	  buyers	  demand.72	  A	  lack	  of	  community	  involvement	  in	  the	  planning	  process	  is	  also	  said	  to	  have	  contributed	  to	  this	  outcome,	  and	  to	  have	  led	  to	  greater	  levels	  of	  opposition	  to	  development	   where	   this	   outcome	   could	   have	   been	   avoided.73	   Finally,	   ‘excessive	  regulation’	  of	  the	  house	  building	  industry	  is	  cited.74	  In	  response	  the	  Coalition	  made	  a	   number	   of	   interventions.	   Centrally	   given	   targets	   for	   house	   building	   were	  abolished.	  The	  National	  Planning	  Policy	  Framework	  streamlined	  guidance	  to	   local	  authority	  planners,	  required	  them	  to	  make	  rolling	  five-­‐year	  land	  release	  plans,	  and	  established	  the	  norm	  that	  local	  authorities	  would	  make	  an	  ‘assumption	  in	  favour	  of	  sustainable	   development’	   (defined	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   capacity	   to	   promote	   economic	  growth).75	  A	   suite	   of	  measures	   that	   created	   financial	   and	  material	   incentives	   for	  local	   authorities	   and	   communities	   to	   co-­‐operate	   with	   the	   new	   guidelines	  accompanied	   the	   reform	  of	   the	  planning	  process.76	   Finally,	   a	   range	  of	  provisions	  increased	   community	   involvement	   in	   selecting	   sites	   for	   development	   and	  development	   options.	   This	   included	   the	   introduction	   of	   ‘Neighbourhood	  Development	   Plans’,	   the	   community	   ‘Right	   to	   Build’,	   and	   ‘Neighbourhood	  Development	   Orders’,	   all	   of	   which	   were	   intended	   to	   facilitate	   communities	   and	  community	   organisations	   in	   granting	   planning	   permission	   independently	   of	   the	  local	  authority	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  this	  participatory	  approach	  would	  facilitate	  raised	  output.77	  	  If	  these	  reforms	  to	  the	  planning	  process	  and	  financial	  oversight	  regimes	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  see	  how	  the	  Coalition	  could	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  demand-­‐side	  intervention	  into	  the	  housing	  market	  was	  consistent	  with	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  80.	  73	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  16.	  74	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  81.	  75	  Department	  For	  Communities	  And	  Local	  Government	  (2012),	  National	  Planning	  Policy	  
Framework	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  14.	  76	  DCLG	  (2011),	  Laying	  The	  Foundations,	  paragraphs	  59	  and	  64.	  77	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  56	  and	  66.	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rising	   housing	   supply,	   a	   return	   to	   equilibrium	   house	   prices	   and	  macroeconomic	  stability:	   the	   institutional	   factors	   that	   were	   deemed	   to	   make	   housing	   a	   volatile	  element	   in	   the	   British	   economy	   were	   being	   addressed	   concurrently	   to	   the	  stimulus.	   Yet	   there	   is	   an	   important	   caveat	   to	   note	   here:	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   these	  interventions	   are	   indeed	   effective	   means	   to	   resolve	   the	   supply	   constraints	   and	  threats	   to	  macroeconomic	  stability	  bound	  up	   in	   the	  British	  housing	  market,	   they	  are	   not	   short-­‐term	   solutions.	   They	   are	   at	   best	   medium-­‐term	  measures,	   and	   are	  more	  likely	  long-­‐term	  ambitions.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  that	  the	  plans	  of	  local	  authorities	   would	   be	   comprehensively	   updated	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   new	   financial	  incentives;	   that	   a	   culture	   of	   engagement	   in	   the	   planning	   process	   could	   be	  established	   among	   local	   communities;	   and	   that	   construction	   companies	   would	  become	  more	  confident	   in	  the	  future	  value	  of	  their	  housing	  output.	  Admittedly,	  a	  number	   of	   shorter-­‐term	   measures	   were	   undertaken,	   including	   funding	   and	  expedited	   planning	   permission	   for	   stalled	   developments	   and	   a	   pledge	   to	   release	  enough	   land	   from	   public	   sector	   land	   banks	   to	   support	   100,000	   homes	   over	   the	  2010	  spending	  review	  period.	  Yet	  it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  of	  these	  could	  have	  been	  imagined	  to	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  raise	  annual	  housing	  output	  from	  ten-­‐year	  net	  annual	   average	  of	  162,000	   to	   the	  232,000	  per	   annum	   that	   the	  government	   itself	  estimated	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	   meet	   the	   shortfall	   in	   supply	   by	   2033.78	   The	  interventions	   can	   only	   be	   described	   as	   ‘decisive’	   in	   a	   cumulative	   and	   non-­‐immediate	  sense.	  	  With	   this	   in	  mind	   it	   seems	  most	  unlikely	   that	   the	  government	  can	  have	  believed	  the	   short-­‐term	   results	   of	   the	  Help	   to	   Buy	   scheme	  would	   be	   anything	   other	   than	  inflationary.	   That	   the	   Coalition	   did	   little	   to	  moderate	   the	   scheme	   in	   light	   of	   the	  sharp	   rise	   in	   house	   prices	   over	   the	   course	   of	   2013	   and	   2014	   or	   the	   growing	  concern	  among	  technocrats	  and	  commentators	  (discussed	  below)	  further	  adds	  to	  the	   notion	   that	   this	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   intended	   outcome.79	   Some	   potential	   tensions	  between	   this	   and	   the	   Coalition’s	   broader	   macroeconomic	   policy	   agenda	   are	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  	  
A	  Safer	  Privatised	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  78	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  1.	  79	  On	  house	  prices	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2013	  and	  2014,	  see	  Nationwide	  (2014),	  Nationwide	  
Houseprice	  Index	  Press	  Release	  December	  2014	  (Swindon:	  Nationwide).	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  The	   foregoing	   has	   significant	   implications	   for	   how	   we	   interpret	   the	   Coalition’s	  approach	   to	  macroeconomic	   rebalancing.	   A	   short-­‐term	  policy	   of	   housing	  market	  reflation	  might	   –	   and	   likely	   does	   –	   serve	   a	   number	   of	   strategic	   agendas	   for	   the	  Coalition,	   including	   possible	   electoral	   ones.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Coalition	  had	   articulated	   a	   link	   between	   consumer/household	   debt	   and	   economic	   growth	  and	   were	   elsewhere	   seeking	   to	   raise	   consumer	   demand	   through	   credit	   easing	  makes	   it	  highly	  unlikely	   that	   the	   issue	  of	  growth	  did	  not	  play	   into	   their	  strategic	  thinking	  when	  pursuing	  what	  was,	  in	  effect,	  the	  platform	  for	  consumer	  borrowing	  and	   further	   rounds	  of	   home	  equity	   release.	   I	   therefore	   conclude	   that	   there	   is	   an	  undisclosed	  element	  to	  the	  Coalition’s	  broader	  post-­‐2012	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  of	  credit	  easing:	  the	  short-­‐term	  resumption	  of	  privatised	  Keynesianism.	  The	  failure	  of	   the	  pre-­‐2012	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  gave	  way	  to	  a	  grudging	  concession	  that	  the	   deflationary	   adjustment	   that	   the	   government	   had	   embarked	   upon	   was	   a	  longer-­‐term	  project	   than	   they	  had	  hitherto	  believed.	   In	   this	   context	   a	   temporary	  resumption	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   serves	   as	   a	   palliative	   for	   the	   negative	  economic	   and	   political	   consequences	   of	   its	   broader	   project	   of	   macroeconomic	  adjustment	  once	  the	  EFCT	  thesis	  ceased	  to	  be	  an	   influence	  and	  the	  Coalition	  was	  forced	  to	  recognise	  anew	  the	  risks	  of	  human	  and	  physical	  capital	  degradation	  in	  a	  prolonged	  recession.	  	  	  There	   is	   undoubtedly	   an	   element	  of	   risk	   involved	   in	   the	  Coalition’s	   strategy	   in	   a	  context	   of	   interest	   rate	   uncertainty	   and	   an	   already	   highly	   leveraged	   household	  sector.	   Yet	   these	   attempts	   to	   temporarily	   and	   pragmatically	   resume	   privatised	  Keynesianism	   take	   place	   within	   a	   reformed	   framework	   of	   discretionary	   ‘macro-­‐prudential’	   regulation	   of	   the	   credit	   cycle	   that,	   at	   least	   from	   a	   neoliberal	  perspective,	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  render	  the	  new	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  less	  risky	  than	  would	  otherwise	  be	  the	  case.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  change	  in	  strategy	  to	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  British	  political	  economy	  should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  Rebalanced	  macroeconomic	  adjustment	  remains	  the	  stated	  objective.	  The	  ongoing	  tolerance	   of	   declining	   real	  wages	   suggests	   that	   this	   is	   still	   being	   pursued,	   albeit	  through	  a	  longer-­‐term	  strategy	  of	  moderated	  wage-­‐deflationary	  adjustment	  rather	  than	  expansionary	  fiscal	  consolidation.	  The	  return	  to	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  thus	  represents	   an	   uneasy	   compromise	   between	   competing	   economic	   and	   political	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objectives:	   a	   slowing	   of	   adjustment	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   mitigating	   the	   perceived	  economic	  and	  political	  risks	  of	  too	  rapid	  a	  withdrawal	  of	  demand.	  	  	  
	  
4.	  
Financial	  Instability	  	  The	  financial	  instability	  of	  2007-­‐2008	  dramatically	  exposed	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  pre-­‐2008	  growth	  model.	  Neoliberal	  restructuring	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  financialisation	  to	   which	   it	   gave	   rise	   are	   strongly	   implicated	   in	   this	   failure	   of	   economic	  performance.	   It	   is	   here	   perhaps	  more	   than	   anywhere	   else	   that	   the	   New	   Labour	  governments’	   faith	   in	   the	   self-­‐stabilizing	   and	   allocative-­‐efficient	   properties	   of	  markets	  was	   found	  wanting	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context.	   	   Consequently	   an	   analysis	  along	   this	   theme	   is	   particularly	   instructive	   in	   charting	   the	   fate	   of	   neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  	  	  	  Brown	  Government	  	  The	  response	  of	  the	  government	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  financial	   instability	  in	  2007	  came	   in	   three	   distinct	   phases:	   the	   first	   in	   2007,	  where	   the	   failures	   of	   individual	  banks	  such	  as	  Northern	  Rock	  were	  treated	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  no	  failure	  of	  the	  overall	  system	  was	  perceived	  to	  have	  occurred;	  a	  second	  during	  the	   ‘panic	  of	  2008’	   in	  which	   the	   government	   adopted	   a	   system-­‐wide	   approach	   and	   sought	   to	  guarantee	  the	  solvency	  of	  the	  UK	  banking	  system;	  and	  a	  contrasting	  third	  phase	  in	  2009	  in	  which	  a	  conservative	  approach	  to	  financial	  reform	  was	  adopted	  and	  efforts	  turned	   to	   shoring	   up	   the	   liberal,	   lightly	   regulated	   and	   privately	   owned	   financial	  system	   in	  a	   form	  as	  closely	  approximating	   that	  of	  before	  2007	  as	  possible.80	  The	  immediate	  bailouts	  were	  the	  product	  of	  desperation	  –	  a	  crisis-­‐driven	  ‘cauterizing’	  of	  a	   financial	  sector	  caught	   in	  a	   ‘death	  cycle’	  of	   illiquidity	  and	  insolvency	  so	  as	  to	  preserve	  the	  supply	  of	  money	  to	  the	  economy	  (although	  I	  suggested	  in	  Chapter	  2	  that	  this	  too	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  consistent	  with	  a	  neoliberal	  coordinative	  discourse,	  albeit	   one	   confronting	   unexpected	   circumstances).	   It	   is	   the	   third	   phase	   that	   I	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  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	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examine	  here,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  this	  that	  we	  see	  a	  coherent	  diagnosis	  and	  policy	  response	  begin	  to	  emerge.	  	  It	  was	  during	  the	  second	  phase	  that	  the	  Brown	  Government	  moved	  to	  cauterise	  the	  ongoing	   financial	   turmoil.	   A	   ‘three-­‐pronged	   attack’	   was	   adopted	   in	   coordination	  with	   the	   Bank	   of	   England.	   A	   £200bn	   facility	   was	   established	   to	   ease	   liquidity	  problems	   while	   an	   additional	   £250bn	   of	   guarantees	   were	   made	   on	   interbank	  lending.	  Finally,	  a	  £50bn	  recapitalisation	  fund	  was	  established	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  equity.	   It	   was	   under	   this	   package	   that	   the	   Royal	   Bank	   of	   Scotland	   and	   Lloyds	  Banking	   Group	   were	   taken	   into	   public	   ownership.	   A	   further	   round	   of	   public	  bailouts	   followed	  in	  2009.	   In	  mid	  2011	  the	  National	  Audit	  Office	  reported	  a	  peak	  public	   sector	   exposure	   of	   nearly	   £1.2tn,	   although	   many	   were	   in	   the	   form	   of	  guarantees	   that	   were	   not	   necessarily	   utilised.	   £123.9bn	   was	   in	   fact	   transferred	  from	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  private	  and	  formerly	  private	  banking	  firms	  in	  the	  form	  of	  loans	   and	   equity	   purchases.81	   An	   arms-­‐length	   holding	   company	   –	   ‘UK	   Financial	  Investments’	  (UKFI)	  –	  was	  then	  established	  to	  oversee	  the	  government’s	  stakes	  in	  its	   newly	   acquired	   banks.	   The	   company	   was	   responsible	   to	   the	   Treasury,	   from	  which	  part	  of	  its	  staff	  were	  drawn.	  UKFI	  was	  tasked	  to	  maximise	  shareholder	  value	  for	  it’s	  one	  stakeholder,	  the	  British	  state,	  while	  ensuring	  as	  swift	  a	  return	  to	  private	  ownership	  as	  was	  consistent	  with	  financial	  stability.	  This	  ‘fund	  manager’	  function	  largely	  marks	   the	   bounds	   of	  UKFI’s	   role	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  political	   economy:	   the	  banks	   themselves	   retain	   independent	   management	   and	   commercial	   strategies,	  continuing	  to	  operate	  as	  though	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  new	  public	  sector	  area	  of	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  markets	  is	  in	  reality	  a	  quasi-­‐private	  sector	  one.	  	  During	  2009,	  the	  government’s	  proposed	  approach	  to	  reform	  began	  to	  emerge.	  Its	  contours	   were	   outlined	   in	   the	   Financial	   Reform	   White	   Paper	   of	   2009,	   although	  these	   were	   truncated	   and	   only	   partly	   legislated	   due	   to	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   2010	  general	   election.	   The	  White	   Paper	   did	   contain	   one	  major	   discontinuity	  with	   pre-­‐2007	   financial	   market	   policy:	   a	   proposed	   return	   to	   discretionary	   credit	   control	  (what	   has	   come	   to	   be	   termed	   ‘macro-­‐prudential	   regulation’).82	   All	   parts	   of	   the	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  National	  Audit	  Office	  (2011),	  The	  Comptroller	  And	  Auditor	  General’s	  Report	  On	  Accounts	  
To	  The	  House	  Of	  Commons:	  The	  Financial	  Stability	  Interventions	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  4-­‐5.	  82	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets.	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tripartite	   infrastructure	   for	   financial	   regulation	   (the	   Treasury,	   Bank	   of	   England,	  and	   Financial	   Services	   Authority)	   were	   given	   an	   explicit	   objective	   to	   maintain	  financial	   stability,	   and	   a	   new	   organ	   –	   the	   Council	   for	   Financial	   Stability	   –	   was	  established	   to	   bring	   their	   efforts	   together.	   The	   principal	   method	   of	   macro-­‐prudential	  regulation	  was	  to	  be	  the	  use	  of	  discretionary	  and	  rules-­‐based	  counter-­‐cyclical	  capital	  and	  liquidity	  controls	  (the	  basis	  of	  which	  was	  to	  be	  developed	  at	  a	  later	  date)	  and	  a	  leverage	  ratio.	  These	  would	  be	  separately	  applied	  to	  those	  firms	  that	  the	  FSA	  identified	  to	  be	  ‘systemically	  significant	  financial	  institutions’.	  	  	  On	   the	   ‘micro-­‐prudential’	   side	   (that	   is,	   the	   incentivisation	   and	   regulation	   of	  behaviour	   within	   and	   between	   firms)	   the	   government’s	   proposals	   centred	   on	  enhancing	  ‘market	  discipline’.	  Measures	  to	  this	  end	  included	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  ‘special	   resolution	   regime’	   in	   the	   Banking	   Act	   (2009)	   and	   moves	   towards	   the	  institution	   of	   compulsory	   ‘Recovery	   and	   Resolution	   Plans’,	   both	   of	   which	   were	  intended	  to	  increase	  shareholder	  exposure	  in	  future	  bank	  bailouts	  by	  establishing	  a	  procedure	  for	  the	  speedy	  isolation	  and	  rescue	  of	  the	  retail	  deposit-­‐taking	  parts	  of	  banking	   firms	   in	   the	   event	   of	   insolvency.	   The	   government	   also	   announced	   its	  intention	   to	   institute	   a	   similar	   scheme	   for	   non-­‐retail	   entities	   such	   as	   investment	  banks.	  The	  powers	  of	   the	  FSA	  were	   judged	  to	  be	  generally	  sufficient	   to	  carry	  out	  micro-­‐prudential	  regulation,	  and	  the	  government	  endorsed	  the	  agency’s	  plans	  for	  ‘enhanced	  supervision’.	  The	  government	  also	  made	  some	  conservative	  reforms	  to	  the	   system	   of	   executive	   remuneration.	   These	   included	   the	   use	   of	   longer-­‐term	  instruments	  and	  the	  requirement	  that	  an	  ‘advisory’	  (i.e.	  non-­‐binding)	  vote	  be	  held	  on	  remuneration	  decisions	  by	  shareholders.	  	  The	   reform	   proposals	   are	   conservative,	   serving	   primarily	   to	   introduce	   ‘flanking	  mechanisms’	  where	  market	   failures	  have	  been	   identified.	  Three	  overarching	  and	  distinctly	   neoliberal	   assumptions	   emerge	   from	   the	  White	   Paper	   that	   represent	  categorically-­‐related	   developments	   of	   the	   problem	   definitions	   attributed	   to	   the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	  that	  under	  conditions	  of	   market	   discipline	   ‘light	   touch’	   regulation	   (and	   now	   counter-­‐cyclical	   capital	  controls)	   are	   sufficient	   to	   ensure	   the	   stability	   of	   financial	   markets.	   While	   the	  government	   offered	   no	   definition	   of	   market	   discipline	   in	   the	  White	   Paper,	   it	   is	  apparent	  from	  its	  discussion	  that	  it	  adhered	  to	  a	  conventional	  conceptualisation	  in	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this	  context:	  market	  discipline	  obtains	  where	  there	  is	  sufficient	  transparency	  over	  firm’s	  positions	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  financial	  products	  for	  rational	  investors	  to	  make	  informed	  choices,	  and	  where	  these	  choices	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  firm	  failure	  is	  a	  sufficient	  incentive	  for	  shareholders	  and	  firm	  executives	  to	  make	  decisions	  that	  are	  consistent	   with	   firm,	   market	   and	   economic	   stability.	   The	   Brown	   Government	  viewed	  failures	  in	  market	  discipline	  and	  resulting	  lack	  of	  prudence	  by	  firms	  to	  be	  the	  prime	  cause	  of	  the	  banking	  crisis	  of	  2008	  both	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US.83	  The	  failure	  of	  firms	  to	  manage	  their	  risk	  profiles	  in	  a	  prudent	  way	  was	  variably	  attributed	  to	  the	   distorting	   effects	   of	   executive	   remuneration,	   poor	   risk	   modelling,	   a	   lack	   of	  shareholder	  oversight	  and	  implicit	  guarantees	  to	  ‘universal	  banks’	  engaged	  in	  both	  retail	   and	   investment	   activities.84	  While	   the	   range	   of	   actions	   controlled	   through	  micro-­‐prudential	   regulation	  was	   to	   increase,	   this	  stopped	  short	  of	  a	   fundamental	  structural	  reform	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  business	  activities	  open	  to	  large	  financial	  firms.	  	  	  The	   depth	   of	   the	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   this	   view	   is	   demonstrated	   in	   its	  hostility	   to	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   proposal	   that	   a	   limited	   form	   of	   structural	  separation	   be	   instituted	   in	   which	   retail	   operations	   are	   ‘ring-­‐fenced’	   (that	   is,	  separately	   capitalised	   and	   subject	   to	   their	   own	   capital	   adequacy	   standards).85	  These	  were	  rejected	  as	  outweighing	   the	  benefits	  such	   institutions	  brought	   to	   the	  economy	   (succinctly,	   that	   they	   increased	   the	   supply	   of	   credit	   by	   intermediating	  between	   capital	  markets	   and	   retail	   lending	  markets,	   and	   achieved	   economies	   of	  scale).86	   Instead,	   a	  minimalist	   programme	  was	   advanced	   in	  which	   it	  was	   argued	  that	   improved	   market	   discipline	   and	   the	   FSA’s	   proposals	   for	   more	   intrusive	  regulatory	  practices	  within	   its	  existing	  powers	  would	  suffice	   to	  remove	  perverse	  incentives.	  	  	  Yet	  for	  all	  the	  orthodoxy	  of	  this	  view,	  the	  claim	  that	  ‘macro-­‐prudential’	  regulation	  is	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   stability	   marks	   a	   degree	   of	   novelty.	   This	   is	   because	   it	  involves	   the	   explicit	   concession	   that	   even	  well-­‐functioning	   financial	  markets	   are	  
inherently	  pro-­‐cyclical	  (both	  in	  terms	  of	  cycles	  in	  financial	  markets	  themselves,	  and	  in	   relation	   to	   the	   economy	   as	   a	   whole),	   and	   that	   a	   market	   failure	   thus	   exists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets,	  paragraphs	  3.2	  and	  5.1-­‐5.3.	  84	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  3.2-­‐3.17.	  85	  On	  the	  public	  statements	  exchanged	  between	  the	  Chancellor	  and	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  during	  this	  debate,	  see	  Watson	  (2013a),	  'The	  Welfare	  State	  Sources’.	  86	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets,	  paragraphs	  5.31-­‐5.38.	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whereby	  rational	  market	  participants	  are	  unable	  to	  manage	  the	  build	  up	  of	  system	  risk.87	   This	   was	   deemed	   something	   for	   which	   government	   should	   now	   take	  responsibility.	  The	   tendency	   for	   a	   cyclical	   oversupply	  of	   credit	  was	   attributed	   to	  poor	  epistemological	  assumptions	  in	  risk	  modelling	  and	  a	  general	  collective	  action	  problem	  of	  markets	  in	  which	  it	  becomes	  irrational	  to	  bet	  against	  an	  upswing	  over	  a	  sustained	  period	  of	  time.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  Brown	  Government	  departed	  from	  New	  Labour’s	   rosier	   assumptions	   about	   the	   informational	   efficiency	   and	   increasing	  stability	   of	   ‘innovative’	   financial	  markets.	   Yet	   this	   is	   hardly	   a	  Keynesian	   analysis	  either.	  A	  rationalist	  conception	  of	   the	  market	  actor	   is	  very	  much	  retained,	  but,	   in	  the	  manner	  of	  other	  strategies	  of	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation,	  a	   ‘market	   failure’	  has	  been	  identified	  requiring	  a	  market-­‐complementing	  response	  from	  the	  government.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  use	  of	  counter-­‐cyclical	  capital	  controls	  was	  sanctioned	  in	  principle,	  although	  no	  concrete	  proposal	  was	  made	  for	  the	  form	  such	  a	  regime	  would	  take.88	  Moreover,	   this	   was	   qualified	   by	   the	   assertion	   that	   international	   consensus	   on	  design	   and	   implementation	   would	   be	   necessary	   before	   such	   reform	   could	   be	  undertaken.89	  	  A	  second	  argument	  underpinning	  the	  White	  Paper	  marks	  a	  striking	  continuity:	  the	  view	   that	   a	   benign	   relationship	   exists	   between	   the	   prosperity	   of	   a	   liberally	  regulated	   financial	   sector	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   private	   non-­‐financial,	  household	   and	   public	   sectors	   on	   the	   other.90	   No	   connection	  was	  made	   between	  shareholder	  value	  maximisation	  and	  industrial	  malperformance	  (as	  the	  formation	  of	  UKFI	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐private	  fund	  manager	  attests).91	  Furthermore,	  the	  assumption	  of	  the	  allocative	  efficiency	  of	  liberal	  financial	  markets	  remains	  intact,	  and	  was	  a	  core	  argument	  offered	  against	  proposals	  for	  a	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  separation.	  92	  The	  view	  was	  retained	   that	   financial	   ‘innovation’	   would	   improve	   the	   performance	   of	   liberal	  financial	   markets	   still	   further,	   and	   that	   the	   general	   impact	   of	   financial	   sector	  innovation	   would	   be	   positive	   for	   both	   households	   and	   business	   through	   the	  improvement	   of	   the	   efficiency	   of	   capital	   allocation	   and	   the	   ‘democratisation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  3.41-­‐3.50	  and	  6.37-­‐6.74.	  88	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  6.37-­‐6.74.	  89	  Ibid,	  paragraph	  6.76.	  90	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  1.4-­‐1.5,	  1.6-­‐1.9	  and	  Box	  1.A.	  91	  Engelen	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  The	  Great	  Complacence.	  92	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets,	  paragraphs	  5.33;	  although	  as	  the	  next	  chapter	  shows,	  there	  is	  something	  of	  tension	  here	  with	  the	  government’s	  microeconomic	  crisis	  diagnosis.	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credit’.93	   This	   demonstrates	   a	   continuing	   commitment	   to	   the	   view	   that	   credit	  expansion	  was	  a	   sustainable	  and,	   through	  correct	  macro-­‐prudential	   regulation,	   a	  manageable,	  safe	  and	  desirable	  outcome	  of	  the	  liberal	  market	  economy.	  	  The	   final	   assumption	   underpinning	   the	  White	   Paper	   is	   that	   these	   benign	   effects	  depend	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  on	  maintaining	  the	  ‘competitiveness’	  of	  Britain’s	  financial	  services	  industry	  (where	  ‘competitiveness’	  appears	  to	  denote	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  Britain	  as	  a	  place	  to	  locate	  financial	  services	  and	  conduct	  financial	  transactions).94	  This	   competitiveness	   is	   in	   turn	   held	   to	   arise	   from	   a	   number	   of	   comparative	  advantages,	   of	   which	   the	   regulatory	   regime	   is	   one.95	   The	   White	   Paper	   closely	  paralleled	   the	   report	   that	   the	   Government	   commissioned	   by	   the	   financial	   sector	  insider	  Bischoff.	   Indeed,	  where	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  revenue	  and	  trade	  benefits	  of	  the	  liberal	   financial	   sector	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   the	   report	   is	   quoted	   near	   verbatim	   in	   the	  
White	  Paper,	  suggesting	  the	  enormous	  influence	  that	  financial	  sector	  interests	  had	  both	  in	  defining	  the	  problems	  facing	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  systems	  and	  devising	  their	  solutions.96	   Significantly,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  UK’s	  financial	  sector	  it	  was	  necessary	  and	  desirable	  to	  trade	  off	   measures	   aimed	   at	   immediately	   improving	   financial	   stability.97	   A	   pragmatic	  compromise	   between	   prosperity	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   macroeconomic	   instability	   was	  consequently	  viewed	  as	  inevitable	  and	  acceptable.	  	  	  	  Coalition	  Government	  	  The	   Coalition’s	   approach	   to	   financial	   reform	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	  broad	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  same	  issue.	  However	  the	  Coalition	  has	  (or	  is)	  put	   into	   practice	   two	   decisive	   interventions	   that	   reveal	   a	   greater	   willingness	   to	  intervene	  unilaterally:	  the	  ring-­‐fencing	  of	  retail	  banks,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  discretionary	  macro-­‐prudential	  regulation	  authority	  with	  the	  power	  (now	  realised	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  3.38;	  6.32.	  94	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  1.1-­‐1.34.	  95	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  1.13-­‐1.22.	  96	  Engelen,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  After	  The	  Great	  Complacence;	  W.	  Bischoff	  (2009),	  UK	  International	  
Financial	  Services:	  The	  Future	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  97	  Treasury	  (2009c),	  Reforming	  Financial	  Markets,	  paragraphs	  5.35	  and	  6.76.	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in	   practice)	   to	   exert	   discretionary	   control	   over	   the	   credit	   cycle.	   The	   Coalition	  endorsed	   the	   view	  of	   the	   Independent	  Commission	  on	  Banking	   that	   retail	   banks	  should	   be	   legally	   and	   operationally	   distinct	   entities,	   ‘ring-­‐fenced’	   within	   their	  respective	   banking	   groups	   and	   subject	   to	   separate	   capital	   adequacy	  requirements.98	   Moreover,	   a	   higher	   rate	   of	   capital	   adequacy	   requirement	   is	   to	  apply	   to	  British	  banking	   firms	   than	   the	   international	  norm,	   in	  principle	   reaching	  17%	  of	  a	  large	  retail	  bank	  or	  ‘Globally	  Systemically	  Important	  Bank’s’	  (GSIB’s)	  risk-­‐adjusted	  assets	  as	  defined	  under	  the	  Basel	  accords.	  The	  portion	  of	  this	  additional	  ‘primary	   loss	   absorbing	   capital’	   not	   accounted	   for	   by	   equity	   and	   other	   Basel-­‐sanctioned	  forms	  will	  be	  comprised	  of	  a	  form	  of	  bond	  subject	  to	  statutory	  ‘bailing-­‐in’	  at	  times	  of	  distress	  (that	  is,	  a	  conversion	  to	  equity	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  absorbing	  loss).	  Ring-­‐fenced	  banks	  will	  be	  prohibited	   from	  providing	  and	  utilizing	  all	  but	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  derivative	  products	  and	  were	  curtailed	  in	  the	  dealing	  they	  might	  have	   with	   wholesale	   and	   capital	   markets	   and	   firms	   outside	   of	   the	   European	  Economic	  Area.	  The	  securitisation	  of	  a	  bank’s	  own	  lending	  assets	  is	  permitted,	  but	  not	   secondary	   participation	   in	   these	   or	   other	   securities	   markets,	   whilst	   the	  leveraging	  of	  wholesale	  funds	  was	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  Basel	  III	  leverage	  ratio.	  The	  position	   does,	   in	   principle,	   allow	   retail	   business	   strategies	   along	   similar	   lines	   to	  those	  prior	  to	  2007-­‐2008,	  but	  with	  the	  operational	   independence,	   loss	  absorbing	  capacity	   and	   reduced	   exposure	   to	   capital	   market	   losses	   intended	   to	   lessen	   the	  likelihood	  of	  such	  business	  models	   leading	   to	  a	  public	  bail-­‐out	  or	  contributing	   to	  the	  transmission	  of	  systemic	  risk.	  	  	  The	   Coalition	   has	   also	   re-­‐drawn	   the	   former	   tripartite	   regime	   of	   financial	  regulation,	  bringing	  micro-­‐prudential	  regulation	  ‘in	  house’	  to	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  through	  the	  Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority	  and	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority.	  However,	   the	  most	   significant	   of	   these	   changes	   (and	  of	  particular	   significance	   to	  the	  Coalition’s	  post-­‐2012	  economic	  strategy)	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Financial	  Policy	   Committee	   (FPC)	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	   England.	   The	   committee	   is	   tasked	   with	  conducting	  discretionary	  macro-­‐prudential	  regulation	  to	  achieve	  financial	  stability	  (subject	   to	   the	   government’s	   economic	   policy)	   by	   identifying	   and	   neutralizing	  systemic	   risk	   not	   ascertained	   by	   the	  market.	   At	   its	   hands	   is	   a	   range	   of	   counter-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  J.	  Vickers	  (2011),	  Independent	  Commission	  on	  Banking:	  Final	  Report	  (London:	  The	  Stationary	  Office).	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cyclical	   instruments,	   including	   general	   counter-­‐cyclical	   requirements	   to	   limit	  credit	   growth	   across	   the	   economy	  and	   sectoral	   capital	   requirements	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	   limit	   particular	   areas	   of	   bank	   lending	   such	   as	   commercial	   property,	  residential	  property	  and	  inter-­‐firm	  exposures.99	  	  These	   financial	   market	   reforms	   represent	   considerable	   discontinuities	   with	   the	  extremely	  permissive	  approach	  to	  financial	  markets	  prior	  to	  2008.	  Yet	  as	  with	  the	  Brown	  Government	  before	  it,	  the	  changes	  wrought	  by	  the	  Coalition	  are	  indicative	  primarily	   of	   ideational	   continuity	   and	   of	   minimally	   adapted	   neoliberal	   problem	  definitions.	   The	   central	   problems	   afflicting	   British	   financial	   markets	   are	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  market	  discipline,	  and	  a	  tendency	  to	  pro-­‐cyclicality	  over	  the	   course	   of	   the	   credit	   cycle.100	   Unlike	   the	   Brown	   Government,	   the	   Coalition	  reasons	   that	   ring-­‐fencing	   of	   retail	   operations	   is	   required	   as	   well	   as	   resolution	  plans,	  but	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  ring-­‐fencing	  remains	  the	   implicit	   insulation	  from	  market	  discipline	  that	  large	  banks	  are	  perceived	  to	  enjoy.101	  The	  new	  discretionary	  architecture	  for	  macro-­‐prudential	  policy	  represents	  the	  concession	  of	  a	  problem	  –	  systemic	  risk	  –	  that	  was	  absent	  prior	  to	  2007	  when	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  ‘financial	  innovation’	  was	  supplanting	  the	  need	  for	  such	  intervention.	  Yet	  it	  remains	  rooted	  in	   the	   rationalist	   analysis	   of	   financial	   markets	   evidenced	   by	   the	   faith	   in	  market	  discipline.	  The	  overarching	  assumption	  remains	   intact	   that	   the	  market	  allocation	  of	  financial	  resources	  ensures	  an	  optimal	  allocation,	  providing	  market	  discipline	  is	  maintained	   and	   the	   credit	   cycle	   is	   not	   permitted	   to	   over-­‐extend	   itself.	   The	  relationship	   between	   capital	   markets	   and	   banking	   firms’	   business	   strategies	   is	  consequently	  addressed	  in	  quite	  conventional	  terms	  (market	  discipline),	  whilst	  the	  pathological	   relationship	   between	   capital	   markets	   and	   non-­‐financial	   businesses	  identified	  by	  critical	  social	  democrats	  is	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  problem	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  P.	  Tucker,	  S.	  Hall,	  and	  A.	  Pattani	  (2013),	  'Macroprudential	  Policy	  At	  The	  Bank	  Of	  England',	  Bank	  Of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2013	  (Q3),	  pp.192-­‐200.	  100	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2012c),	  Banking	  Reform:	  Delivering	  Stability	  And	  Supporting	  A	  
Sustainable	  Economy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  1.2-­‐1.3	  and	  1.11-­‐1.12;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2011b),	  A	  New	  Approach	  To	  Financial	  Regulation:	  The	  Blueprint	  For	  Reform	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  1.3-­‐1.4;	  although	  the	  purported	  inability	  of	  the	  tri-­‐partite	  regime	  to	  effectively	  respond	  to	  this	  pro-­‐cyclicality	  is	  singled	  out	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  diagnosis	  as	  the	  underlying	  cause	  of	  cyclical	  instability,	  rather	  than	  the	  emphasis	  on	  market	  participants	  in	  the	  2009	  Whitepaper.	  This	  perhaps	  reflects	  the	  Brown	  Government’s	  incumbency	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  financial	  crash	  and	  a	  concomitant	  desire	  to	  downplay	  its	  own	  responsibility.	  101	  Treasury	  (2012c),	  Banking	  Reform,	  paragraph	  1.11.	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  Both	   the	   Coalition	   and	   the	   Brown	   Government’s	   approaches	   to	   financial	   reform	  can	   be	   considered	   strategies	   of	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation.	   They	   are	   reactive	   to	  ‘market	  failures’	  revealed	  in	  practice	  by	  events,	  and	  seek	  to	  sure	  up	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  expanded	  realm	  of	  financial	  businesses	  in	  Britain	  could	  be	  profitably	  reproduced.	  Moreover,	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  pivotal	  macroeconomic	  reforms	  in	  the	  service	  of	  ongoing	  neoliberalisation	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  Both	  stabilise	  the	  bases	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	   strategy	   to	   sustain	   levels	   of	  output	  and	  growth,	  whilst	  also	  seeking	  to	  neutralise	  the	  threat	  to	  macroeconomic	  stability	   that	   the	   financialisation	   of	   the	   British	   and	   international	   economies	   had	  been	  revealed	  to	  pose.	  	  	  The	  new	  institutional	  endowment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  dynamic	  in	  Treasury-­‐Bank	  relations	  and	  a	  potential	  contradiction	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  macroeconomic	   strategy	   arising	   from	   the	   simultaneous	   pursuit	   of	   privatised	  Keynesianism	  and	  discretionary	  macro-­‐prudential	   regulation.	   Through	  2013	   and	  early	  2014	  the	  Bank	  found	  itself	  drawn	  into	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  Help	  to	  Buy	  Scheme	  as	  a	  number	  of	  commentators	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  implications	  of	   the	   scheme	   for	   macroeconomic	   stability	   given	   its	   inflationary	   potential.102	  Following	  this	  criticism	  the	  FPC	  was	  tasked	  in	  September	  2013	  with	  reviewing	  the	  Help	   to	  Buy	  Scheme	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  Whilst	   cautiously	  endorsing	   the	  Help	   to	  Buy	   scheme,	   the	   FPC	   moved	   to	   impose	   moderate	   credit	   controls	   on	   mortgage	  lending	  in	  June	  2014,	  utilizing	  its	  discretionary	  powers	  to	  place	  a	  15%	  limit	  on	  the	  proportion	  of	  a	   lender’s	  mortgage	  portfolios	  with	  a	   loan-­‐to-­‐income	  ratio	  of	  more	  than	  4.5%.103	  The	  Governor	  was	  also	  vocal	  about	  his	  views	  on	  the	  potential	  threat	  posed	   to	   macroeconomic	   stability	   by	   ongoing	   structural	   issues	   in	   the	   British	  housing	  market.104	  As	  was	  noted	  in	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  FLS	  above,	  the	  previous	  year	  the	  Bank	  had	  secured	  a	  ‘bilateral	  agreement’	  with	  the	  Treasury	  for	  mortgage	  lending	   to	  be	  excluded	   from	   the	  ongoing	  phases	  of	   the	  FLS.	  Points	   such	  as	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Some	  of	  this	  critical	  commentary	  is	  recorded	  in	  The	  Guardian	  (2014),	  ‘Help	  To	  Buy	  One	  Year	  On’,	  The	  Guardian	  (16/03/2014).	  103	  Bank	  Of	  England	  (2014),	  Financial	  Stability	  Report,	  June	  2014	  (London:	  Bank	  Of	  England).	  104	  British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  (2014b),	  'Bank	  Of	  England’s	  Mark	  Carney	  Warns	  On	  Housing	  Market',	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-­‐27459663>,	  accessed	  15/06/2014.	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signal	  a	  tension,	  and	  latent	  contradiction,	  between	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  FPC	  and	  the	  Coalition’s	  strategy	  to	  bring	  about	  short-­‐term	  growth	  through	  a	  revived	  privatised	  Keynesianism:	   the	   success	   of	   the	   latter	   depends	   on	   the	   FPC	  not	   exercising	  more	  stringent	  credit	  controls.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  on	  subsequent	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  opportunities	   it	  may	  open	  up	  for	  rival	  coordinative	  discourses	  will	  be	   interesting	  to	   say	   the	   least,	   but	   the	   outcome	   of	   such	   a	   process	   can	   only	   be	   guessed	   at	   the	  present	  time.	  	  	  	  
Conclusions	  	  The	  macroeconomic	   approaches	   of	   both	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   are	  marked	   by	  important	   discontinuities	   with	   problem	   definitions	   and	   macroeconomic	   policies	  that	   existed	   prior	   to	   2007-­‐2008.	   Three	   interventions	   in	   particular	   stand	   out	   as	  being	   ‘decisive’	   ones	   by	   the	   terms	   laid	   out	   in	   Chapter	   3:	   the	   re-­‐introduction	   of	  discretionary	   credit	   controls,	   the	   structural	   ring-­‐fencing	  of	   retail	   and	   investment	  banking	  activities,	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  retrenchment	  that	  follows	  from	  the	  policy	  of	   fiscal	   consolidation.	   Both,	   in	   different	   ways,	   aim	   to	   promote	   macroeconomic	  stability	  by	  re-­‐configuring	  the	  boundary	  of	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  responsibility	  through	   new	   strategies	   of	   roll	   back	   and	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation.	   Equally	  significant	   for	   our	   interpretation	   of	   the	   two	   governments’	   crisis	   diagnoses	   are	  several	  continuities	  with	  problem	  definitions	  prior	  to	  2007-­‐2008.	  The	  decision	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  support	  of	  wages	  after	  the	  initial	  fiscal	  stimulus	  programme	  is	  one	  such	   ‘decisive	   continuity’.	   The	   crisis	   diagnoses	   in	   which	   these	   decisive	  interventions	   and	   non-­‐interventions	   are	   arranged	   stresses	   the	   need	   for	   a	  rebalanced	   growth	   model	   and	   a	   transition	   to	   external	   sources	   of	   demand.	   The	  decisive	  interventions	  noted	  above	  aim	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  macroeconomic	  stability	  to	  this	  end	  and	  facilitate	  a	  wage-­‐deflationary	  macroeconomic	  adjustment.	  This,	  in	  essence,	  is	  how	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  diagnosed	  and	  responded	  to	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  in	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  	  The	  crisis	  diagnoses	  of	  the	  two	  governments	  are	  marked	  more	  by	  continuity	  than	  change,	  and	  those	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  are	  of	  a	  bounded	  nature	  that	  reflect	  an	   adaptation	   rather	   than	   a	   rejection	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions.	   The	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perceived	   relationship	   between	   macroeconomic	   variables	   has	   not	   changed,	   yet	  changes	   in	   the	   economic	   context	   are	   perceived	   to	   demand	   the	   reduction	   of	  government	   spending	   on	   an	   unprecedented	   scale	   to	   maintain	   financial	   market	  confidence	  and	  promote	  long-­‐term	  macroeconomic	  adjustment.	  The	  withdrawal	  of	  public	  sector	  demand	  and	  employment	  alongside	  falling	  real	  wages	  is	  not	  seen	  to	  pose	   a	   threat	   to	   economic	   recovery	   because	   there	   is	   strong	   confidence	   that	   the	  private	   sector	   (correctly	   facilitated	   through	   neoliberal	   microeconomic	   and	  macroeconomic	  policies)	  possesses	   the	  dynamism	   to	   fill	   this	   gap	  and	   respond	   to	  new	  sources	  of	  demand.	  Deficit	  reduction	  and	  the	  tolerance	  of	  real	  wage	  deflation	  consequently	   constitute	   a	   strategy	   of	   roll	   back	   neoliberalisation	   at	   the	   level	   of	  macroeconomic	   policy.	   The	   instantiation	   of	   discretionary	   credit	   controls	   can	   be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  similarly	  neoliberal	  light,	  but	  in	  this	  instance	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  roll	  out	   neoliberalisation.	   It	   responds	   to	   a	   market	   failure	   revealed	   through	   the	  outcomes	   of	   earlier	   processes	   of	   roll	   back	   neoliberalisation	   (the	   inability	   of	  ‘innovative’	   liberalised	   financial	   markets	   to	   manage	   systemic	   risk).	   It	   seeks	   to	  facilitate	  the	  correct	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  mechanism	  for	  allocating	  financial	  resources,	  rather	  than	  to	  supplant	  or	  direct	   it	   in	  a	  purposeful	  way.	   Insofar	  as	  the	  government’s	  assessments	  of	  the	  vitality	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  filling	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  withdrawing	  public	  sector	  demand	  is	  correct,	  this	  constitutes	  a	  growth	  strategy:	  the	   medium-­‐term	   result	   would	   indeed	   be	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   aggregate	  demand	  as	  business	  investment,	  and	  subsequently	  export	  demand,	  come	  to	  occupy	  the	  position	  previously	  held	  by	  domestic	  consumption.	  	  The	  pursuit	  of	  macroeconomic	  rebalancing	  through	  wage-­‐deflationary	  adjustment	  is,	  however,	  a	  longer-­‐term	  goal	  that	  exists	  alongside	  shorter-­‐term	  measures	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  physical	  and	  human	  capital	  and	  political	  support	  while	  the	  economy	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  out	  of	  equilibrium.	  There	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  these	  two	  goals;	  a	  trade-­‐off	   is	   being	   made	   between	   long	   and	   short-­‐term	   economic	   and	   political	  imperatives.	   For	   the	   Brown	   Government,	   this	  was	   chiefly	   accomplished	   through	  the	  use	  of	   a	   short	   fiscal	   stimulus,	  with	   the	  government	   supremely	   confident	   that	  recovery	   and	   a	   rebalancing	   of	   demand	   structure	  would	   be	   secured	   in	   2011.	   The	  Coalition	   Government	   ambitiously	   cast	   aside	   the	   perception	   of	   such	   short-­‐term	  constraints	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  EFCT,	  but	  resumed	  this	  point	  of	  view	  from	  the	  end	  of	  2011.	  The	  response	  has	  been	  the	  deliberate	  and	  strategic	  resumption	  of	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privatised	   Keynesianism	   as	   a	   stimulatory	   instrument	   alongside	   attempts	   to	  stimulate	   lending	   to	   businesses.	   Like	   the	   Coalition,	   the	   Brown	   Government	   also	  defended	   the	   institutional	   bases	   of	   privatised	   Keynesianism,	   yet	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  whether	   this	   is	   best	   interpreted	   as	   an	   imperative	   arising	   from	   economic	   policy,	  social	  policy,	  or	  simply	  a	  need	  to	  consolidate	  political	  support.	  The	  interpretation	  is	  more	  clearly	  made	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  Coalition	  because	  it	  identified	  the	  role	  of	  privatised	   Keynesianism	   in	   its	   analysis	   of	   the	   barriers	   to	   macroeconomic	  rebalancing.	   In	  both	  cases,	  however,	   these	  decisions	  undermine	   the	  coherency	  of	  the	   broader	   recovery	   strategy	   by	   augmenting	   the	   disposable	   incomes	   of	  households	   and	   so	   delaying	   rebalancing,	   whilst	   also	   creating	   a	   latent	   risk	   to	  financial	   stability	   by	   stimulating	   further	   household	   leveraging	   in	   a	   context	   of	  declining	  real	  incomes.	  	  The	   degree	   to	   which	   one	   considers	   the	   short-­‐term	   resumption	   of	   privatised	  Keynesianism	   to	   be	   a	   calculated	   risk	   in	   response	   to	   short-­‐term	   economic	   and	  political	   risks	   or	   a	   reckless	   gamble	   for	   political	   support	   depends	   greatly	   on	   the	  confidence	   one	   has	   in	   the	   new	   regime	   of	   macro-­‐prudential	   regulation.	   The	  willingness	  of	  the	  FPC	  to	  utilise	  its	  discretionary	  powers	  suggests	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  confidence	   is	  warranted,	   yet	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   costs	   of	   a	   slow	  down	   in	  privatised	   Keynesianism	   and	   acceleration	   of	   wage-­‐deflationary	   adjustment	   that	  might	  result	  from	  more	  assertive	  utilisation	  of	  macro-­‐prudential	  regulation	  could	  prove	  crisis-­‐inducing	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  until	  such	  a	  time	  as	  the	  vaunted	  ‘rebalanced’	  ‘private	   sector-­‐led’	   growth	   model	   emerges.	   The	   broader	   strategy	   of	   wage-­‐deflationary	   adjustment	   and	   the	   crisis	   diagnosis	   on	  which	   it	   rests	   itself	   is	   highly	  questionable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  CSDP.	  Its	  success	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  to	   which	   the	   assumptions	   of	   private	   sector	   vitality	   and	   the	   stability	   of	  conservatively	   reformed	   financial	  markets	   are	   warranted.	   Should	   they	   be	   found	  wanting,	  as	  critical	  social	  democrats	  essentially	  predict	  through	  their	  emphasis	  on	  pathological	  financial-­‐productive	  capital	  relations,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  recipe	  for	  stagnation	  or	  worse.	  	  	  Late	  2013,	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  present	  analysis	  closes,	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  far	  from	  marking	   the	   end	   of	   the	   process,	   contrary	   to	   the	   hopes	   of	   politicians	   of	   all	  hues.	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	  whether	   these	  decisive	   interventions	  will	   succeed	   in	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moving	   Britain	   on	   to	   a	   new	   growth	  model,	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   period	   of	   catastrophic	  equilibrium	   in	   which	   such	   contradictions	   intensify	   but	   no	   alternative	   form	   of	  intervention	   is	   forthcoming,	   or	   instead	   create	   the	   conditions	   in	   which	   an	  alternative	  crisis	  diagnosis	  might	  rise	  to	  prominence.	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Chapter	  6.1	  
Post-­2008	  Crisis	  Diagnosis:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   examine,	   compare	   and	   interpret	   the	   crisis	   diagnoses	  of	   the	   two	  post-­‐2008	   governments	   where	   they	   relate	   to	   microeconomic	   policies,	   further	  developing	   the	   interpretation	   begun	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   Microeconomic	  policies	  position	  the	  boundary	  of	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  activity	  and	  non-­‐market	  and	   market	   resource	   allocation,	   and	   are	   therefore	   very	   informative	   when	  characterising	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  and	  assessing	  the	  influence	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions.	   I	   make	   this	   analysis	   by	   focusing	   on	  three	   areas	   of	   microeconomic	   policy	   where	   in	   Chapter	   4	   I	   have	   identified	   the	  influence	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   in	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   New	  Labour:	  labour	  market	  policy,	  welfare	  reform	  policy	  and	  industrial	  policy	  (broadly	  defined	   as	   ‘competitiveness	   policy’,	   and	   so	   including	   skills,	   innovation	   and	  industrial	  finance	  policies).	  	  	  The	  analysis	  is	  guided	  by	  those	  themes	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  microeconomic	  policy:	   the	  question	  of	  growth/stagnation,	  of	  employment,	  and	  of	  the	  ‘rebalancing’	  of	  the	  sectoral	  composition	  of	  the	  British	  economy.	  However	  the	  chapter	   is	   structured	   differently	   to	   the	   previous	   one	   in	   order	   to	   accentuate	   its	  central	   finding.	   This	   is	   that	   the	   two	   governments	   have	   both	   pursued	  microeconomic	   strategies	   in	   response	   to	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   that	   are	   readily	  categorised	   in	   neoliberal	   terms	   (as	   new	   strategies	   roll	   back	   and	   roll	   out	  neoliberalisation),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  third	  set	  of	  strategies	  pertaining	  to	  some	  aspects	  of	  industrial	   policy	   that	   are	   qualitatively	   non-­‐neoliberal	   in	   nature.	   It	   is	   the	  substantiation	   and	   interpretation	   of	   this	   finding	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   a	  characterisation	  of	  post-­‐2008	  coordinative	  discourses	  that	   is	  my	  chief	  concern	   in	  this	  chapter.	  I	  discuss	  what	  I	  submit	  to	  be	  strategies	  of	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation,	  roll	   out	   neoliberalisation,	   and	   a	   non-­‐neoliberal	   form	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  interventionism	   under	   respective	   headings.	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   contrasting	  strategies	   reflect	   the	   simultaneous	   existence	   in	   government	   of	   two	   contrasting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  argument	  in	  this	  chapter	  incorporates	  and	  extends	  that	  which	  I	  made	  in	  M.	  Craig	  (2015),	  'Post-­‐2008	  British	  Industrial	  Policy	  And	  Constructivist	  Political	  Economy:	  New	  Directions	  And	  New	  Tensions',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  20	  (1),	  pp.1-­‐19.	  
	   254	  




Roll	  Back	  Neoliberalisation	  	  Strategies	  of	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	  involve	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  political	   economy	   subject	   to	   private	   ownership	   and	   market	   or	   quasi-­‐market	  governance	   and	   resource	   allocation,	   and	   the	   concomitant	   withdrawal	   of	   public	  responsibility	  and	  disciplining	  of	  non-­‐market	  institutions	  and	  forms	  of	  association.	  The	   interventions	   reviewed	   in	   this	   section	   have	   such	   features	   in	   common.	   The	  rationale	  underpinning	  them	  is	  that	  government	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  constitutes,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  efficient	  functioning	  of	  market	  processes,	  and	   that	   they	   are	   thereby	   implicated	   in	   sub-­‐optimal	   economic	   growth,	  employment	   and	   compositional	   balance.	   Whilst	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter	   that	   both	   governments	   have	   committed	   to	   or	   implemented	   strategies	   of	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	  at	  the	  macroeconomic	  level	  through	  their	  commitments	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to	  deficit	  reduction,	   it	   is	  principally	  the	  Coalition	  that	  has	  expressed	  and	  put	   into	  practice	  a	  corresponding	  microeconomic	  strategy.	  The	  strategy	  is	  strongly	  evident	  in	   labour	   market	   liberalisation,	   corporate	   tax	   reduction	   and	   welfare	   reform	  policies.	  	  	  
Labour	  Markets	  	  The	  wage-­‐deflationary	  stance	  shared	  by	  both	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  amounts	  to	  a	  practical	  application	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  labour	  market	  flexibility	  during	  a	  time	  of	  economic	   stress.	  Both	   governments	   credited	   the	   liberal	   labour	  market	   regime	   in	  the	  UK	  with	   limiting	  unemployment	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context,	  with	   the	   resulting	  decline	  in	  real	  wages	  cast	  as	  the	  price	  of	  adjustment.2	  Such	  an	  analysis	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  ongoing	  influence	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  attributed	  to	  New	  Labour	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  a	  public	  sector	  analogue	  of	  private	   sector	   wage	   deflation	   over	   the	   period	   has	   formed	   part	   of	   the	   deficit	  reduction	  strategies	  of	  both	  governments	  through	  the	  instigation	  of	  public	  sector	  pay	  freezes.	  	  	  The	   Coalition	   has,	   however,	   gone	   rather	   further	   than	   this	   passive	   approach	   to	  labour	   market	   adjustment	   and	   has	   set	   about	   the	   further	   neoliberalisation	   of	  Britain’s	  labour	  markets.	  It	  has	  done	  so	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  further	  empowering	  employers	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  employees	  through	  reforms	  to	  employment	  law	  and	  the	   statutory	   institutions	   that	   govern	   industrial	   relations.	   The	   period	   of	  employment	   before	  which	   an	   employee	   can	   claim	   for	   unfair	   dismissal	   has	   been	  raised	  from	  12	  to	  18	  months,	  and	  a	  cap	  of	  12	  month’s	  earnings	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  such	   claims.	   An	   enormous	   economic	   barrier	   has	   been	   erected	   against	   claims	   of	  unfair	   dismissal	   at	   the	   employment	   tribunal	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	  application	   and	   hearing	   fees	   that	   amount	   under	   most	   circumstances	   to	   £1,200,	  whilst	  public	  funding	  for	  witnesses’	  expenses	  has	  been	  withdrawn.	  Concomitantly,	  the	   Coalition	   has	   expressed	   a	   preference	   for	   non-­‐statutory	   forms	   of	   dispute	  reconciliation	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	   through	   free	  ACAS	  conciliation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Treasury	  (2010b),	  Budget	  Report	  2010	  (March),	  paragraphs	  5.5	  and	  B.57;	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013a),	  Employment	  Law	  Review:	  Progress	  On	  Reform	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.13.	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and	  the	  introduction	  of	  ‘settlement	  agreements’	  as	  a	  route	  by	  which	  dismissal	  can	  proceed	  where	  an	  employment	  tribunal	  case	  might	  otherwise	  have	  been	  brought.	  	  	  A	  second	  agenda	  has	  been	  to	  create	  new	  forms	  of	  employment	  relationship.	  A	  new	  category	  of	   ‘employee	  shareholder’	  has	  been	  introduced:	  a	   form	  of	  private	  sector	  employment	   contract	   in	   which	   the	   worker	   voluntarily	   forgoes	   certain	   statutory	  employee	   rights	   in	   return	   for	   at	   least	   £2,000	   of	   company	   shares.	   The	   foregone	  rights	   include	   those	   relating	   to	   unfair	   dismissal,	   statutory	   redundancy	   pay,	   the	  right	   to	   request	   flexible	   working,	   and	   some	   statutory	   rights	   to	   request	   training	  time.	   However,	   whilst	   new	   rights	   have	   in	   principle	   been	   gained	   for	   individual	  employees,	  the	  overarching	  change	  that	  these	  reflect	  is	  the	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  powers	  of	  employers	  to	  dismiss	  employees.	  The	  rationale	  underpinning	  all	  of	  these	   changes	   is	   that	   greater	   labour	   market	   flexibility	   favours	   higher	   rates	   of	  economic	   growth	   and	   employment	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	  SMEs.3	   This	   in	   turn	   reflects	   a	   neoliberal	   definition	   of	   the	   problem	   that	   labour	  markets	  pose	  to	  the	  resumption	  of	  growth	  in	  GDP	  and	  employment.	  The	  Coalition’s	  framing	   of	   the	   problem	   lays	   emphasis	   not	   so	   much	   on	   the	   actual	   institutional	  structure	   of	   the	   labour	   market,	   but	   rather	   on	   employers’	   perceptions	   of	   it.	   The	  Coalition	  asserts	  that	  the	  UK	  labour	  market	  is	  actually	  highly	  flexible,	  but	  also	  that	  perceptions	  of	   the	  potential	  costs	  of	  employment	  regulation	  and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	   employment	   tribunal	   are	   disincentives	   to	   taking	   on	   new	   employees	   and	  expanding	  production.4	  	  
Taxation	  	  In	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   the	  Brown	  Government	  deviated	   little	   from	   its	   existing	  programme	  of	  tax	  reform,	  centred	  on	  the	  simplification	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  taxation	  rather	  than	  substantial	  changes	  in	  the	  rate	  or	  base.5	  	  The	  government	  continued	  to	  highlight	  competitiveness	  as	  an	  organising	  objective	  of	  its	  tax	  policies,	  but	  did	  not	  move	   to	   alter	   the	   main	   rate	   of	   corporation	   tax.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   Coalition	   has	  undertaken	  substantial	  reform	  of	  the	  rates	  of	  business	  taxation.	  In	  the	  Emergency	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  For	  Growth,	  paragraph	  1.61;	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2012a),	  Employment	  Law	  Review:	  Annual	  Update	  2012	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  1.5.	  4	  Ibid,	  p.6.	  5	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2010a),	  Tax	  Framework	  For	  Business	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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Budget	   of	   2010	   it	   committed	   to	   a	   4%	   reduction	   in	   corporation	   tax,	   and	  subsequently	   committed	   to	   a	   further	   4%	   reduction	   by	   2015.	   The	   initial	   reform	  package	   also	   saw	   a	   2%	   reduction	   in	   the	   previous	   government’s	   planned	   rate	   of	  small	  profits	  tax.	  Indeed,	  concomitant	  reductions	  in	  personal	  taxation	  (such	  as	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  50%	  tax	  band	  for	  earners	  of	  more	  than	  £150,000	  per	  annum)	  have	  shown	  the	  Coalition	  to	  have	  a	  preference	  for	  lower	  rates	  of	  taxation	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  macroeconomic	   policy	   emphasis	   on	   fiscal	   consolidation.	   The	   burden	   of	   deficit	  reduction	   and	  macroeconomic	   adjustment	   thus	   falls	   on	  public	   spending,	   shaping	  the	  deficit	  reduction	  programme	  as	  a	  yet	  more	  decisive	  intervention	  by	  magnifying	  the	  changes	  in	  public	  sector	  activity	  that	  it	  necessitates.	  	  	  Like	  the	  reforms	  made	  to	  the	  labour	  market,	  these	  reforms	  are	  thus	  oriented	  to	  an	  expansion	   of	   the	   realm	   of	   private	   sector	   resource	   allocation.	   The	   rationale	  underlying	   these	   changes	   draws	   on	   two	   related	   arguments	   about	   the	   economic	  effects	  of	  lower	  rates	  of	  corporation	  tax,	  neither	  of	  which	  is	  novel	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  canon.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  high	  rates	  of	  corporation	  tax	  are	  a	  ‘drag’	  on	  economic	  and	  employment	  growth	  because	   they	   reduce	   incentives	   for	  businesses	   to	   invest	  and	  take	   on	   additional	   staff.6	   It	   is	   reasoned	   that	   lower	   rates	   would	   increase	   these	  incentives	   (reminiscent	  of,	  but	  not	   identical	  with,	   the	   ‘Laffer	  curve’	  arguments	  of	  the	   1970s	   and	   ‘80s).	   Secondly,	   the	   Coalition	   appeals	   to	   a	   ‘global	   race’	   argument,	  citing	  the	  declining	  relative	  competitiveness	  of	  Britain’s	  tax	  regime	  and	  appealing	  to	  such	  competitiveness	  as	  an	   important	  determinant	  of	   inward	  investment	   from	  increasingly	   mobile	   capital.7	   It	   follows	   from	   this	   analysis	   that,	   all	   other	   things	  being	  equal,	   the	   lower	  rates	  of	  corporation	  and	  income	  tax	  would	  act	   to	   increase	  the	   non-­‐inflationary	   levels	   of	   growth	   and	   employment	   that	   the	   microeconomic	  structure	  of	  the	  UK	  economy	  could	  sustain.	  	  	  
Welfare	  Reform	  	  The	   Coalition	   has	   made	   far-­‐reaching	   reforms	   to	   the	   system	   of	   social	   security.	  Whilst	  falling	  beyond	  the	  present	  argument’s	  immediate	  focus	  on	  economic	  policy,	  an	  examination	  of	  this	  area	  is	  revealing	  of	  the	  government’s	  view	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  For	  Growth,	  paragraph	  1.17.	  7	  Ibid,	  pp.3-­‐4	  and	  paragraph	  1.17.	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unemployment	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  Moreover,	  the	  area	  has	  also	  been	  a	  major	  source	  of	  savings	  in	  the	  Coalition’s	  pursuit	  of	  deficit	  reduction	  (measures	  relating	  to	  working-­‐age	  benefits	  comprised	  over	  £20bn	  of	  the	  Coalition’s	  deficit	  reduction	  plan	   during	   the	   period	   under	   study).	   For	   the	   Coalition,	   the	   system	   is	   deemed	  among	  other	  perceived	  faults	  to	  disincentivise	  labour	  market	  participation	  and	  so	  contribute	   to	   unemployment	   –	   the	   problem	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘welfare	   dependency’	  whereby	   the	   excessive	   generosity,	   perverse	   incentives	   and	   an	   insufficiency	   of	  conditionality	  within	  the	  system	  of	  working	  age	  benefits	  are	  said	  to	  disincentivise	  transition	   from	   benefits	   to	   waged	  work.8	   This	   in	   turn	   is	   regarded	   as	   needlessly	  constraining	   of	   economic	   growth	   through	   the	   ‘loss	   of	   human	   potential’	   that	   it	  engenders	  where	  human	  capital	   is	  degraded	   from	  prolonged	  disconnection	   from	  the	   labour	  market	   (so-­‐called	   ‘scarring	   effects’).	   In	   laying	   the	   blame	   for	   a	   lack	   of	  labour	   market	   participation	   on	   the	   presumed	   rational	   choices	   of	   out-­‐of-­‐work	  individuals,	  and	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  government	  to	  provide	  necessary	  incentives,	  the	  Coalition	  makes	  a	  straightforwardly	  neoliberal	  framing	  of	  unemployment	  as	  a	  supply-­‐side	  problem	  of	   the	   labour	  market	  arising	   from	  distortions	   introduced	  by	  government.	  	  The	   Coalition’s	   response	   has	   encompassed	   a	   great	   number	   of	   qualitative	   and	  quantitative	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  of	  working-­‐age	  benefits	  in	  order	  to	  incentivise	  and	  coerce	  labour	  market	  participation.	  The	  benefits	  to	  which	  working-­‐age	  people	  are	  entitled	  have	  been	  limited	  through	  the	  tightening	  of	  eligibility	  criteria	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  number	  of	   ‘caps’.	  One	  such	  cap	  has	  reduced	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  benefits	   to	   which	   working-­‐age	   households	   are	   entitled	   to	   £500	   per	   week	   for	  couples	  and	  £350	  for	  single-­‐person	  households	  –	  the	  average	   income	  of	  a	  British	  family	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   cap’s	   introduction.	   A	   further	   cap	   has	   been	   placed	  specifically	  on	  housing	  benefit,	   limiting	  it	  to	  £250	  for	  a	  one-­‐bedroom	  property	  or	  £400	   for	   a	   four-­‐bedroom	   or	   larger	   property	   (to	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   some	  regional	   economies	   in	   the	   UK	   where	   households	   were	   in	   receipt	   of	   more	   than	  200%	  of	  these	  amounts).	  More	  generally,	  the	  up-­‐rating	  of	  benefits	  and	  tax	  credits	  was	  held	  below	  the	  rate	  of	  inflation	  from	  April	  2013.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Department	  Of	  Work	  And	  Pensions	  (2010),	  Universal	  Credit:	  Welfare	  That	  Works	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  pp.	  9-­‐13	  and	  pp.25-­‐28.	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Qualitative	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  instantiated	  by	  the	  Coalition	  have	  seen	  it	  encompassing	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  of	  conditionality	  on	  the	  receipt	   of	   benefits	   and	   a	   wider	   scope	   for	   benefit-­‐related	   sanctions	   than	   has	  hitherto	   been	   the	   case.	   Various	   voluntary	   work	   experience	   elements	   of	   the	  previous	  system	  of	  social	  security	  have	  been	  hardened	  into	  compulsory	  ‘work	  for	  your	   benefits’	   programmes	   in	   which	   those	   deemed	   at	   risk	   of	   long-­‐term	  unemployment	   (and	   the	   associated	   ‘scarring’	   of	   human	   capital)	   face	   the	   loss	   of	  benefits	   for	   non-­‐participation.	   A	   much	   harder	   line	   has	   been	   taken	   on	   those	   in	  receipt	   of	   incapacity-­‐related	   benefits	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   work	   capability	  assessments	   to	   re-­‐assess	   the	  mental	   and	   physical	   capacity	   of	   existing	   long-­‐term	  claimants	  for	  work.	  	  	  Whilst	   among	   the	   most	   controversial	   measured	   introduced	   by	   the	   Coalition,	   its	  programme	  of	  social	  security	  reform	  is	  arguably	  a	  straightforward	  continuity	  with	  a	   trajectory	   of	   reform	   begun	   under	   New	   Labour	   and	   inherited	   from	   the	   Brown	  Government.	   This	   claim	   is	   necessarily	   somewhat	   speculative	   as	   the	   Brown	  Government	   did	   not	   survive	   in	   office	   to	   undertake	   a	   full	   programme	   of	   reform.	  However,	   we	   can	   gain	   some	   further	   insights	   into	   the	   government’s	   future	  intentions	   from	   the	   Welfare	   Reform	   White	   Paper	   of	   2008	   and	   the	   subsequent	  Welfare	   Reform	   Act	   of	   2009.	   These	   reveal	   some	   strong	   parallels	   with	   the	  Coalition’s	  own	  programme.	  	  	  The	  act	  sanctioned	  the	  pilot	  use	  of	  mandatory	  ‘work	  for	  your	  benefits’	  schemes	  as	  a	   means	   of	   combating	   the	   degradation	   of	   human	   capital	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	  unemployed.9	  It	  also	  sanctioned	  greater	  conditionality	  on	  lone	  parent	  claimants.10	  The	  argument	  offered	   in	   the	  2008	  White	  Paper	   situated	   these	  changes	  amid	  New	  Labour’s	   social	   security	   reform	   agenda,	   but	   also	   underlined	   the	   threat	   human	  capital	  degradation	  and	  a	  prolonged	  rise	  in	  unemployment	  during	  the	  anticipated	  recession	  as	  part	  of	  their	  rationale.11	  The	  solution	  that	  was	  endorsed	  in	  the	  White	  
Paper	  was	  greater	  ‘personalised	  support’	  by	  a	  competing	  mixture	  of	  public/private	  sector	  providers	  (reminiscent	  of	  reforms	  since	  enacted	  by	  the	  Coalition),	  but	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Department	  Of	  Work	  And	  Pensions	  (2009),	  Explanatory	  Notes	  To	  The	  Welfare	  Reform	  Act	  
2009	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  9-­‐10.	  10	  Ibid,	  paragraphs	  11-­‐14.	  11	  Department	  Of	  Work	  And	  Pensions	  (2008),	  Raising	  Expectations	  And	  Increasing	  Support:	  
Reforming	  Welfare	  For	  The	  Future	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraph	  7.	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the	  placing	  of	   a	   greater	   burden	  of	   responsibility	   on	   claimants	   through	   increased	  use	  of	  sanctions	  and	  compulsory	  work-­‐related	  activities.	  Although	  space	  was	  given	  over	  in	  the	  White	  Paper	  to	  discuss	  other	  factors	  of	  long-­‐term	  unemployment	  such	  as	  drug	  dependency,	  the	  assumption	  remained	  largely	  intact	  that	  unemployment	  is	  a	  supply-­‐side	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  for	  which	  increasingly	  ‘active’	  and	  re-­‐commodifying	  labour	  market	  policies	  are	  the	  appropriate	  response.	  It	  therefore	  seems	   likely	   that	   the	   direction,	   if	   not	   the	   speed	   and	   intensity,	   of	   social	   security	  reform	  under	  a	  re-­‐elected	  Brown	  Government	  would	  have	  been	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Coalition.	  	  	  
2.	  
Roll	  Out	  Neoliberalisation	  	  The	  examples	  of	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	  under	  the	  Coalition	  are	  not	  exhaustive.	  For	  instance,	  one	  could	  also	  consider	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  enterprise	  zones	  as	  a	  tool	   of	   regional	   development,	   or	   the	   privatisations	   that	   have	   taken	   since	   2010	  (some	  of	  which,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Tote,	  were	  planned	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government).	  Whilst	   the	  Brown	  Government	  was	   less	   inclined	   to	  deploy	  strategies	  of	   roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	   in	  microeconomic	   policy	   over	   the	   course	   of	   2009-­‐10,	   its	   stated	  approach	   to	   social	   security	   reform	   suggests	   that	   at	   least	   some	   such	   strategies	  would	  have	  been	  countenanced	  had	  the	  government	  been	  re-­‐elected	  in	  2010.	  	  	  Turning	   now	   to	   the	   two	   governments’	   approaches	   to	   industrial	   policy,	   there	   is	  evidence	   of	   a	   greater	   convergence	   in	   diagnosis	   and	   approach.	   The	   interventions	  examined	   in	   this	   section	   are	   strategies	   of	   roll	   back	   neoliberalisation:	   the	  deployment	   of	   new	   market-­‐supporting	   institutions	   and	   the	   strengthening	   of	  existing	   ones	   in	   response	   to	   already	   perceived	   and	   newly	   identified	   market	  failures.	   The	   case	   studies	   examined	   in	   this	   subsection	   are	   vocational	   skills,	  industrial	  finance	  and	  trade	  finance	  policies.	  The	  former	  category	  of	  interventions	  featured	   prominently	   in	   literature	   regarding	   New	   Labour’s	   microeconomic	  approach,	   the	   latter	   less	   so.	   Both,	   however,	   are	   central	   in	   the	   two	   post-­‐2008	  governments’	   microeconomic	   strategies,	   alongside	   infrastructure	   planning	   and	  ‘innovation’	  policy	  (a	  category	  that	  includes	  both	  university	  research	  funding	  and	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policies	   designed	   to	   support	   and	   incentivise	   private	   sector	   research	   and	  development).12	  	  	  
Skills	  Policies	  	  In	  most	   respects	   the	  Brown	  Government’s	  approach	   to	  skills	  policy	  was	  strongly	  reminiscent	   of	   New	   Labour’s,	   framed	   around	   a	   presumed	   ‘supply-­‐push’	   effect	   of	  publicly	  financed	  human	  capital	  formation	  through	  the	  existing	  architecture	  of	  the	  state	  education	  system.	  In	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  the	  central	  ‘pathology’	  identified	  in	  relation	  to	  skills	  was	  the	  same	  one	  identified	  in	  the	  2006	  Leitch	  Review	  of	  Skills:	  a	   vocational	   training	   system	   that	   under-­‐produces	   skilled	   workers	   and	   that	   is	  insufficiently	   responsive	   to	   employer	   demand.13	   In	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   these	  were	  recruited	   to	   the	  government’s	  analysis	  of	   the	  barriers	   to	   the	  resumption	  of	  rebalanced	  growth	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  employment.	  	  	  The	   response	   largely	   built	   on	   existing	   infrastructure.	   The	   government	   tasked	  UKCES,	   the	   employer-­‐led	   sector	   skills	   councils,	   and	   the	   RDAs	   with	   contributing	  towards	   an	   annual	   national	   skills	   audit	   and	   regional	   skills	   strategies	   that	  would	  inform	  delivery	  of	  training	  within	  local	   further	  education	  colleges.	   In	  response	  to	  the	   Leitch	   Review’s	   emphasis	   on	   a	   ‘vocational	   skills	   deficit’	   in	   Britain,	   the	  government	  announced	  plans	   to	   revive	   the	   stagnant	   institution	  of	   the	  workplace	  apprenticeship.	  It	  pledged	  to	  double	  the	  number	  of	  apprentices	  within	  two	  years,	  investing	  an	  initial	  £16mn	  to	  this	  aim,	  a	  figure	  that	  was	  to	  rise	  to	  £115mn	  by	  2014-­‐15.	  	  	  A	   third	   aspect	   of	   the	   government’s	   response	   warrants	   separate	   mention:	   the	  pledge	   to	   establish	   a	   ‘Skills	   Funding	   Agency’	   in	   2010	   tasked,	   among	   other	  functions,	   with	   directing	   public	   funds	   towards	   skills	   training	   in	   a	   number	   of	  strategically	   prioritised	   sectors	   that	   industrial	   policymakers	   had	   judged	   to	   hold	  particular	   potential	   for	   future	   growth	   and	   employment.	   £100mn	   was	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009a),	  Building	  Britain's	  Future:	  New	  
Industry,	  New	  Jobs	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  For	  Growth.	  13	  S.	  Leitch	  (2006),	  Prosperity	  For	  All	  In	  The	  Global	  Economy:	  Final	  Report	  Of	  The	  Leitch	  
Review	  Of	  Skills	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009b),	  Skills	  For	  Growth:	  The	  National	  Skills	  Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  pp.22-­‐23.	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available	   to	   the	   agency	   to	   this	   end.	   This	   forms	   part	   of	   a	   distinct	   strategic	  discretionary	   agenda	   in	   the	   industrial	   policy	   that	   I	   address	   at	   length	   in	   the	   next	  section.	  	  	  The	   Coalition	   also	   identified	   a	   lack	   of	   demand	   responsiveness	   in	   the	   system	   of	  skills	   training	  as	   a	  problem	  demanding	   redress,	   yet	   it	   attributed	   this	   to	   the	  very	  fact	  that	  such	  training	  had	  in	  recent	  history	  been	  planned,	  financed,	  designed	  and	  delivered	   in	  public	   sector	   institutions	   according	   to	   central	   government	   targets.14	  The	   Coalition’s	   vocational	   skills	   strategy	   centres	   on	   the	   apprenticeship,	  with	   the	  government	   pledging	   a	   50%	   increase	   in	   the	   funding	   of	   such	   courses	   and	  improvements	   in	   their	   quality	   (the	   government	   has	   stipulated	   that	   they	   must	  entail	   a	   workplace	   setting	   and	   training	   to	   the	   ‘level	   3’	   standard	   which	   the	  government	   believed	   to	   yield	   similar	   life-­‐time	   earnings	   to	   that	   of	   a	   degree).	  Changes	  have	  occurred	   in	   relation	   to	  both	   the	   ‘demand	  side’	   and	   ‘supply	   side’	  of	  vocational	   training.	   On	   the	   demand	   side,	   a	   system	  of	   subsidised	   loans	   similar	   to	  those	   used	   in	   higher	   education	   have	   been	   introduced	   for	   adult	   (age	   24+)	  vocational	   training	   on	   the	   principle	   that	   such	   training	   should	   be	   considered	   an	  investment	   in	   future	  private	   income.	  On	   the	   supply	   side,	   among	  other	  measures,	  the	   Coalition	   has	   emphasised	   the	   need	   for	   greater	   employer	   involvement	   in	   the	  design	   and	  delivery	   of	   training	   and	  have	   conducted	   a	   number	   of	   experiments	   to	  this	   end.	   Initially	   a	   £41mn	   public	   investment	   was	   made	   in	   a	   ‘Growth	   and	  Innovation	  Fund’	  that,	  alongside	  £55mn	  of	  private	  investment,	  sought	  to	  leverage	  new	  employer-­‐led	   training	   initiatives.	  The	  scheme	  was	   later	   joined	  by	  a	  £340mn	  ‘Employer	  Ownership	  Pilot’	  (EOP)	  scheme	  that	  incentivises	  and	  leverages	  greater	  employer	  investment	  in	  the	  design	  and	  delivery	  of	  vocational	  training.	  Both	  reflect	  the	   view	   of	   UKCES	   –	   the	   government’s	   advisory	   body	   on	   skills	   policy	   –	   that	  employer-­‐led	   partnerships	   should	   constitute	   the	   directing	   force	   of	   future	  vocational	  training	  design	  and	  delivery.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2010a),	  Skills	  For	  Sustainable	  Growth	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  pp.4-­‐5.	  15	  For	  an	  articulation	  of	  this	  view	  in	  relation	  to	  EOP,	  see	  UKCES	  (2011),	  Employer	  
Ownership	  Of	  Skills:	  Securing	  A	  Sustainable	  Partnership	  For	  The	  Long	  Term	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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Trade	  And	  Industry	  Finance	  	  The	   existence	   of	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘finance	   gap’	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   various	   kinds	   of	  finance	   to	   SMEs	   is	   another	   market	   failure	   against	   which	   non-­‐discretionary	  interventionism	  has	  long	  been	  deployed	  in	  the	  UK.16	  Rather	  than	  depart	  from	  their	  overarching	  commitment	  to	  liberal	  financial	  markets	  in	  light	  of	  this	  market	  failure,	  the	   New	   Labour	   governments	   deployed	   public	   funds	   in	   commercially	   operated	  funds	  at	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  levels	  to	  leverage	  higher	  rates	  of	  private	  sector	  investment	   through	   liberal	   financial	   markets.	   In	   matters	   of	   trade	   finance	  interventions	  have	  been	  more	  direct.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  the	  UK’s	  Export	  Credits	   Guarantee	   Department	   (ECGD)	   has	   provided	   publicly	   subsidised	   trade	  insurance	   and	   finance	   to	   British	   exporters	   subject	   to	   due	   diligence	   tests	   and	   a	  mandate	   to	   operate	   at	   no	   net	   cost	   to	   the	   public	   sector,	   a	   role	   that	   it	   retained	  through	   the	   1980s	   and	   ‘90s	   despite	   the	   neoliberalisation	   of	   other	   areas	   of	   the	  political	  economy.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	   these	  non-­‐discretionary	   interventions	  has	  long	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   criticism,	   with	   the	   ECGD	   in	   particular	   singled	   out	   for	  favouring	  large	  firms	  and	  projects	  over	  small	  ones.17	  	  	  Both	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   have	   responded	   to	   their	   context	   by	   strengthening	  and	   expanding	   these	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions.	   The	   rationales	   offered	   by	  the	  two	  governments	  on	  the	  matter	  are	  actually	  very	  similar:	  a	  ‘finance	  gap’	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  loans	  and	  equity	  to	  SMEs	  is	  perceived	  to	  negatively	  impact	  the	  growth	  and	  employment	  potential	  of	  the	  UK	  economy	  in	  the	  medium	  and	  long	  term,	  and	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  the	  gap	  is	  structural	  and	  would	  continue	  to	  impact	  in	  this	  way	  when	  
credit	  conditions	  normalise.18	  The	  analysis	  of	  market	  failure	  is	  consistent	  with	  that	  made	   by	   New	   Labour	   before	   2007-­‐08,	   incorporating	   informational	   asymmetries	  between	   capital	  market	   financiers	   and	   firms,	   and	   a	  missmatch	   between	   the	   risk	  appetites	   of	   banks	   and	   the	   growth	   ambitions	   of	   small	   companies.19	   Yet	   at	   times	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  DTI	  (1998),	  Building	  The	  Knowledge	  Driven	  Economy.	  17	  Commons	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  Select	  Committee	  (2010),	  Business,	  Innovation	  
and	  Skills	  Committee	  Inquiry	  into	  Government	  Assistance	  to	  Industry:	  Submission	  by	  The	  
Corner	  House	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  18	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  3.25;	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  For	  Growth,	  paragraph	  1.29.	  19	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  3.25;	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  (2013b),	  Building	  The	  Business	  Bank:	  Strategy	  Update	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  pp.7-­‐10	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these	   policy	   documents	   hint	   at	   some	  more	   fundamental	   recognition.	   It	   is	   noted	  that	   UK	   financial	   firms	   have	   become	   increasingly	   oriented	   to	   large	   leveraged	  transitions,	  and	  that	  a	  growing	  demand	  for	  finance	  had,	  and	  would	  again,	  operate	  to	   the	  detriment	  of	  growth	  and	  employment	   in	   the	  SME	  sector.20	   It	   is	  also	  noted	  that	   the	   flotation	   of	   the	   3i	   Corporation	   –	   once	   the	   UK’s	  major	   source	   of	   growth	  capital	   to	   non-­‐listed	   firms	   –	   had	   seen	   the	   firm	   move	   into	   larger	   leveraged	  acquisitions	   and	   away	   from	   the	   provision	   of	   capital	   to	   SMEs.21	   This	   is	   quite	  consistent	  with	  the	  critical	  social	  democrats’	  own	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  capital	  demands	  upon	   the	   business	   strategies	   of	   financial	   firms,	   and	   its	   implications	   for	  levels	   of	   productive	   investment	   in	   the	   British	   economy.	   While	   the	   post-­‐2008	  governments’	  sanguine	  attitude	  to	  financial	  reform	  precludes	  that	  they	  had	  come	  to	   the	   same	   conclusion,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	   they	   identified	  the	  same	  outcomes	  as	  constituting	  policy-­‐relevant	  problems.	  	  By	  mid-­‐2009	  a	  policy	   response	   that	   cohered	  with	   this	  analysis	  began	   to	  emerge.	  Some	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   measures	   targeting	   SME	   lending	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context	   are	   actually	   temporary	   counter-­‐cyclical	   measures	   designed	   to	   bolster	  lending	  to	  the	  non-­‐financial	  private	  sector	  until	  credit	  conditions	  normalise.	  These	  include	   the	   Enterprise	   Finance	   Guarantee	   (EFG),	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   previous	  Small	  Firm	  Loan	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  that	  admits	   larger	   firms	  than	  its	  predecessor	  and	  offers	  75%	  guarantees	  on	  lending	  of	  up	  to	  £1mn.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  EFG’s	  trade	  finance	  corollary	  the	  Export	  Enterprise	  Finance	  Guarantee,	  introduced	  by	  the	  Coalition.	   Schemes	   such	   as	   these	   are	   best	   situated	   amid	   the	   two	   governments’	  macroeconomic	  stimulatory	  agendas	  because	  they	  are	  explicitly	  temporary	  credit-­‐easing	   measures,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   unforeseen	   longevity	   (the	   EFG	   was	   originally	  envisioned	  as	   lasting	   into	  2010,	  but	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  extended	   in	  subsequent	  budgets).	   The	   measures	   focused	   on	   here	   instead	   are	   longterm	   changes	   to	   the	  architecture	  for	  non-­‐discretionary	  intervention	  in	  trade	  and	  industry	  finance	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraphs	  3.24-­‐3.25;	  V.	  Cable	  (2012a),	  'Speech	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills:	  Industrial	  Strategy:	  Cable	  Outlines	  Vision	  for	  Future	  of	  British	  Industry',	  Speech	  Given	  at	  Imperial	  College	  London	  (London,	  11/09/2012).	  21	  H.M.	  Government	  (2009),	  Building	  Britain's	  Future	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  p.51;	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  (2013b),	  Building	  The	  Business	  Bank:	  
Strategy	  Update	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  p.12.	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reflect	   responses	   to	   what	   are	   perceived	   as	   structural	   rather	   than	   cyclical	  pathologies.	  	  The	   Brown	   Government	   established	   two	   large	   privately	   and	   commercially	  operated	  funds.	  The	  first	  –	  the	   ‘Growth	  Capital	  Fund’	  –	  is	  a	  £200mn	  public	  sector	  investment	  made	  on	   the	   recommendation	  of	  Chris	  Rowland,	   former	  head	  of	  3i.22	  The	  fund	  provided	  growth	  capital	  to	  SMEs	  with	  a	  turnover	  of	  £1-­‐25mn	  in	  the	  form	  of	   mezzanine	   debt,	   and	   it	   was	   hoped	   that	   it	   would	   leverage	   a	   total	   of	   £500mn	  before	  beginning	  to	  invest.	  The	  second	  was	  the	  UK	  Innovation	  Investment	  Fund,	  an	  initial	   £150mn	   public	   investment	   into	   two	   commercially	   operated	   funds,	   which	  were	  mandated	   to	  make	  subsequent	   investments	   in	  a	   range	  of	   specialist	  venture	  capital	  funds	  with	  a	  background	  in	  providing	  equity	  to	  high	  technology	  firms	  over	  12-­‐15	  years.	  The	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  fund	  together	  totalled	  £330mn	  at	  their	  first	  close.	  Both	  of	  these	  interventions	  are	  delivered	  through	  existing	  liberal	  financial	  market	  structures,	   in	  which	   government	   played	   the	   role	   of	   a	   fund	   investor	   to	   stimulate	  further	  supply	  of	  private	  sector	  investment.	  	  The	   Coalition	   has	   added	   further	   interventions	   on	   top	   of	   these.	   The	   emergency	  budget	  of	  2010	  allocated	  £25mn	  of	  public	  funds	  to	  a	  new	  Enterprise	  Capital	  Fund	  (ECF)	   intended	   to	   provide	   early	   stage	   risk	   capital	   to	   small	   firms.	   Overall,	   the	  Coalition	   has	   increased	   backing	   to	   the	   ECFs	   by	   £200mn.	   A	   ‘business	   angel	   co-­‐investment	   fund’	   was	   also	   established	   through	   a	   joint	   government	   and	   private	  sector	   bid	   to	   the	   government’s	   Regional	   Growth	   Fund,	   and	   the	   government	  pledged	  a	   further	  £50bn	   to	   the	   scheme	   in	  2013-­‐14.	   In	   a	   larger-­‐scale	   investment,	  the	  2012	  Autumn	  Statement	  introduced	  the	  £1.2bn	  ‘Business	  Finance	  Partnership’,	  which	   exists	   to	   stimulate	  non-­‐bank	   channels	   of	   lending	   to	   SMEs	   through	  private	  and	  quasi-­‐private	  sector	  funds.	  	  	  However,	  perhaps	   the	  most	  striking	  of	   the	  Coalition’s	   interventions	  has	  been	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   ‘Business	   Bank’.	   The	   Business	   Bank	   resembles	   an	  unimplemented	   decision	   by	   the	   Brown	   Government	   to	   establish	   a	   stand-­‐alone	  entity	   called	   ‘UK	   Finance	   for	   Growth’	   to	   provide	   a	   coherent	   front	   end	   to	   non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  C.	  Rowlands	  (2009),	  The	  Provision	  Of	  Growth	  Capital	  To	  UK	  Small	  And	  Medium	  Sized	  
Enterprises	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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discretionary	   interventions	   in	   industrial	   finance.	   However,	   as	   well	   as	  administering	  the	  existing	  £2.9bn	  portfolio	  of	  non-­‐discretionary	  industrial	  finance	  interventions,	  the	  Business	  Bank	  has	  been	  allocated	  an	  additional	  £1bn	  with	  which	  to	  expand	  the	  supply	  of	   long-­‐term	  SME	  finance	  and	  stimulate	  greater	  diversity	  in	  the	  markets	  for	  industrial	  equity,	  credit	  and	  debt	  in	  the	  UK.	  As	  a	  non-­‐discretionary	  measure,	  the	  Business	  Bank	  does	  not	  provide	  finance	  to	  SMEs	  directly	  but	  instead	  uses	   public	   money	   to	   alter	   incentive	   structures	   within	   the	   existing	   liberally	  instituted	  financial	  markets,	  leveraging	  and	  stimulating	  private	  sector	  investment.	  While	   the	   bank	   remains	   at	   an	   early	   stage	   of	   development,	   a	   £300mn	   scheme	   to	  promote	  non-­‐traditional	   lending	  firms	  has	  been	  announced	  that	  will	  draw	  on	  the	  Bank’s	   additional	   funding.	  The	  Coalition	   continues	   to	  announce	  proposals	   in	   this	  vein,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  finance	  gap	  remains	  to	  be	  resolved	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  policy	  makers.	  These	  proposals	   include	  the	  creation	  of	  a	   further	  mezzanine	  fund	  within	  the	   Business	   bank,	   and	   for	   the	   bank	   to	   implement	   new	   forms	   of	   small	   business	  finance	  securitisation.	  	  The	  downturn	  of	  2009	  also	  saw	  a	  cyclical	  restriction	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  trade	  finance.	  The	  Brown	  Government	  undertook	  a	  number	  of	  counter-­‐cyclical	  interventions	  into	  these	   markets,	   including	   a	   temporary	   Letters	   of	   Credit	   scheme	   at	   the	   ECGD.	   In	  addition	  to	  this	  cyclical	  issue,	  both	  the	  Brown	  Government	  and	  Coalition	  have	  also	  identified	   a	   structural	   shortage	   of	   trade	   finance	   as	   posing	   a	   barrier	   to	   the	  rebalancing	  of	   the	  British	  economy’s	  sectoral	   composition	  and	  demand	  structure	  because	   of	   the	   barrier	   it	   presents	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   SMEs	   that	   might	   otherwise	  adopt	  export-­‐oriented	  growth	  strategies.	  23	  In	  response,	  the	  Coalition	  has	  made	  the	  Letters	  of	  Credit	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  introduced	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government	  a	  long-­‐term	  service	  of	  the	  ECGD,	  now	  rebranded	  as	  UK	  Export	  Finance	  (UKEF).	  A	  number	  of	  further	  guarantee	  schemes	  were	  introduced	  to	  cover	  working	  capital	  and	  tender	  and	  contract	  bonds,	  while	  UKEF’s	  insurance	  services	  were	  extended	  to	  cover	  non-­‐capital	  goods.	  UKEF’s	  remit	  was	  also	  expanded	  to	  insure	  trade	  with	  creditworthy	  buyers	  in	  non-­‐OECD	  countries.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  3.35;	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2011b),	  Trade	  And	  Investment	  For	  Growth	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  paragraphs	  1.17	  and	  3.43.	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3.	  
Strategic-­Discretionary	  Industrial	  Policy	  In	  The	  Post-­2008	  Context	  	  The	   strengthening	   and	  expansion	  of	  non-­‐discretionary	   interventions	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   represents	   a	   recognition	   that	   market	   failures	   are	   more	   numerous	  and	   of	   a	   greater	   scale	   than	   had	   hitherto	   been	   acknowledged.	   Yet	   as	   non-­‐discretionary	   forms	   of	   intervention	   they	   are	   consistent	  with	   neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   and	   may	   be	   interpreted	   as	   strategies	   of	   roll	   out	   neoliberalisation.	  Alongside	  the	  instances	  of	  roll	  back	  neoliberalisation	  noted	  above,	  these	  suggest	  a	  microeconomic	  strategy	  that	  conforms	  with	  the	  broader	  macroeconomic	  strategy	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  secure	  an	   improved	  and	  more	  competitive	   business	   environment	   for	   market-­‐led	   industrial	   development	   and	  macroeconomic	  adjustment	   to	  occur	   in.	   In	  each	   intervention	  examined	  so	   far	   the	  market	   is	   prioritised	   as	   the	   allocator	   of	   economic	   resources	   and	   the	   rudder	   of	  industrial	   development.	  Where	   government	  has	   taken	  on	  new	   responsibilities,	   it	  has	  done	  so	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  market	  resource	  allocation.	  	  	  This	  interpretation	  is	  not,	  however,	  an	  accurate	  characterisation	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  both	   governments’	  microeconomic	   agendas.	   A	   third	   tendency	   reveals	   a	   strategic	  discretionary	   element.	   Both	   governments	   have	   purposefully	   and	   directly	   co-­‐invested	  in	  private	  sector	  projects	  where	  they	  have	  judged	  that	  the	  market	  will	  not	  yield	  such	  investment.	  They	  have	  done	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  discretionary	  judgments	  about	   the	   capacity	   of	   these	   projects	   to	   support	   economic	   policy	   objectives	   in	  relation	   to	   growth,	   employment	   and	   compositional	   rebalancing,	   and	   more	  generally	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  argument	  that	  asserts	  the	  possibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  policymakers	   adopting	   such	   a	   role.	   In	   the	   limited	   sites	  where	   this	   tendency	   has	  been	  expressed	  it	  has	  configured	  the	  boundaries	  between	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  responsibility,	  and	  market	  and	  non-­‐market	  resource	  allocation,	   rather	  differently	  to	   the	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions	   discussed	   thus	   far,	   yielding	   an	   expanded	  and	  qualitatively	  different	  role	  for	  industrial	  policymakers	  in	  purposefully	  shaping	  the	   trajectory	   of	   industrial	   development.	   Insofar	   as	   such	   a	   role	   acts	   to	   supplant	  rather	   than	   facilitate	  market	   resource	  allocation	  even	   to	  a	  prescribed	  extent,	   the	  policies	   and	   the	   problem	   definitions	   on	   which	   they	   are	   premised	   are	   non-­‐neoliberal.	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The	   Problem	   Definition	   Underpinning	   Post-­2008	   Strategic-­Discretionary	   Industrial	  
Policy	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  strategic	  discretionary	  tendency	  is	  found	  within	  publications	  and	   policies	   originating	   from	   DBIS.	   Under	   the	   stewardship	   of	   both	   post-­‐2008	  governments	  DBIS	  has	  published	  a	  number	  of	  documents	  outlining	  what	  has	  been	  termed	   an	   ‘industrial	   strategy’.	   The	   new	   agenda	   was	   first	   signalled	   under	   the	  Brown	   Government	   in	   late	   2008	   and	   early	   2009.	   The	   Business	   Secretary	   Peter	  Mandelson	   made	   a	   number	   of	   speeches	   in	   which	   he	   reflected	   on	   the	   role	   of	  industrial	  policy	  and	  called	  for	  ‘market-­‐driven	  industrial	  activism’	  in	  the	  UK.24	  The	  substance	  of	  this	  analysis	  was	  provided	  in	  a	  series	  of	  documents	  published	  under	  the	   heading	   of	   ‘New	   Industry,	   New	   Jobs’.	   These	   cumulatively	   elaborated	   how	   the	  department	   would	   coordinate	   with	   the	   various	   agencies	   of	   industrial	   policy	   to	  accelerate	   the	   development	   of	   a	   number	   of	   strategically	   prioritised	   ‘sectors’	   and	  technologies	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  bringing	  about	  higher	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth,	  employment	   and	   a	   more	   balanced	   sectoral	   structure	   than	   would	   otherwise	   be	  achieved.25	   Concomitantly,	   the	   government	   published	   the	   cross-­‐departmental	  ‘Building	   Britain’s	   Future’	   strategy	   that,	   among	   other	   things,	   pledged	   the	  government	   to	   a	   more	   proactive	   and	   growth-­‐focused	   stance	   on	   the	   use	   of	  diminishing	  public	  spending.26	  	  	  A	   similar	   shift	   is	  evident	   in	   the	  argumentation	  and	  policymaking	  of	   the	  Coalition	  Government,	   but	   it	   was	   less	   vocal	   in	   its	   embrace	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  until	  late	  2011.	  From	  this	  date	  the	  Business	  Secretary	  Vince	  Cable	  made	   a	   number	   of	   high	   profile	   speeches	   in	   which	   a	   strategy	   was	   outlined	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2008c),	  'Globalisation,	  Government	  And	  Britain's	  Economic	  Future',	  Hugo	  
Young	  Lecture	  (London,	  03/12/2008);	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2008a),	  'A	  New	  Industrial	  Activism',	  
RSA	   Lecture:	   The	   Royal	   Society	   For	   The	   Encouragement	   Of	   Arts,	   Manufactures	   And	  
Commerce	  (London,	  17/12/2008).	  	  25	  DBIS	   (2009a),	  New	   Industry;	  Department	  For	  Business,	   Innovation	  And	  Skills	   (2009c),	  
Jobs	  For	  The	  Future	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009d),	  Partnerships	  For	  Growth	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	   Business,	   Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2010b),	   New	   Industry,	   New	   Jobs:	   One	   Year	   On	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009e),	  
The	   Strategic	   Investment	   Fund:	   Interim	   Report	   (London:	   The	   Stationery	   Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2010c),	  Going	  For	  Growth	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office)	  26	  Government	  (2009),	  Building	  Britain’s	  Future.	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bears	  strong	  similarity	   to	   that	  of	   the	  Brown	  Government.27	  This	  was	   followed	  by	  the	   publication	   of	   a	   range	   of	   sector-­‐oriented	   strategy	   documents	   in	   2013.28	  However	   in	   spite	   of	   its	   comparatively	   recent	   rise	   in	   visibility,	   strategic	  discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   has	   been	   a	   feature	   of	   the	   Coalition’s	   industrial	  policy	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  These	  documents	  contain	  arguments	  and	  policies	  of	  both	  a	  non-­‐discretionary	  and	  strategic	   discretionary	   kind	   as	   part	   of	   broader	   growth-­‐oriented	   microeconomic	  agendas.	  It	  is	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  features,	  however,	  that	  are	  the	  most	  novel	  in	   these	  documents.	  They	  relate	   to	  a	  number	  of	   strategically	  prioritised	   ‘sectors’,	  and	  areas	  of	   technology	   impacting	  within	  and	  between	   them.	  The	   term	   ‘sector’	  –	  ever	  an	  ambiguous	  signifier	  –	  is	  used	  in	  a	  specific	  way	  here,	  referring	  to	  groups	  of	  industries	  making	  use	  of	  similar	  technologies,	  subject	  to	  common	  market	  failures	  or	   supplying	   similar	   markets,	   rather	   than	   to	   broad	   areas	   of	   economic	   activity	  (‘manufacturing’,	   ‘services’,	   the	   ‘non-­‐financial	   private	   sector’,	   etc)	   or	   portions	   of	  the	  economy’s	  demand	  structure	  (the	  ‘household	  sector’,	  the	  ‘public	  sector’,	  etc).29	  	  The	  argument	  for	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  is	  very	  similar	  between	  the	  two	  post-­‐2008	  governments,	  suggesting	  a	  convergence	  of	  problem	  definitions.	  They	  make	  three	  broad	  claims.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  there	  are	  opportunities	  for	  the	  UK	  to	   realise	   higher	   rates	   of	   economic	   growth	   and	   employment	   through	   the	  development	  of	  certain	  sectors,	  but	  that	  the	  realisation	  of	  these	  opportunities	  can	  at	   times	   be	   unnecessarily	   obstructed	   when	   developmentally	   critical	   projects	  within	   these	  sectors	  receive	   insufficient	   investment.30	  The	  nature	  of	   the	  problem	  identified	  here	  is	  characterised	  through	  the	  established	  concept	  of	  ‘market	  failure’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  V.	  Cable	  (2011a),	  'Speech	  By	  The	  Secretary	  Of	  State	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills:	  The	  Role	  Of	  Industrial	  Policy	  In	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  The	  Economy',	  Speech	  Given	  At	  The	  'Ideas	  Space',	  
Policy	   Exchange	   (London,	   26/10/2011);	   V.	   Cable	   (2012b),	   'Speech	   By	   The	   Secretary	   Of	  State	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills:	  Industrial	  Strategy:	  Next	  Steps',	  Speech	  Given	  To	  
The	   Institute	   For	   Public	   Policy	   Research	   (London:	   27/02/2012);	   Cable	   (2012a),	   'Speech:	  Cable	   Outlines’;	   Department	   For	   Business,	   Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2012b)	   Industrial	  
Strategy:	   UK	   Sector	   Analysis	   (London:	   The	   Stationery	   Office);	   Department	   For	   Business,	  Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2014a),	   Industrial	   Strategy:	   Government	   And	   Industry	   In	  
Partnership:	  Progress	  Report	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  28	  The	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  government	  would	  select	  sectors	  with	  which	  to	  conduct	  strategic	  discretionary	  relationships	  was	  detailed	  in	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy.	  29	  Ibid.	  30	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraphs	  1.18	  and	  5.8;	  DBIS	  (2012b)	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  pp.4-­‐6	  and	  pp.25-­‐31;	  Cable	  (2012a),	  'Speech:	  Cable	  Outlines’.	  
	   270	  
However	  there	  is	  an	  important	  change	  in	  the	  way	  the	  concept	  is	  appealed	  to:	  it	  is	  conceded	   that	   market	   failures	   can	   impact	   asymmetrically	   on	   particular	   sectors,	  and	  that	  in	  such	  circumstances	  there	  are	  grounds	  to	  offer	  privileged	  support	  to	  the	  affected	   sectors	   if	   they	   are	   judged	   to	   hold	   scope	   for	   economic	   growth	   and	   higher	  
levels	   of	   employment	   in	   the	   future	   (from	  which	   their	   status	   as	   ‘strategic	   sectors’	  arises).31	  Interventions	  in	  this	  vein	  provide	  investment	  at	  what	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  developmentally	  critical	  junctures	  in	  which	  the	  market	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  what	  are	   judged	   to	   be	   viable	   private	   sector	   projects	   with	   sufficient	   investment.	   They	  therefore	  seek	  to	  facilitate	  industrial	  development	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  have	  happened,	   capturing	  advantages	   in	   terms	  of	  growth	  and	  employment	   that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  gone	  to	  the	  country’s	  economic	  competitors.	  Whilst	  not	  departing	  from	   a	   general	   commitment	   to	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventionism,	   a	   role	   for	  strategic	   discretion	   is	   being	   asserted	   to	   secure	   outcomes	   that	   non-­‐discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  would	  alone	  be	  insufficient	  to	  secure.	  	  This	  claim	   is	  necessarily	  premised	  on	  a	  second	  and	   logically	  prior	  one:	   the	  claim	  that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   possible	   for	   industrial	   policymakers	   to	   identify	   strategic	   sectors	  with	   potential	   to	   promote	   broader	   economic	   policy	   goals,	   and	   to	   identify	  commercially	   viable	   private	   projects	   within	   sectors	   that	   market	   actors	   have	  collectively	  missed	  through	  which	  to	  promote	  their	  development.	  The	  claim	  is,	   in	  effect,	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  market	  epistemology	  and	  a	  qualified	  loosening	  of	  the	   notion	   of	   policymakers	   being	   subject	   to	   perverse	   incentives	   that	   I	   argued	   in	  Chapter	   4	   is	   bound	   up	   in	   neoliberal	   microeconomics	   and	   its	   hostility	   to	  discretionary	   interventionism.	   Against	   the	   notion	   that	   perverse	   incentives	   and	  informational	  constraints	  prevent	  policymakers	  from	  forming	  a	  better	  assessment	  of	  developmental	  prospects	  than	  the	  collective	  market	  judgment,	  the	  rationale	  for	  post-­‐2008	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   states	   that	   under	   certain	   specific	  circumstances	   the	   opposite	   is	   true,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	   policymakers	   to	  ensure	  investment	  is	  provided	  in	  projects	  that	  the	  market	  mechanism	  of	  resource	  allocation	   has	   not	   selected	   for	   development.32	   For	   both	   post-­‐2008	   governments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  DBIS	  (2009e),	  The	  Strategic	  Investment	  Fund,	  p.10;	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  pp.	  25-­‐26.	  32	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraphs	  2.1-­‐2.11,	  5.3,	  5.5,	  and	  5.8;	  DBIS	  (2010c),	  Going	  
For	   Growth	   (London:	   The	   Stationery	   Office),	   p.41;	   Cable	   (2012a),	   'Speech:	   Industrial	  Strategy’;	   Cable	   (2012b),	   'Speech:	   Next	   Steps’.	   DBIS	   (2014a),	   Industrial	   Strategy:	  
Government,	  p.1;	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  p.1,	  p.7,	  p.20.	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the	   basis	   for	   policymakers	   to	   identify	   and	   adjudicate	   such	   developmental	  prospects	   is	   a	   dispassionate	   assessment	   of	   the	   UK’s	   existing	   comparative	  advantages	  and	  productive	  strengths	  alongside	  consideration	  of	   likely	  changes	   in	  patterns	  of	  global	  demand,	  and	  consultation	  with	  market	  participants	   in	  order	  to	  glean	  developmental	  opportunities	  and	  potential	  barriers	   to	  their	  realisation.33	   It	  is	  through	  such	  a	  process	  that	  the	  two	  governments	  both	  claim	  to	  have	  arrived	  at	  a	  strikingly	  similar	  assessment	  of	  strategically	  important	  sectors	  that	  merit	  strategic	  discretionary	  intervention.	  	  	  The	   final	   step	   in	   the	   argument	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   under	   the	   circumstances	   noted	  above	   industrial	   policymakers	   can	   and	   should	  make	   discretionary	   interventions	  and	  allocate	  resources	  to	  private	  sector	  projects	  in	  ways	  that	  the	  market	  has	  not	  in	  order	  to	  realise	  the	  potential	  of	  strategic	  sectors	  to	  contribute	  to	  economic	  policy	  goals.34	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  government	  should	  become	  a	  proactive	  agent	  purposefully	  participating	   in	  processes	  that	  shape	  the	  course	  of	   industrial	  development,	  doing	  so	   in	  ways	   that	   they	   judge	  conducive	   to	   the	  government’s	  economic	  policy	  goals.	  This	   reconceptualises	   the	  relationship	  between	   ‘the	  state’	  and	   the	  private	  sector,	  with	   the	   former	  being	   seen	   as	   co-­‐constitutive	   of	   the	  process	   by	  which	   economic	  growth	  and	  development	  is	  obtained	  alongside	  the	  market	  allocation	  of	  resources.	  This	  contrasts	  to	  the	  non-­‐discretionary	  objective	  of	  ensuring	  an	  optimal	  business	  environment	   for	   market	   resource	   allocation	   and	   market-­‐led	   economic	  development	  to	  unfold	  in.	  Both	  governments	  make	  a	  similar	  argument	  to	  this	  end:	  that	   industrial	  policy	   invariably	  exerts	  an	   impact	  on	   industrial	  development,	  and	  that	   what	   the	   new	   policies	   amount	   to	   is	   utilising	   an	   inevitable	   influence	   in	   a	  strategic	  way	  that	  is	  useful	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  economic	  policy.35	  	  	  However,	   the	  appropriate	   scope	  of	   strategic	  discretionary	  policy	   remains	   limited	  in	   this	   problem	   definition.	   Both	   governments	   have	  maintained	   that	   it	   is	   only	   in	  instances	  where	  barriers	  to	  developmental	  opportunities	  are	  deemed	  to	  exist	  and	  where	  discretionary	   intervention	   is	   deemed	  able	   to	  overcome	   such	  barriers	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid;	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraphs	  5.5-­‐5.6;	  DBIS	  (2014a),	  Industrial	  Strategy:	  
Government,	  p.1.	  34	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraphs	  5.2,	  5.6	  and	  5.7;	  Cable	  (2012a),	  'Speech:	  Industrial	  Strategy’;	  Cable	  (2012b),	  'Speech:	  Next	  Steps’.	  35	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  1.17;	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  pp.6-­‐7.	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discretionary	  intervention	  can	  or	  should	  be	  sanctioned.36	  The	  market	  continues	  to	  be	  celebrated	  as	  the	  best	  general	  means	  of	  resource	  allocation.	  Consequently,	  what	  is	  being	  advanced	  is	  not	  a	  rejection	  of	  market-­‐led	  industrial	  development	  in	  favour	  of	  some	  comprehensive	  dirigiste	  alternative	  (for	  example,	  a	  purposeful	  economic	  restructuring	  through	  the	  selective	  public	  provision	  of	  industrial	  finance).	  Yet	  the	  argument	  does	  amount	  to	  a	  proposal	  to	  incorporate	  an	  element	  of	  dirigiste	  policy	  alongside	  market-­‐led	   industrial	  development	   insofar	  as	   it	   represents	  a	   refusal	   to	  allow	  the	  opportunities	  identified	  by	  industrial	  policy	  makers	  to	  remain	  unrealised	  in	  the	  face	  of	  contrary	  judgments	  by	  the	  market.	  	  	  
Post-­2008	  Strategic-­Discretionary	  Industrial	  Policy	  In	  Practice	  	  The	   two	   governments’	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policies	   are	   strikingly	  similar	   in	   practice.	   As	   noted,	   both	   have	   formulated	   and	   published	   national	  strategies	  pertaining	   to	  prioritised	  sectors.	  Secondly,	  both	  have	  established	   large	  national-­‐level	   funds	   to	   finance	   a	   variety	   of	   discretionary	   interventions	   in	  prioritised	   sectors.	   Finally,	   both	   have	   adopted	   a	   similar	   pattern	   of	   discretionary	  intervention	   encompassing	   three	   distinct	   types	   of	   investment:	   direct	   co-­‐investment	   in	   private	   sector	   research	   and	   development	   projects;	   the	   core	  financing	   of	   multi-­‐firm	   development	   and	   proto-­‐typing	   facilities	   known	   as	  ‘technology	   innovation	   centres’	   (‘TICs’);	   and	   direct	   capital	   co-­‐investments	   in	   the	  projects	  of	  particular	  firms	  within	  strategically	  prioritised	  sectors.	  	  	  Between	  May	  2009	  and	  December	  2009	  the	  Brown	  Government	  published	  a	  series	  of	  strategy	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  life	  sciences,	  low	  carbon	  industries,	  advanced	  manufacturing	   industries,	   composite	   materials	   and	   plastic	   electronics	   sectors.37	  The	   primary	   beneficiaries	   of	   discretionary	   interventionism	   outlined	   in	   these	  documents	   were	   a	   range	   of	   ‘high	   value’	   ‘advanced	   manufacturing’	   industries:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  DBIS	  (2009e),	  The	  Strategic	  Investment	  Fund,	  p.4;	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  p.36.	  37	   Department	   For	   Business,	   Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2009f),	   Advanced	   Manufacturing	  
Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009g),	  Low	  Carbon	  Industrial	  Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	   Innovation	  And	  Skills	   (2009h),	  Life	  Sciences	  Blueprint	   (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	   Department	   For	   Business,	   Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2009i),	   The	   UK	   Composites	  
Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2009j),	  Plastic	  Electronics:	  A	  UK	  Strategy	  For	  Success	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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pharmaceuticals,	  aerospace,	  automotive,	   the	  offshore	  wind	  supply	  chain;	   the	  civil	  nuclear	   supply	   chain;	   and	   the	   tidal	   energy	   supply	   chain;	   as	   well	   as	   a	   range	   of	  industries	   for	   whom	   the	   ‘platform	   technologies’	   of	   industrial	   biotechnology	   and	  plastic	  electronics	  were	  deemed	  significant.	  	  	  Around	  this	  time	  the	  government	  also	  published	  details	  of	  the	  approach	  whereby	  the	   diffuse	   agencies	   of	   government	   with	   responsibility	   for	   the	   formation	   and	  delivery	   of	   industrial	   policy	   would	   coordinate	   with	   one	   another	   in	   a	   national	  framework	   for	  discretionary	   intervention	  within	   these	   sectors.38	  Partnerships	   for	  
Growth	   pledged	   to	   align	   the	   work	   of	   RDAs	   and	   local	   authorities	   to	   the	   national	  strategy	   for	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy.	   In	   doing	   so	   the	   document	  addressed	   the	   long-­‐standing	  criticism	  that	  British	   industrial	  policy	   is	   fragmented	  and	   incoherent,	   making	   at	   least	   a	   declaration	   of	   intent	   that	   discretionary	  interventionism	  would	  be	  coordinated	  according	  to	  a	  national	  strategy.39	  	  Since	  2012	  Coalition	  has	  also	  drawn	  up	  strategies	  in	  relation	  to	  prioritised	  sectors,	  each	  reflecting	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  ‘long-­‐term	  partnership’	  with	  the	  sector	  through	  a	  ‘sector	   council’	   comprised	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	   affected	   industries.40	   Its	  choices	   of	   sectors	   closely	   parallel	   the	  Brown	  Government’s,	   including	   aerospace,	  automotive,	   life	  sciences,	   the	  nuclear	  energy	  supply	  chain,	  and	   the	  offshore	  wind	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  DBIS	  (2009d)	  Partnerships	  for	  Growth.	  39	  Bailey	  and	  Driffield	  (2007),	  'Industrial	  Policy,	  FDI’.	  40	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013c),	  Lifting	  Off:	  Implementing	  The	  Strategic	  Vision	  For	  Aerospace	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013d),	  UK	  Strategy	  For	  Agricultural	  Technologies	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013e),	  Driving	  
Success:	  A	  Strategy	  For	  The	  Growth	  And	  Sustainability	  Of	  The	  UK	  Automotive	  Sector	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013f),	  
Construction	  2025:	  Industrial	  Strategy	  For	  Construction	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013g),	  Information	  Economy	  Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013h),	  
International	  Education	  Strategy:	  Global	  Growth	  And	  Prosperity	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2011d),	  Strategy	  For	  UK	  Life	  
Sciences	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013i),	  Nuclear	  Industrial	  Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013j),	  Offshore	  Wind	  Industrial	  Strategy	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013k),	  Oil	  And	  Gas:	  
Business	  And	  Government	  Action	  Plan	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013l),	  Growth	  Is	  Our	  Business:	  A	  Strategy	  For	  Professional	  
And	  Business	  Services	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  The	  precise	  organisation	  of	  each	  sector	  council	  differs	  from	  sector	  to	  sector,	  and	  the	  government	  does	  not	  proscribe	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  organisation,	  see	  DBIS	  (2014a),	  Industrial	  Strategy:	  Government	  And	  
Industry.	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supply	   chain,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   information	   and	   communication	   sector,	   agricultural	  technology,	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  supply	  chain,	  construction,	  international	  education	  and	  the	   professional	   and	   business	   services	   sectors.	  While	   the	   publication	   of	   strategy	  documents	  is	  a	  recent	  development,	   it	  was	  prefigured	  to	  an	  extent	  in	  the	  original	  growth	   strategy	   published	   in	   2011.41	   Although	   the	   document	  was	   dominated	   by	  proposals	  for	  non-­‐discretionary	  forms	  of	  interventionism	  a	  substantial	  second	  part	  was	  given	  over	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  needs	  of	  several	  of	  the	  sectors	  noted	   above.	   Shortly	   thereafter,	   a	   ‘framework’	   document	   outlining	   discretionary	  interventions	   in	   advanced	   manufacturing	   industries	   was	   published,	   as	   was	   a	  similar	  document	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  life-­‐sciences	  sector.42	  With	  these	  points	  in	  mind	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  a	  sectoral	  focus	  has	  been	  an	  ever-­‐present	  aspect	  of	  the	  Coalition	  Government’s	  approach	  to	   industrial	  policy,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  been	  expanded	  and	  become	  increasingly	  prominent	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  2012	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  initial	  deflationary	  macroeconomic	  strategy.	  	  Both	   governments	   have	   also	   made	   use	   of	   large	   centrally	   administered	   funds	   to	  finance	   certain	   strategic	   discretionary	   interventions.	   The	   Brown	   Government	  established	  the	  Strategic	  Investment	  Fund	  (SIF)	   in	  the	  2009	  Budget.	   Initially	  with	  funds	  of	  £750mn,	   it	  was	   later	  boosted	  to	  £1bn	  six	  months	   later.	  The	   fund	  was	  to	  operate	   over	   two	   years.	   Allocative	   decisions	  were	  made	   by	  DBIS	   in	   consultation	  with	  other	  government	  departments,	  regional	  development	  agencies,	  and	  the	  TSB.	  The	  fund	  was	  intended	  primarily	  to	  provide	  finance	  to	  private	  sector	  projects	  that	  developed	  or	  exploited	  ‘platform	  technologies’	  that	  the	  government	  had	  judged	  to	  be	   relevant	   to	   multiple	   strategic	   sectors,	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   finance	   to	   other	  government	  initiatives	  such	  at	  the	  TSB	  or	  to	  non-­‐discretionary	  initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  UKIIF.	  The	  unifying	  thread	  of	  SIF	  investments	  was	  in	  their	  addressing	  market	  failures	  that	  obstructed	  what	  DBIS	  judged	  to	  be	  viable	  developments	  where	  public	  investment	  was	   judged	   able	   to	   promote	   economic	   and	   employment	   growth,	   and	  ‘sustainable	   balanced	   recovery’.43	   Discretionary	   investments	   were	   largely	  allocated	   to	   projects	   in	   advanced	   manufacturing	   sectors,	   with	   the	   two	   largest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  for	  Growth.	  42	  Department	  Of	  Business,	   Innovation	  And	  Skills	   (2011),	  Growth	  Review	  Framework	  For	  
Advanced	   Manufacturing	   (London:	   The	   Stationery	   Office);	   Department	   For	   Business,	  Innovation	   And	   Skills	   (2011d),	   Strategy	   For	   UK	   Life	   Sciences	   (London:	   The	   Stationery	  Office).	  43	  DBIS	  (2009e),	  The	  Strategic	  Investment	  Fund,	  p.3-­‐4.	  
	   275	  
recipients	  being	  aero-­‐space	  and	  offshore	  wind	  industries	  (receiving	  38%	  and	  19%	  of	  the	  initial	  £750mn	  respectively).44	  	  The	  SIF	  also	  contained	  a	  secondary	  function	  as	  a	  means	  of	  centrally	  administered	  discretionary	   regional	   policy.	   One	   of	   the	   fund’s	   aims	   was	   to	   accumulate	   a	  geographically	   diverse	   portfolio	   of	   assets	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   a	   balanced	   regional	  distribution	   of	   economic	   benefits	   accruing	   to	   the	   investments.45	   The	   closest	  institutional	   parallel	   to	   the	   SIF	   in	   the	   Coalition’s	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	  agenda	   –	   the	   Regional	   Growth	   Fund	   (RGF)	   –	   serves	   primarily	   as	   a	   means	   of	  regional	  policy,	  offsetting	  the	  funds	  being	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  RDAs	  as	  they	  were	  abolished	  and	  serving	  the	  objective	  of	  “[helping]	  areas	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  particularly	  affected	  by	  public	  spending	  cuts”.46	  It	  was	  thus	  closely	  linked	  from	  the	  outset	  to	  the	  government’s	   attempts	   to	   promote	   a	   geographical	   rebalancing	   of	   the	   UK’s	  structure	   of	   private	   sector	   activity.	   However,	   the	   fund	   now	   has	   the	   broader	  description	   of	   “helping	   companies	   throughout	   England	   to	   create	   jobs”,	   and	  “stimulating	   enterprise	   by	   providing	   support	   for	   projects	   and	   programmes	  with	  significant	  potential	   for	  economic	  growth,	   leveraging	   in	  significant	  private	  sector	  investment	  and	  creating	  additional	  sustainable	  private	  sector	  employment”.47	  The	  fund	  has	  been	  used,	  in	  effect,	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	   because	   the	   criteria	   with	   which	   bids	   are	   judged	   are	   their	   capacity	   for	  sustainable	  private	  sector	  growth	  and	  job	  creation.48	  	  	  From	  an	   initial	   £1.4bn	   the	   fund	  has	   grown	   to	   £3.2bn	   that	  will	   have	   financed	   six	  successive	   rounds	   by	   2016.	   The	   fund	   is	   intended	   to	   leverage	   additional	   private	  sector	   investment	   through	   the	   co-­‐financing	  of	   single	   or	  multi-­‐firm	   investment	   in	  capital,	   training	   or	   research	   and	   development	   projects.	   The	   fund	   has	   also	  contributed	   towards	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   range	   of	   ‘programmes’	   –	   secondary	  initiatives	   that	   utilise	   RGF	   funds	   to	   create	   secondary	   allocation	   processes	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Ibid,	  p.9.	  45	  Ibid,	  p.10.	  46	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2010d),	  'Press	  Release:	  £1Billion	  Fund	  To	  Help	  Regional	  Business	  (29	  June	  2010)',	  <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/1-­‐billion-­‐fund-­‐to-­‐help-­‐regional-­‐business>,	  accessed	  12/01/12.	  47	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013m),	  Regional	  Growth	  Fund:	  Annual	  
Monitoring	  Report	  2013	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office),	  p.6.	  48	  The	  others	  are	  additionality,	  value	  for	  money	  and	  state	  aid	  compliance	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contribute	   to	   the	   RGF’s	   objectives.	   As	   with	   the	   SIF,	   RGF	  monies	   have	   also	   been	  contributed	  towards	  non-­‐discretionary	  ‘access	  to	  finance’	  schemes	  targeting	  SMEs.	  	  	  Unlike	  the	  SIF,	  the	  RGF	  is	  not	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  Coalition’s	  sector	  strategies,	  and	  those	   administering	   the	   fund	   do	   not	   actively	   seek	   out	   prospects	   for	   investment.	  Instead,	   the	   fund	   is	  open	  to	  bids	  made	  by	   firms,	   local	  enterprise	  partnerships,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  sector	  bodies	  seeking	  to	  establish	  secondary	   funding	  programmes,	  providing	   there	   is	  at	   least	  a	  1:1	  matching	  of	  public	   funds.	  Private	  sector	  bids	  are	  reviewed	   and	   advisory	   selections	  made	   by	   a	   panel	   chaired	   by	  Michael	  Heseltine	  according	   to	   criteria	   noted	   above.	   Yet	   although	   the	   Fund’s	   relationship	   to	   the	  eleven	   industrial	   strategies	   is	   less	   direct	   than	   the	   SIF’s	   was	   to	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	   strategic	   documents,	   in	   practice	   the	   fund	   has	   systematically	  favoured	   some	   of	   these	   strategically	   prioritised	   sectors.	   Of	   the	   £744mn	  discretionary	   allocations	   reported	   in	   the	   Fund’s	   2013	   annual	  monitoring	   report,	  24.5%	  were	  allocated	  to	  projects	  in	  the	  aerospace	  and	  automotive	  sectors;	  17%	  to	  projects	   in	   other	   manufacturing	   sectors	   (likely	   to	   include	   life-­‐science	  manufacturing,	  although	  a	  disaggregation	  of	  this	  percentage	  is	  not	  available);	  10%	  went	   to	   ‘energy	   schemes’	   that	   included	   the	   development	   of	   low	   carbon	  technologies;	  while	  14%	  went	  to	  non-­‐manufacturing	  activities	   including	  business	  services.49	  Consequently,	  both	  the	  RGF	  and	  the	  industrial	  strategies	  form	  part	  of	  a	  broader	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   agenda	   centred	   on	   the	  development	  of	  a	  similar	  group	  of	   industries.	   In	  this	  respect	  the	  RGF	  mirrors	  the	  alignment	  of	  regional	  discretionary	   industrial	  policy	  and	  national	   level	  objectives	  envisioned	   in	   the	   Brown	   Government’s	   Partnerships	   for	   Growth,	   but	   with	   the	  regional	  policy	  aspect	  moved	  to	  the	  national	  level.	  	  Post-­‐2008	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   comprises	   a	   range	   of	  qualitatively	  distinct	  kinds	  of	   intervention.	  Some	  of	  these	  have	  amounted	  to	   little	  more	   than	   sector	   or	   industry-­‐focused	   enhancements	   of	   the	   existing	   non-­‐discretionary	   industrial	   policies	   (for	   example,	   the	   provision	   of	   additional	   higher	  education	  funding	  in	  areas	  of	  research	  deemed	  relevant	  to	  a	  preferred	  industry,	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  DBIS	  (2013m),	  Regional	  Growth	  Fund	  2013,	  p.14;	  the	  use	  of	  the	  fund	  to	  support	  strategically	  prioritised	  sectors	  was	  made	  more	  explicit	  in	  the	  subsequent	  2014	  monitoring	  report,	  see	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2014b),	  Regional	  
Growth	  Fund:	  Annual	  Monitoring	  Report	  2014	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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additional	  market	  intelligence	  provided	  through	  organisations	  such	  as	  UKTI	  or	  the	  Manufacturing	   Advisory	   Service).50	   Others,	   however,	   have	   involved	   government	  and	   government	   agencies	   co-­‐investing	   in	   private	   firms	   for	   the	   development	   and	  commercialisation	   of	   specific	   areas	   of	   technology,	   or	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   new	  productive	   capacity	   in	   particular	   firms	   and	   supply	   chains.	   It	   is	   on	   direct	   co-­‐investments	   by	   government	   in	   private	   sector	   projects	   that	   the	   present	   analysis	  focuses,	  for	  it	  is	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  intervention	  that	  post-­‐2008	  strategic	  discretionary	  policy	  differs	  most	  overtly	  from	  neoliberal	  microeconomic	  problem	  definitions.	  	  	  These	   forms	  of	  direct	   investment	  have	   fallen	   into	   three	  principal	   categories.	  The	  first	  is	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  pre-­‐2008	  practice	  of	  providing	  public	  finance	  to	  private	  sector	  projects	  to	  develop	  and	  commercialise	  ‘innovations’	  (i.e.	  new	  products	  and	  production	   processes)	   through	   the	   TSB.	   Whilst	   the	   Board	   is	   as	   an	   independent	  body,	   in	   practice	   its	   assessment	   of	   strategically	   important	   areas	   of	   technology	  closely	  mirrors	  the	  assessment	  of	  strategically	  important	  sectors	  formed	  by	  central	  government:	   a	   (non-­‐exhaustive)	   range	   of	   examples	   include	   ‘high	   value	  manufacturing’,	   life	   sciences,	   the	   construction	   industry,	   agricultural	   technology,	  low	  carbon	  transport,	  and	  enabling	  technologies	  in	  advanced	  materials	  (including	  advanced	   composites).	   Furthermore,	   both	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   have	   either	  invested	   additional	   resources	   into	   the	   TSB	   to	   facilitate	   funding	   competitions	   in	  areas	   congruent	   to	   their	   broader	   industrial	   strategies,	   or	   have	   undertaken	  coordinated	  co-­‐investments	  with	  the	  board	  in	  areas	  of	  mutual	  priorities.	  Under	  the	  Brown	  Government,	   for	   instance,	   the	  TSB	  made	  a	  £25mn	  investment	   in	   the	  Rolls	  Royce-­‐led	  SAMULET	  project	  as	  part	  of	   the	  advanced	  manufacturing	  strategy.	  The	  ‘Aero-­‐Space	   Technology	   Institute’	   –	   a	   £2bn	  matched	   public	   and	   private-­‐financed	  programme	   of	   R&D	   funding	   in	   the	   aerospace	   sector	   established	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Coalition’s	   aerospace	   industrial	   strategy	   –	   finances	   TSB	   competitions	   for	   private	  sector	  R&D	  projects	  and	  business-­‐academia	  collaborations.51	  New	  ‘Catalyst’	  funds,	  which	   combine	   funding	   from	   the	   research	   councils	   and	   TSB	   in	   private	   sector-­‐academia	   collaborations,	   have	   also	   been	   established	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Coalition’s	  industrial	  strategies:	  a	  £70mn	  agri-­‐tech	  catalyst	  and	  a	  £180mn	  biomedical	  catalyst.	  More	  generally,	  the	  annual	  budgets	  of	  the	  TSB	  have	  increased	  under	  the	  Coalition,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Many	  such	  interventions	  are	  detailed	  in	  two	  government’s	  strategy	  documents	  cited	  above.	  51	  The	  fund	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  finance	  expansion	  to	  national	  centers	  discussed	  below.	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reaching	  £440mn	  by	  2013-­‐14.52	  Discretionary	  intervention	  of	  this	  kind	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  expanded	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  	  Beyond	   the	   TSB,	   direct	   grants	   have	   also	   been	   made	   by	   central	   government	   to	  individual	   firms	   and	   to	   consortiums	   of	   firms	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   researching	   and	  developing	   certain	   technologies	   and	   products.	   As	   part	   of	   its	   Advanced	  
Manufacturing	  Strategy,	  the	  Brown	  Government	  committed	  £45mn	  to	  Rolls	  Royce	  for	   research	   and	   development	   of	   low	   carbon	   engine	   designs.	   The	   Coalition	   has	  made	   numerous	   investments	   in	   individual	   firms’	   research	   and	   development	  projects	  through	  the	  RGF,	  a	  tendency	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  The	  second	  category	  of	  discretionary	  intervention	  is	  public	  sector	  investment	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  national	  TICs	  based	  around	  a	  particular	  area	  of	  technology	  or	  economic	  activity	  deemed	  of	  strategic	  importance.	  TICs	  exist	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  but	  their	  basic	   rationale	   and	   defining	   feature	   is	   to	   facilitate	   access	   to	   capital	   equipment,	  technical	  expertise	  and	  market	  intelligence	  for	  firms	  seeking	  to	  research,	  develop	  and	   demonstrate	   new	   products	   or	   processes	   in	   the	   area	   to	   which	   the	   centre	  relates.	  This	  is	  done	  in	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  market	  failure	  that	  lies	  between	  early	   stage	   technological	   research	   and	   late-­‐stage	   product	   development	   (the	   so-­‐called	   ‘valley	   of	   death’),	   allowing	   firms	   to	   undertake	   R&D	   projects	   and	  demonstrate	   products	   that	   they	   might	   otherwise	   lack	   sufficient	   investment	   or	  incentives	   to	   undertake.53	   Public	   sector	   investment	   in	   TICs	   is	   not	   unique	   to	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context;	   prior	   to	   2008	   some	   RDAs	   co-­‐invested	   with	   universities	   and	  private	   firms	  to	  establish	  such	  centres.54	  However,	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  TICs	  have	  become	  increasingly	  common	  features	  of	  the	  national	   landscape	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	   industrial	  policy,	  with	  new	   investments	   in	   existing	   centres	  and	   the	  establishment	  of	  new	  ones	  in	  relation	  to	  strategically	  important	  sectors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Cf.	  Technology	  Strategy	  Board	  (2010),	  Delivery	  Plan:	  Financial	  Year	  2010-­11	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Technology	  Strategy	  Board	  (2012),	  Delivery	  Plan:	  Financial	  Year	  
2012-­13	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  Technology	  Strategy	  Board	  (2013),	  Delivery	  
Plan:	  Financial	  Year	  2013-­14	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  53	  H.	  Hauser	  (2010),	  The	  Hauser	  Report:	  The	  Current	  And	  Future	  Role	  Of	  Technology	  And	  
Innovation	  Centres	  In	  The	  UK	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	  54	  OneNorthEast,	  for	  example,	  co-­‐invested	  in	  the	  NAREC,	  while	  Yorkshire	  Forwards	  co-­‐invested	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Sheffield’s	  AMRC.	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Under	  the	  Brown	  Government	  the	  approach	  was	  particularly	  prevalent	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  government’s	  efforts	  to	  develop	  industries	  in	  low	  carbon	  energy	  generation	  supply	   chains.	   SIF	   funds	   were	   used	   to	   finance	   an	   £11.5mn	   expansion	   of	   the	  National	   Renewable	   Energy	   Centre	   (NAREC)	   to	   demonstrate	   large	   wind	   turbine	  blades,	   and	  an	  £8mn	  expansion	   for	   onshore	  marine	   energy	   testing	   facilities.	  The	  government	   also	   invested	   £9.5mn	   in	   ‘WaveHub’	   –	   a	   large-­‐scale	   tidal	   electricity	  generation	   testing	   facility	   –	   and	   committed	  £10mn	  of	   financing	   for	   smaller	   scale	  offshore	   testing.	   The	   approach	   was	   also	   apparent	   in	   the	   Brown	   Government’s	  interventions	  to	  develop	  the	  domestic	  civil	  nuclear	  industry.	  It	  contributed	  £15mn	  alongside	   Rolls,	   Forgemasters	   and	   the	   University	   of	   Sheffield,	   towards	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	  Nuclear	  Advanced	  Manufacturing	  Research	   Centre	  with	   the	  intention	   of	   nurturing	   a	   group	   of	   thirty	   firms	   able	   to	   develop	   and	   manufacture	  necessary	   components	   for	   the	   industry.	   £12mn	   was	   co-­‐invested	   in	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   National	   Composites	   Centre,	   with	   an	   additional	   £6mn	   made	  available	   to	   the	   TSB	   to	   develop	   bids	   that	   might	   utilise	   the	   centre.55	   A	   £12mn	  investment	   was	   also	   made	   in	   the	   expansion	   of	   an	   industrial	   biochemistry	  demonstrator	  in	  the	  northeast	  of	  England.	  	  Under	  the	  Coalition	  the	  approach	  has	  reached	  a	  new	  level	  with	  the	  consolidation	  of	  existing	  publicly	   funded	  TICs	  and	   the	  establishment	  of	  new	  ones	   into	  a	   coherent	  network,	   now	   re-­‐branded	   as	   ‘catapults’	   and	   re-­‐organised	   to	   reflect	   the	   national	  level	  assessment	  of	  technological	  priorities.	  This	  systematic	  approach	  was	  a	  legacy	  of	   the	  Hauser	  Report,	   originally	   commissioned	  by	   the	  Brown	  Government,	  which	  stressed	   the	  need	   for	   greater	  public	   investment	   and	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   systematic	  TIC	  infrastructure.56	   In	  response,	   the	  Coalition	  established	  seven	  catapult	  centres	  in	   relation	   to	   strategically	   prioritised	   areas	   of	   technology:	   high	   value	  manufacturing	   (which	   combines,	   among	   others,	   the	   existing	   NAMRC,	   AMRC	   and	  National	  Composites	  centres	  as	  well	  as	  a	  National	  Biologics	  Manufacturing	  Centre	  established	   as	   part	   of	   the	   life	   sciences	   industrial	   strategy);	   cell	   therapy;	   digital	  economy;	   future	   cities;	   offshore	   renewable	   energy;	   satellite	   applications	   and	  transport	   systems.	   Subsequently,	   two	   further	   catapults	   have	   been	   confirmed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Advanced	  composites	  had	  been	  deemed	  an	  important	  strategic	  ‘platform	  technology’	  for	  the	  government’s	  ambitions	  to	  develop	  the	  aerospace	  and	  renewable	  energy	  generation	  industries.	  56	  Hauser	  (2010),	  The	  Hauser	  Report:	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relating	  to	  precision	  medicine	  and	  energy	  systems.	  The	  initial	  public	  investment	  in	  the	   catapult	   network	  was	   £200mn,	   of	   which	   £140mn	  was	   allocated	   to	   the	   High	  Value	  Manufacturing	  Catapult.	   	  Since	  2010	  further	  public	   investments	  of	  £239mn	  have	  been	  made	  in	  the	  network.	  The	  catapult	  centres	  operate	   ‘with	  a	  commercial	  mindset’,	  drawing	  around	  a	  third	  of	  their	  funding	  from	  the	  firms	  who	  utilise	  their	  facilities,	   as	  well	  as	   raising	  another	   third	   through	  collaborative	  bids	  with	  private	  firms	  to	  access	  public	  and	  private	  competitively	  allocated	  funds.	  The	  final	  third	  is	  provided	  as	  core	  funding	  by	  the	  TSB.	  	  	  The	  TSB	  and	  TICs	  both	  represent	  a	  means	  of	  addressing	  a	  perceived	  market	  failure	  between	   innovation	   and	   commercialisation,	   utilising	   the	   public	   sector	   to	   bring	  about	  the	  demonstration	  of	  innovative	  products	  so	  that	  private	  investment	  might	  be	  attracted.	  The	  discretionary	  or	  non-­‐discretionary	  status	  of	  TICs	  as	  instruments	  of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  not	  as	  clear-­‐cut	  as	  the	  TSB’s	  competition	  model	  of	  investment	  because	  industrial	  policymakers	  do	  not	  necessarily	  exercise	  discretion	  as	  to	  which	  projects	  utilising	  the	  centre	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  commercially	  successful.	  If	  established	  everywhere	  that	  the	  ‘valley	  of	  death’	  is	  identified,	  the	  Catapult	  programme	  would	  have	   parallels	   with	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions.	   However	   in	   practice	   the	  approach	  of	  the	  two	  governments	  to	  TICs	  is	  a	  strategic	  discretionary	  one	  because	  they	   have	   been	   established	   selectively	   in	   sectors	   and	   areas	   of	   technology	   that	  industrial	  policymakers	  deem	  strategically	  significant.57	  	  This	   distinction	   aside,	   the	   rationale	   underpinning	   both	   the	   TSB’s	   funding	  competitions	  and	  the	  Catapult	  Centres	  retains	  a	  strong	  faith	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  market	   economy	   as	   the	   general	   means	   of	   resource	   allocation	   and	   rudder	   of	  industrial	   development,	   providing	   that	   specific	   early-­‐stage	   barriers	   to	   the	  commercialisation	  of	   developmentally	   significant	   technologies	   are	   breeched.	   The	  final	   category	   of	   discretionary	   interventionism,	   however,	   demonstrates	   that	   the	  barriers	   against	  which	   the	   discretionary	   industrial	   policies	   of	   both	   governments	  are	   deployed	   extend	   beyond	   the	   facilitation	   of	   research,	   development	   and	  demonstration	   of	   private	   sector	   projects	   in	   strategic	   sectors.	   This	   third	   kind	   of	  intervention	   involves	  the	  making	  of	  direct	  capital	  grants	  and	  loans	  to	   finance	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  H.	  Hauser	  (2014),	  Review	  Of	  The	  Catapult	  Network:	  Recommendations	  On	  The	  Future	  
Shape,	  Scope	  And	  Ambition	  Of	  The	  Programme	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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expansion	   of	   firms	   in	   strategic	   sectors	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   their	   productive	  capacity	  and	  to	  strengthen	  the	  domestic	  supply	  chains.	  	  	  Under	  the	  Brown	  Government	  this	  approach	  was	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   ‘low	  carbon	  energy’	  supply	  chain	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  rationale	  for	  which	  was	  to	  capture	  opportunities	   for	  growth	  from	  national	  and	  international	  moves	  towards	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  infrastructure	  as	  well	  as	  facilitating	  the	  UK’s	  own	  transition.58	  Part	   of	   a	   £45mn	   package	   of	   finance	   to	   Rolls	   Royce	   as	   part	   of	   the	   advanced	  manufacturing	  strategy	  was	   for	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  civil	  nuclear	  production	   facility,	  and	  an	  (ultimately	   ill-­‐fated)	  £80mn	  loan	  was	  approved	  to	  Sheffield	  Forgemasters	  for	   the	   same	   purpose.59	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   development	   of	   an	   offshore	   wind	  manufacturing	  industry,	  £60mn	  was	  invested	  in	  the	  adaptation	  of	  former	  port	  sites	  to	  manufacturers’	  needs,	  and	  £30mn	  was	  invested	  in	  the	  development	  of	  test	  sites	  by	  two	  large	  firms	  in	  the	  industry.	  Beyond	  the	  automotive	  assistance	  programme	  (which	   was	   a	   temporary	   and	   arguably	   an	   events-­‐driven	   piece	   of	   policy	  pragmatism),	   £20.7mn	   of	   further	   assistance	   was	   offered	   to	   Nissan	   to	   develop	   a	  factory	   for	   the	   production	   of	   low	   carbon	   vehicles.	   Aerospace	  was	   another	  major	  beneficiary	   of	   the	   Brown	   Government’s	   discretionary	   capital	   investments.	   SIF	  funds	  were	  allocated	  in	  support	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  three	  new	  facilities	  at	  Rolls	  Royce	   for	   the	  production	  of	  aerospace	  related	  goods.	  The	  government	  also	  made	  direct	  loans	  to	  Airbus	  (£340mn)	  and	  GKN	  (£60mn)	  to	  finance	  the	  development	  of	  the	  A350XWB	  aircraft,	  which	  was	  to	  be	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  advances	  in	  the	  advanced	  composites	   that	   the	   government	   was	   elsewhere	   supporting	   as	   a	   platform	  technology.	  A	  £113mn	  launch	  investment	  was	  made	  in	  Bombardier	  Aerospace	  for	  the	  development	  of	  advanced	  composite	  wings.	  	  	  The	  Coalition	  has	  also	  made	  direct	  discretionary	   investments	   from	  the	  centre.	   In	  mid-­‐2011,	   for	  example,	  a	  £22mn	  loan	  was	  made	  to	   finance	  the	  production	  of	   the	  Augusta	  Westland	  AW169	  helicopter	  (along	  with	  a	  £10mn	  grant	  from	  the	  TSB	  for	  two	  R&D	   projects	   at	   the	   firm).	   However	   the	   predominant	  means	   by	  which	   such	  intervention	  occurs	  under	  the	  Coalition	  is	  the	  RGF.	  Of	  the	  121	  private	  and	  private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  DBIS	  (2009f),	  Advanced	  Manufacturing	  Strategy;	  DBIS	  (2009g),	  Low	  Carbon	  Industrial	  
Strategy.	  59	  The	  incoming	  Coalition	  government	  later	  withdrew	  the	  loan,	  although	  it	  has	  since	  offered	  the	  firm	  a	  £32mn	  loan	  from	  the	  RGF.	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sector	   linked	   grants	   made	   in	   the	   Fund’s	   first	   two	   rounds	   for	   which	   details	   are	  publicly	   available,	   64%	   were	   capital	   investment	   projects	   that	   involved	   the	  expansion	  of	  a	  firm’s	  productive	  capacity,	  and	  the	  current	  fifth	  round	  is	  explicitly	  focused	  on	  such	  projects.60	  The	  RGF	  has	  also	  supported	  a	  secondary	  initiative	  that	  is	   of	   note	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   The	   £345mn	   Advanced	   Manufacturing	   Supply	   Chain	  Initiative	   (AMSCI),	   initially	   a	   LEP-­‐led	   programme	   since	   taken	   up	   as	   a	   national	  instrument,	   seeks	   to	   support	   the	   development	   and	   competitiveness	   of	   domestic	  supply	   chains	   around	   strategic	   manufacturing	   sectors	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  securing	   the	   growth	   and	   employment	   benefits	   accruing	   to	   such	   activities.	   The	  initiative	  makes	  grants	   and	   loans	   to	   collaborative	  projects	  between	   two	  or	  more	  firms	   that	   have	   secured	   a	   commitment	   of	   a	   ‘tier	   one’	   firm	   in	   their	   supply	   chain.	  Bids	   are	   judged	   according	   to	   the	   support	   they	   offer	   for	   government	   policy	   on	  economic,	   social	   and	  environmental	   axes.	  Like	   the	  RGF,	   it	   finances	  R&D,	   training	  and	  capital	  investment	  projects.	  	  
The	  Significance	  Of	  Post-­2008	  Strategic-­Discretionary	  Industrial	  Policy	  	  These	   practices	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context,	   and	   the	   argument	   offered	   for	   them,	   occupy	   an	   uneasy	   relationship	  with	  the	   macroeconomic	   policy	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   and	   those	   policies	  examined	   in	   the	   first	   two	   sections	   of	   this	   chapter.	   These,	   I	   have	   argued,	   are	  suggestive	   of	   neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   and	   new	   strategies	   of	  neoliberalisation,	   stressing	   as	   they	   do	   the	   efficacy	   of	   an	   expanded	   and	   better	  facilitated	  realm	  of	  market	  resource	  allocation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  obtaining	  economic	  policy	   goals.	   This	  market-­‐positive	   assessment	   holds	   expanded	   public	   borrowing,	  market	   failures	   impacting	   on	   the	   credit	   cycle,	   and	   a	  microeconomic	   structure	   in	  need	   of	   further	   liberalisation	   and	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventionism	   as	  imperatives	   for	   intervention.	   In	   this	   view	   the	  private	   sector	   is	   cast	   as	   capable	  of	  bringing	   about	   rebalanced,	   economically	   sustainable	   and	   stable	   growth	   and	  employment.	   The	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda,	   by	   contrast,	   points	   to	   the	  possibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  a	  discretionary	  role	  for	  industrial	  policymakers,	  and	  casts	   such	   a	   role	   as	   necessary	   insofar	   as	   the	   benefits	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  intervention	   for	  promoting	  rebalanced	  economic	  growth	  and	  employment	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  See	  the	  Appendix	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otherwise	  go	  unrealised.	  Furthermore,	  it	  makes	  a	  (sometimes	  implicit)	  case	  for	  the	  further	   expansion	   in	   this	   role	   by	   pointing	   to	   similar	   practices	   on	   the	   part	   of	  competitors	  –	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  return	  presently.61	  From	  a	  neoliberal	  perspective	  the	  role	  is	  both	  unnecessary	  and	  anathema.	  	  	  The	  arguments	  and	  interventions	  comprising	  the	  two	  agendas	  are	  not	  necessarily	  contradictory,	   in	   spite	   of	   their	   differing	   emphases	   in	   relation	   to	   institutional	  change	  and	  the	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy.	  Indeed,	  post-­‐2008	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  has	  been	  articulated	  in	  relation	  to	  deficit	  reduction	  as	  though	  both	  were	   necessary	   –	   the	   latter	   being	   a	   prerequisite	   of	   macroeconomic	   stability	   on	  which	  the	   former	  builds.62	   In	  principle	  such	  a	  diagnosis	  of	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  could	   be	   coherent:	   industrial	   policymakers	   might	   pursue	   their	   role	   of	   strategic	  discretion	  within	   an	   otherwise	   expanded	   private	   sector	   and	   amid	   cuts	   in	   public	  spending,	   insofar	   as	   sufficient	   resources	   are	  made	   available	   to	   them	   to	   do	   so.	   Put	  differently,	   the	   two	   agendas	   are	   contradictory	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   one	  constrains	  the	  other.	  	  	  There	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  a	  contradiction	  does	  indeed	  exist.	  Succinctly,	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  agenda	  as	   it	   is	  articulated	  and	  constituted	   in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	   implies	  a	  different	  set	  of	  budgetary	  priorities	   to	   those	  exhibited	  by	  either	   government.	   The	   importance	   assigned	   to	   discretionary	   interventionism	   in	  the	  arguments	  offered	  for	   it	   implies	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  ring-­‐fencing	  of	  the	  budget	  available	  to	  industrial	  policymakers	  (that	  is,	  of	  DBIS’s	  budget),	  and	  more	  plausibly	  an	   increase	   –	   at	   least	   if	   international	   comparisons	   are	   anything	   to	   go	   by.	   The	  French	   Strategic	   Investment	   Fund,	   established	   in	   2008,	   is	   worth	   nearly	   £16bn	  (€20bn).	   The	   strategic	   discretionary	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   established	   by	  the	   French	   government	   with	   industries	   around	   priority	   areas	   of	   technology	   (an	  approach	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  sectoral	  one	  pursued	  by	  British	  governments)	   last	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  The	  Brown	  Government	  makes	  a	  direct	  appeal	  to	  the	  development	  of	  similar	  industrial	  policy	  agendas	  by	  competitor	  states	  as	  a	  justification	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	  interventionism,	  see	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  1.11.	  The	  Coalition	  is	  more	  circumspect	  about	  the	  transferability	  of	  practices;	  see	  DBIS	  (2012b),	  Industrial	  Strategy,	  p.8.	  Both	  governments	  have,	  however,	  pursued	  practices	  analogous	  to	  prominent	  features	  of	  French	  and	  German	  industrial	  policies	  through	  their	  sectoral	  approaches,	  emphasis	  on	  technology	  development	  through	  TICs,	  and	  their	  use	  of	  centralised	  funds.	  As	  I	  note	  later,	  however,	  these	  instruments	  receive	  significantly	  greater	  quantities	  of	  public	  funding	  in	  the	  French	  and	  German	  contexts	  than	  their	  UK	  equivalents	  do.	  	  62	  DBIS	  (2009a),	  New	  Industry,	  paragraph	  1.2;	  DBIS	  (2011a),	  The	  Plan	  For	  Growth.	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between	   5	   and	   10	   years	   and	   each	   involve	   annual	   public	   funding	   of	   €30-­‐50mn	  (around	  £22-­‐37mn)	  per	   annum.63	  The	   longevity	   of	   these	   interventions	   is	   clearer	  and	   more	   secure	   than	   their	   parallels	   in	   Britain,	   which	   have	   been	   boosted	   from	  budget	   to	   budget	   without	   long-­‐term	   commitment.	   The	   well	   established	   German	  Fraunhofer	   Institutes,	   the	   model	   for	   the	   Catapult	   Network,	   receive	   core	   public	  funding	  of	  around	  £600mn	  per	  annum	  and	  are	  able	  to	  leverage	  large	  quantities	  of	  further	  private	  sector	  finance,	  whereas	  the	  Catapult	  Network	  received	  around	  25%	  of	   this	   level	   of	   public	   funding	   in	   2013-­‐14	   and	   is	   still	   to	   develop	   a	   comparable	  volume	  of	  private	  finance.64	  	  	  Points	   such	   as	   these	  would	   imply	   expansionary	  preferences	   for	   advocates	  of	   the	  strategic	   discretionary	   agenda	   and,	   insofar	   as	   these	   are	   shared	   more	   broadly	  across	  other	  government	  departments,	  an	  expanding	  trajectory	  to	   the	  embryonic	  interventions.	   Instead,	   the	  department	  responsible	   for	   these	  aspects	  of	   industrial	  policy	   has	   been	   a	   repeated	   target	   for	   spending	   reductions	   during	   the	   Coalition’s	  time	   in	  office.	  The	  DBIS’s	  expenditure	   limit	   for	  2011-­‐12	  to	  2014-­‐15	  was	  reduced	  by	   nearly	   30%	   in	   the	   2010	   Spending	   Review	   (the	   second	   largest	   departmental	  expenditure	  limit	  reduction	  in	  that	  review)	  and	  by	  a	  further	  6%	  for	  2015-­‐16	  in	  the	  
2013	  Spending	  Review.65	  DBIS	  was	  also	  the	  largest	  contributor	  to	  the	  initial	  £6.2bn	  round	   of	   spending	   reductions	   announced	   by	   the	   Coalition	   prior	   to	   the	   2010	  spending	  review,	  with	  a	  cut	  of	  £836mn	  or	  nearly	  4%	  of	  its	  budget.66	  An	  analysis	  of	  comparable	  precision	  is	  of	  course	  not	  possible	  for	  the	  Brown	  Government	  because	  it	  had	  deferred	  the	  finalisation	  of	  departmental	  spending	  packages	  until	  after	  the	  election.	   However,	   assuming	   a	   similar	   ring-­‐fencing	   of	   health,	   science	   and	  international	   aid	  budgets,	   it	   is	  most	   likely	   that	  DBIS	  would	  have	   faced	   restricted	  spending	  under	  a	  re-­‐elected	  Labour	  government.	  In	  this	  counterfactual	  future,	  we	  can	  speculate	  that	  the	  severity	  of	  these	  restrictions	  would	  likely	  rest	  on	  the	  degree	  of	   stagnation	   that	  occurred	   in	   the	  years	   to	  2013	  under	   the	  Brown	  Government’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  CBI	  (2015),	  'Industrial	  Strategy:	  France',	  <http://www.cbi.org.uk/media-­‐centre/case-­‐studies/2012/03/industrial-­‐policy-­‐france/>,	  accessed	  15/01/2015.	  64	  Hauser	  (2014),	  Review	  Of	  The	  Catapult.	  65	  Treasury	  (2010e)	  Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review	  2010;	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2013b),	  
Spending	  Review	  2013	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office);	  R.	  	  Crawford,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  'Public	  Spending	  Cuts:	  Pain	  Shared?',	  IFS	  Green	  Budget	  2011	  (London:	  Institute	  for	  Fiscal	  Studies),	  pp.130-­‐62.	  66	  H.M.	  Treasury	  (2010d),	  Press	  Notice	  Pn	  04/10:	  Government	  Announces	  £6Bn	  Of	  Savings	  In	  
2010-­11	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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own	  macroeconomic	  strategy,	  and	  the	  resolve	  of	  the	  leadership	  in	  maintaining	  the	  path	  of	  overall	  departmental	  spending	  reductions	  proposed	  in	  2009	  within	  such	  a	  context.	  As	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  Chapter,	  a	  decisive	  change	  of	  fiscal	  tack	  would	  not	   have	   been	   easy.	   Such	   speculation	   aside,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   both	   post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  pursued	  macroeconomic	  stances	  that	  are	  hostile	  to	  the	  scale	  of	  the	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda.	   The	   shrinking	   of	   funds	   available	   to	   industrial	  policymakers	   therefore	   demonstrates	   a	   tension	   in	   practice	   between	   strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  and	  broader	  economic	  policy.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  that	  what	  we	  are	  witnessing	  is	  two	  contradictory	  sets	  of	  problem	  definitions	  regarding	  industrial	  policy.	  What	  is	  deemed	  a	  problem	  demanding	  institutional	  change	  and	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  in	  one	  is	  made	  a	  secondary	  priority	  and	  a	  source	  of	  savings	   in	   the	   other.	   Put	   differently,	   this	   amounts	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   different	  sections	  within	   the	   governments	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   have	   constructed	   two	  contrasting	  crisis	  diagnoses,	  yielding	  contrasting	  (but	  under	  some	  circumstances,	  pragmatically	  aligned)	  approaches	  to	  economic	  policy	  and	  imperatives	  for	  decisive	  intervention.	  The	  first	  of	   these	  crisis	  diagnoses	   is	   the	  neoliberal	  one	  described	   in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  second,	  located	  among	  industrial	  policymakers	  at	  DBIS,	  remains	   only	   embryonic	   and	   is	   found	   in	   the	   arguments	   offered	   for	   strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  embryonic	  diagnosis	  a	  paucity	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	   intervention	   reduces	   Britain’s	   potential	   of	  rebalanced	   growth	   and	   employment,	   yielding	   an	   imperative	   for	   decisive	  intervention	   in	   the	   form	  of	  new	  or	   expanded	   institutions	   and	   interventions	  with	  which	  to	  deliver	  strategic	  discretionary	  intervention.	  The	  crisis	  diagnosed	  exceeds	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  defining	  a	   ‘problem’	   in	   the	  paucity	  of	  existing	  industrial	  policy	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  diagnosis	  does	  not	  acknowledge.	  Such	  a	  problem	  definition	   is	  qualitatively	   and	   categorically	  distinct	   from	  a	   ‘neoliberal’	  one	  because	  it	  rejects	  market	  epistemology	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  should	   be	   the	   allocator	   of	   economic	   resources	   and	   the	   sole	   directing	   force	   of	  industrial	   development.	   Instead,	   it	   explicitly	   accepts	   a	   role	   for	   industrial	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policymakers	  in	  this	  regard,	  rather	  than	  confining	  their	  role	  to	  that	  of	  creating	  an	  optimal	  business	  environment.67	  	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   problem	  definition	  regarding	   the	   role	   of	   industrial	   policymakers	   practicing	   strategic	   discretionary	  interventionism	   and	   the	   budgetary	   priorities	   that	   follow	   from	   it	   that	   the	   two	  diagnoses	  are	  in	  tension.	  The	  strategies	  of	  roll	  back	  and	  roll	  out	  neoliberalisation	  undertaken	  by	  the	  two	  governments	  need	  find	  no	  opposition	  from	  subscribers	  to	  the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   insofar	   as	   resources	   for	   discretionary	  interventionism	  are	  assured,	  for	  they	  too	  may	  perceive	  labour	  market	  inflexibility	  and	   the	   like	   to	   constitute	   barriers	   to	   recovery.	   There	   is	   consequently	   significant	  potential	   for	   consensus	   in	   microeconomic	   policy	   between	   subscribers	   to	   the	  contrasting	  diagnoses,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  return	  presently.	  	  This	   notion	   of	   two	   contrasting	   crisis	   diagnoses	   operating	   in	   tension	   with	   one	  another	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  conclusion	  in	  this	  chapter.	  However,	  before	  drawing	  this	   conclusion	   and	   reflecting	   on	   its	   implications	   for	   my	   broader	   research	  questions	   it	   is	   first	   necessary	   to	   establish	   whether	   or	   not	   these	   strategic	  discretionary	   industrial	   policies	   amount	   to	   as	   novel	   and	   significant	   a	   change	   in	  British	   industrial	   policy	   as	   the	   argument	   offered	   for	   them	   suggests.	   A	   critical	  appraisal	  of	  the	  agenda’s	  significance	  might	  characterise	  it	   instead	  as	  a	  politically	  expedient	  accessory	  to	  a	  neoliberal	  strategy	  for	  economic	  recovery.	  The	  relatively	  modest	  sums	  committed	   to	   the	  strategy	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	  either	  an	  ad	  hoc	  stimulus	   measure	   designed	   to	   support	   manufacturing	   industries	   through	   the	  downturn	   (one	  at	  odds	  with	  neoliberalism	  because	  of	   its	  discretionary	  elements,	  but	   perhaps	   adopted	   out	   of	   some	   crisis-­‐driven	   inter-­‐paradigm	   borrowing),	   or	   a	  strategy	  to	  reap	  the	  political	  dividend	  of	  being	  seen	  to	  take	  constructive	  action	  in	  a	  context	  characterised	  primarily	  by	  reductions	  in	  public	  spending,	  or	  perhaps	  both.	  	  	  This	  critical	  appraisal	  finds	  support	  in	  the	  limited	  funds	  available	  for	  this	  strategic	  discretionary	   agenda	   and	   its	   relative	   paucity	  when	   compared	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  If	  we	  were	  to	  further	  stretch	  the	  concept	  of	  neoliberalism	  to	  accommodate	  strategic	  discretionary	  interventions	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐discretionary	  interventions	  then	  it	  would	  place	  the	  concept	  in	  danger	  of	  simply	  being	  a	  synonym	  for	  ‘capitalism’.	  It	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  clear	  what	  separates	  this	  form	  of	  capitalism	  from	  any	  other.	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interventions	   in	   other	   countries	   from	   which	   it	   draws	   inspiration.	   The	   actual	  spending	  decisions	   associated	  with	   it	  would	   seem	  at	   best	   a	   partial	   realisation	  of	  the	  agenda.	  A	   second	  supporting	  point	   is	   that	   the	   funds	   from	  which	  much	  of	   the	  finance	   for	   the	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda	   is	   drawn	   have	   been	   time-­‐limited	  interventions.	  It	  was	  not	  envisioned	  that	  funds	  like	  the	  SIF,	  RGF	  and	  AMSCI	  would	  be	   indefinitely	   available	   following	   recovery.	   They	  were	   expanded	   in	   subsequent	  budgets	  following	  their	  creation	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis,	  suggesting	  that	  their	  scale	  and	  temporal	  scope	  was	  not	  finalised,	  but	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  dynamic	  would	   continue	   indefinitely.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   kinds	   of	   direct	   capital	   co-­‐investment	  noted	  above	  were	   to	  become	  a	  persistent	   feature	  of	  British	   industrial	  policy,	   the	  funds	  with	  which	   it	   is	  achieved	  would	  eventually	  have	   to	  originate	  within	  DBIS’s	  departmental	  budgets	  –	  the	  very	  budgets	  under	  constraint	  from	  the	  governments’	  macroeconomic	   stance.	   In	   short,	   the	   status	   of	   such	   interventions	   as	   ‘decisive	  interventions’	  is	  far	  from	  confirmed.	  	  Yet	   to	   locate	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda	   in	   post-­‐2008	  industrial	  policy	  only	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  funds	  allocated	  to	  it	  is	  to	  unduly	  disregard	  its	  broader	  significance,	  particularly	  in	  a	  policymaking	  environment	  that	  has	  been	  prejudicial	   to	   public	   spending	   of	   all	   kinds.	   If,	   as	   I	   have	   suggested,	   the	   crisis	  diagnosis	   that	   these	   interventions	   reflect	   is	   in	   tension	   with	   a	   neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  associated	  strategies	  of	  neoliberalisation	  then	  it	  is	  little	  surprise	  that	  the	   funds	   available	   to	   realise	   it	   are	   limited	   and	   contingent,	   and	   that	   the	   agenda	  remains	   an	   embryonic	   one.	   Rather,	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   agenda	   lies	   in	   the	  articulation	  of	   a	   coherent	   rationale	   for	   strategic	  discretionary	   interventionism	   in	  
such	  a	  context,	  and	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  rationale	  and	  associated	  interventions	  built	  upon	  an	  existing	  strategic	  discretionary	  strand	  in	  British	  industrial	  policy	  that	  was	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  It	  suggests	  a	  desire	  for	  decisive	  intervention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  its	  advocates	   because	   the	   kinds	   of	   intervention	   it	   sanctions	   were	   not	   previously	  exercised	  beyond	  the	  area	  of	  innovation	  policy,	  but	  were	  subsequently	  entrenched	  and	   extended	   in	   a	   coherent	   manner.	   The	   corresponding	   investments	   were	   not	  designed	  to	  leverage	  short-­‐term	  gains	  (as	  we	  might	  expect	  from	  a	  strategy	  devised	  to	  generate	  only	  a	  short-­‐term	  economic	  or	  political	  dividend)	  but	  were	  early	  stage	  and	  capital	  investments	  for	  which	  the	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  growth	  and	  employment	  would	   be	   realised	   over	   the	   long-­‐term.	   Whilst	   the	   agenda’s	   limited	   realisation	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Conclusions	  	  Thus	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  interventions	  analysed	  in	  Section	  3	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  crisis	  diagnoses	  –	  a	  neoliberal	  one	  and	  an	  embryonic	  non-­‐neoliberal	   one	   –	   that	   have	   exerted	   unequal	   and	   separate,	   but	   at	   times	  pragmatically	   aligned	   impacts	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   post-­‐2008	   economic	   policy.	   The	  two	  crisis	  diagnoses	  differ	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy	  makers	  in	  bringing	  about	  economic	  policy	  goals	  of	  rebalanced	  growth	  and	  employment	  and	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  that	  these	  goals	  imply.	  Specifically,	  they	  differ	  on	  the	  possibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	  intervention	  and	   the	   creation	   and	   financing	   of	   institutions	   through	  which	   it	   can	  be	  practiced.	  There	   have	   been	   sections	   within	   both	   governments	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	  associated	  with	  DBIS	   and	   the	  making	   of	   industrial	   policy,	   that	   have	  drawn	  upon	  non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   regarding	   these	   questions	   and	   have	  constructed	   an	   embryonic	   crisis	   diagnosis	   that	   calls	   for	   an	   expanded	   strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy.	  	  	  It	  remains	  to	  consider	  why	  this	  outcome	  has	  come	  about,	  and	  what	  its	  implications	  are	   for	   my	   research	   questions.	   One	   question	   concerns	   the	   factors	   that	   could	  explain	   the	   ideational	   cleavage.	  Previous	   studies	  of	   ideational	   change	  at	   times	  of	  crisis	  have,	  following	  Hall,	  tended	  to	  point	  to	  elections	  as	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  new	  crisis	  diagnoses	  are	  carried	  into	  government,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  Yet	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  the	  two	  governments	  show	  great	  ideational	  convergence	  in	  both	   the	   neoliberal	   aspects	   of	   their	   economic	   policies	   and	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	  strategic	   discretionary	   agenda	   in	   industrial	   policy.	  An	  obvious	  way	  of	   explaining	  this	   cleavage	   in	   the	   present	   Coalition	   Government	   would	   be	   to	   point	   to	   the	  presence	   of	   two	   distinct	   political	   parties	   in	   government.	   This	   explanation	   finds	  some	  support	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  Conservative	  Chancellor	  and	  a	  Liberal	  Democrat	  Business	   Minister,	   the	   latter	   being	   a	   long-­‐time	   advocate	   of	   less	   orthodox	  approaches	   to	   industrial	   policy	   than	   his	   New	   Labour	   and	   Conservative	  counterparts.	  The	  problem	  definitions	  subscribed	   to	  by	  personnel	   in	  positions	  of	  leadership	   (an	   ideational-­‐agential	   factor)	   play	   an	   irreducible	   role	   in	   a	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  explanation.	  However,	  calls	  for	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  discretionary	   industrial	  policy	  extend	  beyond	   the	  Liberal	  Democrat	   ranks,	  as	   the	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involvement	   of	   Michael	   Heseltine	   and	   David	   Willetts	   in	   enacting	   the	   strategic	  discretionary	   agenda	   serves	   to	   remind	   us.	   What	   is	   more,	   there	   are	   prominent	  defenders	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  among	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	  ministers	  at	   the	   Treasury,	   such	   as	   Danny	   Alexander.	   Secondly,	   reducing	   the	   tension	   in	  economic	   policy	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   multiple	   parties	   in	   government	   does	   not	  explain	   why	   the	   same	   tension	   was	   evident	   in	   the	   policymaking	   of	   the	   Brown	  Government.	   Consequently,	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   ideational	   cleavage	   does	   not	  reduce	   to	   contrasting	   priorities	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   two	   parties	   comprising	   the	  Coalition	  Government.	  	  A	  different	   explanation	   that	   addresses	   this	   crosscutting	   of	   party	   lines	  within	   the	  Coalition	   has	   already	   been	   mooted	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   It	   addresses	   the	   impact	   of	  departmental	   boundaries	   on	   coordinative	   discourses	   and	   crisis	   diagnosis.	   In	  Chapter	   4	   I	   observed	   that	   a	   more	   issue-­‐constrained	   strand	   of	   the	   strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  agenda	  was	  already	  present	  in	  DBIS’s	  departmental	  forebear	  prior	  to	  2008,	  manifest	  from	  2003	  onwards	  in	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  technology	  policy.	  The	  problem	  definition	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  agenda	  –	  a	  perceived	  need	   for	   industrial	   policymakers	   to	   proactively	   identify	   and	   support	   areas	   of	  private	   sector	   research	   and	   development	   that	   they	   judge	   to	   hold	   potential	   for	  promoting	   broader	   economic	   policy	   objectives	   in	   the	   future	   –	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  argument	  for	  post-­‐2008	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy.	  In	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	   however,	   the	   general	   problem	   definition	   has	   been	   broadened	   to	   other	  stages	   of	   private	   sector	   activity	   and	   articulated	   as	   a	   more	   general	   strategy	   for	  economic	  performance	  maximisation.	  This	  correspondence	  of	  the	  earlier	  and	  later	  approaches	   suggests	   that	   existing	   ideas	   were	   drawn	   upon	   and	   developed	   by	  industrial	  policymakers	  at	  DBIS	  as	  they	  devised	  a	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  stagnatory	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  The	  commonality	  between	  the	  industrial	  policy	  agendas	  of	  the	  two	  separate	  post-­‐2008	  agendas	  also	  supports	  this	  view.	  The	  ideational	  origins	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  strategic	  discretionary	  agenda	  in	  industrial	  policy	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  departmental	  location	  as	  well	  as	  being	  bolstered	  by	  the	  arrival	  of	  sympathetic	  personnel	  such	  as	  Vince	  Cable	  and	  Peter	  Mandelson.	  Existing	  problem	  definitions	  served	   as	   an	   ideational	   resource	   with	   which	   policymakers	   constructed	   an	  embryonic	  non-­‐neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis.	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Conversely,	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  can	  be	  located	  first	  and	  foremost	  at	  the	  Treasury.	   It	   is	   the	   Treasury	   that	   has	   enforced	   a	   macroeconomic	   strategy	   of	  ‘austerity’	   and	   concomitant	   spending	   restraint	   on	   departments	   such	   as	   DBIS,	   as	  well	   as	   bearing	   responsibility	   for	   financial	   market	   reform	   and	   the	   conservative	  approach	  taken	  in	  this	  area.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  Treasury	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  continuing	  a	  historical	  preference	  for	  fiscal	  orthodoxy.	  	  	  An	  emphasis	  on	  departmentally-­‐demarcated	  problem	  definitions,	   crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  policy	  preferences	  holds	  the	  potential	  to	  explain	  the	  partial	  implementation	  in	  practice	  of	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  agenda	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  a	   tension	  has	  historically	  existed	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	   industrial	  policymakers	  since	  specific	  ministerial	  portfolios	  were	  created	  for	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  1960s.	   At	   times	   of	   economic	   stress	   the	   tension	   has	   been	   resolved	   in	   favour	   of	  macroeconomic	   priorities.	   Factors	   that	   might	   be	   appealed	   to	   in	   explaining	   this	  historic	  tension	  include	  both	  institutional	  bureaucratic-­‐political	  ones	  (a	  desire	  by	  the	  Treasury	  to	  maintain	  its	  privileged	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  economic	  policy)	  and	  ideational	   ones	   (in	   particular	   the	   Treasury’s	   historical	   commitment	   to	   fiscal	  orthodoxy	   and	   the	   Business/Industry	   Ministry’s	   historical	   tendency	   to	  countenance	   more	   resource-­‐intensive	   and	   discretionary	   forms	   of	   intervention).	  Such	   factors	   would	   also	   appear	   to	   be	   at	   play	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   The	  testimony	   of	   Brown	  Government	   insider	   turned	   scholar	  Diamond	  makes	   explicit	  reference	  to	  a	  bureaucratic-­‐political	  conflict	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  advocates	  of	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy,	  although	  he	  also	  notes	  hostility	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  discretionary	  interventionism	  in	  ways	  perceived	  to	  resemble	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  1960s	   among	   officials	   within	   the	   Department	   for	   Business,	   Enterprise	   and	  Regulatory	   Reform	   (one	   of	   DBIS’s	   two	   departmental	   forerunners).68	   Whilst	   the	  degree	  of	   ideational	  divergence	   is	   thus	   likely	  to	  have	  been	  narrower	  than	  in	  past	  conflicts,	   the	   analysis	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   and	   Chapter	   4	   does	   suggest	   an	  ongoing	  divergence	  in	  problem	  definitions	  between	  the	  two	  departments.	  	  	  In	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   as	   in	   the	   past,	   the	   Treasury	   holds	   the	   institutional	  balance	  of	  power,	  and	  it	   is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  decisive	  interventions	  that	  it	  implies	  have	  trumped	  those	  of	  the	  non-­‐neoliberal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Diamond	  (2011),	  'Governing	  As	  New	  Labour’.	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crisis	  diagnosis.	  The	  pragmatism	  of	  neoliberal	  policymakers	  after	  2012,	  witnessed	  in	   the	   turn	   by	   the	   Coalition	   to	   credit	   stimulus,	   may	   account	   for	   the	   (by	   recent	  British	   standards)	   substantial	   resources	  given	  over	   to	   the	   strategic	  discretionary	  agenda.	  Under	   certain	   circumstances	   the	  priorities	  of	   subscribers	   to	   either	   crisis	  diagnosis	  meet	  in	  similar	  policy	  ideas,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  likely	  that	  resources	  will	  coalesce	   around	   policy	   ideas	   where	   there	   is	   least	   divergence.	   The	   two	   large	  discretionary	  funds	  –	  the	  SIF	  and	  the	  RGF	  –	  are	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  convergence	  in	  policy	  ideas	  from	  contrasting	  problem	  definitions:	  serving	  both	  as	  a	  temporary	  pragmatic	  measure	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  discretionary	  investments.	  Yet	  despite	  these	  points	  of	  resonance,	  the	  embryonic	  non-­‐neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  on	  it	  by	  the	  neoliberal	   one.	   So	   long	   as	   the	   ideas	   concerning	   discretionary	   industrial	   policy	  remain	   confined	   to	   coordinative	   discourses	   at	   DBIS	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   sufficient	  resources	  will	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  agenda	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	  decisive	  intervention.	  	  This	  analysis	  returns	  me	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  contrasting	  emphases	  of	  constructivist	  institutionalists	  on	  crisis	  and	  non-­‐crisis	  moments	  encountered	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  There	  I	   suggested	   that	   the	   assumption	   that	   government	   becomes	   a	   collective	   actor	   at	  times	  of	  crisis	   is	   too	  readily	  made	  by	  constructivists	   focusing	  on	  crisis	  moments,	  and	  that	  concepts	  more	  readily	  applicable	  to	  the	  latter	  moments	  could	  hold	  scope	  for	   elucidating	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis	   where	   a	   single	   diagnosis	   fails	   to	  become	   ‘hegemonic’	   among	   policymakers	   within	   government.	   In	   particular,	   I	  suggested	   that	   Kingdon’s	   emphasis	   on	   departmental	   boundaries	   in	   relation	   to	  problem	   definition	   and	   policy	   formation	   might	   extend	   to	   the	   process	   of	   crisis	  diagnosis.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   findings	   here	   support	   the	   view	   of	   a	   departmentally	  bounded	  process	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  a	  primary	  question	  for	  further	  research	  is	  to	  further	   substantiate	   our	   understanding	   of	   this	   mode	   of	   crisis	   diagnosis	   by	  empirically	  exploring	  the	  policy	  communities	  surrounding	  the	  Treasury	  and	  DBIS.	  Conceptually	   speaking,	   an	   animating	   question	   for	   this	   research	   should	   be	   to	   ask	  what	  it	  is	  about	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  that	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  either	   crisis	  diagnosis	   to	  become	  hegemonic	  within	  government.	  A	  more	  general	  consideration	   of	   this	   research	   in	   comparison	   with	   other	   research	   on	   crisis	  diagnosis	   may	   facilitate	   some	   general	   propositions	   about	   the	   conditions	   under	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which	   crisis	   diagnosis	   is	   likely	   to	   take	   either	   a	   hegemonic	   or	   departmentally	  bounded	  mode,	  and	  the	  relative	  frequency	  of	  either	  outcome.	  	  The	   foregoing	   analysis	   also	   raises	   a	   number	   of	   other	   questions	   for	   further	  research.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  relates	  to	  the	  comparative	  validity	  of	  the	  interpretation	  constructed	  here,	  which	  could	  be	  further	  established	  or	  challenged	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  research	  on	  the	  disaggregated	  impact	  of	  fiscal	  and	  trade	  policies	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  compositional	  structure	  of	  the	  UK	  economy.	  These	  areas	  of	  policy	  are	  the	  preserve	  of	   the	   Treasury.	   If,	   as	   I	   have	   suggested	   above,	   a	   neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   and	  corresponding	   coordinative	  discourse	  were	  predominant	   in	   the	  New	  Labour	  and	  post-­‐2008	   Treasury	   then	   we	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   no	   relationship	   between	  supportive	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   the	   sectors	   strategically	   prioritised	   in	   the	   strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  pursued	  by	  DBIS.	  Instead,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  only	   non-­‐discretionary	   forms	   of	   fiscal	   assistance	   through,	   for	   example,	   tax	   relief	  offered	  to	  small	  firms	  and	  fixed	  capital	  depreciation	  allowances	  for	  manufacturing	  firms.	   If	   instead	   subsequent	   research	   were	   to	   discover	   such	   a	   systematic	  discretionary	   relationship	   in	   this	   form	  of	   policy	   then	   this	  would	  have	   significant	  implications	   for	  our	  understanding	  of	   ideational	  change	   in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  that	  are	  contrary	  to	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  here,	  and	  possibly	  the	  characterisation	  of	  New	  Labour	  endorsed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  	  A	   further	   avenue	   of	   research	   is	   to	   explore	   the	   relationship	   between	   future	  developments	  in	  the	  economic	  context	  and	  the	  non-­‐neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  presently	   manifest	   in	   the	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda.	   The	   critical	   social	  democratic	   perspective	   strongly	   suggests	   that	   ‘sustainable’,	   rebalanced	   growth	  and	  employment	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	   the	  outcome	  of	   further	  neoliberalisation	  of	   the	  British	  political	   economy,	   and	   that	   financial	   instability	   and	  prolonged	   stagnation	  remain	   risks.	   Should	   these	   or	   other	   structural	   frailties	   be	   realised,	   the	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  perspective	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  expect	   that	   further	   ideational	   ‘windows	   of	   possibility’	   may	   open.	   These	   are	  conditions	   that	   support	   critical	   reflection	   on	   existing	   problem	  definitions	   by	   the	  actors	   wedded	   to	   them,	   and	   thus	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   growing	   number	   rejecting	  neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   embryonic	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	   that	  presently	  constitutes	  a	   ‘rival	  coordinative	  discourse	  waiting	   in	   the	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wings’.	   Furthermore,	   should	   such	   a	   window	   of	   opportunity	   open,	   it	   raises	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	   definitions	  underpinning	   the	   strategic	   discretionary	   agenda,	   possibly	   in	  ways	   that	   are	  more	  critical	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  that	  it	  sits	  alongside.	  The	  relative	  fates	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  coordinative	  discourse	  and	  its	  rival	  will	  be	  an	  illuminating	  object	  of	  inquiry	   for	   understanding	   the	   subsequent	   trajectory	   of	   the	   British	   political	  economy.	  	  	  A	  final	  avenue	  of	  further	  research	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	   agenda	   and	   the	   institutional	   constraints	   imposed	   upon	   industrial	  policymakers	  by	  the	  state	  aid	  rules	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Presently,	  government	  is	  constrained	  in	  the	  scale	  and	  nature	  of	  strategic	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  by	  these	  rules,	  and	  must	  apply	  for	  approval	  from	  the	  Commission	  where	  a	  departure	  is	   made	   from	   the	   relatively	   limited	   range	   of	   permissible	   forms	   of	   intervention	  sanctioned	  under	  them.	  The	  rules	  are	  more	  permissive	  where	  intervention	  relates	  to	   regional	   policy	   and	   research	   and	   development	   projects,	   both	   of	   which	   are	  common	   themes	   in	   the	   approaches	   of	   both	   governments	   in	   this	   area.69	   One	  interesting	  question	  for	  further	  research	  that	  seeks	  to	  more	  fully	  outline	  the	  nature	  of	   contemporary	   British	   industrial	   policy	  would	   be	   to	   determine	   to	  what	   extent	  these	   institutionally	   structured	   constraints	   and	   opportunities	   have	   shaped	   the	  form	   that	   strategic	   discretionary	   intervention	   has	   taken	   in	   Britain	   to	   date.	  Furthermore,	   in	   a	   period	   in	   which	   Britain	   and	   other	   member	   states	   are	  reconsidering	  their	  relationships	  to	  the	  union	  and	  the	  role	  of	  European	  institutions	  in	  their	  political	  economies,	  it	  may	  prove	  informative	  to	  study	  the	  position	  Britain	  adopts	  on	  the	  supranational	  regulation	  of	  industrial	  policy.	  The	  advocacy	  of	  either	  continuities	   or	   changes	   in	   such	   regulation	   could	   therefore	   prove	   an	   instructive	  means	  of	  assessing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  approach	  and	  its	  associated	   problem	   definitions	   to	   the	   coordinative	   discourses	   of	   future	  governments	  involved	  in	  such	  renegotiation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Department	  For	  Business,	  Innovation	  And	  Skills	  (2013n),	  State	  Aid:	  The	  Basics	  (London:	  The	  Stationery	  Office).	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Chapter	  7.	  
Post-­2008	  Crisis	  Narratives	  
	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  turn	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  crisis	  narration.	   I	   report	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   research	   undertaken	   on	   120	   newspaper	  articles	   written	   by	   ministers	   in	   the	   two	   post-­‐2008	   governments.	   The	   analysis	  reveals	   the	   combative	   use	   of	   contrasting	   communicative	   discourse	   by	   the	   two	  governments	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   convergence	   in	   their	   respective	  neoliberal	   and	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnoses.	   The	   first	   and	   second	   sections	  outline	  the	  crisis	  narratives	  constructed	  by	  the	  Brown	  and	  Coalition	  Governments	  respectively.	   In	   the	   third	   section	   I	   analyse	   the	   interpellative	   strategies	   at	   play	   in	  these	   crisis	   narratives	   in	   greater	   depth,	   comparing	   and	   contrasting	   the	   ways	   in	  which	   they	   are	   designed	   to	   create	   resonance	   between	   the	   interpretations	   and	  policy	  preferences	  inscribed	  within	  them	  and	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  readers.	   In	  the	  conclusion	  I	  offer	  a	  number	  of	  more	  general	  considerations	  about	  the	  narration	  of	  crisis	  in	  light	  of	  this	  research,	  and	  discuss	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  	  
	  
1.	  
The	  Brown	  Government’s	  Crisis	  Narratives	  	  Rather	  than	  building	  a	  perception	  of	  crisis	  where	  it	  was	  absent,	  the	  task	  facing	  the	  Brown	   Government	   in	   late	   2008	   and	   early	   2009	   was	   to	   manage	   and	   shape	   an	  already	  widespread	  sense	  of	  crisis	  in	  a	  way	  that	  deflected	  criticism	  and	  bolstered	  public	   perceptions	   of	   its	   economic	   competence.	   The	   dramatic	   turn	   in	   Britain’s	  fortunes	  had	  occurred	  after	  ten	  years	  of	  Labour	  government,	  so	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	   an	   overarching	   narrative	   of	   ‘blame	   deflection’	   dominated	   ministerial	  newspaper	  publications	  on	  economic	  events	   in	   this	  period.	   Succinctly	   stated,	   the	  blame	   deflection	   narrative	   re-­‐asserted	   the	   New	   Labour/Brown	   Government’s	  economic	  competence	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  crash	  and	  attributed	  the	  economic	  collapse	   to	   factors	   beyond	   their	   control.	   To	   do	   so	   it	   draws	  upon	  negative	   public	  perceptions	  of	  financial	  market	  actors,	  New	  Labour’s	  communicative	  discourse	  of	  benign	   globalisation,	   and	   a	   series	   of	   favourable	   self-­‐comparisons	   with	   the	  Conservative	   Party.	   Emerging	   from	   the	   narrative	   is	   a	   careful	   qualification	   of	   the	  possibility	   and	   desirability	   of	   transformative	   financial	   reform.	   Consequently	   the	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narrative	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   stabilise	   public	   support	   in	   existing	  institutions	  in	  a	  context	  ripe	  for	  claims	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  decisive	  intervention	  –	  an	  inverse	  of	  the	  role	  generally	  played	  by	  crisis	  narratives.	  	  From	  July	  2009	  onwards	  a	  new	  crisis	  narrative	  emerged	  alongside	  the	  earlier	  one.	  It	   asserted	   that	   a	   tentative	   recovery	   had	   been	   established,	   but	   that	   it	   was	  threatened	  by	  an	  impending	  crisis	  of	  Conservative	  misrule.	  The	  narrative	  locates	  a	  new	   crisis	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   possible	   Conservative	   victory	   at	   the	   2010	   general	  election	  and	  presents	  this	  as	  an	  impending	  ethical	  and	  economic	  catastrophe.	  The	  narrative	   is	  dominated	  by	  comparisons	  of	   the	  Labour	  and	  Conservative	  Party	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  commitment	  to	  ‘fairness’	  and	  their	  economic	  competence.	  Not	  coincidentally,	   this	   narrative	   emerged	   at	   around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	  mid-­‐2009	  concession	  that	  spending	  cuts	  would	  form	  part	  of	  its	  fiscal	  consolidation	  strategy.	  Having	  made	  this	  concession,	  the	  new	  crisis	  narrative	  built	  presentational	  differences	  between	  the	  quite	  similar	  decisive	   interventions	  being	  advocated	   by	   the	   two	   parties	   and	   sought	   to	   disrupt	   the	   impression	   that	  Conservative	  charges	  of	  economic	  incompetence	  had	  been	  correct	  all	  along.	  	  The	  Blame	  Deflection	  Narrative	  	  The	   blame	   deflection	   narrative	   was	   structured	   along	   three	   themes.	   The	   first	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  why	  the	  government	  had	  tolerated	  and	  celebrated	  what	  had	  now	   emerged	   to	   be	   a	   fragile	   financial	   architecture.	   In	   response,	   the	   narrative	  stressed	   that	   the	  banking	  crisis	  had	  originated	   from	  outside	   the	  UK	  and	   that	   the	  country	   had	   been	   subject	   to	   an	   exogenous	   shock	   for	   which	   the	   regulatory	  architecture	   in	   Britain	   was	   not	   responsible.1	   Alongside	   this	   claim	   was	   a	   re-­‐assertion	  of	   the	  New	  Labour	  discourse	  on	   ‘globalisation’	  as	  a	  virtuous	  yet	   fragile	  international	   political-­‐economic	   project,	   with	   a	   series	   of	   articles	   identifying	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A.	  Darling	  (2008a),	  'Shocks	  To	  System	  Show	  Need	  For	  Fresh	  Answers',	  The	  Financial	  
Times,	  09/10/2008;	  G.	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our	  Guide:	  Only	  New	  Labour	  Can	  Help	  Businesses	  And	  Families	  Through	  This	  Economic	  Turbulence	  ',	  The	  Guardian,	  20/09/2008;	  G.	  Brown	  (2008b),	  'We	  Must	  Lead	  The	  World	  To	  Financial	  Stability',	  The	  
Times,	  10/10/2008;	  G.	  Brown	  (2008c),	  'Stakes	  Could	  Not	  Be	  Higher,	  This	  Is	  Moment	  Of	  Truth',	  The	  Sunday	  Mirror,	  12/10/2008;	  G.	  Brown	  (2008e),	  'I'll	  Give	  Help	  When	  You	  Need	  It',	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  23/11/2008;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009a),	  'Era	  Of	  Risk	  Is	  Over',	  The	  
Sunday	  Telegraph,	  08/02/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009b),	  'Free	  Trade	  Is	  The	  Gateway	  To	  Recovery',	  The	  Times,	  06/03/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay	  For	  Bankers'	  One-­‐Way	  Bets',	  The	  Times,	  18/02/2009	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‘protectionists’	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   global	   recovery	   and	   asserting	   the	   virtues	   of	  globalisation.2	  The	  government	  argued	  that	  multilateral	  constraints	  arising	  from	  a	  globalised	   international	   economy	   meant	   that	   New	   Labour	   could	   not	   pursue	  unilateral	   strengthening	   of	   financial	   regulation	  without	   foregoing	   the	   benefits	   of	  globalisation	   for	   the	   country,	   and	   that	   maintaining	   these	   benefits	   remained	   a	  priority	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  crash.	  It	  was	  conceded	  that	  international	  financial	  regulation	   had	   not	   kept	   pace	   with	   developments	   in	   the	   industry,	   but	   that	   this	  ‘global	  problem’	  had	  then,	  as	  it	  continued	  to	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  demanded	  a	  multilateral	  solution.3	  	  	  Alongside	  this	  theme	  was	  a	  second	  one	  that	  addressed	  those	  that	  the	  government	  cast	   as	   bearing	   blame	   for	   the	   crash:	   a	   small	   number	   of	   irresponsible	   financial	  market	  actors.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  recruitment	  of	  some	  of	  the	  resentful	  assessments	  of	  financiers	   made	   by	   critical	   commentators	   around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   crash:	   the	  narrative	  endorses	  the	  view	  that	  they	  had	  behaved	  in	  an	  irresponsible	  and	  morally	  questionable	  way,	  and	  had	  failed	  to	  maintain	  a	  compact	  of	  trust	  with	  society.4	  Yet	  the	  endorsement	  of	   these	  views	   is	  carefully	  qualified.	  The	  economic	  contribution	  of	   the	   City	   was	   played	   up	   and	   the	   numbers	   of	   deviant	   financial	   market	   actors	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Darling	  (2008a),	  'Shocks	  To	  System’;	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our’;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2008b),	  'New	  Labour	  Has	  Had	  To	  Adapt	  Its	  Economic	  Policy	  To	  Suit	  The	  Times',	  The	  
Independent,	  05/12/2008;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009a),	  'Four	  Sober	  Steps	  On	  The	  Road	  To	  Recovery',	  The	  Times,	  31/01/2009;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009b),	  'The	  Banks	  Are	  To	  Blame	  For	  This	  Crisis',	  The	  Independent,	  10/02/2009;	  Mandelson	  (2009b),	  'Free	  Trade	  Is’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009d),	  'The	  Special	  Relationship	  Is	  Going	  Global',	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  01/03/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009c),	  'Globalism	  Has	  Been	  Good	  For	  Everyone',	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  01/04/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009g),	  ‘Europe	  Needs	  Action,	  Not	  Quiet	  Consensus’,	  The	  
Financial	  Times,	  23/11/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2010a),	  'Korean	  Miracle	  Shows	  The	  Power	  Of	  World	  Trade	  Deals',	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  17/03/2010.	  3	  Darling	  (2008a),	  'Shocks	  To	  System’;	  Brown	  (2008b),	  'We	  Must	  Lead’;	  Mandelson	  (2009a),	  'Four	  Sober	  Steps’;	  Brown	  (2008c),	  'Stakes	  Could	  Not’;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009d),	  'Only	  A	  Global	  Fix	  Will	  Do',	  The	  Guardian,	  10/03/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009c),	  'We	  Will	  Put	  People	  First,	  Not	  Bankers',	  The	  Observer,	  22/02/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009e),	  'New	  Global	  Economy	  Calls	  For	  New	  Era	  Of	  Financial	  Regulation',	  The	  Sunday	  Telegraph,	  15/03/2009;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working',	  The	  Guardian,	  30/08/2009;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009j),	  ‘A	  Strong	  City	  Is	  Not	  Just	  In	  Britain’s	  Interests’,	  The	  Times,	  02/12/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009k),	  ‘How	  We	  Can	  Restore	  Trust	  in	  Financial	  Institutions’,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  08/11/2009	  4	  Darling	  (2008a),	  'Shocks	  To	  System’;	  Brown	  (2008b),	  'We	  Must	  Lead’;	  Darling	  (2009b),	  'The	  Banks	  Are	  To	  Blame’	  ;	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009f),	  'This	  Is	  London's	  Big	  Chance	  To	  Lead	  The	  World	  Out	  Of	  Crisis',	  The	  London	  Evening	  Standard,	  30/03/2009;	  Darling	  (2009f),	  'Time	  For	  System	  To	  Change'	  ;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009i),	  'After	  Lehmans’	  Fall,	  We	  Must	  Look	  Beyond	  The	  Banks',	  The	  Observer,	  13/09/2009;	  Brown	  (2009h),	  'I'm	  Determined	  To	  Protect	  Families;	  Brown	  (2009k),	  ‘How	  We	  Can	  Restore	  Trust’	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played	  down,	  recasting	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  problem	  from	  one	  of	  an	  entire	  industry	  to	  one	   of	   a	   few	   participants	   who	   responded	   to	   perverse	   incentive	   structures	   that	  would	  now	  be	  subject	  to	  reform	  (although	  the	  government	  still	  frequently	  singled	  out	   ‘the	   banks’	   as	   bearing	   responsibility).5	   The	   argument	   about	   multilateral	  constraints	   and	   the	   virtues	   of	   globalisation	   was	   invoked	   alongside	   these	  arguments	   against	   calls	   for	   decisive	   reforms	   of	   financial	   regulation:	   the	  government	  claimed	   to	  be	  unable	   to	  undertake	  decisive	  reform	  until	  multilateral	  agreement	  was	  made,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  remis	  if	  it	  did.	  	  The	   final	   theme	   in	   the	   blame	   deflection	   narrative	   responds	   to	   Conservative	  criticism	  of	   the	  government’s	  economic	  competency.	   It	  does	  so	  by	   in	   turn	  calling	  into	  question	   the	  Conservatives’	  economic	  competence,	   stressing	   the	  seriousness	  of	   the	   economic	   circumstances	   and	   the	   corresponding	   skill	   and	   success	   of	   the	  government’s	   response.	   In	   particular,	   post-­‐crash	   policies	   were	   linked	   to	   the	  preservation	   of	   employment	   and	   security	   of	   homeownership,	   and	   with	   having	  staved	  off	  a	  risk	  to	  the	  economic	  prospects	  of	  the	  young.6	  The	  purportedly	  perilous	  consequences	   of	   failing	   to	   respond	   in	   the	   way	   the	   government	   was	   doing	   was	  directly	   connected	   to	   certain	   social	   groups	   –	   predominantly	   ‘families’	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Brown	  (2008c),	  'Stakes	  Could	  Not’;	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay’;	  Brown	  (2009c),	  'We	  Will	  Put	  People	  First’;	  Brown	  (2009e),	  'New	  Global	  Economy’;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009j),	  ‘A	  Strong	  City	  Is	  Not	  Just’;	  Brown	  (2009k),	  ‘How	  We	  Can	  Restore	  Trust’	  6	  A.	  Darling	  (2008b),	  'My	  Reasons',	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  12/10/2008;	  Darling	  (2009a),	  'Era	  Of	  Risk’;	  Darling	  (2009c),	  'The	  Banks	  Are	  To	  Blame’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms',	  The	  Birmingham	  Mail,	  30/01/2009;	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay;	  Brown	  (2009c),	  'We	  Will	  Put	  People	  First’;	  Brown	  (2009e),	  'New	  Global	  Economy’;	  Brown	  (2009f),	  'This	  Is	  London's	  Big	  Chance’;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009e),	  'China	  And	  Us	  -­‐	  A	  New	  Cultural	  Revolution',	  The	  Times,	  11/05/2009;	  Mandelson	  (2009c),	  'Globalism	  Has	  Been’	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  A.	  Darling	  (2009h),	  'There	  Is	  Going	  To	  Have	  To	  Be	  Slower	  Growth	  In	  Public	  Spending',	  The	  Independent,	  09/09/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009d),	  'Underdog	  Is	  Ready	  To	  Bite	  Back',	  The	  News	  of	  the	  World,	  02/08/2009;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009e),	  'Osborne's	  Crass	  Political	  Cross-­‐Dressing',	  The	  Guardian,	  12/08/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason	  to	  be	  Proud	  of	  Its	  Young	  People	  this	  Summer',	  The	  
Mirror,	  02/09/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009j),	  'A	  New	  Era	  Of	  Global	  Economic	  Co-­‐Operation	  ',	  The	  
Daily	  Telegraph,	  17/09/2009;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009k),	  ‘Our	  Priority	  Must	  Now	  Turn	  To	  How	  We	  Ensure	  Economic	  Expansion’,	  The	  Western	  Mail,	  10/12/2009;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009l),	  ‘A	  Risk	  To	  Our	  Very	  Future’,	  The	  Guardian,	  31/12/2009;	  G.	  Brown	  (2010a),	  ‘An	  Age	  of	  Aspiration	  Can	  Benefit	  Everyone’,	  The	  Observer,	  03/01/2010;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2010b),	  ‘How	  Cameron	  Became	  One	  Of	  The	  Great	  Ignored’,	  The	  Independent,	  10/04/2010;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away	  The	  Recovery’,	  The	  Independent,	  02/05/2010	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‘businesses’	   (or	   variations	   such	   as	   ‘hard-­‐working	   families’).7	   	   Against	   this	   self-­‐characterisation	  of	  economic	  competency,	  Conservative	  criticism	  was	  identified	  as	  reflecting	   the	   prioritisation	   of	   partisan	   political	   interest	   and	   a	   reckless	  commitment	   to	   an	   inflexible	   ‘small	   state’	   ideology	   that	   predisposed	   them	   to	  spending	  cuts	  regardless	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  consequences.8	  	  	  The	  Narrative	  Of	  Impeding	  Conservative	  Misrule	  	  The	  first	   theme	  comprising	  this	  narrative	  asserts	  that	  owing	  to	  the	  government’s	  fiscal	   and	   financial	   interventions	   a	   recovery	   had	  been	   established	   that	  would	   be	  self-­‐sustaining	   if	   the	   government’s	   policy	  was	   allowed	   to	   play	   out	   to	   its	   allotted	  timescale.9	  The	  particular	  crisis	  that	  the	  narrative	  points	  to	  is	  the	  undoing	  of	  this	  recovery	  and,	  more	  generally,	  of	  societal	  wellbeing,	  should	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  win	  the	  2010	  general	  election	  and	  instigate	  a	  change	  in	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  The	  narrative	  is	  set	  out	  through	  a	  series	  of	  favourable	  comparisons	  between	  the	  Brown	  Government	  and	  its	  Conservative	  competitors	  along	  two	  overarching	  themes.	  The	  first	   of	   these	   continued	   the	   unfavourable	   characterisation	   of	   Conservative	  economic	  competence	  established	  in	  the	  previous	  narrative.	  As	  well	  as	  attributing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our’;	  Brown	  (2008b),	  'We	  Must	  Lead’;	  Brown	  (2008c),	  'Stakes	  Could	  Not’;	  Darling	  (2008b),	  'My	  Reasons';	  A.	  Darling	  (2008c),	  'Breaking	  The	  Rules',	  The	  Birmingham	  Post,	  30/10/2008;	  G.	  Brown	  (2008d),	  'This	  Is	  A	  Defining	  Moment,	  But	  We	  Can	  Emerge	  Stronger	  ',	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  18/10/2008;	  Brown	  (2008e),	  'I'll	  Give	  Help’;	  Darling	  (2009a),	  'Era	  Of	  Risk’;	  Darling	  (2009b),	  'The	  Banks	  Are	  To	  Blame’;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009c),	  'Banks	  Must	  Clean	  Balance	  Sheets	  And	  Rebuild',	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  25/02/2009;	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms’;	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay;	  Brown	  (2009f),	  'This	  Is	  London's	  Big	  Chance’;	  A.	  Darling	  (2009f),	  'Time	  For	  System	  To	  Change',	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  05/07/2009;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009h),	  'There	  Is	  Going	  To’;	  Darling	  (2009i),	  'After	  Lehmans’	  Fall’;	  Mandelson	  (2009d),	  'Underdog	  Is	  Ready’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009h),	  'I'm	  Determined	  To	  Protect	  Families	  ',	  
The	  Mirror,	  02/07/2009;	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason’;	  43;	  Darling	  (2009k),	  ‘Our	  Priority	  Must	  Now	  Turn’;	  Darling	  (2009l),	  ‘A	  Risk	  To	  Our	  Very	  Future’;	  Brown	  (2010a),	  ‘An	  Age	  of	  Aspiration	  Can’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour	  Will	  Ensure	  We	  Don’t	  Get	  the	  Tories’,	  The	  Daily	  Record,	  06/05/2010	  	  8	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our’;	  Brown	  (2008e),	  'I'll	  Give	  Help’;	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms’;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009i),	  'After	  Lehmans’	  Fall	  ;	  Mandelson	  (2009e),	  'Osborne's	  Crass	  Political’;	  Darling	  (2009l),	  ‘A	  Risk	  To	  Our	  Very	  Future’;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009f),	  ‘Low	  Carbon	  Is	  At	  The	  Forefront	  Of	  The	  Government’s	  Agenda’,	  The	  Guardian,	  09/09/2009;	  Brown	  (2010a),	  ‘An	  Age	  of	  Aspiration	  Can’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’	  9	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009h),	  'There	  Is	  Going	  To;	  Darling	  (2009i),	  'After	  Lehmans’	  Fall’;	  Brown	  (2009j),	  'A	  New	  Era	  Of	  Global’;	  Darling	  (2009l),	  ‘A	  Risk	  To	  Our	  Very	  Future’;	  Brown	  (2010a),	  ‘An	  Age	  of	  Aspiration	  Can’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’;	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a	   danger	   to	   the	   recovery,	   parallels	  were	   drawn	   between	   Conservative	   economic	  policy	   and	   ideology	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   ‘90s	   and	   contemporary	   Conservative	  criticism	  of	   the	  Brown	  Government’s	   economic	  policy,	   implying	   that	   undesirable	  outcomes	  of	  these	  historic	  parallels	  would	  be	  repeated.10	  	  	  Alongside	   this	   theme	  was	   developed	   a	   third	   that	   stressed	   purported	   ideological	  differences	   between	   the	   two	   opposing	   parties.	   The	   narrative	   cast	   the	   Brown	  Government	  as	  being	  guided	  by	  a	  set	  of	  deeply	  held	  principles	  and	  a	  contrasting	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  government	  to	  that	  held	  by	  the	  Conservatives.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Conservatives	   are	   also	   cast	   as	   being	   highly	   principled,	   although	   these	   principles	  are	  cast	  in	  an	  unattractive	  light,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  presently.	  Elements	  of	  this	  theme	  were	  also	  present	  in	  the	  earlier	  blame	  deflection	  narrative	  where	  the	  government	  stressed	  the	  rigidly	  principled	  nature	  of	  its	  responses	  to	  financial	  instability,	  but	  it	  was	   from	   mid-­‐2009	   that	   this	   emphasis	   on	   principles	   came	   into	   its	   own.	   This	  distinction	   confers	   a	   rather	  more	   exciting	   significance	  on	   the	  2010	  election	   than	  the	  analysis	  presented	   in	   the	  previous	   two	  chapters	  would	  suggest:	  as	  a	  decisive	  moment	   in	   the	   trajectory	   of	   British	   political	   economic	   history	   and	   a	   choice	  between	   two	   competing	   visions	   of	   the	   country’s	   future,	   rather	   than	   a	   choice	  between	  two	  very	  similar	  recovery	  strategies.	  	  	  Characterizing	   its	  own	   ideological	  position,	   the	  Brown	  Government	  asserted	   that	  its	   economic	   policy	   choices	   were	   structured	   primarily	   by	   ‘fairness’,	   a	   concept	  inherited	  from	  New	  Labour	  (although	  it	  was	  not	  explicitly	  defined).	  The	  evidence	  of	  the	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  ‘fairness’	  was	  its	  purported	  privileging	  of	  the	  interests	   of	   certain	   social	   groups	   to	   which	   it	   directly	   appealed	   in	   the	   articles:	  predominantly	  ‘families’	  and	  ‘businesses’,	  but	  with	  reference	  also	  made	  to	  ‘parents’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms’;	  G.	  Brown	  (2009g),	  'What	  Europe	  Must	  Do	  To	  Build	  Recovery',	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  27/05/2009;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason’;	  Mandelson	  (2010b),	  ‘How	  Cameron	  Became’	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and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  young.11	  Responding	  directly	  to	  the	  macroeconomic	  debate	  that	   characterised	   much	   of	   the	   2010	   election,	   the	   Government	   claimed	   that	   it	  would	   be	   able	   to	   reduce	   the	   deficit	   ‘fairly’;	   privileging	   the	   aforementioned,	  preserving	   of	   public	   services	   and	   being	   more	   proactive	   in	   protecting	   the	  recovery.12	  	  This	  is	  contrasted	  to	  the	  purported	  threat	  of	  a	  Conservative	  victory.	  Central	  to	  this	  was	   the	  claim	  that	   the	  Conservatives	  were	  motivated	   in	   their	  approach	   to	  deficit	  reduction	   by	   a	   ‘small	   state’	   ideology	   and	   a	   desire	   to	   favour	   the	   wealthy	   to	   the	  general	   detriment	   of	   the	   social	   groups	   to	   which	   the	   government	   claimed	   to	   be	  committed.13	  Cameronite	  claims	  to	  have	  modernised	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  were	  dismissed	  as	  a	  front	  masking	  the	  continuing	  dominance	  of	  a	  small	  state	  faction	  to	  which	   Cameron	   himself	   was	   said	   to	   belong.14	   The	   purported	   danger	   of	  Conservative	   victory	   amplified	   through	   the	   use	   of	   rather	   striking	   hyperbole	   that	  appears	   in	   both	   tabloid	   and	   midmarket/broadsheet	   papers:	   a	   ‘gleeful,	   whetted	  appetite’	  and	   ‘ideological	  zeal’	   for	   ‘deep	  and	  savage	  cuts’,	   ‘cruelly	  and	   immorally’	  prioritizing	  tax	  cuts	  for	  the	  wealthy	  over	  public	  services	  whilst	  favouring	  policies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our’;	  Brown	  (2008b),	  'We	  Must	  Lead’;	  Brown	  (2008c),	  'Stakes	  Could	  Not’;	  Darling	  (2008b),	  'My	  Reasons';	  Darling	  (2008c),	  'Breaking	  The	  Rules';	  Brown	  (2008d),	  'This	  Is	  A	  Defining	  Moment;	  Brown	  (2008e),	  'I'll	  Give	  Help’;	  Darling	  (2009a),	  'Era	  Of	  Risk’;	  Darling	  (2009b),	  'The	  Banks	  Are	  To	  Blame’;	  Darling	  (2009c),	  'Banks	  Must	  Clean’;	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms’;	  Brown	  (2009b),	  'We	  Won't	  Pay’;	  Brown	  (2009f),	  'This	  Is	  London's	  Big	  Chance’;	  Darling	  (2009f),	  'Time	  For	  System	  To	  Change';	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009h),	  'There	  Is	  Going	  To’;	  Darling	  (2009i),	  'After	  Lehmans’	  Fall’;	  Mandelson	  (2009d),	  'Underdog	  Is	  Ready’;	  Brown	  (2009h),	  'I'm	  Determined	  To	  Protect	  Families;	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason’;	  Darling	  (2009k),	  ‘Our	  Priority	  Must	  Now	  Turn’;	  Darling	  (2009l),	  ‘A	  Risk	  To	  Our	  Very	  Future’;	  Brown	  (2010a),	  ‘An	  Age	  of	  Aspiration	  Can’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’.	  12	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Darling	  (2009h),	  'There	  Is	  Going	  To’;	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason’;	  Darling	  (2009k),	  ‘Our	  Priority	  Must	  Now	  Turn’;	  Mandelson	  (2009f),	  ‘Low	  Carbon	  Is’;	  P.	  Mandelson	  (2009h),	  ‘Growth	  Will	  Pay	  Our	  Way	  Out	  Of	  Debt’,	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  06/12/2009;	  Mandelson	  (2010b),	  ‘How	  Cameron	  Became’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’.	  13	  Brown	  (2008a),	  'Fairness	  Is	  Still	  Our’;	  Brown	  (2009a),	  'I	  Will	  Help	  UK	  Car	  Firms’;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Mandelson	  (2009d),	  'Underdog	  Is	  Ready’;	  Mandelson	  (2009e),	  'Osborne's	  Crass	  Political’;	  Brown	  (2009i),	  'Britain	  Has	  Every	  Reason’;	  Mandelson	  (2009f),	  ‘Low	  Carbon	  Is’	  (small	  state);	  Mandelson	  (2010b),	  ‘How	  Cameron	  Became’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’	  14	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working';	  Mandelson	  (2009e),	  'Osborne's	  Crass	  Political’;	  Mandelson	  (2010b),	  ‘How	  Cameron	  Became’.	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that	  would	   ‘consign	  people	  to	   the	  scrap	  heap’.15	  Having	   framed	  the	  election	  thus,	  the	  Brown	  Government	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  entering	  the	  2010	  electoral	  campaign	  principally	   to	   preserve	   the	   country	   from	   this	   crisis	   of	   impending	   Conservative	  misrule.	  	  
2.	  
The	  Coalition	  Government’s	  Crisis	  Narratives	  	  The	   Coalition	   took	   office	   intending	   to	   immediately	   begin	   an	   aggressive	   fiscal	  consolidation,	  but	  at	  a	  time	  when	  economic	   indicators	  were	  generally	   improving.	  The	  Brown	  Government	  had	  already	  claimed	  (however	  hubristically)	  that	  recovery	  was	   secured	  providing	  macroeconomic	  policy	  was	  not	   reset,	   so	   it	  was	  necessary	  for	   the	  Coalition	   to	   construct	  a	   sense	  of	   economic	   crisis	   anew.	   In	  doing	   so	   it	  has	  drawn	  first	  and	  foremost	  on	  the	  ‘deficit	  crisis	  narrative’	  that	  had	  been	  the	  mainstay	  of	   the	   Conservative	   Party’s	   election	   campaign.	   This	   narrative	   has	   infused	   the	  Coalition’s	  communicative	  discourse	  in	  relation	  to	  many	  areas	  of	  policy.	  Its	  essence	  is	   that	   the	  previous	  Labour	  governments	  had	  so	  badly	  mismanaged	  public	  sector	  finances	   that	   by	   2010	   they	   posed	   an	   immediate	   and	   severe	   risk	   to	   economic	  stability,	  necessitating	  immediate	  fiscal	  consolidation	  across	  government.	  The	  two-­‐fold	   effect	   was	   not	   only	   to	   characterise	   deficit	   reduction	   as	   an	   unavoidably	  necessary	  decisive	   intervention,	  but	   also	   to	  displace	  blame	   for	   the	   consequences	  on	  to	  the	  Labour	  Party.	  	  	  The	  deficit	   crisis	  narrative	  also	  provided	  a	   resource	  with	  which	   retrenchment	   in	  the	  activities	  of	  other	  departments	  could	  be	  justified.	  Yet	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  reform	  of	   working-­‐age	   benefits	   it	   was	   not	   deemed	   sufficient.	   Instead,	   elements	   of	   the	  deficit	   crisis	  narrative	  were	  drawn	   into	  a	   second	  one	   that	   constructs	  an	  ongoing	  crisis	   of	   fairness	   and	   cost	   in	   the	   system	   of	   ‘welfare’	   –	   the	   ‘Crisis	   of	   Welfare	  Narrative’.	  Reductions	  in	  the	  budget	  for	  working-­‐age	  benefits	  announced	  in	  2010	  and	   the	   Autumn	   Statement	   2012	   comprised	   over	   20%	   of	   the	   cuts	   to	   spending	  growth	  that	  the	  Coalition	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  by	  2015-­‐16,	  and	  have	  thus	  constituted	  a	  crucial	   decisive	   intervention	  upon	  which	   the	  broader	  macroeconomic	   strategy	   is	  premised.	   Consequently,	   the	   two	   crisis	   narratives	   re-­‐inforce	   one	   another	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Respectively,	  Mandelson	  (2009d),	  'Underdog	  Is	  Ready’;	  Mandelson	  (2010c),	  ‘Don’t	  Gamble	  Away’;	  Brown	  (2010b),	  ‘Only	  a	  Vote	  for	  Labour’;	  Darling	  (2009g),	  'The	  Cure	  Is	  Working'.	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asserting	   the	   necessity	   of	   related	   decisive	   interventions.	   The	   crisis	   of	   welfare	  narrative	   asserts	   a	   structural	   rather	   than	   a	   cyclical	   crisis	   of	   the	   system	  of	   social	  security	  benefits,	   arising	   from	  the	  purportedly	  excessive	  generosity	  of	   incentives	  and	  manifest	  in	  the	  unfairness	  of	  the	  ‘benefits	  culture’	  that	  it	  is	  said	  to	  sustain.	  Like	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative,	   the	  welfare	  crisis	  narrative	  has	  been	  an	  enduring	  one.	  However	   its	   terms	   remained	  mostly	   stable,	   with	   the	   principal	   dynamic	   element	  being	  the	  particular	  aspect	  of	  social	  security	  that	  the	  government	  was	  addressing	  at	   any	   particular	   moment.	   This	   began	   with	   housing	   benefit	   and	   the	   aggregate	  quantity	   of	   working-­‐age	   benefits	   a	   household	   was	   entitled	   to,	   and	   thence	   to	  benefits	   paid	   to	   council	   house	   tenants,	   conditionality	   on	   young	   claimants	   and	  sickness/incapacity	  benefits.	  	  	  The	  Deficit	  Crisis	  Narrative16	  	  The	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  was	  comprised	  of	   three	  themes.	  The	  first	  asserted	  the	  Coalition	   had	   taken	   power	   at	   a	  moment	   of	   impending	   economic	   disaster;	   that	   a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  sovereign	  borrowing	  was	  immediately	  imminent.	  The	  threat	  was	  articulated	  (perhaps	  surprisingly)	  in	  technical	  and	  economic	  terms:	  failure	  to	  immediately	   establish	   confidence	   in	   the	   government’s	   financial	   position	   through	  fiscal	  consolidation	  would,	  it	  is	  claimed,	  lead	  to	  a	  spike	  in	  interest	  rates	  that	  would	  in	   turn	   disrupt	   household	   and	   business	   finances	   and	   return	   the	   country	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  Coalition	  uses	  the	  terms	  ‘debt’	  and	  ‘deficit’	  largely	  inter-­‐changeably	  in	  its	  crisis	  narratives.	  Debt	  is	  the	  more	  frequently	  used	  of	  the	  two,	  likely	  because	  it	  holds	  a	  greater	  significance	  to	  those	  not	  versed	  in	  financial	  terminology.	  However	  what	  is	  generally	  being	  discussed	  is	  the	  budget	  deficit.	  Consequently	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  crisis	  narrative	  by	  this	  term.	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recession.	   17	   The	   threat	  was	   further	   articulated	   through	   direct	   references	   to	   the	  interests	   of	   various	   social	   groups	   whose	   interests	   it	   was	   claimed	   would	   be	  compromised:	   predominantly	   the	   same	   couplet	   of	   ‘families	   and	   businesses’	  appealed	  to	  by	  the	  Brown	  Government,	  as	  well	  as	  less	  directly	  through	  a	  stress	  on	  the	   dangers	   posed	   to	   jobs,	   homeownership	   and	   the	   economic	   prospects	   of	   the	  young.18	  Conversely,	  it	  was	  claimed	  that	  action	  to	  appease	  the	  sentiment	  attributed	  to	   financial	   market	   actors	   would	   bolster	   confidence	   and	   promote	   recovery.	   The	  effect,	   insofar	   as	   these	   claims	   are	   accepted,	   is	   to	   render	   fiscal	   consolidation	   a	  contextually	   proscribed	   necessity	   and	   remove	   the	   notion	   that	   macroeconomic	  policy	  was	  the	  product	  of	  choice.	  	  A	   second	   theme	   is	   comprised	   of	   a	   number	   of	   spurious	   equivalences	   between	  circumstances	   facing	  households	  and	  peripheral	   eurozone	  economies	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  British	  government	  on	  the	  other.	  Frequent	  references	  were	  made	  to	  European	   economies	   undergoing	   debt	   crises	   during	   the	   period,	   particularly	  Greece,	   Italy	   and	   Portugal,	   with	   the	   unqualified	   implication	   that	   similar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010b),	  'We	  Have	  To	  Slash	  Our	  Massive	  Debt	  Now',	  The	  Sun,	  25/05/2010;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010c),	  'Debt	  Is	  The	  Spectre	  That	  Haunts	  The	  G20	  Feast',	  The	  Times,	  05/06/2010;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010e),	  'We've	  Shown	  The	  World	  That	  Britain	  Is	  Back	  In	  Business',	  The	  Evening	  Standard,	  28/06/2010;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  'A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today',	  The	  Express	  On	  Sunday,	  24/10/2010;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011a),	  'Europe	  Must	  Start	  Putting	  Its	  House	  In	  Order',	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  05/01/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011f),	  'UK	  PLC	  Is	  On	  Mend',	  The	  Sun,	  07/06/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011g),	  'The	  Three	  Lessons	  Of	  The	  Euro	  Crisis',	  The	  Sunday	  Telegraph,	  24/07/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011h),	  'Britain	  Is	  Leading	  The	  Way	  Out	  Of	  This	  Crisis',	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  08/08/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012e),	  'We	  Will	  Not	  Prop	  Up	  Europe's	  Banks',	  The	  Sunday	  Telegraph,	  10/06/2012;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012f),	  'This	  Is	  How	  The	  Coalition	  Is	  Committed	  To	  Putting	  The	  Economy	  -­‐	  And	  Wales	  -­‐	  Back	  On	  Track',	  The	  Western	  Mail,	  23/07/2012;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012h),	  'Hard	  Times	  Will	  Pay	  Off	  Later',	  The	  Sun,	  02/12/2012;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2013a),	  'Loss	  Of	  Triple	  A	  Only	  Redoubles	  Our	  Resolve	  To	  Carry	  On	  With	  The	  Recovery	  Plan	  For	  Britain',	  The	  Sun,	  24/02/2013;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2013b),	  'My	  Budget	  Will	  Be	  Tough	  But	  It	  Will	  Help	  People	  Who	  Work	  Hard',	  The	  
Sun,	  17/03/2013;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  'The	  New	  Politics	  Is	  Bold	  And	  Above	  All	  It	  Is	  Working',	  The	  Sunday	  Telegraph,	  05/09/2010;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010e),	  'We're	  Using	  Your	  Money	  The	  Right	  Way',	  The	  Western	  Mail,	  29/10/2010;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2011c),	  'Giving	  You	  A	  Chance	  To	  Play	  Your	  Part	  In	  Society',	  The	  Western	  Mail,	  05/03/2011;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2011f),	  'Yes	  To	  Treaty	  Change	  -­‐	  But	  Only	  On	  Our	  Terms	  ',	  The	  Times,	  07/12/2011;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011d),	  'Private	  Recovery	  Can	  Create	  Growth	  Potion',	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  17/02/2011	  18	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010a),	  'We're	  In	  A	  Mess',	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  16/05/2010;	  Osborne	  (2010b),	  ‘We	  Have	  To	  Slash’;	  Osborne	  (2011g),	  ‘The	  Three	  Lessons’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011i),	  ‘Fix	  This	  Euro	  Crisis	  With	  The	  Smack	  Of	  Firm	  Government’,	  The	  London	  Evening	  Standard,	  14/11/2011;	  Osborne	  (2012f),	  ‘This	  Is	  How	  The	  Coalition’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012g),	  ‘Obama	  Proves	  You	  Can	  Win	  In	  Tough	  Times	  ‘,	  The	  Times,	  13/11/2012;	  Osborne	  (2013a),	  ‘Loss	  Of	  Triple	  A’;	  Osborne	  (2013b),	  ‘My	  Budget	  Will	  Be’;	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  Cameron	  (2011c),	  ‘Giving	  You	  A	  Chance’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I	  Speak,	  We	  Agree	  On	  One	  Thing	  -­‐	  We	  Are	  Here	  For	  Five	  Years’,	  The	  Daily	  Mail,	  08/05/2011	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consequences	  would	  follow	  from	  a	  failure	  to	  enact	  the	  Coalition’s	  macroeconomic	  preferences.19	   Images	   of	   anxious	   elites,	   mass	   demonstrations	   and	   deadlocked	  negotiations	  in	  southern	  Europe	  were	  widely	  broadcast	  during	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  the	  Coalition’s	  term,	  and	  would	  likely	  have	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  the	  conjuncture	  for	  many	  in	  Britain.	  A	  similar	  feature	  has	  been	  the	  use	  of	  a	  range	  of	   ‘household’	   analogies	   and	   metaphors	   in	   the	   articulation	   of	   the	   deficit	   crisis	  narrative.	   Through	   these	   an	   equivalence	   is	   drawn	   between	   the	   exercise	   of	  responsible	  budgetary	  prudence	  by	  ordinary	  citizens	  and	  that	  of	   the	  government	  and	   public	   sector.	   Examples	   include	   the	   repetition	   of	   the	   need	   for	   one	   to	   ‘live	  within	  one’s	  means’,	  to	  ‘keep	  one’s	  house	  in	  order’	  and	  to	  ‘fix	  the	  roof	  while	  the	  sun	  is	   shining’,	  whilst	   the	  deficit	  was	  at	   times	  equated	   to	   the	   ‘nation’s	  credit	   card’	  or	  ‘cheque	   book’	   and	   deficit	   reduction	   to	   ‘belt	   tightening’	   following	   a	   period	   of	  excessive	  spending.20	  	  A	  third	  theme	  in	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  locates	  responsibility	  for	  the	  purported	  crisis	  and	  corresponding	  macroeconomic	  stance	  with	  the	  Brown	  Government.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  a	  series	  of	  favourable	  comparisons	  between	  the	  Coalition	  and	  the	   Brown	   Government,	   stressing	   the	   former’s	   economic	   competence	   and	  disinclination	   to	   political	   opportunism.	   The	   Labour	   Party	   is	   cast	   as	   bearing	   a	  seldom-­‐qualified	  responsibility	   for	   the	  entirety	  of	   the	  deficit	  and	  nearly	  all	  of	   the	  UK’s	  post-­‐2008	  economic	  woes.	  It	  is	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	  the	  deficit	  constitutes	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Osborne	  (2010a),	  ‘We’re	  In	  A	  Mess’;	  Osborne	  (2010b),	  ‘We	  Have	  To	  Slash’;	  Osborne	  (2010d),	  ‘A	  Budget	  To	  Fix	  The	  Wrecked	  Economy’;	  Osborne	  (2011f),	  ‘UK	  PLC	  Is	  On	  Mend’;	  Osborne	  (2011h),	  ‘Britain	  Is	  Leading’;	  Osborne	  (2011i),	  ‘Fix	  This	  Euro	  Crisis’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012a),	  ‘It’s	  A	  Crisis	  Of	  Confidence,	  Not	  Of	  Capitalism’,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  27/01/2012;	  Osborne	  (2013a),	  ‘Loss	  Of	  Triple	  A’;	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  Cameron	  (2011c),	  ‘Giving	  You	  A	  Chance’;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’	  20	  Osborne	  (2010a),	  ‘We’re	  In	  A	  Mess’;	  Osborne	  (2010c),	  'Debt	  Is	  The’;	  Osborne	  (2010d),	  ‘A	  Budget	  To	  Fix	  The	  Wrecked	  Economy’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011c),	  ‘Anger	  Won’t	  Create	  A	  Job’,	  The	  Sun,	  10/02/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011d),	  ‘I’ll	  Get	  Britain	  Working	  Again’,	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  20/03/2011;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012d),	  ‘The	  Storm	  Rages	  But	  The	  IMF	  Says	  We’re	  On	  Track’,	  The	  Evening	  Standard,	  22/05/2012;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012i),	  ‘We’re	  On	  The	  Right	  Road	  And	  There’s	  No	  Way	  Back’,	  The	  Sun,	  02/12/2012;	  Osborne	  (2013b),	  ‘My	  Budget	  Will	  Be’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010c),	  ‘The	  Pain	  -­‐	  And	  The	  Prize	  -­‐	  Before	  Us’,	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  08/08/2010;	  Cameron	  (2010e),	  ‘We’re	  Using	  Your	  Money	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‘mess’	  left	  by	  Labour	  as	  a	  result	  of	  macroeconomic	  mismanagement.21	  The	  mess	  is	  ascribed	  principally	  to	  incompetence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Brown	  Government	  and	  its	  predecessors,	   but	   also	   on	   occasions	   to	   a	   prioritisation	   of	   party	   interest	   over	  national	  economic	  health.22	  The	  Coalition	  characterises	  itself	  as	  comprised	  of	  sober	  pragmatists	  united	   in	   the	  recognition	  of	   the	  necessity	  of	   fiscal	  consolidation.	  The	  inscribed	  assertion	  of	  competency	  is	  occasionally	  reinforced	  through	  appeals	  to	  a	  variety	   of	   international	   and	   domestic	   organisations	   who	   are	   cast	   as	   ‘epistemic	  authorities’,	  particularly	  the	  IMF.23	  	  Two	  additional	  features	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  deficit	  narrative	  warrant	  further	  comment.	  The	   first	  relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Coalition,	  unlike	   the	  Brown	  Government,	  has	  drawn	   upon	   its	   central	   crisis	   narrative	   over	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   time.	   It	   is	  consequently	  possible	  to	  discern	  a	  variable	  quality	  to	  the	  way	  that	  it	  is	  articulated.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  correlation	  between	  this	  variation	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  GDP:	  at	  moments	  when	  GDP	  figures	  improved,	  the	  Coalition	  ascribed	  this	  improvement	  to	  its	  macroeconomic	  strategy,	  whilst	  deteriorating	  GDP	  figures	  were	  (paradoxically)	  recruited	   to	   underline	   the	   necessity	   of	   this	  macroeconomic	   stance.	   Through	   this	  dual-­‐faceted	  use	  of	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  the	  Coalition	  sought	  to	  contain	  and	  neutralise	   public	   perception	   that	   an	   alternative	  macroeconomic	   stance	  might	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Osborne	  (2010b),	  ‘We	  Have	  To	  Slash’;	  Osborne	  (2010d),	  ‘A	  Budget	  To	  Fix	  The	  Wrecked	  Economy’;	  Osborne	  (2010e),	  ‘We’ve	  Shown	  The	  World;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain	  Stronger’,	  The	  Sun,	  21/10/2010;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2011b),	  ‘A	  Single	  Icy	  Month	  Must	  Not	  Put	  Us	  Off	  Balance’,	  The	  Evening	  
Standard,	  25/01/2011;	  Osborne	  (2012f),	  ‘This	  Is	  How	  The	  Coalition’;	  Osborne	  (2012g),	  ‘Obama	  Proves	  You	  Can’;	  Osborne	  (2013a),	  ‘Loss	  Of	  Triple	  A’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal	  Is	  Right’,	  The	  News	  Of	  The	  World,	  23/05/2010;	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2011b),	  ‘How	  We	  Will	  Release	  The	  Grip	  Of	  State	  Control’,	  The	  Daily	  
Telegraph,	  21/02/2011;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’;	  V.	  Cable	  and	  E.	  Pickles	  (2010),	  ‘A	  Recovering	  Economy	  Requires	  Local	  Remedies’,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  05/09/2010.	  22	  Osborne	  (2010a),	  ‘We’re	  In	  A	  Mess’;	  Osborne	  (2010b),	  ‘We	  Have	  To	  Slash’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010d),	  ‘A	  Budget	  To	  Fix	  The	  Wrecked	  Economy’,	  The	  Sun,	  15/06/2010;	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2010h),	  ‘Our	  Plan	  Is	  Working	  And	  We’re	  Out	  Of	  Danger	  Zone’,	  The	  Sun,	  30/11/2010;	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012c),	  ‘This	  Is	  Injury	  Time,	  Europe	  Has	  To	  Act	  Now’,	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  20/05/2012;	  Osborne	  (2012d),	  ‘The	  Storm	  Rages	  But’;	  Osborne	  (2013b),	  ‘My	  Budget	  Will	  Be’;	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010f),	  ‘Before	  Protesting,	  Students	  Need	  To	  Get	  The	  Facts	  Straight’,	  The	  Evening	  Standard,	  20/11/2010;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2010b),	  ‘United	  In	  Austerity:	  This	  Budget	  Is	  Tough’,	  The	  Guardian,	  23/06/2010.	  23	  Osborne	  (2010e),	  ‘We’ve	  Shown	  The	  World;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  Osborne	  (2011b),	  ‘A	  Single	  Icy	  Month’;	  Osborne	  (2011f),	  ‘UK	  PLC	  Is	  On	  Mend’;	  Osborne	  (2011h),	  ‘Britain	  Is	  Leading’;	  Osborne	  (2012c),	  ‘This	  Is	  Injury	  Time’;	  Osborne	  (2012d),	  ‘The	  Storm	  Rages	  But’.	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possible.	   The	   first	   ‘moment	   of	   crisis’	   identified	   in	   the	  deficit	   crisis	   narrative	  was	  the	  first	  few	  months	  following	  the	  2010	  general	  election.	  Having	  made	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  budgetary	  commitments	  by	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2010	  the	  Coalition	  claimed	  that	   crisis	   had	   been	   averted,	   for	   the	   time	   being.24	   This	   important	   qualification	   is	  reflected	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  government	  reacted	  to	  two	  major	  setbacks,	  both	  heralded	  by	  disappointing	  growth	   figures.	   In	   the	   first	  quarter	  of	  2011	  and,	  more	  seriously,	  during	  the	  ‘almost	  double-­‐dip	  recession’	  of	  2012	  (with	  three	  consecutive	  quarters	   of	   zero	   or	   negative	   growth	   from	   Quarter	   4	   2011),	   the	   narrative	  emphasised	   the	   immediacy	   of	   the	   threat	   of	   deficit	   crisis	   with	   corresponding	  allusions	  to	  European	  economies	  to	  head	  off	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘Plan	  B’	  (a	  term	  that	  quickly	  established	   itself	   as	   the	   central	   slogan	   among	   commentators	   critical	   of	   the	  Coalition’s	  approach).25	  The	  strategy	  was	  again	  deployed	   in	  early	  2013	  when	  the	  UK	  lost	  its	  vaunted	  ‘triple	  A’	  credit	  rating.26	  By	  contrast	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2010	  and	   2011,	   and	   from	   late	   2012	   onwards,	   the	   narrative	   emphasised	   a	   causal	  relationship	  between	  improving	  growth	  figures,	  economic	  recovery	  and	  austerity	  to	   reinforce	   the	   necessity	   of	   its	   continuity.27	   As	   economic	   figures	   continued	   to	  improve	   through	   2013	   the	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   became	   less	   prominent	   as	   the	  government	  has	  sought	  to	  accentuate	  the	  recovery	  it	  claims	  to	  have	  created,	  yet	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Osborne	  (2010e),	  ‘We’ve	  Shown	  The	  World;	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  Osborne	  (2010h),	  ‘Our	  Plan	  Is	  Working’;	  Osborne	  (2011a),	  ‘Europe	  Must	  Start;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010b),	  ‘We’ll	  Transform	  Britain	  By	  Giving	  Power	  Away’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  12/07/2010;	  Cameron	  (2010d),	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  Cameron	  (2010f),	  ‘Before	  Protesting,	  Students’;	  Cable	  and	  Pickles	  (2010),	  ‘A	  Recovering	  Economy’.	  25	  Osborne	  (2011b),	  ‘A	  Single	  Icy	  Month’;	  A19,	  Osborne	  (2012a),	  ‘It’s	  A	  Crisis	  Of	  Confidence’,	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012b),	  ‘Beware	  The	  Risks	  Of	  The	  Rush	  To	  Regulate’,	  The	  
Financial	  Times,	  22/02/2012,	  Osborne	  (2012c),	  ‘This	  Is	  Injury	  Time’,	  Osborne	  (2012d),	  ‘The	  Storm	  Rages	  But’,	  Osborne	  (2012e),	  ‘We	  Will	  Not	  Prop’;	  Osborne	  (2012f),	  ‘This	  Is	  How	  The	  Coalition’;	  Cameron	  (2011c),	  ‘Giving	  You	  A	  Chance’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2012b),	  ‘We	  Disagree	  -­‐	  But	  That	  Won’t	  Stop	  Us’,	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  15/07/2012;Cable	  (2011d),	  ‘Private	  Recovery	  Can’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011h),	  ‘This	  Week	  At	  WorldSkills	  London’,	  The	  Sun,	  05/10/2011;	  V.	  Cable	  (2012c),	  ‘We’re	  In	  It	  For	  The	  Long	  Haul	  -­‐	  Stop	  Looking	  For	  A	  Quick-­‐Fix	  Solution’,	  The	  Times,	  12/06/2012	  26	  Osborne	  (2013a),	  ‘Loss	  Of	  Triple	  A’	  27	  Osborne	  (2010e),	  ‘We’ve	  Shown	  The	  World,	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’,	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’,	  Osborne	  (2010h),	  ‘Our	  Plan	  Is	  Working’;	  Osborne	  (2011a),	  ‘Europe	  Must	  Start;	  Cameron	  (2010d)	  ‘The	  New	  Politics’;	  Osborne	  (2011e),	  ‘UK	  Is	  Working’;	  Osborne	  (2011f),	  ‘UK	  PLC	  Is	  On	  Mend’,	  Osborne	  (2011h),	  ‘Britain	  Is	  Leading’;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011e),	  ‘Striking	  A	  Balance:	  Economic	  Growth	  Versus	  Fiscal	  Discipline’,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  04/04/2011,	  27,	  28,	  30,	  D.	  Cameron	  (2013a),	  ‘Conservatives	  Will	  Battle	  For	  Britain’s	  Future’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  02/05/2013	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seems	  highly	  probable	   that	   further	  deteriorations	   in	  economic	  growth	  will	   see	   it	  return.	  	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  bearing	  further	  comment	  is	  its	  co-­‐articulation	   with	   a	   number	   of	   other	   communicative	   discourses	   targeting	   the	  distinct	  electoral	  constituencies	  of	  two	  parties.	  Unlike	  the	  Brown	  Government,	  the	  Coalition’s	  central	  crisis	  narrative	   is	  a	   largely	  negative	  one:	   it	  paints	  a	  dangerous	  and	  uncertain	  context,	  and	  celebrates	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  decisive	  intervention	  in	  the	  form	  of	  fiscal	  consolidation	  that	  imposes	  costs	  on	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  electorate.	  It	  is	  likely	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   the	  deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   sits	   alongside	   several	   inter-­‐related	  stories	  that	  stress	  a	  more	  positive	  purpose	  for	  the	  Coalition.	  	  There	  is	  a	  bifurcation	  between	  the	  secondary	  discourses	  appealed	  to	  by	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	   Business	   Secretary	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   Conservative	   Chancellor,	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Work	  and	  Pensions	  Secretary	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  welfare	  crisis	  narrative,	   to	  which	  we	   turn	  presently,	   is	   one	   such	   secondary	  discourse.	  Another	  one,	  particularly	  associated	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  but	  reflected	  in	  the	  articles	  of	  the	  other	  Conservative	  ministers,	  centred	  around	  economic	  and	  social	  renewal	  and	  the	   re-­‐invigoration	   of	   civil	   society	   captured	   in	   the	   amorphous	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘big	  society’.28	   Statements	   that	   comprise	   this	   narrative	   are	   dominated	   by	   a	   stress	   on	  the	   transfer	   of	   responsibility	   and	   power	   to	   individuals	   and	   ‘communities’	   and	  contain	  a	  readily	  discernible	  scepticism	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  The	  positive	  purpose	  ascribed	   to	   the	  Coalition	  by	  Vince	  Cable	   relates	  much	  more	   to	   the	   opportunities	  arising	  from	  a	  rejuvenation	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  a	  geographical	  rebalancing	  of	  the	  UK	   economy	   that	   he	   argued	   would	   result	   from	   the	   Coalition’s	   economic	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal’;	  Cameron	  (2010b),	  ‘We’ll	  Transform	  Britain’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2011a),	  ‘Have	  No	  Doubt,	  The	  Big	  Society	  Is	  On	  Its	  Way’,	  The	  Observer,	  13/02/2011;	  Cameron	  (2011b),	  ‘How	  We	  Will	  Release’;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’;	  Cameron	  (2012b),	  ‘We	  Disagree	  -­‐	  But’	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agenda.29	   A	   similar	   emphasis	   is	   present	   in	   the	   articles	   authored	   by	   the	  Conservative	   ministers,	   yet	   what	   is	   distinct	   about	   Cable’s	   articles	   is	   that	   the	  Welfare	   Crisis	   and	   Big	   Society	   narratives	   do	   not	   feature	   prominently,	   if	   at	   all.	  Indeed,	   in	   one	   article	   he	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	   assert	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   rather	  different	  diagnoses	  of	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	   two	  parties,	  with	  the	  Conservatives	  cast	  as	  more	  sceptical	  of	  public	  spending	  and	  services	  whilst	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  are	  presented	  as	   reluctantly	  austere	  due	   to	   the	   fiscal	  position	  inherited	  from	  Labour.30	  	  This	  uneven	  emphasis	  and	  carefully	  articulated	  statement	  of	  difference	  is	  likely	  to	  be	   an	   aspect	   of	   crisis	   narration	   unique	   to	   coalition	   governments,	   and	   in	   turn	   is	  likely	   to	   arise	   from	   the	   need	   for	   each	   party	   to	   project	   a	   distinct	   identity	   to	  supporters	   and	   potential	   voters.	   Yet	   whilst	   these	   narratives	   differ	   in	   emphasis,	  they	  at	  no	  point	  contradict	  one	  another	  or	  the	  policies	  that	  they	  relate	  to.	  Instead,	  they	   represent	   different	   attempts	   to	   mobilise	   readers	   to	   the	   same	   policy	  programme.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   thread	   uniting	   these	   narratives	   is	   the	  deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   itself,	   which	   is	   articulated	   by	   all	   of	   the	   authors	   whose	  articles	  I	  have	  examined	  and	  underpins	  the	  other	  narratives	  that	  they	  appeal	  to.	  It	  is	   the	   supposed	   imminence	   of	   a	   debt	   crisis	   that	   provides	   a	   basis	   of	   absolute	  economic	  necessity	  to	  otherwise	  rather	  idealistic	  goals	  of	  the	  big	  society	  and	  or	  the	  rejuvenation	  of	  manufacturing,	  whilst	  these	  goals	  in	  turn	  reinforce	  the	  palatability	  of	   the	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   through	   proposing	   a	   ‘silver	   lining’	   to	   the	  retrenchment.	  The	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  is	  consequently	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  Coalition	  ideology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  V.	  Cable	  (2010a),	  ‘When	  Government	  Must	  Get	  Out	  Of	  The	  Way	  ‘,	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  20/06/2010;	  V.	  Cable	  (2010c),	  ‘Putting	  New	  Businesses	  Back	  At	  Forefront	  Of	  British	  Economy’,	  Western	  Morning	  News,	  29/06/2010;	  Cable	  and	  Pickles	  (2010),	  ‘A	  Recovering	  Economy’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2010d),	  ‘If	  Government	  Can	  Do	  Its	  Bit,	  I	  Believe	  British	  Business	  Has	  The	  Capacity,	  Energy	  And	  Ambition	  To	  Help	  Create	  A	  More	  Prosperous	  Future	  For	  All	  ‘,	  
The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  06/11/2010;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011b),	  ‘Region’s	  Vital	  Role	  In	  Export-­‐Led	  Recovery’,	  Western	  Morning	  News,	  03/02/2011;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011c),	  ‘Merlin:	  Our	  Bonus	  For	  British	  Business’,	  The	  Guardian,	  10/02/2011;	  Cable	  (2011d),	  ‘Private	  Recovery	  Can’;	  Cable	  (2011e),	  ‘Striking	  A	  Balance’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011f),	  ‘We’ll	  Rip	  Red	  Tape’,	  The	  Sun,	  14/04/2011;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011g),	  ‘Where	  We	  Agree	  To	  Differ	  On	  Restoring	  The	  Economy’,	  The	  Financial	  
Times,	  11/06/2011;	  Cable	  (2011h),	  ‘This	  Week	  At	  WorldSkills’;	  V.	  Cable	  (2011i),	  ‘Put	  Aside	  The	  Whinging:	  The	  Threats	  To	  The	  City	  From	  Banking	  Reform	  Are	  Overstated’,	  The	  
Guardian,	  21/12/2011;	  Cable	  (2012c),	  ‘We’re	  In	  It	  For’	  30	  Cable	  (2011g),	  ‘Where	  We	  Agree	  To	  Differ’	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Crisis	  Of	  Welfare	  Narrative	  	  The	   crisis	   of	  welfare	  narrative	   is	   constituted	  by	   three	   themes.	  The	   first	   specifies	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  crisis	  as	  a	  structural	  rather	  than	  cyclical	  one.	  Although	  appeals	  to	  the	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   frequently	   sit	   alongside	   those	   to	   the	   welfare	   crisis	  narrative,	   the	  problem	   identified	  as	  being	   in	  need	  of	  decisive	   intervention	   in	   the	  latter	   is	   one	   of	   a	   ‘benefits	   culture’	   of	   chronic	   long-­‐term	   claimancy.	   The	   benefits	  culture	   is	   characterised	   as	   simultaneously	   unfair	   to	   those	   who	   finance	   it	   and	  detrimental	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	   interests	   of	   claimants.31	   It	   is	   consequently	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   system	   itself	   that	   the	   Coalition	   cast	   as	   the	   motivation	   for	   its	  interventions,	  although	  it	  appeals	  to	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  in	  a	  secondary	  role	  in	  order	  to	  assert	  that	  reform	  is	  now	  unavoidable.	  	  The	   nature	   of	   this	   structural	   crisis	   is	   outlined	   in	   a	   second	   theme.	   The	   theme	  attributes	  the	  rising	  costs	  of	  the	  system	  to	  what	  is	  implied	  to	  be	  a	  very	  large	  group	  of	   long-­‐term	  claimants	   (particularly	   the	   long-­‐term	  unemployed),	  alongside	   fraud,	  error	  and	  inefficiency.	  The	  overwhelming	  focus	  of	  the	  narrative	  is,	  however,	  these	  long-­‐term	  claimants.	  The	  current	  benefits	  system	  is	  said	  to	  have	  emerged	  over	  the	  thirteen	   years	   of	   Labour	   government,	   with	   a	   large	   and	   growing	   number	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  Osborne	  (2010h),	  ‘Our	  Plan	  Is	  Working’;	  Osborne	  (2012a),	  ‘It’s	  A	  Crisis	  Of	  Confidence’;	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal’;	  Cameron	  (2010c),	  ‘The	  Pain	  -­‐	  And’;	  Cameron	  (2013a),	  ‘Conservatives	  Will	  Battle’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2013b),	  ‘Crazy	  Situation	  Where	  You	  Earn	  More	  On	  Benefits	  Than	  You	  Do	  At	  Work	  Ends	  NOW’,	  The	  Sun,	  07/04/2013;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms	  Will	  Bring	  Hope,	  Not	  Despair’,	  The	  Daily	  Mail,	  09/11/2010;I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010b),	  ‘Breaking	  The	  Deadly	  Grip	  Of	  Dependency’,	  The	  
Sunday	  Telegraph,	  26/12/2010;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011a),	  ‘Brussels	  Poses	  Serious	  Threat	  To	  Our	  Welfare	  Reforms’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  30/09/2011;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘We’ll	  Make	  Work	  Worth	  It’,	  The	  Guardian,	  06/10/2011;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer,	  And	  For	  The	  Claimant’,	  The	  Independent,	  12/02/2012;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012b),	  ‘The	  Delusions	  Of	  X	  Factor	  And	  Sneering	  Job	  Snobs	  Who	  Betray	  The	  Young’,	  The	  Daily	  Mail,	  20/02/2012;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare	  Be	  A	  Lifestyle	  Choice’,	  The	  Daily	  Mail,	  15/07/2012;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  and	  G.	  Osborne	  (2012),	  ‘George	  Osborne	  And	  Iain	  Duncan	  Smith	  Set	  Out	  How	  They	  Will	  End	  The	  ‘Something	  For	  Nothing’	  Culture’,	  The	  Daily	  Mail,	  08/10/2012.;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness	  Back	  To	  Welfare’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  20/12/2012;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013b),	  ‘Britain	  Cannot	  Afford	  The	  Spare	  Room	  Subsidy’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  07/03/2013;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013c),	  ‘We’ll	  Go	  Further	  To	  Tackle	  Benefits	  Culture’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  24/04/2013;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013d),	  ‘I’m	  Proud	  Of	  Our	  Welfare	  Reforms’,	  The	  Guardian,	  28/07/2013;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013e),	  ‘For	  Those	  Eyeballing	  Benefits	  As	  A	  One-­‐Way	  Ticket	  To	  Easy	  Street,	  I	  Have	  A	  Wake-­‐Up	  Call	  For	  You:	  Those	  Days	  Are	  Over!’,	  The	  Daily	  
Mail,	  11/08/2013;	  I.	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013f),	  ‘We	  Will	  Stop	  People	  Coming	  Here	  To	  Claim	  Benefits’,	  The	  Times,	  13/12/2013	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claimants	   making	   indefinite	   claims	   on	   a	   range	   of	   conditional	   benefits	   whilst	  
choosing	  not	  to	  pursue	  employment	  opportunities	  that	  would	  make	  them	  ineligible	  for	  these	  benefits.	  	  	  Long-­‐term	   claimants	   are	   spoken	   about	   in	   two	   quite	   distinct	   ways	   within	   the	  narrative.	  The	  first	  refers	  to	  claimants	  who	  have	  allegedly	  become	  ‘trapped’	  in	  the	  benefits	   culture	   because	   of	   perverse	   institutional	   arrangements	   whereby	   the	  material	  costs	  of	  seeking	  employment	  opportunities	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.32	  The	  group	  is	  treated	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  sympathy	  and	  assigned	  a	  degree	  of	  victimhood:	  the	  welfare	  system	  is	  said	  to	  have	   ‘failed	  them’,	   ‘trapping’	   them	  in	  a	   life	  bereft	  of	  freedom	  and	  self-­‐respect.33	  This	   in	   turn	  allowed	   the	  government	  on	  occasions	   to	  characterise	   its	   own	   reforms	   as	   ‘progressive’	   by	   lifting	   such	   claimants	   out	   of	  victimhood	  and	  constraint,	  and	  allowing	  them	  to	  return	  to	  work.	  The	  second	  group	  –	   comprised	   in	   the	   imaginary	   of	   the	   narrative	   as	   those	   who	   are	   defrauding	   the	  benefits	  system	  or	  are	  bent	  on	  not	  seeking	  employment	  opportunities	  under	  any	  circumstances	   –	   is	   characterised	   in	   an	   altogether	   less	   sympathetic	   light.34	   A	  number	  of	  articles	  position	  migrants	  as	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  this	  problem.35	  	  The	  behaviour	  of	  these	  claimants,	  and	  the	  expanding	  costs	  arising	  from	  it,	  is	  cast	  as	  unfair	   to	   people	   in	   paid	   employment	   (frequently	   identified	   as	   ‘hard-­‐working	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2010g),	  ‘Why	  £7.5m	  A	  Year	  Will	  Help	  Give	  Every	  Child	  A	  Change’,	  The	  
Sun,	  10/12/2010;	  Cameron	  (2011c),	  ‘Giving	  You	  A	  Chance’;	  Cameron	  (2013b),	  ‘Crazy	  Situation	  Where’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  and	  Osborne	  (2012),	  ‘George	  Osborne	  And’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013c),	  ‘We’ll	  Go	  Further	  To’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013d),	  ‘I’m	  Proud	  Of	  Our’	  33	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘We’ll	  Make	  Work	  Worth’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  and	  Osborne	  (2012),	  ‘George	  Osborne	  And’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness’;	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’.	  34	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal’;	  Cameron	  (2011e),	  ‘Whenever	  Nick	  And	  I’;D.	  Cameron	  (2012a),	  ‘I	  Get	  The	  Message	  –	  But	  Reform	  Takes	  Time’,	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  07/05/2012;	  Cameron	  (2012b),	  ‘We	  Disagree	  -­‐	  But’;	  D.	  Cameron	  (2013c),	  ‘Free	  Movement	  Within	  Europe	  Needs	  To	  Be	  Less	  Free’,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  26/11/2013;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘Brussels	  Poses	  Serious’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013e),	  ‘For	  Those	  Eyeballing	  Benefits’.	  35	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘Brussels	  Poses	  Serious’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013f),	  ‘We	  Will	  Stop	  People’;	  Cameron	  (2013c),	  ‘Free	  Movement	  Within’.	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families’,	  or	  sometimes	   through	   the	  broader	  notion	  of	   ‘taxpayers’).	  Claimants	  are	  said	  to	  unjustly	  enjoy	  privileges	  in	  relation	  to	  housing,	  income	  and	  family	  planning	  that	  are	  financed	  but	  not	  enjoyed	  by	  those	  in	  work.36	   It	   is	   in	  this	   juxtaposition	  of	  the	  relative	  incomes	  and	  opportunities	  of	  long-­‐term	  claimants	  who	  have	  allegedly	  made	   socially	   irresponsible	   choices	   and	  working	  people	  who	  have	  made	   socially	  responsible	  choices	   that	   the	  crisis	   is	   said	   to	   lie.	  The	  reduction	  and	  retargeting	  of	  resources	   given	   over	   to	   benefits	   through	   the	   tightening	   and	   shortening	   of	  eligibility	   criteria	   would	   thus	   simultaneously	   ensure	   ‘fairness’	   by	   adjusting	   the	  relative	   incomes	   of	   claimants	   and	   non-­‐claimants,	   whilst	   also	   incentivizing	   and	  coercing	   long-­‐term	   claimants	   into	   allegedly	   plentiful	   employment	   opportunities	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  social	  security	  spending.	  	  A	   final	   theme	  placed	   the	  blame	   for	   the	   ‘benefits	   culture’	  on	   the	  New	  Labour	  and	  Brown	  Governments.	  These	  Labour	  governments	  are	  painted	  as	  having	  chosen	  not	  to	  reform	  the	  system	  prior	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  recession,	  and	  as	  actively	  contributing	  to	  the	   problem	   by	   increasing	   spending	   so	   as	   to	   secure	   populist	   favour	   and	   avoid	  political	  costs	  of	  reform.	  37	  This	  draws	  upon	  and	  reinforces	  the	  notion	  of	  Labour’s	  fiscal	   impropriety	   established	   in	   the	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative.	   On	   other	   occasions	  Labour	  are	  cast	  as	  holding	  a	  similar	  stance	  towards	  welfare	  reform	  to	  the	  Coalition	  but	   lacking	   in	   the	   resolve	   to	   pursue	   it,	   suggesting	   that	   Labour’s	   criticism	   of	   the	  reforms	  was	  opportunistic.38	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  Osborne	  (2012g),	  ‘Obama	  Proves	  You	  Can’;	  Osborne	  (2012h),	  ‘Hard	  Times	  Will	  Pay’;	  Osborne	  (2013b),	  ‘My	  Budget	  Will	  Be’;	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal’;	  Cameron	  (2013a),	  ‘Conservatives	  Will	  Battle’;	  Cameron	  (2013b),	  ‘Crazy	  Situation	  Where’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010b),	  ‘Breaking	  The	  Deadly’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘Brussels	  Poses	  Serious’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2011b),	  ‘We’ll	  Make	  Work	  Worth’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  and	  Osborne	  (2012),	  ‘George	  Osborne	  And’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013b),	  ‘Britain	  Cannot	  Afford’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013d),	  ‘I’m	  Proud	  Of	  Our’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013e),	  ‘For	  Those	  Eyeballing	  Benefits’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013f),	  ‘We	  Will	  Stop	  People’;	  37	  Osborne	  (2010f),	  ‘Only	  Way	  To	  Make	  Britain’;	  Osborne	  (2010g),	  ‘A	  Stronger	  UK	  Starts	  Today’;	  Osborne	  (2010h),	  ‘Our	  Plan	  Is	  Working’;	  Cameron	  (2010a),	  ‘I	  Know	  The	  Deal’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  and	  Osborne	  (2012),	  ‘George	  Osborne	  And’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012d),	  ‘We’ve	  Bought	  Fairness’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013d),	  ‘I’m	  Proud	  Of	  Our’.	  38	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2010a),	  ‘Why	  These	  Reforms’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012a),	  ‘Fairness	  For	  The	  Taxpayer’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012b),	  ‘The	  Delusions	  Of	  X’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012c),	  ‘I	  Won’t	  Let	  Welfare’;	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2013e),	  ‘For	  Those	  Eyeballing	  Benefits’.	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3.	  
Analysis	  	  In	   all	   four	   of	   the	   crisis	   narratives	   described	   above	   one	   can	   observe	   the	   kind	   of	  selective,	   interpellative,	  dynamic	  and	   ideological	   communication	   that	   is	   captured	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  crisis	  narration.	  The	  techniques	  by	  which	  the	  narrative’s	  authors	  have	   sought	   to	   gain	   this	   mobilizing	   effect	   can	   be	   made	   explicit,	   analysed	   and	  compared	   by	   utilizing	   the	   concepts	   discussed	   in	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3:	   narrative	  selectivity,	   direct	   interpellation,	   empaphic	   interpellation	   through	   value	  amplification	  and	  narrative	  bridging,	  and	  counter-­‐narration.	  	  
Narrative	  Selectivity	  	  Narrative	  selectivity	  refers	  to	  the	  privileging	  of	  certain	  facts	  and	  interpretations	  in	  a	   narrative	   and	   the	   downplaying	   of	   others,	   creating	   a	   partial	   and	   selective	  interpretation	   of	   a	   more	   complex	   reality.	   It	   is	   a	   fairly	   obvious	   trait	   of	   political	  communication	   that	   inconvenient	   truths	   will	   be	   played	   down,	   yet	   what	   is	   clear	  from	  these	  post-­‐2008	  crisis	  narratives	  is	  how	  brazen	  narrative	  selectivity	  actually	  is	  and	  the	  thoroughly	  ironic	  consequences	  that	  can	  result.	  	  	  The	   ‘Deflection	   of	   Blame	   Narrative’	   highlighted	   the	   ‘globalisation’	   of	   financial	  markets	   and	   the	   corresponding	   constraints	   that	   this	   places	   on	   unilateral	   reform	  initiatives	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	   government’s	   lack	   of	   preparedness	   for	   the	  financial	  instability	  of	  2007-­‐08.	  Yet	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  ‘deselected’	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  New	  Labour	  governments	  had	  extolled	  the	  virtues	  of	  this	  process	  to	  other	  governments	  and	   had	   been	   sanguine	   about	   the	   benefits	   of	   financial	   innovation.	   The	   ‘crisis	   of	  impending	  Conservative	  misrule’	  narrative	  omits	  the	  content	  of	  Labour’s	  proposed	  approach	   to	   fiscal	   consolidation	   (the	   comprehensive	   spending	   review	  was	   to	   be	  delayed	  until	  after	  the	  election),	  leaving	  little	  evidence	  on	  which	  to	  base	  the	  claim	  that	  Labour’s	  approach	   to	  deficit	   reduction	  would	  be	   ‘fairer’	   than	  a	  Conservative	  one.	  	  	  
	   314	  
The	  ‘debt	  crisis	  narrative’	  deselected	  improving	  economic	  indicators	  in	  2010	  when	  foregrounding	   the	   deficit	   and	   asserting	   the	   immediate	   imminence	   of	   economic	  ruin.	  The	  crises	  unfolding	  in	  southern	  Europe	  were	  selected	  for	  inclusion	  and	  held	  up	   in	   an	   oft-­‐unqualified	   way	   as	   though	   a	   relevant	   comparison	   with	   Britain,	  excluding	   contrary	   information	   about	   the	   very	   different	   economic	   situations	   in	  these	   countries.	   In	   characterizing	   Labour	   as	   chronically	   and	   cynically	   fiscally	  irresponsible	  over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  term,	  the	  debt	  crisis	  narrative	  excludes	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  had	  advocated	  a	  very	  similar	  fiscal	  position	  to	  that	  of	  the	  New	  Labour	  government	  prior	  to	  2007,	  whilst	  the	  ritualistic	  repetition	  that	  the	  deficit	   and	   other	   economic	   problems	  were	   the	   ‘mess	   that	   Labour	   left’	   appear	   in	  most	  instance	  to	  discount	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  financial	  crash	  of	  historic	  proportions	  had	  occurred	  less	  than	  two	  years	  earlier.	  	  	  In	   the	   crisis	   of	  welfare	   narrative,	   the	   division	   of	   low	   and	  middle-­‐income	   people	  into	   ‘deserving’	   and	   ‘undeserving’	   categories	   (as	   seen	   in	   the	   distinction	   between	  working	  people	  vs.	   trapped	  claimants	  vs.	  dishonest	  claimants)	  detaches	  the	   issue	  of	   long-­‐term	  claimancy	   from	  the	  many	  social,	  economic	  and	  physiological	   factors	  that	  might	  cause	  it.	  Instead,	  it	  selectively	  reduces	  it	  to	  an	  issue	  of	  moral	  bankruptcy	  and	  idleness.	  Another	  selective	  omission	  in	  the	  narrative	  is	  the	  bleak	  prospects	  for	  finding	  long-­‐term	  employment	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  particularly	  for	  the	  young.	  The	   narrative	   implied	   that	   there	   was	   a	   ready	   supply	   of	   jobs	   to	   soak	   up	   the	  undeserving	  poor	  if	  only	  they	  could	  be	  correctly	  incentivised,	  a	  contestable	  claim	  in	  a	   context	  where	   the	   rate	  of	  unemployment	  only	  began	  a	   sustained	  downward	  trend	   towards	   pre-­‐2008	   levels	   in	   mid	   2013.39	   Moreover,	   during	   a	   time	   of	  fluctuating	   and	   frequently	   deteriorating	   economic	   indicators	   and	   falling	   real	  incomes	  there	  was	  a	  real	  potential	  that	  the	  very	  readers	  who	  the	  narrative	  sought	  to	   mobilise	   would	   themselves	   become	   claimants	   of	   benefits	   that	   were	   being	  capped.	  This	  potential	  was,	  naturally,	  omitted	  from	  the	  narrative.	  	  What	   the	   foregoing	   makes	   clear	   is	   that	   narrative	   selectivity	   is	   driven	   by	   an	  instrumental	  logic	  –	  facts	  that	  are	  useful	  are	  selected	  (along	  with	  some	  that	  have	  a	  spurious	  significance	  at	  best),	  whilst	  those	  that	  are	  not	  useful	  are	  simply	  left	  aside.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  ONS	  unemployment	  data	  plotted	  in	  British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  (2014a),	  ‘Economy	  Tracker'.	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This	  is	  unsurprising,	  however	  it	  does	  suggest	  an	  important	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  crisis	  narration:	  choices	  about	  what	  is	  included	  and	  excluded	  reflect	  principles	  other	  than	  factual	  rigour	  or	  plausibility.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  governing	  principles	  of	  selection	   also	   reflect	   what	   the	   architects	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   believe	   will	   be	  persuasive,	   this	   in	   turn	   suggests	   that	   they	   believe	   the	   persuasiveness	   of	   crisis	  narratives	   to	   arise	   from	   factors	   other	   than	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   analysis.	   An	  alternative	  possibility	  is	  that	  narrative	  selectivity	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  opportunities	  to	   deploy	   the	   interpellative	   strategies	   discussed	   in	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3,	   which	  persuade	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   resonance	   between	   distant	   and	   disparate	  events,	   and	   the	   lived	   experiences	   of	   ordinary	   citizens.	   As	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	  section	  shows,	  the	  narratives	  are	  rich	  with	  such	  techniques.	  	  
Direct	  Interpellation	  	  Direct	   interpellation	   functions	   by	   placing	   subject	   positions	   with	   which	   readers	  may	  identify	  into	  the	  narrative	  and	  portraying	  these	  as	  having	  certain	  interests	  or	  being	  subject	  to	  certain	  threats.	  Direct	   interpellation	   is	  evident	  to	  some	  extent	   in	  all	  narratives.	   In	   the	  blame	  deflection	  narrative,	   crisis	  of	   impending	  conservative	  misrule	  narrative	  and	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  the	  most	  common	  direct	  appeal	  is	  to	   ‘families’,	   ‘hard	  working	  families’	  or	   ‘families	  and	  businesses’	  when	  elucidating	  the	  various	  dangers	  or	  disadvantages	  that	  the	  respective	  crises	  are	  said	  to	  impose.	  The	  latter	  couplet	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  common.	  What	  all	  of	  these	  categories	  have	  in	  common	   is	   their	  scope:	  a	  very	   large	  number	  of	   readers	  will	  either	  belong	   to	  a	  family	  unit	  and/or	  be	  employed	  by	  or	  own	  a	  business.	  The	  less	  frequent	  appeals	  to	  the	   interests	   of	   ‘young	   people’	   serves	   a	   similar	   function,	   for	   it	   calls	   for	   the	  identification	  of	  young	  people	  or	  parents.	  	  	  The	  predominant	  means	  of	  direct	  interpellation	  in	  the	  welfare	  crisis,	  meanwhile,	  is	  found	  in	  an	  even	  larger	  category	  of	  people:	  the	  sizeable	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  who	  are	  or	  have	  been	  employed	  (denoted	  through	  appeals	  to	  ‘people	  who	  work	  for	  a	   living’	   and	   other	   formulations	   of	   the	   same).	   The	   narrative	   depends	   to	   a	   great	  extent	  on	  the	  success	  of	  this	  strategy	  of	  direct	  interpellation,	  explicitly	  juxtaposing	  the	   ‘unfair’	   behaviour	   of	   long-­‐term	   claimants	   with	   the	   frustrating	   economic	  position	  of	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  working	  households	  during	  the	  period	  of	  falling	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real	  incomes	  –	  circumstances	  with	  which	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  readership	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  directly	  experienced	  in	  the	  straitened	  circumstances	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  unlikely	  that	  the	  narrative	  would	  hold	  much	  resonance	  with	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  readily	  fit	  into	  this	  category,	  such	  as	  long-­‐term	  claimants	  themselves.	  	  	  What	   the	   foregoing	   suggests	   is	   that	   strategies	   of	   direct	   interpellation	   are	   not	  sophisticated	   in	   government-­‐produced	   crisis	   narratives	   and	   draw	   upon	   a	   very	  limited	  number	  of	  subject	  positions.	  They	  are	  calculated	  to	  be	  very	  inclusive,	  and	  presumably	   this	   is	   precisely	   because	   this	   increases	   the	   number	   of	   readers	   for	  whom	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  directly	  relate	  to	  the	  preferred	  subject	  position	  in	  the	  narrative.	   This	   in	   turn	   reflects	   the	   demands	   of	   centrist	   democratic	   politics	   –	   the	  encompassing	   categories	   reflect	   the	   encompassing	   cross-­‐sectional	   constituencies	  that	  centrist	  parties	  must	  mobilise.	  	  The	  welfare	  crisis	  narrative	  is	  unusual	  alongside	  the	  other	  ones	  examined	  here	  as	  being	  the	  only	  one	  where	  direct	  interpellation	  is	  so	  systematically	  important	  to	  the	  narrative	   in	   the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	   instances	  examined.	   In	   the	  others,	   the	  strategy	  operates	  as	  a	   supplementary	   strategy	   that	   supports	  a	  broader	  empathic	  mode	   of	   interpellation.	   Such	   strategies	   solicit	   agreement	   and	   create	   resonance	  with	   the	   lived	   experiences	   of	   the	   reader	   through	   more	   subtle	   interpellative	  techniques.	  	  	  
Value	  Amplification	  	  One	   such	   interpellative	   technique	   is	   value	   amplification.	   This	   technique	   involves	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  narrative	  around	  widely	  held	  normative	  values.40	  In	  the	  blame	  deflection	   narrative	   the	   shifting	   of	   blame	   away	   from	   government	   and	   on	   to	  financial	  market	   actors	   is	   partly	   achieved	   through	   a	   characterisation	   of	   financial	  market	   actors	   as	   being	   irresponsible	   and	   greedy,	   traits	   that	   are	   widely	  disapproved	  of.	  It	  is	  more	  strongly	  present	  in	  the	  crisis	  of	  impending	  conservative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Whether	  this	  is	  intentional,	  unintentional,	  or	  both	  is	  an	  interesting	  question,	  although	  not	  one	  I	  can	  categorically	  adjudicate	  here.	  Given	  the	  care	  that	  is	  taken	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  crisis	  narratives	  it	  is	  a	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  the	  technique	  is	  deliberate,	  and	  I	  proaceed	  here	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  assumption.	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misrule	  narrative,	   in	  which	   the	   ‘unfairness’	  of	  Conservative	  priorities	   is	  asserted.	  Underlying	  this	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  set	  of	  ‘common	  sense’	  values	  likely	  to	  be	  held	  by	  a	   great	   many	   readers	   are	   being	   violated	   –	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   the	   imperative	   to	  distribute	  the	  burden	  of	  shared	  problems	  fairly	  by	  privileging	  the	  least	  well-­‐off	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  young.	  Direct	  interpellations	  can	  double	  up	  in	  this	  regard	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   a	   reader	   who	   does	   not	   occupy	   the	   subject	   position	  appealed	  to	  (for	   instance,	  a	  person	  with	  no	  children	  or	  any	  surviving	   family)	  has	  internalised	  widely	  held	  values	   that	  render	   the	  subject	  positions	   inscribed	   in	   the	  narrative	  (parents,	  families)	  as	  ones	  worthy	  of	  sympathy	  and	  support.	  	  A	   similar	   strategy	   of	   value	   amplification	   occurs	   in	   the	   crisis	   of	   debt	   narrative,	  where	  the	  same	  emphasis	  on	  ‘fairness’	  is	  activated	  but	  in	  support	  of	  a	  different	  set	  of	  policies	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  supposed	  immediacy	  of	  a	  debt	  crisis.	  Yet	  the	  deficit	  crisis	   narrative	   includes	   another	   interesting	   value-­‐amplifying	   feature:	   the	   use	   of	  ‘household	   metaphors’.	   Household	   metaphors	   can	   function	   to	   create	   resonance	  with	   lived	   experiences	   because	   they	   explain	   economic	   policy	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  ordinary	  citizen’s	  own	  domestic	  finances.	  These	  domestic	  finances	  are	  not	  simply	  common	   sense:	   underlying	   them	  are	   a	   set	   of	   norms	   and	   values	   emphasizing	   the	  importance	   of	   prudence,	   of	   self-­‐reliance	   and	   financial	   self-­‐sufficiency,	   and	   of	   the	  virtues	  of	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  and	  bearing	  the	  consequences	  of	  over-­‐spending.	  By	  narrating	  the	  debt	  crisis	  as	  though	  the	  public	  sector	  was	  a	  household	  that	  had	  over-­‐spent	  and	  was	  now	  ‘tightening	  its	  belt’,	  the	  Coalition	  sought	  to	  ‘activate’	  these	  values	   in	   the	   reader	   and	   use	   these	   to	   guide	   them	   towards	   the	   narrative’s	  conclusions	  on	  appropriate	  fiscal	  policy.	  	  	  Interestingly,	   the	   gap	  between	   the	   ideal	   financially	   literate	   ‘welfare	   citizens’	   that	  were	  implied	  by	  New	  Labour’s	  asset-­‐based	  welfare	  agenda	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  many	  citizens’	   financial	   prudence	   revealed	   by	   the	   subsequent	   financial	   instability	  suggests	   that	   these	  norms	  and	  values	  may	  not	  have	  been	  as	  keenly	  endorsed	  by	  the	  population	  as	  their	  importance	  to	  the	  debt	  crisis	  narrative	  would	  suggest.	  Yet	  the	  Coalition	  could	  reasonably	  speculate	  that	  the	  experiences	  of	  many	  households	  of	   over-­‐leverage	   and	   balance	   sheet	   adjustment	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   would	  increase	   the	   resonance	   of	   such	   norms	   and	   values	   after	   the	   event.	   For	   those	  households	  who	  had	  directly	  or	   indirectly	  experienced	  a	   fall	   in	  consumption	  as	  a	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result	  of	  deleveraging	  or	  unemployment	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  need	  for	  ‘belt	  tightening’	  and	   of	   safeguarding	   one’s	   creditworthiness	   would	   be	   all	   too	   familiar,	   and	   its	  extension	  onto	  the	  public	  sector’s	  finances	  perhaps	  all	  the	  more	  compelling.	  	  Of	  the	  narratives	  presented	  here,	   it	   is	   the	  crisis	  of	  welfare	  narrative	   in	  which	  the	  strategy	   of	   value-­‐amplification	   is	   most	   prominent.	   Central	   to	   it	   is	   the	   dual	  normative	  emphasis	  on	  the	  value	  of	  ‘work’	  (equated	  as	  labour	  market	  participation	  in	  the	  narrative)	  and	  the	  corresponding	  reprehensibility	  of	  accepting	  income	  that	  one	  has	  not	  earned	  through	  labour	  market	  participation	  or	  which	  arises	  from	  the	  earned	   incomes	  of	  others.	   It	   is	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   this	   simple	  normative	  proposition	  that	  long-­‐term	  claimants	  are	  rendered	  undeserving.	  Through	  narrative	  selectivity	  the	  other	   socially	  valorised	  responsibilities	   that	   such	  claimants	  might	  bear	   (such	  as	   parenthood	  or	   a	   long-­‐term	   care	   role)	   are	   excluded,	   facilitating	   the	  narrative’s	  central	   conclusion	   that	   long-­‐term	   claimants	   should	   under	   no	   circumstances	  receive	  more	  than	  those	  in	  work.	  	  	  
Narrative	  Bridging	  	  What	   the	   foregoing	   suggests	   is	   that	   the	   authors	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   incorporate	  simple	  normative	  arguments	  into	  their	  crisis	  narratives	  that	  are	  calculated	  to	  have	  a	  wide	  appeal.	  Yet	  such	  appeals	  are	  only	  effective	  insofar	  as	  the	  values	  appealed	  to	  are	   indeed	  widely	   shared.	  We	   can	   readily	   imagine	   that	   individuals	  may	   possess	  other	   normative	   commitments	   that	   would	   disrupt	   the	   intended	   effects	   of	   these	  normative	  strategies	  and	  lead	  the	  reader	  to	  more	  nuanced	  conclusions.	  A	  recipient	  of	  the	  crisis	  of	  welfare	  narrative,	  for	  instance,	  might	  be	  predisposed	  through	  their	  own	   value	   system	   to	   sympathise	   with	   the	   socially	   disadvantaged,	   yielding	   a	  disagreement	  with	  the	  policy	  preferences	  inscribed	  in	  the	  narrative.	  One	  means	  of	  ensuring	  a	  broad	  effectiveness	   in	   the	  value	  amplifying	   features	  of	   a	  narrative,	   as	  well	  as	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  conclusions	  it	  proposes	  will	  be	  accepted,	  is	   to	   connect	   it	   (‘bridge’)	   to	   a	   more	   established	   narrative	   that	   exists	   within	   the	  society	  in	  which	  it	  is	  articulated.	  	  	  A	   strategy	   of	   narrative	   bridging	   can	   be	   noted	   in	   both	   the	   crisis	   of	   conservative	  misrule	  narrative	  and	  in	  the	  welfare	  crisis	  narrative.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former,	  the	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equation	  of	  the	  present-­‐day	  Conservative	  Party’s	  values	  and	  policy	  preferences	  to	  those	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  activates	  the	  very	  potent	  and	  polarizing	  memory	  of	  the	   Thatcher	   governments.	   In	   particular,	   it	   conforms	   to	   a	   centre-­‐left	   political	  narrative	   of	   those	   governments	   recognisable	   to	   many	   in	   Britain,	   which	  characterises	  them	  as	  having	  celebrated	  market	  acquisitiveness	  and	  ‘greed’	  and	  as	  having	   held	   the	   unemployed	   in	   contempt	   even	   as	   they	   presided	   over	   economic	  processes	   that	   decimated	   communities	   and	   livelihoods.41	   Although	   this	   broader	  narrative	   is	   well	   known,	   attitudes	   towards	   Thatcher	   vary	   widely.42	   The	   actual	  impact	  that	  this	  bridging	  strategy	  has	  is	  likely	  to	  vary	  depending	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	   reader	   agrees	   with	   it.	   The	   message	   would	   appear	   designed	   largely	   to	   rally	  Labour’s	   core	   constituents,	   particularly	   in	   northern	   constituencies	   where	   the	  physical	   and	   social	   evidence	   of	   1980s’	   and	   1990s’	   de-­‐industrialisation	   and	  unemployment	   are	   still	   very	  much	   in	   evidence.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   consider	   how	  constituents	   in	   the	   south	   of	   the	   UK	   might	   have	   received	   such	   a	   message.	   The	  Thatcher	  governments	  drew	  important	  electoral	  support	  from	  such	  groups.43	  Here,	  perhaps,	   the	   bridge	  would	   be	   less	   successful.	   However	   the	   second	   aspect	   of	   the	  narrative	  –	  the	  calling	  into	  question	  of	  Conservative	  economic	  competence	  –	  may	  have	   held	  more	   purchase	   as	   it	   stressed	   alleged	   risks	   posed	   in	   the	   Conservative	  approach	   to	  deficit	   reduction	   to	   employment	   and	  homeownership.	   Consequently	  the	   two	   components	   of	   the	   narrative	   together	   extend	   its	   socio-­‐economic	   and	  geographical	  reach.	  	  The	  welfare	  crisis	  narrative	  also	  represents	  a	  bridge.	  Its	  terms	  –	  the	  division	  of	  the	  poor	  into	  ‘undeserving’	  and	  ‘deserving’	  categories	  based	  on	  their	  fitness	  for	  work	  and	   labour	  market	   participation	   –	   has	   its	   antecedents	   in	   the	   19th	   century.44	   The	  
30th	   British	   Social	   Attitudes	   Survey	   found	   a	   similarly	   negative	   assessment	   of	   the	  plight	  of	  long-­‐term	  claimants	  to	  be	  widespread	  in	  contemporary	  British	  society.45	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  For	  a	  paradigmatic	  recital	  of	  its	  terms,	  see	  R.	  Seymore	  (2013),	  'An	  Obituary	  From	  Below',	  Jacobin,	  April	  2013.	  	  42	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  Thatcher	  Poll	  (London:	  ICM).	  43	  J.	  Peck	  and	  A.	  Tickell	  (1995),	  'The	  Social	  Regulation	  Of	  Uneven	  Development:	  'Regulatory	  Deficit',	  England's	  South	  East,	  And	  The	  Collapse	  Of	  Thatcherism',	  Environment	  
And	  Planning	  A,	  27	  (1),	  pp.15-­‐40.	  44	  Garthwaite,	  K.	  (2011).	  ‘The	  Language	  of	  Shirkers	  And	  Scroungers?’	  Talking	  About	  Illness,	  Disability	  And	  Coalition	  Welfare	  Reform’,	  Disability	  &	  Society,	  26	  (3),	  pp.369-­‐372.	  45	  Park,	  A.,	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  British	  Social	  Attitudes	  30	  (London:	  NatCen),	  Table	  2.4.	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The	   crisis	   of	   welfare	   narrative	   consequently	   represents	   a	   straightforward	  recruitment	  of	  an	  existing	  set	  of	  attitudes	  to	  long-­‐term	  claimants.	  	  In	   both	   of	   these	   narratives	   a	   bridge	   is	  made	   to	   a	  more	  widely	   held	   pre-­‐existing	  social	  narrative.	  Narrative	  bridging	  also	  plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	   two	  other	  narratives,	  although	  a	   less	  pivotal	  one.	  The	  blame	  deflection	  narrative	  carefully	  bridges	   to	  a	  set	   of	   negative	   propositions	   about	   the	   banking	   industry,	   recruiting	   popular	  sentiment	  following	  the	  collapse	  in	  positive	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  industry	  during	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  2008.46	  The	  government	  claimed	  to	  understand	  and,	  to	  a	  qualified	  extent,	  share	  the	  anger	  of	  those	  who	  blamed	  financial	  market	  actors	  for	  the	   deterioration	   of	   economic	   circumstances,	   but	   sought	   to	   mitigate	   calls	   for	  decisive	   intervention	   in	   this	   area	   of	   political	   economy	   through	   the	   very	   same	  narrative	   in	   which	   this	   theme	   was	   incorporated.	   Similarly,	   a	   number	   of	   texts	  comprising	   the	   debt	   crisis	   narrative	  make	   a	   link	   between	   New	   Labour’s	   alleged	  fiscal	  irresponsibility	  and	  incompetence	  prior	  to	  2008	  and	  that	  which	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	   characterised	   Labour	   governments	   in	   the	   1970s	   –	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   same	  thirty	  year	  old	  crisis	  narrative	  studied	  by	  Hay.47	  	  
Dynamics	  Of	  Crisis	  Narration	  	  Crisis	  narration	  is	  a	  dynamic	  process,	  occurring	  over	  time	  and	  in	  response	  both	  to	  events	   and	   the	   development	   of	   opponents’	   crisis	   narratives.	   This	   dynamism	   is	  captured	   in	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘counter	  narration’.	   The	   clearest	   example	   of	   this	   is	   the	  narrative	  of	   impending	  Conservative	  misrule,	  which	   is	  arguably	   in	  and	  of	   itself	   a	  counter-­‐narrative	   in	   response	   to	   conservative	   criticism	   of	   the	   Brown	  Government’s	   economic	  policy.	  By	  mid-­‐2009	   the	  Conservatives	  had	   consolidated	  what	  would	  become	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  and	  had	  attacked	  the	  government	  for	   failing	   to	   concede	   the	   need	   for	   cuts	   to	   spending	   growth	   (the	   slogan	   ‘deficit	  denier’	   made	   a	   mercifully	   brief	   appearance	   in	   the	   political	   lexicon	   around	   this	  time).	   Although	   the	   government	   had	   not	   explicitly	   denied	   the	   need	   for	   deficit	  reduction,	   the	  mid-­‐2009	   concession	   that	   cuts	  would	   form	  part	  of	   a	  Labour	   fiscal	  consolidation	   strategy	   risked	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   change	   in	   policy	   given	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Ibid,	  Table	  0.1.	  47	  Hay	  (1996),	  'Narrating	  Crisis’.	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earlier	  playing	  up	  of	  fiscal	  stimulus	  as	  evidence	  of	  their	  competence.	  The	  response,	  the	  ‘impending	  crisis	  of	  Conservative	  misrule	  narrative’,	  functions	  as	  a	  ripost	  to	  the	  Conservative	  position	  by	   incorporating	  both	   fiscal	   stimulus	   and	  deficit	   reduction	  and	  stressing	  the	  risks	  inherent	  in	  the	  opposition’s	  implementation	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  New	   elements	   can	   be	   dynamically	   incorporated	   into	   particular	   narratives	   in	  response	   to	   changing	   events	   as	  well	   as	   to	   narrative	   challenges	   from	   opponents.	  Indeed,	  the	  blame	  deflection	  narratives	  and	  the	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  suggest	  that	  these	   processes	   are	   actually	   inter-­‐linked,	   with	   opponents	   seizing	   upon	   negative	  economic	  developments	  and	  forcing	  the	  government	  to	  reconsolidate	  its	  narrative.	  The	   strategy	   of	   counter-­‐narration	   in	   the	   blame	   deflection	   narrative	  was	   straight	  forward	  enough:	  it	  reinforced	  the	  government’s	  economic	  competence	  by	  pointing	  to	   Conservative	   opposition	   to	   fiscal	   stimulus	   as	   evidence	   of	   their	   corresponding	  economic	   incompetence,	   thereby	   turning	   the	   charge	   around.	   The	   deficit	   crisis	  narrative	   achieved	   the	   same	   effect	   by	   linking	   the	   issues	   of	   economic	   growth	   to	  deficit	  reduction	  during	  moments	  when	  reported	  GDP	  figures	  fell	  to	  or	  below	  zero,	  meeting	   calls	   from	  critical	   commentators	   for	   a	   ‘Plan	  B’	   (and	  more	  qualified	   calls	  from	  Labour	   for	   a	   clearer	   growth	   strategy)	  with	   the	   claim	   that	   deficit	   reduction	  
was	   a	   growth	   strategy.	   Both	   recovery	   and	   deterioration	   pointed	   to	   the	   need	   for	  ongoing	  fiscal	  consolidation	  in	  this	  narrative.	  As	  GDP	  figures	  improved	  this	  in	  turn	  served	   to	   facilitate	   a	   ripost	   to	   the	   policy	   proposals	   of	   opponents	   as	   having	   been	  short-­‐sighted,	   no	   doubt	   triggering	   the	   development	   of	   their	   narratives	   too.	  Interestingly,	   the	   strategy	   of	   counter-­‐narration	   utilised	   on	   the	   occasion	   of	   both	  downturns	   was	   broadly	   the	   same,	   suggesting	   a	   certain	   mechanical	   quality	   to	  narrative	  design.	  Whether	  the	  strategy	  proved	  more	  or	  less	  persuasive	  the	  second	  time	  constitutes	  an	  interesting	  question	  for	  further	  research.	  	  Strategies	  of	  counter-­‐narration	  are	  also	  visible	  in	  particular	  texts	  that	  comprise	  the	  crisis	  of	  welfare	  narrative,	  although	  they	  do	  not	  achieve	  the	  systemic	  quality	  of	  the	  others.	   One	   example	   included	   the	   invention	   of	   the	   category	   of	   the	   ‘sneering	   job	  snob’	  as	  a	  characterisation	  of	  those	  who	  opposed	  the	  government’s	  youth	  training	  schemes	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  that	  they	  prepared	  young	  people	  primarily	  for	  low-­‐paid	  work	   of	   uncertain	   duration.48	   The	   lack	   of	   an	   overarching	   strategy	   to	   defend	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Duncan-­‐Smith	  (2012b),	  ‘The	  Delusions	  Of	  X’.	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narrative	  from	  critique	  beyond	  the	  claim	  to	  be	  ‘freeing’	  those	  ‘trapped’	  on	  benefits	  perhaps	  suggests	  a	  degree	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  the	  narrative	  by	  its	  authors	  that	  was	  not	  found	  in	  the	  others	  examined	  here.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	  research	  reported	  here	  shows	  that	  the	  concepts	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  hold	  purchase	  on	  political	  communication	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  and	  enable	  its	  analysis.	  Four	  separate	  crisis	  narratives	   linked	   to	  post-­‐2008	  economic	  policy	  are	  clearly	   discernible.	   The	   mode	   of	   political	   communication	   denoted	   by	   the	   crisis	  narrative	   concept	   is	   clearly	   visible:	   both	   governments	   have	   sought	   to	   link	   the	  decisive	   interventions	   that	   their	   crisis	  diagnoses	  entail	   to	   stories	  about	   the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   that	   encourage	   the	   perception	   of	   crisis.	   The	   concepts	   that	   I	   have	  taken	  from	  Hay’s	  work	  and	  the	  framing	  perspective	  allow	  us	  to	  compare,	  contrast	  and	  analyze	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  politicians	  attempt	  to	  construct	  resonance	  between	   crisis	   narratives	   and	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   the	   readers.	   The	   present	  research	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   narrative’s	   success	   in	   shaping	  public	   opinion,	   or	   to	   the	   broader	   processes	   through	   which	   a	   particular	   crisis	  narrative	   becomes	   hegemonic.	   However,	   it	   is	   an	   important	   step	   towards	   this	  enterprise	   because	   the	   crisis	   narratives	   produced	   by	   politicians	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  important	  instruments	  and	  objects	  of	  contestation	  in	  such	  processes.	  	  By	  way	  of	  a	  conclusion	  I	  shall	  consider	  what	  light	  my	  analysis	  shines	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  crisis	  narration	  as	  a	  process.	   It	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	   further	  research	  on	  crisis	  narration	   in	  different	  spatial	  and	   temporal	   contexts	   to	  be	  carried	  out	  before	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  say	  with	  greater	  certainty	  whether	  these	  points	  are	  general	  features	  of	  crisis	   narration,	   or	   whether	   they	   are	   features	   unique	   to	   the	   British	   post-­‐2008	  context.	   In	   this	   spirit,	   I	   shall	   consider	   some	   of	   the	   opportunities	   for	   further	  research	  that	  the	  present	  research	  has	  opened	  up.	  	  Firstly,	  my	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  crisis	  narratives	  do	  not	  operate	  in	  isolation	  from	  other	   narratives	   in	   a	   government’s	   communicative	   discourse	   that	   tell	   a	   positive	  story	   about	   its	   purpose.	   These	   are	   not	   ‘crisis	   narratives’	   because	   they	   do	   not	  encourage	   the	   perception	   of	   crisis,	   yet	   they	   often	   feature	   alongside	   the	   crisis	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narrative	  within	  a	  particular	  text.	  The	  Coalition	  Government	  is	  particularly	  rich	  in	  this	   regard,	   having	   developed	   narratives	   of	   social	   transformation	   and	   economic	  renewal	   alongside	   the	  deficit	   crisis	  narrative.	  This	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   in	  part	  because	  crisis	   narratives	   are	   often	   negative	   stories	   in	   which	   decisive	   interventions	   are	  presented	   as	   unfortunate	   necessities	   rather	   than	   the	   political	   choices.	   Crisis	  narratives	  can	  therefore	  make	  governments	  look	  somewhat	  weak	  and	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  circumstance	  unless	  accompanied	  by	  a	  story	  of	  positive	  purpose.	   It	   is	  possible	  that	   such	   associations	   are	   particularly	   necessary	   where	   decisive	   intervention	  imposes	   costs	   on	   citizens:	   a	   story	   that	   describes	   a	   ‘better	   tomorrow’	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	   the	  pain	  of	  reform	  can	  potentially	  mitigate	   the	   loss	  of	   legitimacy.	  Yet	   this	   is	   not	   always	   the	   case.	   The	  welfare	   crisis	   combines	   both	   a	   story	   of	   the	  unavoidable	  necessity	  and	  a	  positive	  and	  deliberate	  purpose	  to	  the	  government’s	  actions	  in	  a	  single	  narrative	  –	  the	  resolution	  of	  purported	  unfairness.	  	  	  A	  variable	  feature	  of	  crisis	  narratives	  that	  can	  be	  noted	  from	  the	  sample	  examined	  here	  is	  their	   ‘level	  of	  generality’:	  how	  specific	  they	  are	  to	  a	  particular	  policy	  area.	  The	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   does	   not	   refer	   to	   a	   single	   decisive	   intervention,	   but	  rather	   to	   a	   suite	   of	   such	   interventions	   that	   would	   be	   necessitated	   by	   the	  government’s	   fiscal	   agenda.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   narrative	   is	   successful	   in	  persuading	  readers	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  deficit	  reduction,	  this	  arguably	  increases	  its	  power	  as	  it	  can	  then	  be	  applied	  in	  support	  of	  reforms	  in	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  areas,	  or	  alongside	  other	  more	  area-­‐specific	  crisis	  narratives	  (as	  it	  was	  with	  the	  welfare	  crisis	   narrative).	   The	   welfare	   crisis	   narrative	   was,	   although	   complementary,	  considerably	   more	   specific.	   The	   crisis	   of	   impending	   Conservative	   misrule	  narrative,	  in	  contrast	  to	  both	  of	  these,	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  mobilise	  support	  for	  or	  against	   reforms	   across	   policy	   areas	   or	   in	   particular	   policy	   areas,	   but	   against	   a	  particular	  electoral	  choice.	  Yet	  it	  existed	  at	  a	  similar	  level	  of	  generality	  to	  the	  crisis	  of	   debt	   narrative,	   and	   its	   themes	   were	   mobilised	   to	   create	   a	   sense	   of	   crisis	   in	  relation	   to	   both	   social	   and	   economic	   policy.	   The	   relative	   successes	   of	   high	  generality	   and	   low	   generality	   crisis	   narrations,	   and	   whether	   they	   are	   typically	  deployed	   together	   or	   represent	   potentially	   contrasting	   approaches,	   is	   something	  that	  further	  research	  may	  shed	  light	  on.	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The	  crisis	  narratives	  examined	  here	  are	  overwhelmingly	  about	  governments	  and	  opposition	   parties.	   This	   supports	   Schmidt’s	   assertion	   that	   communicative	  discourse	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   it	   is	   articulated:	   in	   a	  majoritarian	  democratic	  system	  where	  government	  is	  historically	  passed	  between	  two	  political	  parties	  the	  major	  threat	  to	  an	  incumbent	  government	  comes	  from	  the	  other	   large	   party.49	   	   Legitimacy	   rests	   upon	   discrediting	   one’s	   opponents	   and	  constructing	  a	  crisis	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  are	  either	  responsible	   for	  a	  crisis	  or	  constitute	  a	  crisis	   in	  and	  of	   themselves.	  This	   is	   so	  even	  (or	  perhaps	  particularly)	  when	  the	  decisive	  interventions	  being	  advanced	  by	  the	  two	  parties	  are	  essentially	  very	   similar.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  Coalition	  Government	   includes	   a	   third	  party	   is	   an	  interesting	   development	   in	   this	   regard,	   and	   the	   occasional	   and	   careful	   attempts	  made	  by	   the	   two	  parties	   to	  distance	   themselves	   from	  one	  another	  and	  appeal	   to	  distinct	  electoral	  constituencies	  while	  retaining	  a	  coherence	  with	  their	  respective	  crisis	  narratives	  may	  attest	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	  narrating	  a	  crisis	  as	  a	  Coalition.	  	  The	   analysis	   above	   suggests	   that	   narrative	   selectivity	   is	   governed	   more	   by	  convenience	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  deploy	  the	  rhetorical	  interpellative	  techniques	  than	   it	   is	   the	  need	   to	  make	  a	   rigorous	  analysis.	   If	   the	   latter	  were	   the	   case,	   there	  would	  presumably	  be	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  justification	  offered	  in	  policy	  documents	  and	   in	   documents	   produced	   for	   public	   consumption.	   In	   contrast	   to	   this,	  we	   find	  that	   policy	   documents	   contain	   rigorous	   (if	   contestable)	   economic	   argumentation	  whilst	  crisis	  narratives	  are	  composed	  of	  altogether	  weaker	  arguments	   that	  make	  questionable	  assertions	  about	  events	  and	  other	  actors,	  often	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  scant	  evidence	  and	  with	  ironic	  consequences.	  	  Yet	  while	  crisis	  narratives	  are	  often	  far	  from	  convincing	  to	  an	  informed	  observer,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  produced	  at	  all	  does	  suggest	  that	  their	  authors	  believe	  them	  capable	  of	  having	  a	  persuasive	  effect.	  To	   the	  extent	   that	   this	   is	   true,	   this	   implies	  that	  this	  effect	  arises	  from	  the	  interpellative	  techniques	  that	  they	  employ.	  This	  in	  turn	   implies	   that	   opponents	   of	   a	   crisis	   narrative	  must	   do	  more	   than	  point	   to	   its	  factual	   inaccuracies,	   silences	   or	   tenuous	   conclusions	   to	   disrupt	   any	   persuasive	  effect	   that	   it	   may	   or	   may	   not	   achieve.	   Instead,	   they	   must	   construct	   persuasive	  ‘counter-­‐narratives’,	  employing	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  interpellative	  techniques	  used	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Schmidt	  (2002),	  The	  Futures.	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the	   construction	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   in	   order	   to	   disrupt	   their	   persuasive	   effect	   –	  what	  I	  have	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘counter-­‐narration’.	  The	  dynamic	  incorporation	  of	  new	  defensive	  elements	  into	  some	  of	  the	  crisis	  narratives	  examined	  above	  suggests	  that	  opponents	   are	   sometimes	   successful	   in	  doing	   this,	   for	   these	  are	  moments	  where	  the	  governments	  themselves	  have	  engaged	  in	  counter-­‐narration	  to	  shore	  up	  their	  crisis	  narratives.	  	  	  Yet	   such	  moments	   are	   relatively	   infrequent.	   This	   is	   surprising;	   given	   the	   lack	   of	  analytical	   rigour	   present	   in	   crisis	   narratives	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   informed	  commentators	  are	  constantly	  calling	  them	  into	  question,	  whilst	  opposition	  parties	  presumably	  advance	  their	  own	  contrasting	  communicative	  discourses	  replete	  with	  similar	   rhetorical	   techniques	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   wrestle	   legitimacy	   away	   from	   the	  government.	   This	   raises	   the	   interesting	   question	   of	   under	   what	   conditions	  opponents	   of	   a	   crisis	   narrative	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   successful	   in	   advancing	   their	  counter-­‐narratives	   and	   disrupting	   crisis	   narratives.	   No	   decisive	   answer	   can	   be	  given	  here,	   although	   a	  number	  of	   impressions	   arise	   from	  my	   findings	   that	   could	  prove	   fruitful	  avenues	   for	   further	   research.	  One	  possibility	   is	   that	  opponents	  are	  able	  to	  exploit	  public	  sympathy	  for	  certain	  groups	  that	  are	  impacted	  negatively	  by	  economic	  policy	   in	  order	   to	  question	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   a	   government’s	  narrative.	  The	  incorporation	  of	  the	  ‘sneering	  job	  snob’	  into	  the	  otherwise	  very	  stable	  crisis	  of	  welfare	   narrative	   betrays	   an	   anxiety	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   narrative’s	   authors	   to	  deflect	  criticism	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  reform	  on	  young	  people	  in	  a	  way	  they	  did	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  groups	  categorised	  as	  ‘undeserving	  poor’.	  	  	  Yet	   the	   small	   sample	   of	   crisis	   narratives	   here	   would	   suggest	   the	   greater	  prominence	   of	   a	   different,	   more	   prosaic	   consideration:	   perceptions	   of	   a	  government’s	   economic	   competence.	   The	   Brown	   Government	   articulated	   its	  second	   crisis	   narrative	   at	   the	   point	   that	   a	   Conservative	   critique	   had	   been	  established	   which	   struck	   at	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   government’s	   initial	   claims	   to	  economic	   competence	   –	   fiscal	   stimulus.	   The	   nascent	   deficit	   crisis	   narrative	   held	  fiscal	   largesse	   to	   be	   evidence	   of	   the	   very	   opposite	   and	   called	   for	   immediate	  reversal	  of	  fiscal	  policy.	  At	  this	  juncture	  the	  government	  felt	  obliged	  to	  respond	  to	  the	   Conservatives	   by	   creating	   a	   new	   crisis	   narrative	   that	   questioned	   both	   the	  Conservative’s	   motives	   and	   economic	   competency	   in	   making	   the	   critique.	   The	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earlier	  blame	  deflection	  narrative	  also	  centred	  on	  economic	  competency.	  Likewise,	  the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   debt	   crisis	   narrative	   varied	   according	   to	   GDP	   performance,	  with	  the	  Coalition	  adapting	  it	  as	  circumstances	  deteriorated.	  	  Both	  instances	  were	  ones	  in	  which	  particular	  indicators	  of	  economic	  performance	  become	   politicised.	   The	   negative	   performance	   of	   indicators	   in	   general	   is	   not,	   it	  appears,	  sufficient	  to	  prompt	  governments	  to	  develop	  their	  crisis	  narratives.	  GDP	  growth	   (or	   the	   lack	   thereof)	   is	  what	  prompted	  defensive	  dynamics	   in	   the	  deficit	  crisis	   narrative,	   whilst	   falling	   real	   wages	   cited	   in	   Chapter	   5	   did	   not	   (in	   spite	   of	  attempts	  by	   the	  TUC	   to	  politicise	   this	   indicator	  during	   the	  period).	  This	  prompts	  two	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  avenues	  for	  future	  inquiry	  arising	  from	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  The	   first	   relates	   to	   whether	   any	   one	   particular	   actor	   (be	   it	   a	   political	   party,	  business	   association	   or	   campaign	   group)	   can	   succeed	   in	   politicizing	   a	   particular	  indicator,	  and	  what	  role	  the	  media	  would	  play	  in	  such	  a	  process.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  was	  the	  Conservative	  Party’s	  deficit	  crisis	  narrative	  that	  caused	  the	  Brown	  Government	  to	  perceive	  the	  deficit	  to	  have	  become	  politicised	  and	  to	  articulate	  the	  crisis	  of	  impending	  Conservative	  misrule.	  As	  was	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  way	  that	  a	  set	  of	  events	  are	  remembered	  as	  a	  crisis	  by	  the	  general	  public	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  narrative	  contestation	  rather	  than	  the	  product	  of	  any	  one	  particular	  actor.	  Moreover,	  Hay’s	  work	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  media	   in	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  narration.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  media	  in	  drawing	  attention	  to	  and	  interpreting	  particular	  economic	  indicators	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  crucial	  mediating	  factor	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  crisis	  narratives.	   Here	   a	   greater	   engagement	   with	   sociological	   frameworks	   for	   the	  analysis	   of	   media	   narration	   and	   political	   mobilisation	   (such	   as	   the	   framing	  approach	  highlighted	  in	  Chapter	  3)	  and	  their	  findings	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  fruitful.	  	  A	  second	  question	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  governments	  respond	  to	  actual	  shifts	  in	  public	  opinion	  when	  modifying	  their	  crisis	  narratives	  during	  moments	  of	  indicator	  politicisation,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  simply	  the	  perception	  that	  public	  opinion	  might	  shift	  that	  prompts	  the	  process.	  At	  stake	  here	  is	  the	  effect	  that	  crisis	  narratives	  actually	  have	   on	   public	   opinion,	   and	   the	   directionality	   of	   that	   effect.	   Seabrooke,	   for	  instance,	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   process	   is	   not	   a	   uni-­‐directional	   one	   in	   which	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legitimacy	   (or,	   by	   extension,	   indicator	   politicisation)	   is	   ‘proclaimed’	   by	   elites.50	  Rather,	   ‘everyday	  politics’	  are	  an	   important	  contributing	   factor	   to	  such	  a	  process	  and	  shape	  both	  the	  narratives	  and	  policy	  responses	  that	  policymakers	  are	  able	  to	  advance	  in	  a	  given	  context.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  changes	  in	  public	  opinion	  are	  an	   important	   factor	   in	   shaping	   the	   dynamics	   of	   crisis	   narration	   and	   politicizing	  indicators.	  More	  broadly	  still,	  the	  question	  cuts	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  core	  assumption	  of	   constructivist	   institutionalist	   research	   on	   crisis	   narration:	   that	   the	   process	   of	  crisis	   narration	   (however	   complex	   and	   bi-­‐directional	   it	   is	   conceptualised	   to	   be)	  does	  shape	  public	  opinion.	  	  In	  sum	  then,	   there	   is	  much	  yet	   to	   learn	  about	  crisis	  narration.	  This	  analysis	  does	  not	  address	  the	  full	  scope	  of	  these	  issues	  –	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  one	  study	  could.	  Yet	  it	  does	  contribute	  towards	  this	  broader	  goal	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  applicability	  and	   utility	   of	   a	   range	   of	   concepts	   as	   a	  means	   of	   analyzing	   crisis	   narratives	   and	  crisis	  narration	  and	  pointing	  towards	  a	  range	  of	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  broader	  contributions	  of	  my	  dissertation	  in	  totem	  that	  we	  now	  turn	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Seabrooke	  (2007),	  'The	  Everyday	  Social’.	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Conclusion	  
	  	  My	  thesis	  has	  investigated	  a	  sample	  of	  a	  turbulent	  and	  ongoing	  conjuncture	  in	  the	  British	  political	  economy.	  Adopting	  a	  constructivist	  institutionalist	  perspective	  and	  corresponding	   interpretivist	   epistemology,	   I	   have	   turned	   my	   focus	   to	   the	  construction	   of	   crisis	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   –	   its	   diagnosis	   and	   narration	   –	  situating	  the	  outcomes	  of	   these	  processes	  among	  the	   institutional	  conditions	  and	  dynamics	   analysed	  by	   the	   critical	   social	   democratic	   perspective.	  My	   analysis	   has	  revealed	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   contested	   process	   of	   change	   than	   a	   focus	   on	  institutional	  processes	  alone	  does.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  highlights,	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  analysis	   of,	   the	   scope	   for	   contingency	   and	   categorical	   change	   in	   the	   nature	   of	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   in	   this	   ongoing	   conjuncture.	   By	   way	   of	   a	  conclusion	   I	   reflect	   upon	   the	   analysis	   in	   light	   of	   the	   critical	   social	   democratic	  perspective	  and	  several	  enduring	  issues	  in	  the	  study	  of	  British	  political	  economy,	  as	  well	  as	  summarising	  the	  principal	  avenues	  for	  further	  research	  that	  it	  opens	  up.	  	  	  I	   have	   revealed	   the	   diagnosis	   of	   crisis	   to	   be	   a	   more	   complicated	   and	   contested	  process	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   than	   analyses	   which	   stress	   the	   tendency	   of	  neoliberalism	   to	   ‘fail	   forwards’	  might	   have	   led	   us	   to	   believe.	  Neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	  have	  not	  emerged	  entirely	  unchallenged:	  a	  ‘rival	  coordinative	  discourse	  waiting	   in	   the	   wings’	   has	   been	   articulated	   in	   relation	   to	   crisis	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  strategic	   discretionary	   framing	   of	   post-­‐2008	   industrial	   policy	   and	   the	   problem	  definitions	  that	  it	  reflects.	  These	  problem	  definitions	  are	  not	  new	  to	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context,	  yet	  they	  challenge	  some	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  as	  highlighted	  by	  the	  critical	  social	  democratic	  perspective.	  Specifically,	  they	  highlight	  the	  under-­‐performance	  of	   the	  productive	   economy,	   and	   they	   stress	   the	   essential	  co-­‐creation	   of	   economic	   growth	   by	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   the	   state	   through	   the	  exercise	  of	  both	  market	   resource	  allocation	  and	   strategic-­‐discretionary	  oversight	  by	  industrial	  policymakers.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  neoliberal	  microeconomic	  problem	  definitions,	  which	  constrain	  the	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy	  to	  expanding	  the	  realm	  of	  market	   resource	   allocation,	   ensuring	   the	   conditions	   for	   commodification,	   and	  responding	  to	  the	  tendency	  of	   the	  private	  sector	  to	  undermine	  or	  under-­‐produce	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  own	  reproduction.	  From	  the	  former	  perspective	  the	  framing	  of	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the	  crisis	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  as	  one	  of	  excessive	  public	  sector	  activity	  per	  se	  is	   fraught	   insofar	   as	   it	   impacts	   upon	   the	   budgets	   available	   for	   strategic	  discretionary	   intervention.	   The	   resumption	   of	   sustainable,	   rebalanced	   and	  geographically	   dispersed	   growth	   is	   seen	   to	   require	   decisive	   intervention	   in	   the	  form	   of	   new	   and	   permanent	   instruments	   of	   strategic	   discretionary	  interventionism.	  	  	  That	  this	  diagnosis	  is	  articulated	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  significant:	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  consensus	  on	  economic	  policy	  within	   government,	   and	   its	   status	   as	   the	   predominant	   form	   of	   post-­‐2008	  restructuring	  is	  thus	  the	  result	  of	  its	  imposition	  on	  industrial	  policymakers.	  Yet	  the	  radicalism	  of	   these	  non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	   should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  As	   they	   are	   presently	   constituted	   they	   neglect	   the	   reform	   of	   many	   institutional	  factors	   identified	   by	   the	   critical	   social	   democrats	   as	   militating	   against	   the	  rejuvenation	  of	  the	  productive	  economy	  and	  favouring	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  ALGM.	  	  	  Perhaps	   most	   importantly,	   they	   do	   not	   problematise	   the	   financialisation	   of	   the	  British	   economy.	   The	   diagnosis	   notes	   a	   shortfall	   of	   productive	   investment	   in	  certain	   developmentally	   critical	   junctures	   as	   militating	   against	   the	   capture	   of	  growth	   and	   employment	   opportunities	   for	   the	   British	   economy,	   yet	   it	   envisions	  industrial	   policymakers	   exercising	   a	   supplementary	   role	   alongside	   permissively	  regulated	   financial	   markets.	   Through	   strategic	   discretionary	   intervention,	  industrial	   policymakers	   are	   envisioned	   as	   the	   vanguard	   of	   Schumpeterian	  ‘disruption’	   and	   the	   part-­‐underwriters	   of	   certain	   developmentally	   significant	  private	   sector	   projects.	   Yet	   the	   general	   flow	   of	   credit	   and	   investment	   remains	  subject	  to	  market	  allocation,	  and	  no	  attempt	  is	  envisioned	  to	  systematically	  direct	  it	  away	  from	  inter-­‐financial,	  consumer	  and	  property	  lending	  towards	  strategically	  significant	  sectors	  through	  instruments	  such	  as	  direct	  credit	  controls	  or	  a	  national	  investment	   bank.	   Instead,	   some	   small	   and	   likely	   insufficient	   non-­‐discretionary	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  alter	   incentives	   in	  the	  existing	  financial	  architecture	  to	  favour	  lending	  to	  SMEs.	  	  	  In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   an	   approach	   the	   other	   problematic	   elements	   of	  financialisation	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   continue	   unabated.	   The	   pathological	   capital	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market-­‐firm	   relations	   that	   exist	   alongside	   the	   ALGM,	   along	   with	   the	   norm	   of	  shareholder	  value	  that	  they	  favour,	  would	  continue	  to	  impose	  short	  time-­‐horizons	  on	   manufacturers,	   while	   the	   inflated	   value	   of	   sterling	   that	   arises	   from	   the	  predominance	   of	   the	   financial	   services	   activity	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   create	   a	  hostile	  business	  environment	  for	  the	  very	  export-­‐oriented	  business	  strategies	  that	  the	   diagnosis	   extols.	   The	   protection	   of	   early-­‐stage	   industries	   is	   (unsurprisingly	  given	   the	   international	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   contexts)	   utterly	   disavowed.	  Yet	   without	   addressing	   these	   kinds	   of	   issues	   a	   critical	   social	   democratic	  perspective	   is	   sceptical	   that	   the	   fetishisation	   of	   ‘innovation’	   alone	   will	   prove	   a	  panacea	   for	   ensuring	   the	   economic	   outcomes	   that	   the	   diagnosis	   seeks	   to	   obtain,	  any	  more	  than	  the	  fetishisation	  of	  ‘skills’	  did	  in	  addressing	  the	  rise	  in	  pre-­‐transfer	  inequality	  and	  wage	  stagnation	  under	  New	  Labour.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   is	   in	   apparent	   consensus	  with	   the	  neoliberal	   one	   on	   certain	   issues	   that	   critical	   social	   democrats	   identify	   as	  institutional	   factors	   of	   the	   ALGM.	   Among	   these	   is	   the	   orientation	   of	   post-­‐2008	  microeconomic	  policy	   to	   labour	  market	   liberalisation.	   The	   celebration	  of	   flexible	  labour	   markets,	   and	   thus	   the	   market	   setting	   of	   wage	   and	   employment	   levels,	  continued	  under	   the	  Brown	  Government	  and	  has	  been	  entrenched	   further	  under	  the	  Coalition.	  This	  orientation	  has	  been	  implicated	  in	  the	  decline	  in	  real	  wages	  by	  critical	   social	   democrats	   and,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   rejuvenation	   of	   productive	  enterprises,	  is	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  preponderance	  of	  low-­‐paid,	  low-­‐skill	  jobs	  in	  Britain.	  	  	  In	  short,	  the	  non-­‐neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  stops	  well	  short	  of	  diagnosing	  a	  crisis	  of	   Britain’s	   financialised	   growth	  model,	   even	   as	   it	   lay	   stricken	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	  context.	   Yet	   for	   all	   its	   shortcomings,	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   does	   at	  least	  speak	  to	  some	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  non-­‐financial	  economy	  and	  to	  some	  of	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  neoliberal	  prescriptions	  in	  relation	  to	  them.	  In	  time	  then,	  there	  is	  the	   possibility	   that	   the	   non-­‐neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   might	   grow	   to	   become	   a	  more	   encompassing	   critique	   of	   neoliberalisation,	   perhaps	   with	   a	   corresponding	  crisis	  narrative.	  I	  return	  to	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  this	  could	  occur	  presently.	  However	  even	  if	  it	  were	  to	  develop	  in	  this	  way,	  its	  capacity	  to	  make	  inroads	  at	  all	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  dominance	  of	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	  among	  macroeconomic	  policymakers.	  In	  the	  last	  analysis	  neoliberalism	  has	  indeed	  failed	  forwards:	  it	  is	  the	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neoliberal	   construction	   of	   crisis	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   that	   is	   predominant	   in	  both	   policy	   and	   communicative	   discourse,	   and	   thus	   in	   post-­‐2008	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  	  The	  neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	   centres	  on	   the	  need	   for	  new	  strategies	  of	   roll	   out	  neoliberalisation	   and	   roll	   back	   neoliberalisation	   in	   macro	   and	   microeconomic	  policy:	   the	   retrenchment	   of	   the	   public	   sector	   through	   deficit	   reduction	   so	   as	   to	  placate	   perceived	   financial	   market	   sentiment,	   the	   enablement	   of	   private	   sector	  activity	   through	   new	   or	   enhanced	   non-­‐discretionary	   interventions,	   and	   the	  stabilisation	  of	   the	  whole	  edifice	  through	  the	  tentative	  re-­‐regulation	  of	   the	  credit	  cycle	  and	  new	  structural	  stipulations	  on	  universal	  banks.	  It	  creates	  the	  conditions	  for	   a	  wage-­‐deflationary	   adjustment	   to	   occur,	   although	   it	  moderates	   the	   speed	  of	  this	   adjustment	   through	   various	   stimulus	   measures	   designed	   to	   limit	   the	  degradation	  of	  human	  and	  physical	   capital	  while	   the	  economy	   is	  perceived	   to	  be	  out	   of	   equilibrium.	   The	   problem	   definitions	   comprising	   the	   diagnosis	   are	  supremely	   confident	   in	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   bring	   about	  rebalanced,	  sustainable	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  growth	  and	  employment.	  	  Crisis	   narration	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   has	   been	   articulated	   in	   defence	   of	   the	  decisive	   interventions	   and	   non-­‐interventions	   that	   this	   neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	  sanctions,	   further	   demonstrating	   its	   dominance.	   Even	   those	  ministers	   associated	  with	   the	   strategic-­‐discretionary	   agenda	   have	   had	   to	   exhort	   the	   merits	   of	   their	  policy	   in	  narrative	   frameworks	   that	  accentuate	   the	  necessity	  of	  deficit	   reduction.	  As	  expected,	   crisis	  narratives	  give	   the	  gloss	  of	   internal	   coherence	   to	  government	  policy.	   The	   tensions	   between	   subscribers	   to	   the	   two-­‐crisis	   diagnosis	   have	  consequently	   played	   out	   behind	   closed	   doors.	   Unlike	   other	   constructivist	  institutionalist	  case	  studies,	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  not	  one	  where	  the	  narration	  of	  crisis	  has	  proven	  a	  decisive	  factor	  between	  which	  of	  two	  contrasting	  visions	  for	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	  has	  come	  to	  fruition.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  intra-­‐executive	  processes	  that	  account	  for	  the	  outcome.	  	  The	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  is	  wholly	  inadequate	  to	  address	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	   ALGM	   or	   move	   Britain	   beyond	   it.	   Indeed,	   the	   likely	   impact	   of	   the	   decisive	  interventions	   that	   it	   sanctions	   is	   to	   introduce	   new	   contradictions	   to	   the	   growth	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model	  and	  exacerbate	  existing	  ones.	  As	  already	  noted,	  financialisation	  is	  not	  being	  challenged.	   Instead,	   post-­‐2008	   governments	   have	   sought	   to	   stabilise	   speculative	  asset	   markets	   through	   the	   re-­‐regulation	   of	   the	   credit	   cycle.	   In	   continuing	   to	  sanction	   the	  market	  allocation	  of	   credit,	   and	  practices	  such	  as	  securitisation	   that	  facilitate	  transaction	  generation	  business	  strategies,	  post-­‐2008	  governments	  have	  defended	   the	   conditions	   upon	   which	   the	   supply	   of	   household	   credit	   expanded	  prior	  to	  2008.	  In	  failing	  to	  decisively	  intervene	  either	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  housing	  or	  the	  disparities	   in	   economic	   activity	   that	   lead	   to	   oversupply	   in	   some	  areas	   of	   the	  country	   and	   under-­‐supply	   in	   others,	   the	   conditions	   for	   expanding	   HEW	   and	   its	  associated	  ‘wealth	  effect’	  remain	  intact.	  In	  tolerating	  sustained	  real	  wage	  deflation	  whilst	   simultaneously	   adopting	   stances	   hostile	   to	   transfer	   payments,	   they	   have	  increased	  the	  role	  that	  the	   leveraging	  of	  consumption	  must	  perform	  in	  aggregate	  demand	  if	  domestic-­‐consumption-­‐led	  growth	  is	  to	  obtain.	  The	  paucity	  of	  industrial	  policy	  noted	  above	  means	  that	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  ‘	  private	  sector	  export-­‐led	  growth	  model’	  is	  an	  unlikely	  outcome	  –	  there	  is	  certainly	  little	  evidence	  of	  it	  to	  date.	  The	  more	  likely	  outcome	  is,	  at	  best,	  a	  revival	  of	  privatised	  Keynesianism,	  or	  at	  worst	  a	  return	  to	  prolonged	  stagnation	  or	  recession.	  	  Yet	  the	  renewed	  bout	  of	  privatised	  Keynesianism	  to	  which	  this	  points	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  much	  more	  uncertain	  context	  and	  amid	  new	  latent	  contradictions	  within	  the	  growth	   model.	   Crucially,	   the	   endowment	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   with	   a	  responsibility	   to	   ensure	   financial	   stability	   and	   discretionary	   instruments	   with	  which	   to	   check	   excessive	   credit	   growth	   means	   that	   a	   latent	   contradiction	   now	  exists	  between	   financial	   stability	  policy	  and	  privatised	  Keynesianism.	  Not	  only	   is	  the	  growth	  model	   threatened	  by	   interest	   rate	   rises	   (admittedly	   a	   small	   threat	   in	  recent	   years	   given	   the	   ongoing	  monetary	   stimulus	   and	   deflation	   of	   oil	  markets),	  but	  it	  is	  also	  now	  threatened	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  uptick	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  should	  the	  FPC	  deem	  it	  a	  threat	  to	  financial	  stability.	  Should	  the	  FPC	  resolve	  to	  use	  its	  discretionary	  instruments	  to	  stem	  mortgage	  lending	  (as	  it	  has	  shown	  resolve	  to	  do	  already),	   the	   result	  would	  be	   to	  undermine	   the	  pace	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  return	   the	   economy	   to	   stagnation.	   The	   growth	   model	   is	   thus	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  success	  of	  the	  very	  transaction	  generating	  financial	  business	  strategies	  that	  sustain	  it.	  Yet	  even	   if	   the	  FPC	  adopts	  a	  permissive	  orientation	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  credit,	  the	  capacity	  for	  endogenous	  financial	  instability	  that	  the	  liberal	  financial	  sector	  has	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shown	   remains	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   growth	  model.	  Much	   consequently	  depends	  upon	  the	   capacity	   of	   the	   new	   regime	   of	   macro-­‐prudential	   regulation	   to	   maintain	   the	  stability	  of	  permissively	  regulated	  financial	  markets.	  This	  analysis	  thus	  points	  to	  a	  fragile	   growth	   dynamic,	   the	   distinct	   possibility	   of	   a	   return	   to	   stagnation	   or	  recession	   in	   the	   near	   future,	   and	  with	   this	   outcome,	   the	   conditions	   of	   economic	  performance	  failure	  in	  which	  crisis	  may	  be	  constructed	  anew:	  2013	  (indeed	  2015)	  is	  unlikely	  to	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  this	  conjuncture	  in	  British	  political	  economy.	  	  	  Although	   the	   crisis	   has	   been	   diagnosed	   and	   decisive	   interventions	   made,	   the	  outcomes	   of	   this	   neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   in	   many	  respects	   resemble	   a	   state	   of	   catastrophic	   equilibrium:	   the	   new	   institutional	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  growth	  model	  do	  not	  suffice	  to	  resolve	  its	  vulnerabilities	  and	  contradictions.	   It	   is	   in	   the	   scenario	   of	   a	   return	   to	   stagnation	   or	   recession	   the	  unacknowledged	   scope	   for	   contingency	   stressed	   in	  my	   analysis	   comes	   into	   play.	  Should	   economic	   performance	   failure	   return,	   the	   allegiance	   of	   policymakers	   to	  neoliberal	  problem	  definitions	   could	  be	   tested	  both	  by	  events	   and	  by	  new	   intra-­‐executive	   and	   electoral	   pressures	   for	   a	   categorical	   change	   in	   the	   trajectory	   of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring.	  These	  pressures	  may	  find	  expression	  in	  the	  non-­‐neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis,	  which,	  as	  I	  have	  noted	  above,	  speaks	  to	  silences	  in	  the	  neoliberal	   crisis	   diagnosis	   and	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   expanded	   into	   a	   more	  encompassing	  critique	  of	  the	  ALGM.	  Future	  constructivist	   institutionalist	  analysis	  will	  be	  most	  illuminating	  in	  understanding	  this	  process.	  	  Beyond	  its	   immediate	  context,	  my	  analysis	  speaks	  to	  a	  number	  of	  more	  enduring	  themes	   in	   the	   study	   of	   British	   political	   economy.	   Firstly,	   it	   suggests	   that	   an	  enduring	   conflict	   between	   finance	   and	   industry	   capital	   has	   been	   at	   stake	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context.	  As	  a	  financialised	  growth	  model,	  the	  ALGM,	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  maintain	  it,	  reflect	  the	  short-­‐term	  profitability	  of	  financial	  businesses	  (although	   both	   the	   ALGM	   and	   financialisation	   are	   the	   unintended	   outcome	   of	  neoliberalisation,	  which	  aims	  at	   greater	   general	   economic	  performance).	  A	   crisis	  diagnosis	   that	   decisively	   challenges	   neoliberalism	   and	   financialisation	   is	   yet	   to	  emerge,	  although	  the	  strategic	  discretionary	  crisis	  diagnosis	  does	  place	  the	  specific	  needs	   of	   producers,	   particularly	   manufacturers,	   at	   the	   forefront.	   The	   post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  not	  one	  in	  which	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  these	  different	  business	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interests	   has	   changed,	   but	   it	   is	   one	   in	   which	   some	   of	   the	   negative	   impacts	   of	  financialisation	   on	   the	   productive	   economy	   have	   been	   articulated	   in	   non-­‐neoliberal	  terms	  within	  departments	  responsible	  for	  economic	  policymaking.	  The	  fate	  of	  this	  conflict	  will	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  capacity	  of	  policymakers	  to	  manage	  the	  growth	  model’s	  contradictions	  and	  vulnerabilities.	  	  Another	   enduring	   issue	   that	   is	   implicated,	   but	  which	   is	  not	  at	   stake,	   in	   the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  that	  of	  growing	  inequality	  and	  income	  distribution.	  Neoliberalism,	  with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   (re)commodification	   of	   labour	   and	   the	   dissembedding	   of	  market	   processes,	   exacerbates	   inequality	   and	   ‘regressively	   redistributes’	   wealth	  and	  income	  through	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  subject	  to	   market	   rule	   and	   resource	   allocation.	   This	   is	   true	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	  response	   to	   crisis,	   seen	   in	  wage	   deflationary	   adjustment	   and	   the	   preference	   for	  monetary	   stimulus	   techniques	   that	   channel	   funds	   through	  private	   lenders	   rather	  than	  directly	   increasing	  the	   incomes	  of	  citizens.1	   In	  problematising	  the	  neglect	  of	  producers	  in	  neoliberal	  industrial	  policy,	  the	  non-­‐neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  makes	  a	   tentative	   problematisation	   of	   some	   of	   these	   dynamics:	   it	   proposes	   to	   utilise	  public	   funds	   to	   capture	   developmental	   opportunities	   and	   expand	   the	   number	   of	  high-­‐skill	  jobs.	  Yet	  the	  sectors	  that	  it	  targets	  are	  often	  highly	  mechanised,	  and	  it	  is	  far	   from	   clear	   that	   even	   a	   more	   encompassing	   strategy	   of	   supply-­‐chain	  reconstruction	   around	   strategically	   prioritised	   industries	   would	   suffice	   to	   offset	  the	   tendency	   towards	   low-­‐skill,	   low-­‐wage	   jobs	   in	   Britain.	   Moreover,	   any	   such	  strategy	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  ambition.	  In	  the	  short	  term,	  wage	  restraint	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  scarce	  public	  resources	  to	  private	  enterprises	  are	  likely	  to	  feature	  prominently	  even	   in	   this	   non-­‐neoliberal	   approach	   to	   political-­‐economic	   restructuring.	   Hence,	  the	  tendency	  towards	  growing	  inequality	  is	  unlikely	  to	  reverse	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  scope	  for	  contingency	  and	  change	  that	  my	  analysis	  points	  to.	  	  A	  final	  enduring	  issue	  of	  British	  political	  economy,	  this	  time	  very	  much	  at	  stake	  in	  the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   is	   intra-­‐executive	   politics	   and	   diverging	   priorities	   of	   the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Business/Industry	  Ministry.	  The	  existence	  of	  two	  diverging	  crisis	  diagnoses	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context	   raises	   the	   interesting	   question	   of	   why	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  J.	  Green	  and	  S.	  Lavery	  (2014),	  ‘Britain’s	  Post-­‐Crisis	  Political	  Economy	  And	  Recovery	  Through	  ‘Regressive	  Redistribution’,	  SPERI	  Papers	  (11;	  Sheffield:	  SPERI,	  University	  Of	  Sheffield)	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outcome	  has	  emerged.	  As	  a	   first	  cut	  to	  answering	  this	  question	  I	  have	  pointed	  to	  Treasury-­‐Business/Industry	   Ministry	   relations	   and	   suggested	   that	   these	   reflect	  divergent	  problem	  definitions	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  policymakers.	  There	  is	  a	  historical	   precedent	   for	  my	   claim,	   and	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   also	   visible	   in	   the	  economic	  policy	  of	  New	  Labour.	  The	  replication	  of	   this	  historical	   tendency	   in	  the	  post-­‐2008	   context	   in	   two	   separate	   governments	   comprised	   of	   different	   parties	  suggests	  the	  impact	  of	  intra-­‐executive	  politics,	  and	  departmentally	  bound	  problem	  definitions	   and	   coordinative	  discourses,	   on	   the	  process	  of	   crisis	  diagnosis.	  While	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  diagnosis	  to	  achieve	  hegemony	  among	  economic	  policymakers	   opens	   up	   a	   degree	   of	   possible	   contingency,	   the	   neoliberal	   crisis	  diagnosis	   has	   nevertheless	   succeeded	   so	   far	   as	   a	   ‘state	   project’	   because	   its	  prescribed	   decisive	   interventions	   are	   imprinted	   upon	   the	   course	   of	   post-­‐2008	  political-­‐economic	   restructuring	   and	   constrain	   the	   expression	   of	   contrary	  tendencies	   within	   government.	   Framed	   thus,	   the	   finding	   raises	   two	   avenues	   of	  further	   research	   that	   are	   of	   theoretical	   importance	   to	   constructivist	  institutionalism	   and	   empirical	   importance	   to	   the	   study	   of	   British	   political	  economy:	   how	   are	   crisis	   diagnoses	   formed,	   and	   how	   do	   they	   become	   (or	   fail	   to	  
become)	  hegemonic	  within	  government?	  	  	  In	   relation	   to	   the	   first	   question,	   it	   has	   lain	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   my	   thesis	   to	  empirically	  trace	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	  diagnosis	  in	  each	  department	  and	  elucidate	  the	   mechanisms	   and	   empirical	   factors	   through	   which	   these	   particular	   crisis	  diagnoses	  were	  arrived	  at.	  However,	  such	  an	  analysis	  is	  necessary	  if	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  is	  to	  be	  fully	  comprehended	  as	  a	  conjuncture	  in	  British	  political	  economy,	  for	   these	   processes	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   have	   shaped	   them,	   account	   for	   why	  macroeconomic	  policymakers	  have	  sanctioned	  the	  trajectory	  of	  political-­‐economic	  restructuring	   that	   they	   have.	   I	   have	   pointed	   to	   a	   potentially	   fruitful	   avenue	   for	  doing	   this	   in	   Chapter	   2:	   the	   policy	   communities	   that	   government	   departments	  include	   in	  their	  coordinative	  discourses.	  Mapping	  the	  policy	  communities	  around	  the	  Treasury	  and	  DBIS	  will	  help	  us	  answer	  these	  questions,	  and,	  more	  generally,	  to	  understand	   the	   nodes	   from	   which	   neoliberal	   and	   non-­‐neoliberal	   problem	  definitions	  may	  emerge	  in	  future	  moments	  of	  crisis.	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A	  particularly	   fruitful	   line	  of	   inquiry	  may	  be	   to	   look	   to	   think	   tanks.	  As	   I	  noted	   in	  Chapter	   5,	   there	   is	   a	   similarity	   between	   the	   arguments	   advanced	   by	   Policy	  Exchange	  and	  the	  Coalition’s	  macroeconomic	  policy	  agenda,	  and	  an	  interchange	  of	  personnel	   between	   the	   organisation	   and	   the	   Conservative	   Party.	   Moreover,	   as	   I	  noted	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   the	   literature	   on	   neoliberalism	   highlights	   the	  importance	   of	   think	   tanks	   in	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   neoliberal	   restructuring	  ethos	   was	   first	   brought	   to	   governing	   power.	   Future	   research	   should	   trace	   the	  relationships	  between	   the	   two	  departments	  with	   such	  organisations	   as	  part	   of	   a	  broader	   enterprise	   to	   chart	   the	   policy	   communities	   included	   within	   their	  coordinative	  discourses.	  	  In	   relation	   to	   the	   second	   question,	   future	   research	   could	   adopt	   a	   historically	  and/or	   geographically	   comparative	   approach	   to	   studying	   processes	   of	   crisis	  diagnosis,	   looking	   to	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   crisis	   diagnoses	   extend	   their	  reach	  from	  one	  departmentally-­‐bounded	  policy	  area	  into	  other	  areas	  of	  policy.	  The	  present	   argument	   has	   suggested	   that	   control	   of	   macroeconomic	   policy	   is	   a	   key	  factor	   in	   the	   British	   case	   because	   of	   the	   resources	   with	   which	   the	   Treasury	   is	  endowed	   to	   control	   the	   budgets	   of	   other	   departments	   and	   so	   subordinate	   their	  activities	  to	  macroeconomic	  policy	  objectives.	  Yet	  this	  would	  not	  necessarily	  hold	  true	   in	   other	   polities	   with	   differing	   constitutional	   structures,	   where	   industrial	  policymakers	  at	  various	   levels	  of	  government	  might	  hold	  greater	  autonomy.	  This	  in	   turn	   may	   engender	   more	   complicated	   and	   contested	   processes	   of	   crisis	  diagnosis	   than	   has	   occurred	   in	   Britain	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context,	   making	   the	  comparative	  political	  economy	  of	  crisis	  construction	  a	  potentially	  very	  interesting	  research	  agenda.	  	  A	   final	   avenue	  of	   future	   research	   implied	  by	  my	   thesis	   concerns	   the	   impact	   that	  crisis	   narration	   has	   had	   on	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   In	  particular,	   it	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   the	   link	   between	   crisis	   narration	   and	   the	  relatively	   muted	   extra-­‐parliamentary	   resistance	   that	   has	   occurred	   to	   date.	   As	  noted	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  7,	  politicians	  are	  important	  contributors	  to	  the	  process	  of	  crisis	   narration,	   but	   they	   by	   no	  means	   determine	   its	   outcomes.	   Future	   research	  should	   look	  to	   the	  broader	  production	  of	  crisis	  narratives	  by	  multiple	  actors,	   the	  mediation	   of	   these	   narratives	   by	   news	   organisation,	   and	   correlations	   between	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these	  crisis	  narratives	  and	  public	  understandings	  of	  the	  post-­‐2008	  contexts.	  I	  have	  also	   argued	   that	   these	   findings	   should	   be	   situated	   in	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   role	   of	  ‘everyday	  politics’	  and	  resistance	  to	  elite	  narratives	  by	  the	  general	  public,	   for	  the	  critical	   conceptualisation	   of	   persuasion	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   2	   and	   some	   of	   the	  dynamics	  of	  narrative	  reproduction	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  7	  both	  suggest	  that	  such	  processes	  may	   have	   played	   an	   important	   part	   in	   shaping	   the	   outcomes	   of	   crisis	  narration	   in	   the	   post-­‐2008	   context.	   Such	   a	   research	   agenda	   is	   already	   being	  established,	  and	  the	  present	  study	  makes	  but	  one	  contribution	  to	  the	  collaborative	  enterprise	  that	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	  it	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  fruition.2	  	  With	  these	  avenues	  of	  further	  research	  in	  mind	  my	  analysis	  ends,	  confident	  in	  the	  view	   that	   the	   turbulent	   conjuncture	   in	   British	   politics	   that	   I	   have	   sampled	   is	   an	  ongoing	  one.	  For	  the	  decade	  and	  a	  half	  preceding	  the	  financial	  crash	  of	  2007-­‐2008	  the	  trajectory	  of	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  in	  Britain	  appeared	  unassailable.	  Recent	  events	  have	  done	  much	  to	  correct	  this	  misapprehension,	  yet	  many	  have	  too	  swiftly	  asserted	  the	  unqualified	  triumph	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  amid	  a	  crisis	  of	  its	  own	  making.	  The	  contribution	  of	  constructivist	  institutionalism	  to	  the	  study	   of	   political	   economy	   is	   to	   expose	   that	   which	   is	   seemingly	   inevitable	   and	  depoliticised	   as	   the	   intended	   and	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   political	   choices	  conditioned	   by	   dominant	   ways	   of	   thinking.	   This	   contribution	   is	   simultaneously	  analytical	  and	  normative	  because	  it	  exposes	  the	  eternal	  fragility	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  the	  effort	  that	  must	  be	  expended	  to	  maintain	  it.	  Advancing	  from	  this	  position,	  I	  have	   shown	   that	   even	   in	   a	   conjuncture	   marked	   by	   the	   re-­‐assertion	   of	   a	   more	  aggressive	   trajectory	   of	   neoliberalisation,	   a	   more	   complex	   and	   contested	   (and	  therefore	  contestable)	  process	  of	  crisis	  construction	  has	  prevailed.	  The	  neoliberal	  crisis	   diagnosis	   has	   had	   to	   be	   asserted	   against	   a	   diverging	   diagnosis	   within	  government,	  and	  defended	   from	  a	   loss	  of	   legitimacy	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	   the	  electorate	  through	  narrative	  techniques	  that	  can	  themselves	  be	  analysed,	  problematised	  and	  contested.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   proximity	   of	   a	   change	   in	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political-­‐economic	  restructuring,	  Britain	  in	  the	  post-­‐2008	  context	  more	  closely	  parallels	  the	  catastrophic	  equilibrium	  of	  the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐1970s	  than	  the	  moment	  of	  crisis	  that	  marked	  the	  close	  of	  that	  decade.	  Yet	  the	  scale	  of	  decisive	  intervention	  necessary	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  example,	  L.	  Stanley	  (2014),	  '"We're	  Reaping	  What	  We	  Sowed":	  Everyday	  Crisis	  Narratives	  And	  Acquiescence	  To	  The	  Age	  Of	  Austerity',	  New	  Political	  Economy,	  19	  (6),	  pp.895-­‐917.	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achieve	   even	   this	   outcome	   has	   been	   very	   great	   indeed,	   and	   will	   continue	   to	  generate	  the	  scope	  for	  economic	  policy	  failure	  and	  impose	  costs	  on	  the	  electorate	  long	   after	   the	   2015	   election.	   The	   analogy	   between	   now	   and	   the	   1970s	   may	  therefore	  prove	  indicative	  of	  the	  shape	  of	  things	  to	  come.	  	  Sheffield,	  2015.
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Appendix.	  
Research	  On	  The	  Nature	  Of	  Regional	  Growth	  Fund	  Awards	  
	  	  The	   Regional	   Growth	   Fund	   makes	   awards	   both	   to	   primary	   bidders	   (termed	  ‘projects’)	  and	   to	  secondary	   initiatives	   that	  advance	   the	  Fund’s	  overarching	  aims	  (which	  are	   termed	   ‘programmes’).	  The	  Fund	  considers	  project	  bids	   that	  propose	  research	  and	  development,	  capital	  investment,	  or	  skills	  training	  investments.	  	  	  It	   is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  bidder	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  details	  of	  the	  bid	  are	   placed	   in	   the	   public	   domain,	   likely	   reflecting	   the	   commercial	   sensitivity	   of	  some	  of	  these	  projects.	  Consequently	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  undertake	  some	  primary	  research	   to	  ascertain	  what	  sorts	  of	  projects	  were	  prioritised	  by	   the	  Fund	  and,	   in	  particular,	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   capital	   projects.	   This	   appendix	   reports	   the	  details	  of	   this	  research,	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  conditional	  awards	  made	   in	  the	   first	  and	  second	  rounds	  of	  the	  RGF.	  	  	  The	  names	  of	  the	  firms	  awarded	  RGF	  funding	  are	  available	  from	  the	  DBIS	  website.	  Using	   this	   information	  and	   the	  Google	   search	  engine	   I	   located	   local	   and	  national	  newspaper	   articles	   and	   articles	   in	   industry	   newsletters	   that	   reported	   upon	   the	  details	  of	  awards	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  successful	  bidders	  had	  chosen	  to	  publicise	  the	   details	   of	   their	   bids.	   The	   search	   term	   used	   included	   the	   words	   “Regional	  Growth	   Fund”,	   the	   name	   of	   the	   firm,	   and	   the	   addition	   of	   date	   filters	   where	  necessary.	   Local	   authority	   infrastructure	  projects	  were	   omitted	   from	   the	   sample	  because	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  ascertain	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Fund	  is	   being	   used	   in	   relation	   to	   private	   sector	   activities.	   For	   this	   reason,	   however,	  private	   and	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   bidders	   delivering	   such	   infrastructure	  projects	  were	   included.	   The	   sample	   also	   includes	   funding	   to	   other	   public	   sector	  agencies	   where	   they	   are	   engaging	   in	   market	   activities	   (for	   example	   FE	   college	  ‘spin-­‐offs’)	  or	  where	  they	  engage	  in	  industrial	  policy	  (such	  as	  TICs).	  This	  yields	  an	  initial	  sample	  of	  167	  bids,	  of	  which	  information	  regarding	  121	  was	  found	  to	  be	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  Consequently	  there	  is	  an	  unaccounted	  for	  27%	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  sample.	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The	   details	   of	   bids	  were	   recorded	   in	   a	   database,	   and	   categorised	   by	   the	   kind	   of	  investment	   that	   the	   bid	   proposed.	   My	   particular	   interest	   was	   to	   ascertain	   what	  proportion	  of	  the	  121	  cases	  represented	  discretionary	  investment	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  output	  potential	  of	   firms	  producing	  goods	  and	  services,	   rather	   than	   the	  R&D	  support	  that	  was	  the	  predominant	  strand	  in	  discretionary	  industrial	  policy	  prior	  to	  2008.	   I	   operationalise	   ‘capital	   investment’	   in	   relation	   to	   such	   projects.	   The	  category	  is	  somewhat	  nebulous,	  but	   it	   includes	  much	  of	  what	  would	  generally	  be	  classified	   as	   fixed	   capital	   investment	   –	   the	   purchasing	   of	   physical	   plant	   and	  machinery,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  premises	  to	  house	  it.	  I	  have	  also	  included	  projects	  that	   involve	   a	   move	   from	   smaller	   to	   larger	   premises	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   new	  physical	   and	   software	   infrastructure	   for	   producing	   a	   good	   or	   service	   (such	   as	  investment	  by	  transport	  firms	  in	  their	  own	  service	  infrastructure).	  Finally,	  while	  I	  have	   excluded	   projects	   that	   are	   simply	   mergers	   between	   existing	   firms	   I	   have	  included	  projects	  that	  seek	  to	  consolidate	  the	  fixed	  capital	  of	  two	  or	  more	  firms	  on	  a	  single	  site.	  	  Excluded	  from	  the	  category	  are	  research	  and	  development	  projects	  and	  projects	  to	  create	   or	   expand	  R&D	   facilities	   and	   training	   centres.	   This	   is	   categorised	   as	   R&D	  and	   human	   capital	   investment	   respectively.	   Also	   excluded	   are	   projects	   that	  amount	  to	  public	  sector	  support	  for	  the	  production	  or	  launch	  of	  a	  product,	  as	  this	  form	  of	  subsidy	  does	  not	  directly	  increase	  the	  output	  potential	  of	  the	  UK	  economy.	  Finally,	   projects	   to	   finance	   or	   accelerate	   the	   delivery	   of	   public	   infrastructure	  projects	  by	  public	  or	  private	  sector	  organisations	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  category.	  	  
Findings	  and	  interpretation	  	  Of	  the	  121	  projects	  on	  which	  information	  was	  available	  	  
• 64%	  were	  capital	  investment	  projects	  
• 35%	  fell	  within	  the	  other	  categories,	  with	  the	  majority	  being	  R&D	  projects.	  	  Of	  the	  167	  cases	  in	  the	  sample	  
• 48%	  were	  demonstrably	  capital	  projects	  
• 25%	  demonstrably	  fell	  within	  the	  other	  categories	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• 27%	  are	  unaccounted	  for.	  	  Of	  the	  117	  cases	  for	  which	  details	  were	  available	  regarding	  the	  sector	  in	  which	  the	  bidder	  operates:	  
• 70%	  were	  manufacturing	  firms	  	  The	  findings	  show	  that	  in	  its	  first	  two	  rounds	  capital	  investment	  as	  defined	  above	  constituted	  an	  important	  objective	  for	  the	  fund.	  Manufacturing	  firms	  are	  the	  major	  beneficiaries	  of	   all	   categories	  of	   investment	   in	   the	   cases	   in	   the	   sample	   for	  which	  information	  is	  available.	  	  Taken	  at	  face	  value	  the	  findings	  would	  suggest	  that	  capital	  investment	  constituted	  the	   most	   important	   form	   of	   investment	   for	   the	   fund	   in	   its	   first	   two	   rounds.	  However,	  caution	  is	  warranted	  here.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  information	  regarding	  projects	  in	   the	   27%	   of	   the	   sample	   that	   is	   not	   accounted	   for	   have	   been	   withheld	   due	   to	  commercial	   sensitivity,	   and	   it	   is	   plausible	   to	   assume	   commercial	   sensitivity	   is	  greater	  in	  relation	  to	  R&D	  projects	  where	  a	  market	  leader	  is	  yet	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  technology	   or	   product	   under	   development.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	  portion	  of	  the	  sample	  constituted	  by	  R&D	  projects	  would	  be	  higher	  were	  I	  able	  to	  account	  for	  this	  27%,	  decreasing	  the	  relative	  significance	  of	  capital	  investment.	  Yet	  the	   significance	  of	   capital	   investment	   to	   the	  RGF’s	   allocative	  decisions	   in	   its	   first	  two	  rounds	  is	  clearly	  established.	  	  	  
